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Abstract	
 
The	understanding	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	and	firms’	activities	is	an	
important	issue	from	both	macroeconomics	and	microeconomics	perspectives.	
The	 recent	 development	 of	 the	 asymmetric	 information	 approach	 has	
established	a	link	between	finance	and	the	real	activity.	A	good	understanding	
of	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 firms’	 activities	 would	 provide	
valuable	 information	 about	 the	 mechanism	 through	 which	 monetary	 policy	
affects	 real	 economic	 activities	 and	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	macroeconomic	
dynamics.	 From	 a	 microeconomics	 perspective,	 the	 study	 of	 the	 effects	 of	
financial	 constraints	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 understating	 of	 firms’	 corporate	
finance	behaviors	and	the	importance	of	firm	heterogeneity	in	firms’	activities.	
This	 research	 uses	 two	 large	 samples	 of	 firm‐level	 panel	 data	 from	 China	 to	
study	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	three	key	firm	activities.	
	
First,	 using	 an	 Euler	 equation	 investment	 model,	 we	 empirically	 study	 the	
effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 firms’	 fixed	 investment	 in	 China	 over	 the	
period	1998‐2005.	We	find	strong	evidence	indicating	there	is	a	“lending	bias”	
at	work.	Where	the	state‐owned	enterprises	and	collectively	owned	enterprises	
are	 less	 financially	 constrained	 that	privately	owned	 firms.	The	evidence	also	
suggests	that	listed	firms	are	more	financially	constrained	than	unlisted	firms.	
Moreover,	the	results	indicate	that	the	presence	of	foreign	ownership	helps	to	
reduce	the	level	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	firms.		
	
Second,	we	use	an	error	correction	model	augmented	with	cash	flow	to	test	the	
effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 firms’	 inventory	 investment	 in	 China	 with	
emphasis	 on	 the	 firm	 heterogeneity.	 	We	 find	 that	 cash	 flow	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	for	inventory	investment	of	privately	owned	firms,	foreign	owned	
firms,	 firms	with	 no	 political	 affiliations	 to	 the	 central	 or	 local	 governments.		
The	 result	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 faced	 by	 firms	
increased	over	the	study	period.	
	
Last,	we	test	whether	there	is	a	link	between	financial	factors	and	firms’	export	
decisions	 in	 China.	 We	 find	 that	 firms’	 liquidity	 and	 leverage	 levels	 are	
important	 determinants	 of	 firm’s	 exports	 participation	 decisions,	 where	 the	
effects	are	strongest	for	privately	owned	firms.	When	we	focus	on	the	exports	
participation	 decision	 of	 the	 private	 firms,	 we	 find	 financial	 factors	 are	
particular	 important	 for	 firms	 that	 are	 smaller,	 younger	 and	with	no	political	
affiliations.	
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1.1	Introduction	
	
The	seminal	work	of	Modigliani	and	Miller	(1958)	suggests	that	under	perfect	
and	 complete	 capital	 market,	 firm’s	 investment	 decisions	 and	 its	 financing	
decisions	 should	 be	 independent	 from	 each	 other.	 In	 this	 framework,	 the	
external	finance	and	internal	finance	are	perfect	substitutes.	Firms	are	able	to	
undertake	 all	 the	 profitable	 investment	 opportunities.	 In	 the	 Modigliani	 and	
Miller’s	perfect	capital	market	world,	finance	is	irrelevant	for	real	decisions.		
	 	
However,	 in	 reality	 the	 capital	markets	 are	 rarely	 perfect.	 There	 are	 a	
large	number	of	factors	that	can	lead	to	imperfections	in	capital	market,	such	as	
taxes,	 transaction	 costs,	 and	 most	 importantly	 the	 information	 asymmetries	
between	 lenders	 and	 borrowers.	 Following	 the	 theoretical	 developments	 in	
information	economics	in	the	1970s,	a	number	of	studies	has	shown	that	under	
the	 assumption	 of	 imperfect	 capital	 market	 internal	 finance	 and	 external	
finance	are	no	 longer	perfect	substitutes(Stiglitz	and	Weiss	1981a;	Myers	and	
Majluf	 1984).	 	 Subsequently,	 Fazzari,	 Hubbard	 and	 Peterson	 (1988)	 ,	 using	 a	
firm	 level	 data	 from	 the	 US,	 pioneered	 a	 framework	 to	 test	 for	 the	 financial	
constraints	on	investment	behavior	by	looking	at	the	sensitivity	of	investment	
to	 change	 in	 cash	 flow.	 Their	 results	 suggest	 that	 internal	 finance	 is	 an	
important	determinant	of	firms’	fixed	investment.		Now	there	is	a	large	finance	
and	macroeconomic	 literature	 have	 adapted	Fazzari,	Hubbard	 and	Peterson‘s	
(1988)	 approach	 to	 test	 the	 impacts	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 investment	
((Hoshi	 et	 al.	 1991;	 Schaller	1993;	Hubbard	et	 al.	 1995;	Konings	 et	 al.	 2003).	
14 
 
Recently,	the	literature	of	financial	constraints	have	extended	the	study	beyond	
fixed	 investment	 to	 analyze	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 	 other	
activities	 of	 the	 firms,	 such	 as	 inventory	 investment,	 R&D	 investment,	 and	
export	participation	decisions.		
	
The	 understanding	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 firms’	
activities	 is	 an	 important	 issue	 from	 both	 macroeconomics	 and	
microeconomics	 perspectives.	 The	 recent	 development	 of	 the	 asymmetric	
information	 approach	 has	 established	 a	 link	 between	 finance	 and	 the	 real	
activity.	A	good	understanding	of	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	and	firms’	
activities	 would	 provide	 valuable	 information	 about	 the	 mechanism	 through	
which	monetary	policy	affects	 real	economic	activities	and	 the	understanding	
of	 the	 macroeconomic	 dynamics.	 Moreover,	 from	 a	 microeconomics	
perspective,	the	study	of	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	also	contributes	to	
the	 understating	 of	 firms’	 corporate	 finance	 behaviors	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
firm	heterogeneity	in	firms’	activities.	
	
Despite	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 study	 of	 financial	 constraints,	 the	 large	
amount	of	existing	literature	are	mainly	focus	on	developed	countries	such	as	
US	and	UK.	Only	a	few	studies	have	attempted	to	study	the	impacts	of	financial	
constraints	in	the	context	of	China	(Chow	and	Fung	1998;	Chow	and	Fung	2000;	
Héricourt	 and	 Poncet	 2009;	 Guariglia	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Most	 of	 these	 studies	 are	
conducted	based	on	a	small	samples	and	 focus	only	on	the	effects	of	 financial	
15 
 
constraints	 on	 fixed	 investment,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Guariglia	 et	al	 (2010)	
who	study	 the	effects	of	 financial	 constraints	on	 firms’	asset	growth	 in	China.	
The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	fill	this	gap	in	the	empirical	literature,	we	explore	the	
effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 three	 different	 firm	 activities:	 fixed	
investment,	 inventory	 investment	 and	 the	 exports	 market	 participation	
decisions.		
	
The	 rest	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 organized	 follows:	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 we	
provide	the	motivations	of	studying	these	three	firm	activities,	and	the	specific	
aims	of	 the	 study;	 then	 in	 section	1.3,	we	 introduce	 the	 two	datasets	 that	we	
will	use	 for	our	empirical	study;	 last,	section	1.4	presents	 the	structure	of	the	
thesis.	
	
1.2	Motivation	and	aims	of	the	study	
 
 
China’s	economy	has	experienced	extraordinary	growth	in	the	past	twenty	year.	
Since	its	economic	reform	and	opening	in	1978,	China	has	achieved	an	average	
of	 nearly	double‐digit	 growth	 rates	 in	 the	 last	 two	decades,	which	helps	 it	 to	
overtake	 Japan	as	world’s	 second‐biggest	 economy	 in	year	2011.	 If	China	 can	
maintain	its	current	rate	of	growth,	China	will	replace	the	US	as	the	world’s	top	
economy	by	2020.		
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The	 reform	 initiated	 from	1978	has	 transformed	 the	Chinese	economy	
from	a	planned	economy	to	a	mixed	economy	by	gradually	introducing	market	
forces	into	the	economy.	This	gradualism	approach	produces	a	relatively	stable	
and	 fast	 expansion	 of	 the	 economy	 for	 three	 decades.	 However,	 government	
continues	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 key	 resources	which	
causes	distortion	in	a	number	of	key	factor	markets	such	as	financial	markets,	
which	 leads	 to	 a	 relatively	 underdeveloped	 legal	 and	 financial	 system,	which	
prevents	market	forces	to	play	a	dominant	role	in	resource	allocation.		
	
	 Given	the	poor	state	of	development	of	the	Chinese	financial	system,	the	
miracle	growth	speed	of	 the	Chinese	economy	 is	often	considered	as	a	puzzle	
(Allen	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Therefore	 it	 is	 interesting	 study	 whether	 firms	 are	
financially	 constrained	 in	 China,	 how	 financial	 constraints	 affects	 firms	
activities,	and	what	types	of	firms	are	more	likely	to	face	financial	constraints	in	
the	context	of	China	by	taking	into	account	it	special	institutional	settings.	
	
In	 this	 thesis,	we	use	 two	 large	panel	datasets	 to	empirically	study	the	
effects	of	financial	constraints	on	firms’	activities	in	China.	Specifically,	we	will	
empirically	 analyze	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 firms’	 fixed	
investment	decisions,	firms’	 inventory	investment	decisions,	and	firms’	export	
decisions.	 We	 will	 present	 our	 motivations	 for	 choosing	 these	 three	 firms	
activities	as	the	focus	of	this	thesis	below.		
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	 First,	 fixed	 investment	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 the	 Chinese	
economic	 growth.	 Song	 et	 al	 (2011)	 show	 that	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 is	
characterized	 by	 persistently	 high	 fixed	 investment	 rates.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	
conduct	 an	 empirical	 study	 to	 analyze	 whether	 firms’	 fixed	 investment	 are	
financially	 constrained.	 If	 firms’	 are	 indeed	 financially	 constrained,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 identify	 what	 types	 of	 firms	 are	 financially	 constrained.	 This	
provides	the	policy	makers	with	the	necessary	 information	about	the	types	of	
firms	that	they	can	target	in	the	process	of	policy	design.	By	providing	finance	
to	 those	 financially	 constrained	 firms	 would	 help	 to	 maintain	 China’s	 high	
economic	growth	rate.	Motivated	by	these	facts,	chapter	3	is	devoted	to	study	
the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	firms’	fixed	investment	in	China.	
	
	 Our	chapter	4	study	based	on	inventory	investment	is	motivated	by	the	
fact	that	inventory	investment	plays	an	important	role	in	the	explanation	of	the	
business	 cycle.	 Despite	 of	 its	 small	 magnitude	 relative	 to	 total	 production,	 it	
typically	 accounts	 for	 a	 significant	proportion	of	 the	 reduction	 in	GDP	during	
recession.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 have	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	
inventory	 investment	 behaviors	 in	 China.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 empirical	
papers	has	yet	examine	the	effects	of	 financial	constraints	on	firms’	 inventory	
investment	behavior	in	China.	Our	study	intends	to	fill	this	gap	in	the	literature.	
Moreover,	 inventory	 investment	 is	 typically	 characterized	 by	 relatively	 small	
adjustment	 costs	 compare	 to	 the	 large	 adjustment	 costs	 for	 fixed	 investment.	
Hence,	 firms	 tend	 to	 adjust	 their	 inventory	 investment	 first,	 when	 they	 are	
facing	 financial	 constraints.	 As	 a	 result,	 inventory	 investment	 will	 be	 more	
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sensitive	 to	 the	 change	 of	 firms’	 cash	 flow.	 Therefore,	 inventory	 investment	
offers	a	better	framework	to	test	the	hypothesis	of	the	financial	constraints.		
	 	
	 Exports	 have	 long	 been	 perceived	 to	 be	 an	 important	 stimulating	
influence	of	countries’	economy	across	the	developed	and	developing	countries.	
Moreover	 in	 the	 context	 of	 China,	 export	 is	 the	 second	 main	 drivers	 of	 the	
miracle	growth	rate	of	 the	Chinese	economy.	The	export‐led	growth	model	of	
China	 helps	 it	 to	 capture	 the	 gains	 of	 its	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 abundant	
labour	supply.	The	remarkable	growth	between	1978	and	2000	are	mainly	due	
to	the	early	reform.	But	the	growth	in	the	past	10	years	has	been	mainly	driven	
by	exports.	The	accession	to	the	WTO	in	2001	helps	China	to	better	integrate	to	
the	world	market	and	 further	exploits	 its	export‐led	growth	model	and	speed	
up	 the	process	 of	 industrialization.	 Exporters	 are	 typically	more	 efficient	 and	
more	 profitable	 than	 non‐exporters.	 	 Policy‐makers	 around	 the	 world	 have	
devoted	 significant	 efforts	 into	 the	 development	 and	 implement	 trade	
promotion	programs.	The	effectiveness	of	 these	programs	depends	closely	on	
our	clear	understanding	of	the	determinants	of	export	decisions.	Chaney	(2005)	
suggests	 that	 financial	constraints	may	be	 the	reason	that	why	some	 industry	
firms	with	high	productivity	do	not	export.	A	recent	paper	by	Greenaway	et	al	
(2007)	 shows	 that	 firms’	 financial	 health	 is	 important	 for	 firms	 exports	
decisions	in	UK.	Yet,	only	one	paper	by	Li	and	Yu(2009)has	looked	at	the	links	
between	 financial	 constraints	and	export	participation	decisions	 in	China.	We	
extend	the	study	of	the	financial	constraints	and	export	participation	by	taking	
into	account	a	number	of	firm	heterogeneities,	such	as	firm	size,	firm	age,	and	
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political	 affiliation	 etc.	 Through	 these	 exercise,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 identify	 some	
important	criteria	that	may	help	export	promotion	policies	to	target	firms	that	
are	most	needed	the	help. 
	
	 Moreover,	given	the	special	institutional	setting	in	China,	where	lending	
bias	 and	 regional	 disparities	 have	 important	 roles	 to	 play	 in	 firms’	 activities.	
For	all	three	empirical	studies	in	this	thesis,	we	also	focus	on	the	interactions	of	
the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 with	 the	 ownership	 types	 for	 firms	 and	
regional	 disparities.	We	would	 like	 to	 see	whether	 financial	 constraints	 have	
heterogeneous	effects	on	firms’	activities	across	ownerships	and	regions.				
	
1.3	Datasets	
 
 
Until	recently,	it	is	difficult	assess	the	financial	constraints	on	firms’	activities	in	
China.	 This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 reliable	 microeconomic	 data	 to	 test	 the	
relevant	hypothesis	in	the	context	of	China.	In	this	thesis,	we	employ	two	large	
firm	 level	 panel	 datasets	 for	 our	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	
constraints	 on	 firms’	 activities	 in	 China.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 will	 discuss	 the	
source	of	the	datasets	and	their	suitability	for	our	study.	
	
	 The	dataset	used	for	the	study	of	chapter	3	 is	drawn	from	the	ORIANA	
database	published	by	Bureau	van	Dijk,	with	financial	information	derived	from	
firms’	 financial	 statements	 for	both	public	and	private	companies	 in	 the	Asia‐
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pacific	region.	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	we	have	restricted	our	attention	to	
firms	 from	 China.	 This	 panel	 dataset	 covers	 22,274	 firms,	 corresponding	 to	
114,098	observations	between	year	1998	and	2005.	By	allowing	firms	to	entry	
and	exit	the	sample,	we	have	a	large	unbalanced	firm‐level	datasets.	One	of	the	
key	 reasons	 for	 choosing	 this	 dataset	 for	 our	 study	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	
constraints	 and	 fixed	 investment	 in	 chapter	3	 is	 because	 its	 coverage	of	 both	
listed	and	unlisted	firms.	This	allows	us	to	assess	whether	listed	firms	are	less	
financially	 constrained	 than	 unlisted	 firms.	 Using	 a	 unify	 dataset,	 allow	 us	 to	
avoid	 the	problems	 that	 commonly	arise	due	 to	gathering	 financial	data	 from	
two	 different	 firm	 level	 datasets	 (such	 as	 different	 definition	 for	 variables,	
measurement	 errors	 and	 mistakes	 in	 combining	 two	 firm	 level	 data).	 This	
makes	our	empirical	results	more	reliable.		
	
	 The	dataset	used	for	the	study	of	chapter	4	and	chapter	5	is	a	large	firm‐
level	panel	dataset	produced	by	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China	(NBS).	
It	 is	 a	 survey	 of	 industrial	 firms	 conducted	 by	 NBS	 annually.	 This	 dataset	
includes	all	 “above	scale”	 industrial	 firms	with	sales	over	RMB	5million	yuan.	
One	of	the	unique	advantages	of	this	dataset	is	its	coverage	of	all	state‐owned	
enterprises	 in	 China.	 There	 are	 around	 1,805,803	 observations	 for	 541,436	
firms	for	the	period	between	2000	and	2007	from	31	provinces	operating	in	49	
different	 two‐digits	 manufacturing	 industries.	 This	 dataset	 is	 particularly	
suitable	 for	 our	 study	 for	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	
representative	 firm	 level	 datasets	 for	 China.	 It	 would	 provide	 a	 very	 good	
picture	of	the	firm	behaviors	in	China.	Second,	it	contains	both	very	small	firms	
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and	very	large	firms.	This	is	particularly	important	in	the	study	of	the	effects	of	
financial	 constraints,	 as	 smaller	 firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 financially	
constrained.		
			
1.4	The	structure	of	the	thesis	
 
	
In	 chapter	 2,	 we	 provide	 a	 literature	 review	 on	 financial	 constraints	 and	
investment	 as	 a	 background	 of	 the	 empirical	 studies	 of	 this	 thesis.	 First,	 we	
present	 the	 intuition	 of	 the	 theoretical	 arguments	 that	 have	 provided	 the	
support	 to	 the	capital	market	 imperfections	(financial	constraints).	Follow	by,	
an	overview	of	 the	 interpretation	of	 investment	 cash‐flow	sensitivities	with	a	
review	 of	 three	 widely	 used	 investment	 models	 in	 the	 empirical	 tests	 of	
financial	constraints	on	investment.	Last,	we	will	present	a	brief	review	of	the	
empirical	evidences.	
	
Chapter	 3	 is	 devoted	 to	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	
firms’	 fixed	 investment	 in	 China	 using	 a	 specification	 derived	 from	 an	 Euler	
equation	model.	This	allows	us	 to	avoid	some	of	empirical	 critiques	based	on	
the	 Q‐model	 approaches.	 Chapter	 3	 first	 provides	 some	 stylized	 facts	 and	
background	to	Chinese	fixed	investment	using	aggregate	data.	Then	a	review	of	
the	development	and	reform	of	the	financial	system	in	China	is	presented.	We	
first	 test	 whether	 financial	 constraints	 matters	 for	 Chinese	 firms	 fixed	
investment	for	the	full	sample.	We	then	study	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	
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on	 fixed	 investment	 by	 diving	 firms	 into	 different	 groups	 based	 on	 their	
ownership	 types	 or	 their	 locations.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 compare	 the	 levels	 of	
financial	 constraints	 faced	by	 firms	across	 regions	and	ownership	 types.	Last,	
we	 also	 use	 the	 Euler	 equation	 framework	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 presence	 of	
foreign	ownership	helps	to	alleviate	the	levels	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	
Chinese	firms.	
	
Chapter	 4	 is	 devoted	 to	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	
inventory	 investment	 in	 China.	 By	 estimating	 an	 error‐correction	 model	 of	
inventory	investment,	chapter	4	first	tests	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	
inventory	 investment	 in	 China	 based	 on	 the	 full	 sample.	 Given	 the	 special	
institution	 setting	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy,	 we	 then	 estimate	 the	 error‐
correction	 model	 by	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 ownership	 type	
heterogeneity,	 regional	 disparities,	 political	 affiliations	 and	 different	 firm	
characteristics.	Last,	we	use	year	2003	as	a	cutoff	point	to	assess	whether	the	
levels	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	firms	in	China	has	changed	overtime.	
	
Chapter	5	is	devoted	to	study	the	relationship	between	financial	health	
and	 export	 participation	 decisions	 in	 China.	 By	 estimating	 a	 random‐effects	
probit	 model,	 chapter	 5	 tests	 how	 financial	 factors	 affect	 firms’	 exports	
participation	 decisions.	 Similar	 to	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters,	 chapter	 5	 then	
further	assess	whether	firm	heterogeneity	plays	an	important	role	in	the	effects	
of	financial	constraints	on	exports	participation	decisions.	
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Finally,	 chapter	 6	 concludes	 the	 paper	with	 a	 review	 of	 our	 empirical	
findings.	 Then	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 results	 and	 relevant	 policy	 implications	 is	
provided.	Last,	we	make	some	suggestions	of	how	we	can	extend	our	research	
in	the	future.		
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Chapter	2:	Financial	constraints	and	
investment:	A	literature	review	
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2.1	Introduction	
	
The	pace	and	pattern	of	business	investment	in	fixed	capital	are	central	to	our	
understanding	 of	 economic	 activity.	 Business	 investment	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	determinants	of	an	economy’s	long‐term	growth	rate	and	also	plays	a	
pivotal	role	 in	explaining	business	cycle	 fluctuations.	 It	 is	 therefore	crucial	 for	
economists	 and	policy‐makers	 to	understand	 the	mechanisms	 that	determine	
investment	spending.	Furthermore,	it	is	particularly	important	to	central	banks	
for	an	effective	conduct	of	monetary	policy,	because	investment	is	believed	to	be	
a	major	interest‐sensitive	expenditure.		
	
Despite	extensive	research,	 the	explanation	of	 investment	behavior	has	
been	 disappointing.	 Thus,	 researchers	 have	 started	 to	 improve	 the	 empirical	
specification	 of	 investment	models	 by	modifying	 the	 fundamental	 underlying	
assumptions.	One	of	the	recent	progresses	 is	by	examining	the	 implications	of	
financial	constraints	caused	by	capital	market	imperfections	on	investment.		
	
A	positive	relationship	between	internal	funds	and	investment	has	long	
been	documented,	which	can	trace	back	to	Meyer	and	Kuh	(1957).	However	the	
analytical	basis	for	this	positive	relationship	has	been	a	matter	of	great	dispute	
and	a	largely	unsolved	issue.	After	the	prominent	work	of	Modigliani	and	Miller	
(1958)’s	 followers,	 in	which	 they	demonstrated	 that	 in	perfect	 capital	market	
the	 value	 of	 a	 firm	 is	 independent	 of	 its	 financial	 structure;	 research	 on	 how	
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firm’s	 financial	 decisions	 affect	 their	 investment	 was	 shelved.	 None	 of	 the	
neoclassical	investment	model,	sales	accelerator	model,	and	the	Q	model	which	
were	derived	during	that	period	recognizes	any	role	for	financial	variables	as	a	
determinant	of	investment.	
	
After	 the	 theoretical	 developments	 in	 information	 economics	 in	 the	
1970s,	the	literature	on	financial	variable	and	investment	was	revived.	With	the	
theoretical	arguments	of	asymmetric	information,	Modigliani	and	Miller’s	claim	
no	 longer	 stands.	 In	 their	 extensive	 empirical	 studies,	 Fazzari,	 Hubbard	 and	
Petersen	 (1988)1	found	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 firm’s	
investment	and	cash	flow.	They	interpreted	this	result	as	financial	constraints	in	
the	 sense	 that	 the	 firm	may	 have	 to	 forego	 profitable	 projects	 due	 to	 lack	 of	
finance.	They	concluded	that	financial	constraints	have	a	significant	impact	on	
firm’s	 behavior	 at	 least	 for	 the	 portion	 of	 firms	 that	 suffer	 from	 information	
problems.	
	
This	 literature	 review	 is	 intended	 to	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	
theoretical	 background,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 empirical	 modeling	 strategies	 of	 the	
implications	of	 financial	constraints	on	investment.	This	paper	 is	organized	as	
follows.	 In	section	2.2,	 I	present	 the	theoretical	arguments	that	have	provided	
the	support	to	capital	market	imperfections.	In	section	2.3,	an	overview	of	the	
interpretation	 of	 investment	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 and	 the	 investment	 cash‐
flow	excess	sensitivities	in	the	general	case,	is	provided.	I	also	present	a	review	
of	 three	 widely	 used	 investment	 models	 in	 the	 empirical	 tests	 of	 financial	
                                                 
1 FHP 1988 thereafter 
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constraints	 on	 investment:	 the	 Q	 model,	 the	 Euler	 equation	 and	 the	 error	
correction	model.	I	will	then	discuss	the	problems	faced	by	each	of	the	models	
in	 the	 empirical	 tests.	 In	 section	 2.4,	 I	 review	 the	 measurement	 problem	 of	
financial	 constraint.	 Specifically,	 I	 described	 the	 sample	 splitting	 criteria	 that	
are	used	to	identify	firms	as	financial	constrained	a	priori.	And	some	empirical	
evidence	is	also	presented.	Section	2.5	concludes	the	paper.	
	
2.2	Theoretical	backgrounds	
	
2.2.1	Capital	market	imperfection	
 
Modigliani	 and	 Miller	 (1958)	 proposed	 that,	 under	 a	 very	 restrictive	 set	 of	
assumption,	 the	 market	 value	 of	 an	 enterprise	 is	 independent	 of	 its	 capital	
structure.	 This	 proposition	 implies	 that	 firms’	 investment	 decisions	will	 only	
depend	 on	 the	 expected	 rate	 of	 return	 of	 the	 projects,	 and	 should	 not	 be	
affected	by	how	the	investments	are	financed.	Under	the	Modigliani	and	Miller	
theorem,	firm’s	internal	and	external	funds	are	perfect	substitutes.	Thus	firm’s	
investment	decisions	are	independent	of	financing	decisions.		
	
Among	the	assumptions	that	Modigliani	and	Miller	used	to	derive	their	
theorem,	perfect	 and	 complete	 capital	market	has	been	 the	most	problematic	
one.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 why	 capital	 market	might	 be	 imperfect.	
Factors	such	as	transaction	costs,	flotation	costs,	bankruptcy	costs	and	taxation	
are	all	contributing	to	the	imperfect	capital	market.	Contemporary	research	in	
investment	 studies	 has	 therefore	 appeal	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 asymmetric	
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information.	(FHP	1988)		
	
Existing	 models	 of	 imperfect	 capital	 market	 focus	 on	 the	 problems	 of	
adverse	 selection	and	moral	hazard	 in	generating	 frictions	 in	 capital	markets.	
Myers	 and	 Majluf	 (1984)	 present	 a	 model	 of	 equity	 finance,	 recognizing	 the	
problems	 of	 information	 asymmetry,	 which	 lead	 to	 adverse	 selection.	 They	
show	that	when	outsiders	(investors)	have	imperfect	knowledge	of	the	value	of	
the	 firm,	 they	will	demand	a	premium	to	acquire	the	 firm’s	shares	 in	order	to	
compensate	 the	 losses	 incurred	 from	 financing	 a	 ‘lemon’	 firm.	 This	 premium	
makes	the	external	cost	of	capital	more	expensive.	To	the	extreme,	Stiglitz	and	
Weiss	(1981)	argue	that	informational	asymmetries	will	lead	to	credit	rationing	
in	 the	 loans	market,	 as	 lenders	 are	unable	 to	discriminate	between	good	 and	
bad	 borrowers.	 In	 this	 situation,	 lenders	 will	 intentionally	 set	 a	 price	 that	
creates	an	excess	demand	of	loans.	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	argue	that	due	
to	limited	liability,	a	moral	hazard	problem	may	arise	when	borrowers	have	the	
incentive	to	use	funds	on	excessively	risky	projects.	In	order	to	compensate	this	
potential	 risk,	 lender	 will	 demand	 a	 premium	 for	 the	 loan	 and	 possibly	 use	
covenants	to	restrict	the	use	of	funds	in	specific	areas.	
	
Despite	 the	 difference	 in	 details	 in	 these	 theoretical	 studies,	 they	 all	
provide	us	with	 the	 common	 theme	 that	 a	 general	 implication	of	 information	
problems	 in	 capital	 market	 is	 that	 internal	 funds	 and	 external	 funds	 are	 no	
longer	perfect	substitutes.	There	is	a	gap	between	the	cost	of	internal	funds	and	
external	 funds.	 This	 gap	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 information	
asymmetry	 which	 leads	 to	 an	 “information	 cost”.	 Firms	 that	 face	 higher	
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information	asymmetries	will	tend	to	face	a	much	higher	cost	for	external	funds	
than	 firms	with	 low	 level	of	asymmetric	 information.	Thus,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	
believe	that	capital	markets	are	imperfect,	and	that	the	MM	theorem	no	longer	
stands.	
	
2.2.2	Hierarchy	of	finance	
	
Based	on	the	assumption	of	imperfect	capital	markets,	firms	facing	information	
problems	may	 only	 be	 able	 to	 obtain	 finance	 on	 less	 favourable	 terms	 in	 the	
capital	markets,	 or	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 obtain	 any	 funds	 at	 all	 when	 there	 is	
credit	 rationing	 (this	 could	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 an	 extremely	 high	 cost	 of	
funds).	As	a	 result,	 these	 firms’	 investments	may	be	 financially	constrained	 in	
‘hierarchy	of	finance’	or	‘pecking	order’	models,	in	which	internal	funds	have	a	
cost	advantage	over	new	debt	of	equity	 finance.	The	 “hierarchy	of	 finance”	or	
“pecking	 order”	 literature	 states	 that	 enterprises	 have	 a	 precise	 preference	
order	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 sources	 to	 finance	 investment	 (Myers	 and	 Majluf	
1984).	 The	 main	 reason	 of	 this	 hierarchy	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 asymmetric	
information.	Firms	prefer	cheap	internal	finance	to	expensive	external	finance.	
When	 external	 finance	 is	 needed	 for	 funding	 investment,	 the	 firm	 will	 work	
down	the	pecking	order,	by	issuing	safest	debt	first	then	move	on	to	riskier	debt	
and	 finally	 use	 equity	 as	 a	 last	 resort.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 firms’	
investment	and	financing	decisions	are	interdependent,	and	the	level	of	internal	
funding	 could	 be	 an	 important	 empirical	 determinant	 of	 investment.	 This	
concept	can	be	illustrated	with	some	simple	graphical	illustrations.	
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2.2.3	Hierarchy	of	finance:	A	graphical	illustration	
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The hierarchy of finance model with no debt finance 
Source: Bond and Meghir (1994) 
 
Figure	2.1	above	presents	the	hierarchy	of	finance	model	with	no	debt	finance.	
The	 rate	 of	 return	 Rr 	shows	 the	 cost	 of	 internal	 funds	 (which	 is	 the	 required	
rate	 of	 return	 on	 internal	 funds).	 The	 rate	 of	 return	 Nr 	shows	 the	 cost	 of	
external	 finance,	 such	 as	 new	 share	 issues.	 The	 downward	 sloping	 schedules	
( 1D , 2D 	and 3D )	 show	 three	 different	 possible	 investment	 opportunities	
available	to	a	given	firm,	relating	the	required	rate	of	return	to	the	feasible	level	
of	investment.	
	
Let	 I 	be	the	maximum	level	of	 investment	that	can	be	finance	with	the	
firm’s	 internally	 available	 funds.	 If	 the	 firm	 has	 relatively	 limited	 investment	
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opportunities	( 1D 	curve),	then	the	firm	can	finance	all	of	its	desired	investment	
from	 internal	 funds.	 Therefore,	 the	 firm’s	 investment	 level	 would	 occur	 at	 1I 	
and	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	by	 the	 fluctuations	 in	 its	 internal	 funds.	 If	 the	
firm	 has	 relatively	 large	 investment	 opportunities	 ( 3D 	curve),	 then	 it	 would	
find	 it	worthwhile	 to	make	 use	 of	 external	 funds,	 despite	 the	 higher	 costs	 of	
such	funding.	Its	investment	level	would	be	at	 3I ,	which	again	is	unaffected	by	
the	fluctuations	in	internal	fund	around	the	level	corresponding	to	 I .	
	
The	more	 interesting	case	 is	 the	 intermediate	case,	which	 is	 illustrated	
by	 the	 curve	 2D ,	 where	 financial	 constraints	 affect	 the	 firm’s	 investment	
spending.	This	firm	has	sufficiently	profitable	investment	opportunities,	which	
lead	it	to	exhaust	all	its	internal	funds.	However,	the	level	of	investment	above	
I is	 not	 attractive	 enough	 for	 the	 firm	 to	 resort	 to	 the	 more	 costly	 external	
funds.	The	investment	spending	of	such	firm	is	limited	to	the	level	that	can	be	
financed	 from	 its	 internal	 funds,	 namely	 I .	 A	 rise	 in	 retained	 earnings	 to	
'I would	shift	the	maximum	level	of	investment	that	can	be	financed	internally,	
so	that	there	also	would	be	an	increase	in	the	investment	of	constrained	firms.	
Thus,	 a	 ‘financially	 constrained’	 firm	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 firm	 whose	
investment	 spending	 would	 rise	 (fall)	 if	 its	 retained	 earnings	 increased	
(decreased).	
	
Debt	finance	is	normally	a	cheaper	source	of	finance	than	equity	finance,	
because	 debt	 holders	 have	 prior	 claim	 on	 firm’s	 assets	 in	 the	 event	 of	
bankruptcy.	 Incorporating	 debt	 finance	 into	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 finance	 model	
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complicates	 the	 story	 but	 offers	 us	 richer	 insights	 on	 firm’s	 investment	
behaviour.	Assuming	that	the	cost	of	debt	finance	rises	with	the	amount	raised	
(as	the	risk	of	default	increases	with	leverage),	the	supply	schedule	for	external	
funds	 has	 a	 kink	 at	 the	 its	 level	 of	 internal	 funds	 I ,	 see	 figure	 2.	 The	
implications	for	firms	with	demand	schedule	 1D 	and	 3D 	are	basically	the	same	
as	in	the	hierarchy	of	finance	model	without	debt	finance.	However,	firms	with	
3D 	demand	schedule	can	now	finance	investment	with	a	mix	of	debt	and	equity.	
 
 
Figure 2.2 The Hierarchy of finance model with debt finance 
Source: Bond and Meghir (1994) 
 
 
Firms	with	demand	schedule	 2D 	can	increase	their	level	of	investment	to	
2I ,	 since	 they	 can	 finance	 higher	 investment	 through	 debt	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
they	 find	 it	worthwhile	 to	bear	 in	 the	 increasing	 cost	of	 fund.	However,	 these	
firms	are	still	financially	constrained,	for	example	an	increase	in	internal	funds	
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from	 I to	 2I 	would	increase	their	investment	level	to	 '2I .	The	investment	level	of	
these	 firms	 is	 still	 limited	 by	 the	 availability	 of	 internal	 finance,	 even	 though	
now	they	can	finance	their	investment	from	debt.		
	
Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.1,	 due	 to	 asymmetric	 information,	
lenders	will	demand	a	cost	premium	to	compensate	for	information	costs.	The	
slope	 of	 the	 loan	 supply	 schedule	 reflects	 the	 information	 costs	 in	
uncollateralized	debt.	The	higher	is	the	marginal	cost	the	steeper	is	the	upward‐
sloping	portion	of	 the	 loan	 supply	 schedule.	Thus,	 for	 firms	 facing	 little	or	no	
information	 costs,	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 loan	 supply	 schedule	 is	 relatively	 flat.	 An	
increase	in	net	worth	independent	of	changes	in	investment	opportunities	has	
little	 or	 no	 effect	 on	 investment.	 For	 firms	 facing	 high	 information	 costs,	 an	
increase	 in	 internal	 fund	would	 lead	 to	 greater	 investment,	 given	 that	 all	 else	
being	equal.	
	
2.2.4	Summary	
	
Given	asymmetric	 information	problems,	 there	 is	a	wedge	between	the	
costs	 of	 internal	 funds	 and	external	 funds,	which	 implies	 that	 unless	 external	
funds	 can	 be	 fully	 collateralized	 they	 will	 be	 more	 costly	 than	 internally	
generated	 funds.	Thus,	 financially	 constrained	 firms	will	 rely	 on	 their	 level	 of	
internal	 funds	 in	 order	 to	 invest.	 Moreover,	 firms	 facing	 high	 asymmetric	
information	will	be	more	sensitive	to	internal	funds.	These	three	implications	of	
financial	 constraints	 and	 capital	 market	 imperfection	 imply	 that	 it	 may	 be	
necessary	 to	 include	 a	 measure	 of	 internal	 funds	 (such	 as	 cash	 flow)	 in	 the	
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model	of	investment	spending.	In	the	next	section,	we	will	look	at	how	financial	
constraints	 can	be	empirically	 tested,	 and	also	 the	difficulties	 in	 testing	 these	
implications.	
	
2.3	Financial	constraints	and	investment:	intuition	and	
investment	model	
	
2.3.1	Financial	constraints	and	investment	
	
In	an	influential	paper	by	Fazzari,	Hubbard	and	Petersen	(1988),	using	a	panel	
of	 U.S	 manufacturing	 firms,	 they	 empirically	 test	 the	 relationship	 between	
investment	and	internal	 funds	by	augmenting	the	Q	model	of	 investment	with	
cash	flow,	which	acts	as	proxy	to	measure	internal	funds.	They	then	divide	the	
sample	 using	 a	 priori	 classifications	 of	 firms’	 financing	 constraints	 such	 as	
dividend	pay‐out	ratios,	and	compare	the	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	of	
the	different	sub‐samples.	 In	this	extensive	empirical	research,	 ,	 they	find	that	
even	after	controlling	for	investment	opportunities	using	Tobin’s	Q,	cash	flow	is	
still	 a	 significant	 determinant	 of	 firm’s	 investment	 spending.	 And	 the	 sub‐
sample	classified	as	financially	constrained	is	more	sensitive	to	the	availability	
of	internal	funds.	They	interpret	this	as	evidence	of	financial	constraints.		
	
The	assumption	of	representative	firms	is	common	to	the	early	research	
on	investment,	where	the	same	empirical	model	applies	to	all	firms	regardless	
of	the	specification.	Therefore,	these	tests	fail	to	identify	whether	the	observed	
empirical	 sensitivity	 of	 investment	 to	 financial	 variables	 differed	 in	 different	
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kinds	of	firms.	Thus	the	representative	firm	paradigm	limited	the	explanations	
that	could	be	provided	for	financial	effects.	Fazzari	et	al	(1988)	is	the	first	paper	
that	abandons	the	representative	firm	framework	and	uses	panel	data	to	study	
financial	 constraints	 in	 relation	 to	 firm	 heterogeneity.	 Their	 findings,	 show	
significant	different	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	between	groups	of	firms	
that	 have	 been	 split	 based	 on	 some	 a	 priori	measure	 of	 information	 costs	 or	
access	to	external	capital	markets	(for	example	dividend	payout	behavior,	size).	
This	new	insight	 illustrates	the	 importance	of	 firm	heterogeneity	with	respect	
to	the	costs	of	internal	and	external	finance.	Using	firm‐level	panel	data	allows	a	
researcher	 to	 examine	 how	 information	 and	 incentive	 problems	 vary	 across	
firms	 and	 over	 time,	 and	 how	 they	 affect	 investment	 spending	 of	 firms	 with	
different	 characteristics.	 Using	 firm‐level	 data,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 papers	
following	 FHP’s	 (1988)	 methodology	 find	 similar	 relationships	 between	
investment	 and	 cash	 flows	 (Hoshi	 et	 al.	 1991;	 Oliner	 and	 Rudebusch	 1992;	
Whited	 1992;	 Bond	 and	 Meghir	 1994),	 and	 confirm	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	
constraint	on	firm’s	investment	spending2.	
	
The	 fundamental	empirical	 strategy	of	FHP	(1988)	and	 their	 followers,	
described	 above,	 is	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 neoclassical	 investment	 models	
derived	under	 the	assumption	of	perfect	 capital	markets	hold	 for	 firms	 facing	
low	information	costs,	but	fails	to	hold	for	firms	with	higher	information	costs.	
Furthermore,	they	tend	to	measure	how	changes	in	net	worth	affect	investment	
for	 firms	with	 high	 information	 costs.	 There	 are	 two	major	 challenges	 in	 this	
                                                 
2 see Hubbard RG. (1998). "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment." Journal of Economic 
Literature 36, 193-225. for a survey 
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type	of	empirical	tests.	First,	it	is	crucial	important	to	accurately	measure	firms’	
investment	 opportunities.	 In	 order	 to	 interpret	 investment	 cash	 flow	
sensitivities	 as	 evidence	 of	 financial	 constraints,	 we	 need	 to	 fully	 control	 for	
investment	opportunities,	so	that	the	significance	of	cash	flow	is	not	reflecting	
future	 profitability	 but	 the	 effects	 of	 information	 problems.	 The	 existing	
literature	builds	on	three	 investment	models:	 the	Q	model,	 the	Euler	equation	
and	 the	 error	 correction	model.	 The	 second	 challenge	 is	 measuring	 financial	
constraints.	In	order	to	measure	the	cross‐sectional	differences	in	the	effects	of	
cash	 flow	 on	 the	 investment	 of	 firms	 facing	 different	 level	 of	 information	
problem,	we	 need	 to	 find	 some	 proxy,	which	 reflects	 the	 level	 of	 information	
asymmetry	 faced	by	 firms,	which	can	be	used	 to	partition	samples	a	priori	as	
financially	 constrained	 and	 not	 financially	 constrained.	 These	 proxies	 are	
commonly	known	as	sample	splitting	criteria	in	the	literature.	Finding	suitable	
sample	splitting	criteria	is	not	an	easy	task.	Empirical	evidences	show	that	size,	
age	 and	 affiliation	 to	 industry	 groups	 are	 good	 proxies,	 but	 the	 usefulness	 of	
these	proxies	is	not	robust	and	they	tend	to	vary	across	datasets	and	countries.	
	
The	 rest	 of	 this	 section	 will	 be	 organised	 around	 the	 two	 challenges	
described	above.	 In	 section	2.3.2	we	will	briefly	 review	 the	 three	widely	used	
investment	models	and	how	to	 incorporate	 them	with	 financial	 factors	 to	 test	
for	financial	constraints.	Then	their	merits	and	shortcomings	will	be	addressed.	
In	 section	 2.3.3,	we	will	 first	 review	 the	 sample	 splitting	 criteria	 used	 in	 the	
literature	 and	 the	 rationale	 for	 choosing	 them	 to	 partition	 the	 samples.	 The	
empirical	evidence	related	to	them	will	then	be	provided.	
	
37 
 
2.3.2	Investment	models	
	
One	of	the	earliest	empirical	investment	models	is	the	accelerator	model,	which	
explains	 investment	 using	 current	 and	 lagged	 changes	 of	 sales	 growth.	 This	
type	 of	 model	 performs	 quite	 well	 empirically,	 but	 it	 lacks	 a	 convincing	
theoretical	 background.	 The	neoclassical	 investment	 theory	 closes	 this	 gap.	 It	
views	investment	as	a	choice	variable	for	managers,	whose	aim	is	to	maximize	
the	 firm’s	value	 for	shareholders.	The	 first	neoclassical	model	 is	developed	by	
Jorgenson	(1971),	which	specifies	that	the	investment	rate	is	determined	by	the	
user	 cost	 of	 capital	 (the	 return	 required	 by	 firms	 in	 order	 to	 undertake	 an	
investment).	 Despite	 the	 simplicity	 and	 intuitiveness	 of	 this	model,	 it	 fails	 to	
establish	 its	 validity	 in	 empirical	 tests	 using	 aggregate	 investment	 data.	 One	
explanation	 to	 this	 empirical	 failure	 is	 that	 Jorgenson’s	 neoclassical	model	 of	
investment	 is	 formulated	 assuming	 static	 expectations,	 but	 investment	 is	
forward‐looking	behaviour	and	so	expectations	will	be	a	crucial	determinant	of	
investment	decisions.	As	a	result	a	dynamic	investment	model,	the	Q	theory,	is	
developed	 by	 introducing	 convex	 adjustment	 cost	 of	 capital	 into	 the	
neoclassical	investment	model.		
 
2.3.2.1	The	Q	model	
	
Assume	that	a	firm	maximizes	its	value,	which	is	a	function	of	the	capital	stock	
from	previous	period.	The	firm’s	problem	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
	
1 1( ) max{ ( , , ) [ ( )]}t t t t t t t tV K R K L I E V K   																							(1)	
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Where	 1( )t tV K  	is	 the	 firm’s	 current	 period	 value	 function,	 	is	 a	 discount	
factor,	and	 tE 	is	the	expectation	operator	based	on	all	the	information	available	
on	time	t,	and	 ( , , )t t tR K L I 	is	the	net	revenue	function:	
	
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) It t t t t t t t t t t t tR K L I p F K L p C K I w L P I    																(2)	
	
In	 the	 revenue	 function	 (2),	 F(.)	 is	 a	 production	 function	 and	 C(.)	 is	 the	
adjustment	 cost	 function.	 K,	 L,	 and	 I	 stand	 for	 capital,	 labor	 and	 investment	
respectively,	 tw 	is	the	wage	rate,	 tp 	is	the	price	of	the	firm’s	product	and	 ItP 	is	
the	 price	 of	 investment	 goods.	 The	 firm’s	 infinite	 horizon	 optimization	
problems	 can	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 two‐period	 problem.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
period	 the	 firm	 chooses	 how	much	 capital	 it	wants	 to	 install,	which	becomes	
operative	immediately.	Capital	formation	follows	the	following	rule:	
	
	
1(1 )t t tK K I    																																														(3)	
	
where	 	is	a	constant	depreciation	rate.	We	further	assume	that	the	firm	faces	
convex	adjustment	costs.	The	higher	the	investment	in	proportion	to	its	existing	
capital	 stock	 the	higher	 the	 adjustment	 costs	will	 incur.	 In	 order	 to	derive	 an	
expression	for	investment	rate,	we	need	to	specify	a	functional	form	for	the	cost	
of	 adjustment	 function.	 It	 is	 typical	 in	 the	 literature	 to	 assume	 that	 both	 the	
adjustment	 cost	 function	 C(.)	 and	 the	 production	 function	 F(.)	 are	
homogeneously	 linear	 in	 capital.	 The	most	 common	 form	 of	 adjustment	 cost	
function	is	the	quadratic	cost	of	adjustment	function:	
	
21( , ) [( ) ]
2t t t t
IC K I aK b
K
  																																							(4)	
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The	 firm	 maximizes	 its	 value	 function	 subject	 to	 the	 capital	 formation	
constraint	(3),	so	we	can	construct	a	Lagrangean	equation	corresponding	to	the	
firm’s	problem	as:	
	
1 1( , , ) [ ( )] [ (1 ) ]t t t t t t t t t t tL R K L I E V K K K I         																(5)	
	
The	first	order	conditions	for	the	firm’s	maximization	problem	with	respect	to	
previous	period	capital	stock	are:	
	
1
1
( , , ) ( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0t t t t t tt t
t t t
L K L I R V KE
K K K
    

             
									(6)	
	
Equation	(6)	can	be	rewritten	as	follows:	
	
1( )t t t
t t
t t
R V KE
K K
        																																								(7)	
	
Equation	(7)	states	that	the	shadow	value	of	capital,	i.e.	the	additional	value	for	
the	firm	from	relaxing	constraint	(3),	is	equal	to	the	discounted	value	of	current	
and	future	revenues	generated	by	the	marginal	unit	of	capital.	
The	first	order	condition	with	respect	to	investment	is:	
	
( , , ) 0t t t t t
t t
L K L I R
I I
     																																								(8)	
	
40 
 
Equation	(8)	is	widely	used	to	derive	an	investment	equation	based	on	average	
Q.	(Hayashi	1982)	Solve	(8)	for	the	optimal	investment	rate
t
I
K
    	:	
	
1
i it t
it
I b Q
K a
       																																												(9)	
Based	on	the	fact	that	 tI
tp
 	is	marginal	q,	where	the	market	value	added	to	the	
firm	by	 an	 additional	unit	 of	 capital	 divided	by	 its	 replacement	 cost.	 	We	 can	
replace	 tI
tp
 	with	q	and	rewrite	equation	(9)	as:	
 1 1 I tt t
t t
pI b q
K a p
        																																					(10)	
	
Incorporating	the	subscript	 i,	which	represents	each	individual	firm	and	using	
average	 Q	 as	 a	 measure	 for	 the	 marginal	 q,	 the	 empirical	 equation	 linking	
investment	to	average	q	can	be	written	as:	
	
1
i it it
it
I b Q
K a
       																																											(11)	
	
where	 it 	is	the	sum	of	three	mean‐zero	components:	
	
it i t itv u w    																																																(12)	
	
Where	 iv 	accounts	 for	 unobserved	 firm‐specific	 heterogeneity,	 assumed	 to	 be	
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constant	over	time;	 tu 	capture	the	cyclical	factors	that	have	a	common	effect	on	
all	firms;	and	 itw 	is	a	stochastic	disturbance	to	the	firm.	
	
Equation	 (10)	 links	 the	 investment	 rate	 to	 the	marginal	 q	 adjusted	 for	
the	relative	price	of	investment	goods.	However,	the	marginal	q	is	unobservable	
to	the	researcher.	Hayashi	(1982)	shows	that	under	the	assumptions	of	perfect	
competition	 in	 the	 factor	 and	 product	markets,	 homogeneity	 of	 fixed	 capital,	
linear	 homogeneity	 of	 technologies	 for	 production	 and	 adjustment	 costs,	 and	
independence	 of	 financing	 and	 investment	 decisions,	 average	 Q	 which	 is	
constructed	as	the	ratio	of	the	market	value	of	the	firm	to	the	replacement	value	
of	 the	 capital	 stock	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 marginal	 q.	 In	 this	 way	
unobservable	expectations	of	the	future	profitability	of	investment	activity	can	
be	captured	by	share	prices	in	the	stock	market	and	incorporated	explicitly	into	
the	q	model	 of	 investment.	 In	 average	Q,	 stock	market	 valuations	 are	used	 to	
proxy	for	the	marginal	benefits	of	investment,	assuming	a	homogeneous	capital	
stock.	 If	an	additional	unit	of	 capital	 increases	 the	market	value	of	a	 firm	and	
this	increase	is	greater	than	the	cost	of	acquiring	that	marginal	unit	of	capital,	
investment	 will	 take	 place.	 The	 capital	 stock	 will	 increase	 until	 its	 current	
replacement	cost	equals	the	market	capitalization.		
	
Equation	 (11)	 is	 a	 standard	 empirical	 formulation	 of	 the	 neoclassical	
investment	model	under	the	null	of	perfect	capital	markets.	Numerous	studies	
have	used	this	equation	to	test	the	null	against	the	alternative	in	which	financial	
factors	affect	investment.	The	usual	procedure	is	to	augment	equation	(11)	with	
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a	 variable	 –	 typically,	 cash	 flow	 –	 that	 contains	 information	 about	 a	 firm’s	
financial	 position.	 There	 is	 a	 distinctive	 advantage	 of	 this	 approach,	 since	 the	
observable,	 average	 Q,	 completely	 summarizes	 all	 the	 information	 about	 the	
expected	discounted	present	value	of	additional	investment.	Under	this	theory,	
no	other	variables	 including	 financial	 variables	 such	as	 cash	 flow	should	be	a	
significant	 determinant	 of	 investment.	 	 Therefore	 if	 the	 augmented	 cash	 flow	
term	turns	out	to	be	statistically	significant,	we	would	reject	the	frictionless	Q	
model	and	interpret	it	as	evidence	for	financial	constraints.	The	heterogeneity	
of	firms	can	be	studied	by	dividing	the	firms	into	groups	facing	different	levels	
of	 information	 problems	 a	 priori	 according	 to	 some	 sample	 splitting	 criteria,	
which	we	will	 discuss	 in	detail	 in	 a	 later	 section.	We	would	 expect	 the	 group	
that	classified	as	not	financially	constrained	to	display	no	significant	cash	flow	
coefficient,	 but	 the	 financially	 constrained	 group	 to	 display	 a	 positive	 and	
significant	 cash	 flow	 coefficient.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 positive	 and	 significant	
cash	 flow	 coefficient	 as	 evidence	 of	 financial	 constraints	 is	 however	 not	
undisputed.	 There	 are	 three	 alternative	 interpretations	 that	 have	 been	
proposed	in	the	literature	for	this	finding.	The	first	and	dominant	interpretation	
is	 that	 the	 empirical	 significance	 of	 cash	 flow	 terms	 in	 Q	 model	 reflects	 the	
financial	constraints	faced	by	firms	due	to	capital	market	imperfection.	This	is	
because	 cash	 flow	 acts	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 firm’s	 net	 worth	 and	 therefore	
determines	the	external	finance	premium	facing	the	firm	(FHP	(1988)).	
		
An	alternative	explanation	for	the	significance	of	cash	flow	is	due	to	the	
Q	model	fails	to	fully	capture	firms’	investment	opportunities.	In	the	presence	of	
imperfect	capital	market	or	violation	of	other	assumptions	that	the	standard	q	
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models	 is	 based	 on,	 the	 equality	 of	 average	 and	marginal	 q	will	 be	 distorted.		
Since	 cash	 flow	 is	 closely	 correlated	 with	 future	 profitability	 and	 sales,	 it	
provides	 additional	 information	 about	 firm’s	 profitability	 and	 investment	
opportunities	in	a	Q	model.	One	major	measurement	error	can	result	from	the	
measurement	of	market	value	of	the	firm,	since	the	market	value	of	the	firms	is	
derived	from	firms’	stock	prices.	When	the	stock	markets	are	not	efficient	and	
stock	prices	are	driven	by	fads	and	fashion,	the	market	value	of	the	firm	will	no	
longer	be	a	good	proxy	for	 its	 fundamentals.	 In	this	case	the	average	Q	that	 is	
used	 to	 measure	 and	 control	 for	 investment	 opportunities	 will	 be	 seriously	
distorted	and	the	 interpretations	of	sensitivities	of	 investment	 to	cash	 flow	as	
indication	 of	 financial	 constraint	 will	 be	 invalidated.	 Because	 now	 cash	 flow	
reflects	 the	 investment	 opportunities	 and	 profitability	 that	 average	 Q	 fails	 to	
capture.	 Bond	 and	 Cummins	 (Bond	 and	 Cummins	 2001)	 investigate	 how	 an	
inefficient	 stock	 market	 leads	 to	 the	 empirical	 failing	 of	 the	 Q	 model	 of	
investment.	 They	 find	 that	 stock	 market	 valuations	 tend	 to	 deviate	 quite	
persistently	and	significantly	from	fundamental	values.	After	controlling	for	the	
misevaluation	of	the	share	price,	they	find	no	evidence	of	correlation	between	
investment	 and	 cash	 flow.	 Cummins,	 Hassett	 and	 Oliner	 (2006)	 address	 the	
measurement	 error	 problem	 by	 using	 analysts’	 forecasts	 to	 construct	 a	
“modified	 Q”	 and	 use	 it	 in	 the	 place	 of	 average	 Q	 to	 control	 for	 future	
investment	 opportunities.	 They	 find	 that	 financial	 variables	 are	 no	 longer	
significant	 in	 investment	 equations.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Carpenter	 and	 Guariglia	
(2008)	 introduce	 a	 new	 proxy	 for	 expectations	 reflecting	 the	 firms’	 insider	
evaluation	of	opportunities,	i.e.	the	firm’s	contractual	obligations	for	future	new	
investment	 projects,	 alongside	 Q	 to	 provide	 an	 extra	 control	 for	 investment	
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opportunities	 that	might	not	be	reflected	by	Q.	Using	a	 large	UK	dataset,	 they	
find	that	the	explanatory	power	of	cash	flow	falls	for	large	firms,	but	remaining	
strong	 for	 small	 firms.	 Gilchrist	 and	 Himmelberg	 (1995)	 use	 a	 set	 of	 VAR	
equations	 to	estimate	 the	marginal	Q,	which	 they	used	as	a	measure	of	 firm’s	
investment	 opportunities	 instead	 the	 conventional	 Tobin’s	 Q.	 In	 their	 studies,	
the	 cash	 flow	 effects	 disappears	 for	 firms	 that	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 face	 financial	
constraints,	 whereas	 the	 cash	 flow	 remains	 significant	 for	 the	 group	 of	
constrained	 firms.	 These	 results	 show	 that	 after	 fully	 controlling	 for	 the	
investment	 opportunities	 that	 the	 average	 Q	 fails	 to	 capture	 with	 additional	
control	variables,	the	cash	flow	remains	significant	for	the	group	of	constrained	
firms	which	is	in	line	with	FHP’s	(1988)	findings.	
	
The	 third	 alternative	 interpretation	 for	 the	 significance	 of	 cash	 flow	 is	
that	managers	use	free	cash	flow	(cash	flow	left	after	 investment	 in	profitable	
projects	 has	 been	 carried	 out)	 to	 overinvest,	 i.e.	 these	 firms	 engage	 in	
suboptimal	 investment	 policies	 where	 they	 focus	 on	 firms’	 growth	 in	 size,	
which	could	boost	their	pay,	status	and	power.	In	this	case	the	Q	model	is	not	an	
appropriate	description	of	firm	investment	behaviour	(Jensen	1986).	This	free	
cash	flow	theory	provides	an	alternative	explanation	for	statistical	significance	
of	cash	flow	in	Q	models	of	investment.	However,	this	theory	is	very	difficult	to	
test	as	free	cash	flow	cannot	be	observed.	
	
2.3.2.2	The	Euler	equation	
 
To	 circumvent	 some	 of	 the	 empirical	 caveats	 of	 Q	 models,	 an	 alternative	
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methodology,	 the	 Euler	 equation	 approach	 is	 used.	 The	 Euler	 equation	 is	 a	
different	 way	 to	 rearrange	 the	 first‐order	 conditions	 from	 the	 same	
maximization	 problem	 used	 to	 derive	 the	 Q	 model.	 Following	 Bond	 and	
Meghir’s	 (1994)	 approach,	 by	 combining	 (6)	 and	 (7)	we	 can	derive	 the	Euler	
equation	for	investment:	
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Equation	 (13)	 indicates	 that	 the	marginal	 benefits	 generated	by	 the	marginal	
unit	of	capital	at	time	t	should	equal	to	the	discounted	value	of	marginal	costs	
for	 investment	 at	 time	 t+1,	 which	 makes	 the	 firm	 indifferent	 between	
investment	 in	 two	 adjacent	 periods.	 If	 the	 marginal	 benefits	 from	 the	
installation	of	an	additional	unit	of	capital	at	time	t	exceeded	the	marginal	costs	
for	investment	at	time	t+1,	the	firm	would	invest	more	in	time	t	and	vice	versa.	
Thus	 we	 can	 solve	 equation	 (13)	 for	
1t
I
K 
    	which	 will	 give	 us	 the	 inter‐
temporally	optimal	rate	of	 investment.	Using	the	adjustment	cost	function	(4),	
and	 with	 the	 assumptions	 of	 perfect	 foresight,	 linear	 homogeneity	 of	 the	
production	 function	 in	 capital	 and	 labour	 and	 constant	 return	 to	 scale,	 the	
optimal	rate	of	investment	will	be:	
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		 is	 the	 user	 cost	 of	 capital,	 which	 equals	 to	 the	
expectation	of	the	discounted	relative	price	of	net	investment	tomorrow	minus	
the	relative	price	of	investment	goods	today.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	cost	of	
capital	and	the	cash‐flow	term	enter	equation	(14)	with	opposite	sign.	
	
The	 literature	 that	uses	Euler	 equation	 to	 analyse	 the	 importance	of	 financial	
constraints	 is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 error	 term	 in	 the	 Euler	 equation	
reflects	expectational	errors	and	should	be	orthogonal	to	information	available	
in	 period	 t	 under	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 symmetric	 information	 and	 rational	
expectations.	 However	 if	 financial	 constraints	 bind,	 then	 the	 Euler	 equation	
should	 depend	 on	 the	 shadow	 cost	 of	 external	 financing.	 The	 Euler	 equation	
model,	 such	as	equation	 (14)	derived	under	 the	assumption	of	perfect	 capital	
market	 that	 omits	 the	 information	 of	 financial	 constraints	 would	 be	
misspecified.	 This	 misspecification	 will	 be	 detected	 by	 the	 test	 of	
overidentifying	restrictions	 (Whited	1992;	Bond	and	Meghir	1994;).	Since	 the	
power	 of	 overidentification	 test	may	 be	 poor	 in	 some	 circumstances,	Whited	
(1992)	 and	 Bond	 and	 Meghir	 (1994)	 extend	 the	 Euler	 equation	 model	 by	
allowing	the	shadow	cost	of	finance	to	depend	on	some	balance	sheet	variables.	
The	 coefficients	 on	 these	 variables	 would	 measure	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	
constraints	on	 the	 firm’s	discount	 rate.	The	Euler	 equation	approach	 can	also	
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take	explicit	account	of	that	fact	that	firms	are	heterogeneous	in	the	fashion	of	
the	Q	model	approach	discussed	above.	By	dividing	firms	into	groups	of	more	or	
less	likely	financial	constrained,	we	would	expect	to	see	that	the	Euler	equation	
is	 not	 rejected	 by	 the	 overidenfiying	 restriction	 test	 for	 firms	 facing	 low	
information	 problems,	 but	 reject	 the	 Euler	 equation	 for	 firms	 facing	 high	
information	problems.	
	
The	most	important	advantage	of	the	Euler	equation	approach	is	that	it	
does	not	 rely	on	 firms’	market	value	 to	measure	expected	profitability.	 So	 the	
distortion	 of	 the	 stock	 market	 pricing	 will	 not	 affect	 the	 Euler	 equation	 to	
control	for	investment	opportunities.	But	it	still	preserves	the	advantage	of	the	
Q	model,	where	under	 the	maintained	 structure,	 the	model	 fully	 accounts	 for	
the	 effects	 of	 expectation	 about	 future	 investment	 opportunities	 on	 current	
investment.	Moreover,	in	many	countries,	unlisted	firms	are	the	largest	portion	
of	 the	 economy,	 and	 this	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 developing	 countries	 and	
transition	 economies	 with	 very	 small	 or	 no	 financial	 markets.	 The	 Euler	
equation	 approach	 provides	 us	 a	 framework	 to	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	
financial	 constraints	 on	 investment	 for	 firms	 that	 are	 not	 listed	 in	 the	 stock	
exchange,	 in	which	 information	 problems	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 particularly	 severe.	
The	major	 shortcoming	 of	 the	 Euler	 equation	 approach	 is	 outlined	 by	 Zeldes	
(1989)	 in	 the	 context	 of	 liquidity	 constraints	 on	 consumption.	 The	 Euler	
equation	approach	may	fails	to	detect	the	presence	of	financial	constraints	if	the	
tightness	 of	 the	 constraints	 is	 constant	 over	 time.	 Then	 the	 tests	 of	 over‐
identifying	 restrictions	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 detect	 departures	 from	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	no	constraints.	But	this	will	be	less	of	a	problem,	if	we	have	data	
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over	 a	 long	 period	 time	 which	 captures	 the	 changes	 in	 individual	 firms’	
financial	 health.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 both	 the	 Q	model	 and	 the	 Euler	
equation	of	investment	are	derived	from	the	same	underlying	model,	based	on	
the	 assumption	 of	 convex	 adjustment	 costs.	 If	 there	 are	 irreversibility	
constraints	on	 investment	or	other	 forms	of	asymmetries	 in	adjustment	costs,	
then	both	models	would	be	fundamentally	misspecified.	Therefore,	other	model	
such	 as	 the	 error‐correction	 model	 is	 also	 used	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	
financial	constraints.		
	
2.3.2.3	Error‐correction	model	for	investment:	
	
Recently,	 the	 error‐correction	 model	 is	 used	 as	 an	 alternative	 model	 that	
departs	 from	 the	 neoclassical	 models	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 financial	
constraints	 (Bond	et	al	2003;	Guariglia	2006).	The	error‐correction	model	 for	
investment	was	 first	 introduced	 into	the	 investment	 literature	by	Bean(1981).	
This	model	 specifies	 a	 long‐run	 or	 ‘target’	 level	 of	 capital	 stock	 and	 allows	 a	
flexible	specification	of	the	adjustment	dynamics	to	be	estimated	form	the	data.		
Assuming	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 adjustment	 costs	 or	 barriers	 to	 immediate	
adjustment,	the	firm’s	desired	capital	stock	takes	the	form:	
it it it ik s j v   																																																				(15)	
where	 itk represents	the	logarithm	of	the	firms’	capital	stock,	 its 	represents	the	
logarithm	 of	 the	 firms’	 sales,	 and	 itj ,	 the	 real	 user	 cost	 of	 capital;	 and	 itv 	is	 a	
firm‐specific	effect.		
However,	 with	 the	 presence	 of	 adjustment	 costs,	 the	 firm	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	
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immediately	adjust	its	capital	stock	to	the	target	level.	Thus,	we	need	to	impose	
a	 dynamic	 adjustment	 mechanism	 between	 k	 and	 s	 as	 an	 autoregressive‐
distributed	model	with	two	lags,	in	which	equation	(15)	is	nested	as	a	long‐run	
equilibrium.	Assuming	that	all	variations	in	the	user	cost	of	capital	is	captured	
by	the	time‐specific	components	of	the	error	term,	we	can	obtain	an	expression	
for	the	logarithm	of	the	firms’	capital	stock:	
1 1 2 2 3 4 1 5 2it it it it it it i t jt itk k k s s s v v v e                															(16)	
where	 iv 	is	 a	 firm‐specific	 effect;	 tv ,	 a	 time‐specific	 component;	 jtv ,	 a	 time‐
specific	effect	that	varies	across	industries;	and	 ite ,	an	idiosyncratic	error	term.	
Re‐parameterising	this	model	in	an	error‐correction	form,	and	impose	the	unit	
elasticity	 restriction	 i.e.	 that	 in	 the	 long	 run	 3 4 5 1 2( ) /(1 )        	is	 equal	
to	1,	and	using	the	approximation	 1( / )it it it ik I K    ,	where	 i stands	for	firm‐
specific	depreciation,	which	 is	expected	to	be	reflected	in	the	 iv 	component	of	
the	error	term,	we	can	obtain	the	empirical	specification	of	the	error‐correction	
model:	
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							(17)	
	
It	 is	 important	to	note	that	 in	order	to	be	consistent	with	the	error‐correction	
behaviour,	the	coefficient	associated	with	 2 2( )it itk s  	should	be	negative,	i.e.	if	
capital	stock	is	lower	than	its	desired	or	‘target’	level,	future	investment	should	
be	 higher	 to	 catch	 up	 with	 the	 desired	 level	 of	 capital	 stock	 and	 vice	 versa.	
Financial	constraints	are	modelled	by	augmenting	equation	(17)	with	the	cash	
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flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 to	 capture	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 Moreover	 a	
dummy	variable	such	as	dividend	cut	is	also	introduced	to	study	the	differential	
effect	 of	 cash	 flow	on	different	 firms.	This	 dummy	variable	 is	 interacted	with	
the	 cash	 flow	 variable.	 Thus	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 cash	 flow	 terms	 by	
themselves	 will	 capture	 the	 responsiveness	 of	 investment	 to	 cash	 flow	 for	
unconstrained	 firms,	 which	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 small	 and	 insignificant.	 The	
responsiveness	of	investment	to	cash	flow	for	constrained	firms	is	then	given	by	
the	 combination	 of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 cash	 flow	 and	 the	 coefficients	 on	 the	
interactive	variables.	The	coefficients	on	these	interactive	terms	are	expected	to	
be	 jointly	 significant	 and	 positively	 signed	 if	 financially	 constrained	 firms	
respond	more	strongly	to	cash	flow	than	unconstrained	firms.		
	
2.3.3	The	Kaplan	and	Zingales	critique:	
	
The	overall	evidence	of	the	empirical	studies	on	financial	constraints	suggests	
that	 the	sub‐sample	of	 firms	thought	a	priori	 to	 face	more	severe	 information	
problems	 is	 indeed	 financially	 constrained.	 However,	 a	more	 recent	 study	 by	
Kaplan	 and	 Zingales	 (1997)	 casts	 doubt	 on	 using	 investment	 cash	 flow	
sensitivities	as	evidence	of	the	presence	of	financial	constraints.	In	their	study,	
they	re‐examine	the	sample	of	49	low‐dividend	pay‐out	firms	from	FHP	(1988)	
and	try	to	find	statements	indicating	whether	or	not	financial	constraints	are	a	
problem.	 Based	 on	 this	 information,	 they	 divide	 the	 firms	 in	 groups	 as:	 not	
financially	 constrained,	 possibly	 financially	 constrained,	 and	 financially	
constrained.	 They	 find	 that,	 in	 contrary	 to	 FHP‘s	 (1988)	 finding,	 that	 the	
financially	 constrained	 group	 actually	 displays	 the	 lowest	 sensitivity	 of	
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investment	 to	 cash	 flow	 of	 the	 three	 groups.	 Using	 a	 larger	 sample,	 Cleary	
(1999)	finds	evidence	supporting	KZ	(1997)	by	splitting	US	firms	according	to	
their	 creditworthiness	 that	 reflects	 financial	 constraints.	 They	 find	 that	 the	
investment	 decisions	 of	 firms	 are	 very	 sensitive	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 internal	
funds	 in	 general	 but	 less	 creditworthy	 firms	 are	 relatively	 less	 sensitive	 to	
internal	 fund.	 This	 apparent	 contradictory	 result	 led	 to	 a	 heated	 debate.	
((Fazzari	et	al.	2000)；(Kaplan	and	Zingales	2000)	)		
	
The	 conclusions	 from	KZ’s	 tests	 suffer	 from	 some	problems.	 First,	 it	 is	
very	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 to	 define	 so	 finely	 the	 degree	 of	 financing	
constraints,	 especially	 in	 such	 a	 small	 sample.	 Second,	 their	 classification	 is	
based	 on	managers’	 statements,	 which	 are	 not	 necessarily	 reliable,	 since	 the	
operational	 definition	 of	 financial	 constraints	 is	 not	well	 defined.	Despite	 the	
problems	associate	with	KZ’s	classification	of	firms,	their	finding	is	an	extension	
to	FHP‘s	(1988).	FHP	(2000)	note	that	the	FHP	(1988)	firms‐years	KZ	classify	
as	 “more	 financially	 constrained”	 are	 actually	 “financially	 distressed”.	 These	
observations	 include	 firms	 that	 violated	 the	 debt	 covenants	 and	 renegotiated	
debt	 payments.	 Financially	 distressed	 firms	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 restricted	 by	
creditors	from	using	internal	funds	for	 investment	and	might	therefore	have	a	
relatively	low	responsiveness	of	investment	to	internal	funds.		
	
Allayannis	 and	 Mozumdar	 (2004)	 provide	 evidence	 on	 the	 impact	 of	
financially	 distressed	 firms	 on	 the	 estimate	 of	 investment	 cash	 flow	
sensitivities.	Using	a	sample	of	overwhelmingly	fragile	firms,	they	find	that	the	
investment	of	those	firms	having	negative	cash	flow	is	not	sensitive	to	cash	flow,	
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but	 after	 excluding	 such	 firms	 from	 the	 sample	 the	 investment	 cash	 flow	
sensitivity	increases	for	the	more	constrained	firms.		
	
Cleary,	 Povel	 and	 Raith	 (2007)	 provide	 a	 model	 that	 reconciles	 the	
puzzling	 results	 generated	 in	 the	 previous	 literature.	 They	 extended	 the	 debt	
contract	 model	 with	 three	 additional	 assumptions	 that	 are	 different	 from	
previous	 studies:	 1)	 the	 firms	 have	 more	 than	 one	 opportunity	 to	 invest,	 2)	
firms	 can	 have	 negative	 cash	 flow	 and	 3)	 all	 the	 costs	 of	 raising	 funds	 are	
endogeneously	determined.	They	find	that,	under	the	interaction	between	cost	
and	 revenue	 effects,	 firm’s	 optimal	 investment	 function	 is	 U‐shaped	 over	 the	
range	of	 feasible	 levels	of	 internal	 funds.	The	 cost	 effects	occurs	when	higher	
level	 of	 investment	 increases	 the	 firms	 repayment	 costs	 and	 thereby	 raise	 its	
risk	of	default	and	liquidation,	 in	turn	raising	the	marginal	cost	of	debt.	When	
cost	 effects	 are	 dominant,	 the	model	 predicts	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	
cash	 flow	 and	 investment.	 The	 revenue	 effect	 occurs	 when	 higher	 levels	 of	
investment	 generate	 more	 revenue,	 which	 increases	 the	 firm’s	 chance	 of	
survival	and	lowers	the	marginal	cost	of	debt	finance.	When	the	revenue	effect	
dominates,	there	is	a	negative	relationship	between	cash	flow	and	investment.	
Cleary	 et	 al	 (2007)	 also	 demonstrate	 that	 as	 the	 degrees	 of	 asymmetric	
information	 increases,	 the	 investment	 curve	 becomes	 steeper	 almost	
everywhere,	which	implies	that	a	higher	level	of	asymmetric	information	leads	
to	an	increase	in	sensitivity	of	investment	to	cash	flow.		Based	on	these	findings,	
they	note	 that	 the	measures	of	 financial	 constraints	can	be	classified	 into	 two	
categories:	1)	 internal	 financial	 constraints,	which	classify	 firms	or	 firm‐years	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 indicators	 related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 internally	 generated	 funds	
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available	 to	 them,	 2)	 external	 financial	 constraints,	which	 classify	 firms	using	
criteria	such	as	firm	size,	age,	dividend	payout	ratio.	These	criteria	indicate	the	
degree	of	asymmetric	information	the	firms	are	facing.	They	further	show	that	
the	contradictory	results	obtain	by	FHP	(1988)	and	KZ	(1997)	can	be	explained	
by	 the	 different	 criteria	 utilised	 in	 their	 studies	 to	 partition	 their	 samples.	
Studies	 that	 use	 external	 financial	 constraints	 criteria,	 such	 as	 FHP	 (1988),	
suggest	 that	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 investment	 to	 cash	 flow	 tends	 to	 increase	
monotonically	with	 the	 degree	 of	 external	 financial	 constraints.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	studies	that	use	internal	financial	constraints	as	sample	splitting	criteria,	
i.e.	the	level	of	internal	funds	available	to	the	firms,	such	as	KZ	(1997),	suggest	
that	the	relationship	between	investment	and	cash	flow	is	U‐shaped	and	firms	
classified	as	less	financially	constrained	is	likely	to	display	a	higher	investment	
cash	 flow	sensitivity	 than	 financially	constrained	 firms.	Guariglia	 (2008)	 finds	
similar	result	using	a	panel	of	UK	data.			
	
2.4	Sample	splitting	criteria	
	
Another	 essential	 component	 in	 the	 test	 of	 financial	 constraints	hypothesis	 is	
the	sample	splitting	criteria.	By	splitting	firms	into	groups	with	different	level	of	
asymmetric	 information,	 we	 can	 investigate	 the	 asymmetric	 impact	 of	
asymmetric	 information	 and	 agency	 problems	 on	 firms	 with	 different	
characteristics.	Using	this	method,	we	can	avoid	the	problem	of	aggregation	in	
previous	 studies.	 Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 the	 empirical	
evidence	of	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	tends	to	be	quite	sensitive	to	the	
choice	of	sample	splitting	criteria.	In	this	section,	we	first	review	some	general	
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issues	 about	 the	 sample	 splitting	 criteria	 and	 examine	 the	 rationale	 for	 the	
sample	 splitting	 criteria	 that	 are	widely	 used	 in	 the	 literature.	 The	 empirical	
evidence	from	the	literature	is	also	presented.	
	
There	are	three	general	 issues	and	problems	in	choosing	the	criteria	to	
partition	 the	 sample	 into	 more	 or	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 financially	 constrained	
(Schiantarelli	(1996).	First,	in	the	early	studies,	firm’s	status	as	being	financially	
constrained	 or	 unconstrained	 tended	 to	 be	 fixed	 over	 entire	 sample	 period.	
However,	 firms	 tend	 to	 transit	 between	 different	 regimes	 over	 time,	 where	
financial	 constraints	may	be	binding	 for	some	year	but	not	 in	others.	 In	more	
recent	 studies,	 researchers	 tend	 to	 assign	 firm‐years	 into	 different	 groups	
which	 allow	 firms	 to	 transit	 between	 different	 financial	 regimes	 during	 the	
sample	period.	
	
The	 second	 issue	 that	we	 need	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 is	 the	 endogeneity	
problem	of	the	sample	splitting	criteria.	Most	of	the	criteria,	that	are	based	on	
firm’s	 characteristics	 tend	 to	 be	 endogenous,	 is	 correlated	 with	 firm‐specific	
and	 time	 invariant	 component	 of	 the	 error	 term	 (Schiantarelli	 1996).	 The	
endogeneity	problem	can	be	dealt	with	by	using	GMM	procedures	in	estimation.	
.	
The	third	issue	relates	to	whether	single	or	multiple	indicators	should	be	
used.	The	decisions	tend	to	vary	with	the	context.	The	common	approach	in	the	
literature	 is	 to	 use	 a	 single	 indicator	 to	 partition	 the	 sample	 into	 groups.	
Multiple	indicators	could	also	be	used	to	partition	the	sample.	However	as	the	
number	 of	 indicators	 increases,	 the	 numbers	 of	 parameters	 to	 be	 estimated	
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increases	 rapidly	 as	 well,	 which	 can	 be	 particularly	 problematic	 in	 small	
samples.	Generally,	most	of	the	studies	are	in	favour	of	using	a	single	indicator.	
Now	 we	 will	 move	 on	 to	 look	 at	 the	 most	 commonly	 used	 criteria	 in	 the	
literatures.	
	
2.4.1	Dividend	pay‐out	ratio	
	
The	 use	 of	 the	 dividend	 payout	 ratio	was	 first	 proposed	 by	 Fazzari,	 Hubbard	
and	 Petersen	 (1988).	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	 dividend	 payout	 ratio	 is	 that	
firms	with	low	dividend	pay‐out	ratio	are	likely	to	be	firms	that	have	exhausted	
their	 internally	 generated	 funds	 and	 are	 forced	 to	 use	 the	 more	 expansive	
external	 funds.	Based	on	 this	 sample	 splitting	 criteria,	FHP	 (1988)	 found	 that	
firms	with	low	dividend	payout	ratio	display	higher	sensitivities	of	investment	
to	 cash	 flow	 than	 firms	with	high	dividend	payout	 ratio.	 In	 the	 context	of	 the	
Euler	 equation,	 Hubbard,	 Kashyap	 and	Whited	 (1995)	 using	 average	 pay‐out	
ratio	as	sample	splitting	criterion,	find	that	the	Euler	equation	model	is	rejected	
for	the	low	dividend	payout	firms,	but	not	for	the	high	dividend	payout	firms.	
	
2.4.2	Affiliation	to	the	industrial	group	
	
Being	part	of	industrial	groups,	firms	have	access	to	the	internal	capital	market	
created	by	the	group.	Industrial	groups	are	particular	effective	in	dealing	with	
information	 and	 contract	 enforcement	 problems	 within	 the	 groups.	 When	 a	
firm	 needs	 external	 finance	 it	 can	 obtain	 funds	 at	 a	 relative	 lower	 cost.	
Therefore	it	is	expected	that	firms	who	have	affiliation	to	industrial	groups	will	
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have	lower	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	than	firms	who	are	not	part	of	an	
industrial	group,	because	of	the	reduction	in	information	costs	for	being	part	of	
the	 group	 and	 the	 access	 to	 the	 internal	 capital	 group.	Moreover,	 this	 sample	
splitting	 criterion	 is	 particularly	 desirable,	 because	 the	 status	 of	 affiliation	 to	
industrial	 groups	 tends	 to	be	 fixed,	which	avoids	 the	problem	of	 endogeneity.	
The	evidence	of	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	tend	to	be	quite	robust	with	
the	affiliation	to	the	industrial	group	as	a	sorting	criterion.	Hoshi,	Kashyap	and	
Scharfstein	(1991),	using	dataset	from	Japan,	find	that	firms	that	are	part	of	the	
industrial	 groups	 display	 lower	 cash‐flow	 sensitivities.	 Evidence	 from	 other	
countries	such	as	Korea	(Shin	and	Park	1999),	Canada	(Schaller	1993;	Chirinko	
and	Schaller	1995)	also	found	supporting	results	for	the	idea	that	affiliation	to	
industrial	 groups	 helps	 to	 reduce	 information	 asymmetries	 and	 to	 relax	
financial	constraints.	
	
2.4.3	Size	
	
Firm	 size	 has	 been	 the	 most	 widely	 studied	 sample	 splitting	 criterion.	 It	 is	
expected	 that	 size	 is	 closely	 correlated	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 financially	
constrained.	Small	firms	are	likely	to	be	young	firms;	they	have	little	or	no	track	
records,	 which	 lead	 to	 high	 information	 asymmetry	 costs,	 but	 as	 they	 grow	
bigger	and	have	a	longer	operating	period,	the	costs	of	information	asymmetry	
are	 expected	 to	 decrease.	 Moreover,	 the	 collateral	 value	 of	 assets	 is	 highly	
correlated	 to	 firm	size,	where	 large	 firms	 tend	 to	have	 lower	unit	bankruptcy	
costs.	Finally,	 it	 is	 likely	that	transaction	costs	 for	new	share	or	bond	issues	 is	
high	for	small	firms	and	these	costs	will	decrease	as	firms	grow	larger.	Based	on	
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the	 above	 arguments,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 large	 firm	 will	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
financially	constrained.	On	the	other	hand,	size	may	be	inversely	related	to	the	
concentration	 of	 ownership,	 where	 firms	 with	 high	 concentrated	 share	
ownership	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 low	 agency	 problems	 between	 managers	 and	
investors.	If	the	sample	of	study	involves	only	relative	large	quoted	firms,	then	
we	need	to	pay	extra	attention	to	this	issue.	
	
The	 evidence	 from	 studies	 using	 size	 to	 partition	 sample	 is	 mixed.	 In	
general,	 the	 results	 tend	 to	 suggest	 that	 smaller	 firms	 display	 significantly	
higher	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities	(see	FHP	(1988);	Hu	and	Schiantarelli	
(1998);	 Jaramillo	 (Jaramillo	 et	 al.	 1996)).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Devereux	 and	
Schiantarelli	 (Devereux	 and	 Schiantarelli	 1990),	 using	 a	 sample	 of	 relatively	
large	quoted	firm	from	UK,	find	that	 large	firms	are	more	sensitive	than	small	
firms	to	cash‐flow	fluctuations.	This	is	probably	due	to	the	ownership	argument	
we	 discussed	 above.	 Moreover	 Chow	 and	 Fung	 (1998),	 using	 firm‐level	 data	
from	a	survey	of	manufacturing	sector	 investment	 in	Shanghai,	 find	 that	 large	
firms	 are	 more	 financially	 constrained	 than	 small	 firms.	 They	 suggest	 three	
reasons	 for	 this	 unusual	 finding:	 1)	 Collectively‐owned	 enterprises	which	 are	
managerial	 efficiency	 dominate	 the	 small	 firm	 classes,	 they	 have	 greater	
capacity	 in	 generating	 large	 enough	 cash	 flow	 in	 financing	 their	 fixed	
investment;	 2)	 the	 presence	 of	 heavy	 indebtedness	 of	 large	 state‐owned	
enterprises	 may	 deprive	 them	 of	 sufficient	 cash	 available	 for	 investment	
decision;	 3)	 Small	 firms	 in	 non‐state	 sectors	 can	 rely	 on	 borrowing	 from	 the	
informal	credit	market	although	they	can	only	obtain	very	 limited	bank	credit	
from	the	formal	banking	institutions.	
58 
 
		
2.4.4	Bond	Ratings	
 
Bond	rating	is	a	popular	choice	in	recent	studies.	It	provides	a	better,	exogenous	
proxy	for	splitting	the	sample	to	reflect	differences	in	 information	available	to	
external	lenders.	Firms	that	have	their	corporate	bonds	rated	by	a	bond	rating	
agency	are	considered	less	likely	to	be	financially	constrained,	since	bond	rating	
provide	 extra	 information	 to	 lenders	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 rated	 firms’	
investment	 opportunities.	 Moreover,	 if	 firms	 do	 not	 have	 a	 bond	 rating,	 it	
indicates	 that	 they	 do	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market.	 Whited	
(1992)	 find	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 financial	 constraints	 appears	 to	 be	 stronger	 for	
firms	that	do	not	have	bond	rating	than	firms	have	a	bond	rating.	
	
2.4.5	Leverage	ratio	
 
Another	 criterion	 used	 in	 testing	 for	 financial	 constraint	 is	 the	 leverage	 ratio	
which	 is	 constructed	 as	 total	 debts	 divide	 by	 total	 assets.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	
firms	with	high	 leverage	may	be	expected	 to	meet	higher	agency	costs.	These	
agency	costs	can	arise	from	‘moral	hazard’	generated	by	the	firms’	managers	by	
making	an	excessively	risky	investment.	The	reason	for	this	risky	behaviour	is	
that	with	high	leverage	the	firms	may	retain	most	of	the	profit	from	any	success	
but	 lenders	 incur	 most	 of	 the	 losses	 from	 failure	 due	 to	 the	 limited	 liability	
nature	 of	 debt	 contracts.	 Agung	 (2000),	 using	 data	 from	 Indonesia,	 find	 that	
high	 leverage	 firms	display	higher	 investment	cash	 flow	sensitivities	 than	 low	
leverage	firms.	
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2.4.6	Coverage	ratio	
 
The	coverage	ratio	is	defined	as	the	ratio	between	firms’	total	profits	before	tax	
and	before	interest	and	their	total	interest	payments.	It	indicates	the	availability	
of	internal	funds	that	firms	can	use	to	finance	their	real	activities.	If	a	firm	can	
generate	sufficient	internal	funds,	it	will	not	have	great	need	to	borrow	and	will	
not	be	likely	to	run	up	against	its	debt	limit.	The	coverage	ratio	is	widely	used	in	
the	 literature	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 firms’	 activities	
((Guariglia	 1999;	 Guariglia	 2000;	 Guariglia	 and	 Mateut	 2006)and	 Whited,	
1992).	Based	on	the	model	develop	by	Cleary,	Povel	and	Raith	(2007),	coverage	
ratio	can	be	seen	as	a	measure	of	internal	financial	constraint.	Guariglia	(2008),	
using	a	large	UK	data,	finds	that	relationship	between	investment	and	cash	flow	
is	U‐shaped.		
	
2.4.7	Cash	flow	
 
 
Cash	flow	itself	can	also	be	used	as	a	sample	splitting	criterion.	 It	 is	generally	
used	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 internal	 funds	 and	 internal	 financial	 constraints.	 One	
distinctive	advantage	of	 cash	 flow	 is	 that	 it	 can	 take	negative	values,	which	 is	
important	 in	 the	model	proposed	by	Cleary	etl	al’s	 (2007)	as	discussed	 in	the	
last	section.	It	is	for	those	firms	whose	internal	funds	are	sufficiently	negative,	
that	 the	 revenue	 effect	 dominates,	 leading	 to	 a	negative	 relationship	between	
investment	 and	 internal	 funds.	 A	 major	 drawback	 for	 using	 cash	 flow	 as	 a	
measure	for	internal	funds	is	that	it	is	a	flow	variable,	which	ignores	the	stock	of	
funds	accumulated	in	the	past.	Using	cash	flow	as	a	sample	separation	criterion,	
Cleary	et	al	(2007)	and	Guariglia	(2008)	find	that,	when	including	negative	cash	
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flow,	the	relationship	between	investment	and	cash	flow	is	U‐shaped.					
	
2.4.8	Summary	for	sample	split	criteria	
 
 
Sample	 splitting	 criteria	 are	 used	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 level	 of	 information	
asymmetries	and	agency	costs	that	a	firm	faces.	Firms	are	divided	into	groups	
of	 a	priori	 more	 or	 less	 likely	 financially	 constrained.	 From	 the	 brief	 review	
above,	we	can	see	that	most	sample	splitting	criteria,	which	are	currently	used	
in	the	existing	 literatures,	are	 imperfect	and	subject	to	a	number	of	problems.	
Nonetheless,	 these	 sample	 splitting	 criteria	 offer	 us	 some	 insights	 about	 the	
relationship	between	 firms’	 characteristics	and	 their	behaviour.	This	provides	
us	a	framework	to	study	firm	heterogeneity.	
	
2.5	Conclusions	
 
	
In	this	literature	review,	we	have	looked	at	the	key	components	of	the	tests	for	
financial	 constraint.	 We	 investigated	 how	 alternative	 investment	 model	
specifications	(the	Q	model,	the	Euler	equation	and	the	error‐correction‐model)	
were	 used	 to	 control	 for	 investment	 opportunities.	 Then	 we	 examined	 the	
commonly	 used	 sample	 splitting	 criteria	 that	 were	 used	 to	 identify	 firms	 as	
more	 or	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 financially	 constrained.	 Empirical	 evidence	 has	
generally	 supported	 the	 financial	 constraints	 hypothesis,	 across	 different	
countries	and	different	firm	characteristics.	On	the	other	hand,	some	empirical	
evidence	 casts	 doubts	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 investment	 cash	 flow	
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sensitivities	 as	 evidence	 of	 financial	 constraints,	 these	 criticisms	 are	 mainly	
relying	 on	 that	 the	 Q	 model	 failed	 to	 properly	 control	 of	 investment	
opportunities.	 In	 order	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 effects	 and	 implication	 of	
financial	constraints,	further	research	is	necessary.		
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Chapter	3:	Ownership,	Financial	Constraints	
and	Investment:	Evidence	from	China	
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3.1	Introduction	
	
The	pace	and	pattern	of	business	investment	in	fixed	capital	are	central	to	our	
understanding	 of	 economic	 activity.	 Business	 investment	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	
determinants	of	an	economy’s	 long‐term	growth	rate	and	also	plays	a	pivotal	
role	 in	 explaining	 business	 cycle	 fluctuations.	 It	 is	 therefore	 crucial	 for	
economists	 and	policy‐makers	 to	understand	 the	mechanisms	 that	determine	
investment	spending.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	particular	 important	 to	central	banks	
for	an	effective	conduct	of	monetary	policy,	because	 investment	is	believed	to	
be	a	major	interest‐sensitive	expenditure.		
	
Despite	the	extensive	research,	the	explanation	of	investment	behaviour	
has	 been	 disappointing.	 Thus,	 researchers	 start	 to	 improve	 the	 empirical	
specification	 of	 investment	models	 by	modifying	 the	 fundamental	 underlying	
assumptions.	One	of	the	recent	progresses	is	by	examining	the	implications	of	
financial	constraints	caused	by	capital	market	imperfections	on	investment.		
	
Financial	 constraints	 have	 long	 been	 cited	 as	 the	 major	 obstacle	 for	
business.	And	this	is	particular	true	for	transition	economies	like	China,	which	
has	a	relatively	less	developed	financial	market	and	a	state‐dominated	financial	
system.	 Investment	 has	 been	 the	 key	 drivers	 of	 China’s	 economic	 growth	 in	
recent	years.	And	private	 firms	are	considered	to	be	 the	engine	of	growth	 for	
the	 Chinese	 economy	 in	 the	 future.	 However,	 recent	 surveys	 indicate	 that	
private	 firms	 in	China	have	continuously	cited	 failing	 to	obtain	 finance	as	 the	
major	obstacles	for	their	growth	and	development.	Recent	studies	suggest	that	
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capital	 and	 resources	 are	 possibly	 misallocated	 across	 firm	 ownership.	 In	
particular	 there	 is	 a	 lending	 bias	 in	 China’s	 financial	 system	 which	 gives	
preferential	access	to	finance	to	state‐owned	firms	and	creates	political	induced	
obstacles	for	private	firms	to	obtain	finance.	Huang	(2003),	in	his	popular	book	
“Selling	China”,	 characterised	 this	 type	 of	 policy	 induced	 liquidity	 constraints	
for	different	ownership	as	a	“political	pecking	order”	for	finance.		
	
This	 paper	 is	 intended	 to	 study	 the	 relationship	 between	 financial	
constraints	and	investment	in	China.	In	particular,	we	will	focus	on	the	impact	
of	ownership	on	the	level	of	financial	constraints.	We	will	also	explore	whether	
regional	 disparities	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 Last,	
China	has	been	one	of	the	biggest	FDI	recipients	 in	the	World.	We	would	also	
like	to	test	whether	foreign	 investment	helps	to	alleviate	 the	 level	of	 financial	
constraints.	
	
		 The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follow.	 Section	 3.2	 presents	 a	 brief	
review	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 investment3.	 Section	 3.3	 provides	 some	
stylized	facts	and	background	to	Chinese	fixed	investment	in	the	past	10	years	
using	aggregate	data.	Section	3.4	discusses	the	development	and	reform	of	the	
financial	system	in	China,	and	develops	the	hypothesis	related	to	the	financial	
constraints	in	China	to	be	tested	with	our	empirical	model.	Section	3.5	presents	
the	estimation	framework	and	presents	the	empirical	model	to	be	tested	in	this	
chapter.	 Section	 3.6	 describes	 the	 data	 used	 in	 this	 study	 and	 provides	 the	
                                                 
3 A more comprehensive literature review of financial constraints and investment is provided in 
chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	 sample	 data.	 Section	 3.7	 discusses	 the	 empirical	
results.	Section	3.8	concludes	the	paper	and	provides	some	policy	implications.	
	
3.2			Literature	Review	
	
3.2.1	Theory	of	financial	constraints	
	
Modigliani	 and	Miller’s	 (1958)	 seminal	work	 suggests	 that	 under	perfect	 and	
complete	 capital	 markets,	 firms’	 investment	 decisions	 and	 their	 financing	
decisions	 should	 be	 independent	 from	 each	 other.	 In	 this	 framework,	 the	
external	 finance	 (debt	 and	 new	 equity	 issues)	 and	 internal	 finance	 (retained	
earnings)	are	perfect	substitutes.	Firms	are	able	to	undertake	all	the	profitable	
investment	opportunities.	
	
However,	 in	 reality	 capital	 markets	 are	 rarely	 perfect.	 There	 are	 a	
number	of	 factors	 that	 lead	 to	 imperfections	 in	 capital	market,	 such	 as	 taxes,	
transaction	 costs,	 and	 most	 importantly	 information	 asymmetries	 between	
lenders	and	borrowers.	These	lead	external	finance	to	be	more	expensive	than	
internal	finance.	Moreover,	external	finance	may	not	be	available	at	all	for	some	
firms.	This	implies	that	internal	finance	provide	a	cheaper	source	of	financing,	
thus	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 level	 of	 internal	 finance	 increase	 the	 desired	 level	
investment	 spending.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 level	 of	 internal	 fund	 could	 be	 an	
important	determinant	of	investment	empirically.		
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Existing	models	 of	 imperfect	 capital	 market	 focus	 on	 the	 problems	 of	
adverse	selection	and	moral	hazard	 in	generating	 frictions	 in	capital	markets.	
Myers	 and	Majluf	 (1984)	 present	 a	 model	 of	 equity	 finance,	 recognizing	 the	
problems	 of	 information	 asymmetry,	 which	 lead	 to	 adverse	 selection.	 They	
show	that	when	outsiders	(investors)	have	imperfect	knowledge	of	the	value	of	
the	firm,	they	will	demand	a	premium	to	acquire	the	firm’s	shares	 in	order	to	
compensate	 the	 losses	 incurred	 from	 financing	 a	 ‘lemon’	 firm.	 This	 premium	
makes	 the	 external	 cost	 of	 capital	 higher.	 To	 the	 extreme,	 Stiglitz	 and	Weiss	
(1981b)	argue	 that	 informational	asymmetries	will	 lead	 to	 credit	 rationing	 in	
the	loans	market,	as	lenders	are	unable	to	discriminate	between	good	and	bad	
borrowers.	In	this	situation,	lenders	will	intentionally	set	a	price	that	creates	an	
excess	demand	for	loans.	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	argue	that	due	to	limited	
liability,	a	moral	hazard	problem	may	arise	when	borrowers	have	the	incentive	
to	use	funds	on	excessively	risky	projects.	In	order	to	compensate	this	potential	
risk,	lender	will	demand	a	premium	for	the	loan	and	possibly	use	covenants	to	
restrict	the	use	of	funds	in	specific	areas.	
	
Despite	 the	 difference	 in	 details	 in	 these	 theoretical	 studies,	 they	 all	
provide	us	with	 the	 common	 theme	 that	a	general	 implication	of	 information	
problems	 in	 capital	 market	 is	 that	 internal	 funds	 and	 external	 funds	 are	 no	
longer	perfect	substitutes.	There	is	a	gap	between	the	cost	of	internal	funds	and	
external	 funds.	 This	 gap	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 information	
asymmetry	which	leads	to	an	“information	cost”.	Firms	that	facing	higher	level	
of	 information	 asymmetries	will	 tend	 to	 face	 a	much	 higher	 cost	 for	 external	
funds	 than	 firms	 facing	 low	 level	 of	 asymmetric	 information.	 These	 firms’	
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investment	will	 tend	 to	 be	 financially	 constrained	 and	 could	 not	 achieve	 the	
optimal	investment	level.	
	
3.2.2	Investment	Cash‐Flow	sensitivities	and	financial	constraints	
	
Empirically,	 financing	 constraints	 could	 be	 identified	 through	 sensitivity	 of	
investment	with	respect	to	internal	funds4.	The	concept	of	financial	constraints	
can	be	understood	from	the	graphical	illustration	of	figure	3.1	below.	 
 
 
Figure 3.1: investment and net worth in imperfect capital market.  
Adapted from  Hubbard (1998) . 
  
In	 the	 context	 of	 perfect	 capital	 market,	 there	 is	 no	 asymmetric	
information,	 so	both	 insiders	 and	outsiders	have	 the	 same	 information.	Thus,	
the	 cost	 of	 external	 funds	 always	 equals	 to	 the	 opportunity	 cost	 of	 internal	
funds.	Firms	will	be	able	to	obtain	external	finance	for	the	gap	between	internal	
                                                 
4 Internal finance is typically proxy by the level of cash-flow in the empirical literatures. 
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finance	 and	 external	 finance	 to	 achieve	 the	 optimal	 investment	 level	 at	 the	
opportunity	cost	of	internal	funds.	Therefore	internal	funds	have	no	effects	on	
investment,	and	underinvestment	will	not	occur.		
	
Figure	3.1	illustrates	the	demand	for	capital	and	the	supply	of	funds	in	the	
presence	of	information	asymmetries.	The	curve	S(W)	represents	the	supply	of	
funds,	 where	W	 is	 the	 level	 of	 internal	 funds	 of	 the	 firm.	 Recall	 from	 the	
discussion	from	the	last	section,	 information	asymmetry	will	 lead	outsiders	to	
demand	 a	 premium	 of	 external	 funds,	 therefore	 for	 funds	 above	 the	 level	 of	
internal	 funds	 is	 represented	 by	 an	 upward	 sloping	 supply	 curve,	 where	 the	
firm	will	face	higher	costs	of	capital.	Now	consider	a	firm	with	net	worth	of	W0	
and	investment	demand	curve	D,	due	to	imperfect	capital	market,	the	firm	will	
only	 invest	up	 to	 the	point	K0	which	 is	much	 less	 than	 its	optimal	 investment	
level	in	perfect	capital	market.	This	illustrates	the	important	impact	of	financial	
constraints	 of	 investment,	where	 lack	 of	 finance	will	 cause	 the	 firm	 to	 fail	 to	
achieve	its	optimal	investment	level.		
	
An	increase	in	net	worth	(or	internal	funds)	from	W0	to	W1	in	the	financially	
constrained	firms	will	lead	to	an	increase	in	investment	from	K0	to	K1,	holding	
the	 investment	 opportunities	 unchanged,	 as	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 3.1.	 This	
increase	 in	 internal	 funds	 which	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 investment	
opportunities	helps	to	alleviate	the	problems	of	financial	constraints	and	leads	
to	an	increase	in	investment	and	the	level	of	capital	stock.	The	slop	of	the	S(W)	
curve	is	typically	determined	by	the	level	of	information	problems	a	firms	faced.	
For	firms	that	are	facing	high	information	problems,	the	S(W)	curve	tend	to	be	
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much	steeper,	on	the	other	hand	well	established	firms	facing	low	information	
problems	 ten	 to	 have	 a	 flatter	 S(W)	 curve	 which	 indicates	 that	 the	 costs	 of	
external	 funds	 is	close	to	 their	 internal	 funds.	This	provides	a	 justification	 for	
the	 investment	 cash‐flow	 sensitivities	 studies,	 where	 higher	 sensitivity	 of	
investment	to	cash‐flow	suggests	the	presence	of	financing	constraints.	
	
3.2.3	Empirical	evidence	on	financing	constraints	
	
3.2.3.1	Empirical	evidence	on	developed	countries	and	
developing	countries	
	
The	 effect	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 investment	 is	 essentially	 an	 empirical	
problem.	 Generally,	 there	 are	 two	 main	 approaches	 to	 test	 the	 sensitivity	
between	investment	and	cash	flows.	The	first	approach	is	based	on	the	Q	theory	
of	 investment	 developed	 by	 Tobin	 (1969).	 The	 seminal	 paper	 of	 Fazzari,	
Hubbard	and	Petersen	 (1988)	 (hereafter	 “FHP”)	used	 it	 as	 the	base	model	 to	
investigate	 the	 presence	 of	 financing	 constraints.	 By	 including	 a	 measure	 of	
internal	 funds	 (Cash	 flow)	 as	 an	 explanatory	 variable	 in	 the	 reduced	 form	q‐
model,	 they	divide	 the	sample	using	a	priori	 classifications	of	 firm’s	 financing	
constraints	 (dividend	 policy)	 and	 then	 compare	 the	 investment‐cash	 flow	
sensitivities	 of	 the	 different	 sub	 samples.	 They	 interpreted	 the	 higher	
sensitivities	of	cash	flows	for	the	sub‐sample	of	a	priori	more	constrained	firms	
as	evidence	of	financial	constraints.	FHP	argue	that	firms	facing	higher	financial	
constraints	find	external	finance	much	more	expensive	and	have	to	depend	on	
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their	internal	finance	for	expanding	investment.	Therefore,	these	firms	should	
demonstrate	a	high	sensitivity	between	investment	and	cash‐flows.		
	
There	 has	 been	 a	 large	 literature	 using	 similar	 methodologies	 that	
confirms	 findings	 in	 the	 FHP’s	 (1988)	 seminal	 paper.	 Hoshi,	 Kashyap	 and	
Scharfstein(1991)	compare	Japanese	manufacturing	firms	which	are	members	
of	a	keiretsu	and	those	who	are	not.	They	find	that	the	latter	are	more	sensitive	
to	 internal	 funds	 than	 the	 former	 and	 conclude	 that	membership	 of	 keiretsu	
reduces	 the	 likelihood	 of	 being	 financially	 constrained.	 Oliner	 and	 Rudebush	
(1992)	 find	 that	 investment‐cash	 flow	 sensitivity	 is	 higher	 for	 young	 firms,	
whose	shares	are	traded	over‐the‐counter,	than	other	firms.	
	
An	 alternative	 approach	 to	 tests	 for	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 financial	
constraints	 is	 based	 on	 Euler	 investment	 equation.	 Whited	 (1992)	 find	 that	
Euler	investment	equation	fits	well	for	firms	with	bond	ratings	but	it	is	rejected	
for	firms	without	bond	ratings.	Similarly,	Hubbard,	Kashyap	and	Whited	(1995)	
report	 that	 the	standard	Euler	equation	models	 is	 rejected	 for	 firms	with	 low	
dividend	 pay‐out	 ratios,	 but	 not	 for	 firms	with	 high	 dividend	 pay‐out	 ratios.	
Both	 papers	 suggest	 that	 exogenous	 financial	 constraints	 are	 particularly	
binding	for	constrained	firms,	which	supports	the	FHP	(1988)	results.		
	
The	Euler	equation	approach	 is	 the	preferred	model	 for	 this	study.	We	
will	provide	the	basic	derivation	of	the	Euler	equation	investment	model	from	
firm’s	 optimal	 problems	 in	 section	 5	 and	 its	 empirical	 specification	 for	 the	
econometric	tests.	
71 
 
	
3.2.3.2	Empirical	evidence	on	China	
	
Despite	the	 important	role	of	 fixed	investments	plays	 in	the	Chinese	economy	
and	China’s	phenomenal	economic	growth	in	the	past	three	decades,	very	little	
empirical	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 fixed	
investment	 and	 financial	 constraints	 in	 the	 context	 of	China.	One	of	 the	main	
reasons	is	due	to	the	lack	of	good	quality	micro	level	data	on	Chinese	firms.		
	
Using	data	for	Shanghai’s	manufacturing	sector	between	1989	and	1992,	
Chow	and	Fung	(1998)	study	the	relationship	between	investment	and	ash	flow.	
They	 estimate	 a	 sales	 accelerator	 model	 and	 confirm	 that	 the	 investment	 of	
manufacturing	 enterprises	 in	 Shanghai	 is	 constrained	 by	 cash	 flow.	
Furthermore,	 their	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 private	 firms	 are	more	 financially	
constrained	than	state‐owned	enterprises	(SOEs),	which	support	the	existence	
of	a	“lending	bias”	where	the	banking	sectors	have	a	preference	to	lend	to	SOEs	
over	private	firms.		They	also	find	evidence	that	international	joint	ventures	are	
the	 least	 financially	 constrained.	 Using	 the	 same	 dataset	 and	 empirical	
specification,	Chow	and	Fung	 (2000)	 find	 that	 small	 firms	display	 lower	 level	
sensitivities	of	investment	to	cash	flow	than	large	firms,	which	is	in	contrast	to	
those	findings	from	the	developed	countries.	They	argue	this	finding	is	due	to	
the	fact	that	small	firms	are	successful	and	fast	growing,	which	allows	them	to	
smooth	their	fixed	investment	with	working	capital	adjustment.	
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	 Using	 firm‐level	 data	 on	 1300	 China’s	 domestic	 firms	 over	 the	 period	
2000‐2002,	Héricourt	and	Poncet	(2009)	estimate	a	dynamic	investment	model	
to	study	the	presence	of	financing	constraints	for	domestic	firms	in	China.	Their	
study	suggests	a	significant	difference	between	the	credit	constraints	faced	by	
private	firms	and	state‐owned	firms.	Moreover,	by	focusing	on	the	effects	of	FDI	
inflows,	Héricourt	and	Poncet	(2009)	 find	the	FDI	 inflows	seem	to	reduce	the	
level	of	financial	constraints	of	private	firms	in	China.	
	
3.3	Stylized	facts	and	trends	of	fixed	investment	in	China	
	
Fixed	investment	has	 long	been	identified	as	one	of	the	key	drivers	of	China’s	
rapid	economic	growth	in	the	last	three	decades.	In	order	to	understand	China’s	
phenomenon	growth	speed,	it	is	important	to	gain	a	good	understanding	of	its	
fixed	 investment.	This	 section	aims	 to	 look	at	 the	 stylized	 facts	and	 trends	of	
fixed	asset	investment	in	China	from	1995	to	2006	from	the	aggregate	data.	In	
particular,	 we	would	 like	 to	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 investments	 are	 financed	 and	
which	ownership	 types	are	 investing.	This	provides	us	 some	backgrounds	 for	
our	empirical	investigation	of	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	investment	
for	different	ownership	groups.		
	
3.3.1	Investment	growth	and	Investment‐GDP	ratio	
	
Figure	3.2	indicates	that	China’s	investment	has	been	growing	rapidly	in	recent	
years.	 Since	 the	 slowdown	 of	 investment	 growth	 in	 the	 1995	 due	 to	 the	
government’s	tightening	of	the	economy	to	combat	the	high	inflation	rate,	and	
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after	the	1998	recession	due	to	the	Asian	financial	crisis,	the	investment	growth	
rate	decline	 to	around	5%	at	 the	 trough	 in	1999,	 the	 investment	growth	 rate	
has	 picked	 up	 its	 pace	 and	 reached	 a	 peak	 of	 27.7%	 in	 2003.	 Although	
investment	 growth	 has	 been	 easing	 after	 2003,	 investment	 has	 been	
continuously	growing	at	a	rate	well	above	20%.	
 
Figure 3.2: China’s fixed investment growth rate.  
Sources: NBS; and Authors’ estimates 
 
It	is	widely	recognised	that	the	phenomenal	growth	rate	of	the	Chinese	
economy	 is	 largely	 driven	 by	 capital	 accumulation.	 Figure	 3.3	 plots	 the	
investment	to	GDP	ratios	over	the	period	of	1995	and	2006.		The	investment	to	
GDP	 ratio	 has	 been	 well	 above	 30%	 since	 1995,	 and	 continues	 to	 grow	 and	
reaching	 nearly	 52%	 in	 20065.	 	 China’s	 investment	 ratio	 in	 recent	 year	 is	
exceptionally	high	compare	to	other	countries.	Even	when	we	compare	China’s	
                                                 
5 See table 1 for detail investment to GDP ratios. 
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investment	 ratio	 to	 Korea	 and	 Japan	 during	 their	 boom	 years,	 China’s	
investment	ratio	is	much	higher6.		
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Figure 3.3: Fixed investment as a percentage of GDP in China 1995-2006 
Sources: NBS; and Authors’ calculation 
 
 
Table	 3.1	 reports	 the	 level	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 and	 foreign	
direct	investment	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	 	The	absolute	level	of	foreign	direct	
investment	has	almost	doubled	over	 the	past	 ten	years	reaching	69.47	billion	
USD	in	year	2006.	However,	its	impact	on	GDP	seems	to	be	declining,	due	to	the	
rapid	increase	in	GDP:		in	1995	FDI	was	around	5.15%	of	GDP,	but	it	declines	to	
around	only	2.63%	of	GDP	 in	2006.	The	 continuous	 inflow	of	FDI	 to	China	 in	
recent	 year	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 a	 high	 demand	 for	 finance,	where	 FDI	 is	
used	as	a	 substitute	 to	domestic	 financing	 sources,	 given	 that	 some	 firms	are	
biased	against	 in	 the	 formal	 financial	system	in	China.	We	will	 further	 look	at	
this	issue	at	the	later	sections.	In	particular,	we	would	like	to	explore	whether	
                                                 
6 Japan’s investment ratio peaked in 1973 at 37.1% and Korea’s investment ratio peaked in1991 at 
38.9%. Sources: OECD Fact book 2008. 
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foreign	investment	in	the	form	of	foreign	ownership	will	help	to	alleviate	firms’	
level	of	financial	constraints.	
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Year GDP  Total Fixed Investment Percentage of  Foreign
  (RMB 100Million) (RMB 100Million)  GDP (US
1995 60793.7 20019.3 32.93% 
1996 71176.6 22913.5 32.19% 
1997 78973.0 24941.1 31.58% 
1998 84402.3 28406.2 33.66% 
1999 89677.1 29854.7 33.29% 
2000 99214.6 32917.7 33.18% 
2001 109655.2 37213.5 33.94% 
2002 120332.7 43499.9 36.15% 
2003 135822.8 55566.6 40.91% 
2004 159878.3 70477.4 44.08% 
2005 183867.9 88773.6 48.28% 
2006 210871.0 109998.2 52.16% 
 
Table	3.1:	Fixed	Asset	Investment	and	FDI	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	in	China	
Sources: NBS China Statistics Yearbooks; various issues
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3.3.2	Investment	by	ownership	
	
The	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China	(NBS)	provides	data	on	investment	in	
fixed	 asset	 by	 different	 ownership	 types.	 Table	 3.2	 shows	 the	 share	 of	
investment	 in	 fixed	 asset	 by	 different	 ownership	 types	 for	 the	 period	 1995	 ‐	
2005.	 The	main	 ownership	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 official	 registered	 status	
include:	state‐owned	units,	collective‐owned	units,	individual	economy	(private	
firms),	 joint	 ownership	 units,	 share‐holding	 units,	 foreign	 funded	 units	 and	
units	with	funds	from	Hong	Kong,	Macao	and	Taiwan.			
	
The	state‐owned	firms’	share	of	investment	in	fixed	assets	has	declined	
over	 the	 ten	 year	 period	 from	 54.44%	 to	 around	 33.42%.	 This	 result	 is	
consistent	with	the	on‐going	reform	and	privatisation	of	the	state‐owned	sector.	
Despite	the	decline	in	the	share	of	investment	in	fixed	asset,	it	is	clear	that	the	
state	 sector	 still	 accounts	 for	 about	 one	 third	 of	 the	 fixed	 asset	 investment,	
which	makes	them	still	the	biggest	player	in	the	economy.			
	
On	the	other	hand,	after	years	of	reform	and	opening	up	of	the	Chinese	
economy,	 the	 private	 sector’s	 share	 of	 fixed	 asset	 investment	 is	 stagnant.	
Private	 sector’s	 share	of	 investment	 in	 fixed	asset	 remains	 at	 around	14%	 to	
15%.	 Lack	 of	 access	 to	 external	 funding	 or	 financial	 constraints	 could	 be	 an	
important	explanation	for	this	stagnant	growth	of	the	private	sector	investment.	
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Table	3.2:	Total	Investment	in	Fixed	Assets	in	the	China	by	Ownership	1995‐2005	
Sources: NBS China Statistics Yearbooks; various issues 
 
 
 
               Nominal RMB millions 
Year Total State-owned % Collective-owned % Individuals % Joint % Share % Foreign % Units with Funds % Others % 
  Units  Units  Economy  Ownership  Holding  Funded  From Hong Kong,    
              Macao and Taiwan    
1995 20,019.27 10,898.24 54.44% 3,289.45 16.43% 2,560.25 12.79% 118.48 0.59% 863.99 4.32% 1,555.26 7.77% 673.64 3.36% 60.00 0.55% 
1996 22,913.50 12,006.20 52.40% 3,651.50 15.94% 3,211.17 14.01% 126.78 0.55% 1,034.57 4.52% 1,876.11 8.19% 835.41 3.65% 171.80 1.43% 
1997 24,941.12 13,091.73 52.49% 3,850.87 15.44% 3,429.43 13.75% 123.12 0.49% 1,387.22 5.56% 1,955.95 7.84% 937.14 3.76% 165.68 1.27% 
1998 28,406.18 15,369.38 54.11% 4,192.24 14.76% 3,744.38 13.18% 60.50 0.21% 1,947.02 6.85% 1,639.61 5.77% 1,334.26 4.70% 118.96 0.77% 
1999 29,854.72 15,947.77 53.42% 4,338.55 14.53% 4,195.75 14.05% 97.90 0.33% 2,478.89 8.30% 1,433.41 4.80% 1,218.07 4.08% 144.45 0.91% 
2000 32,917.74 16,504.45 50.14% 4,801.45 14.59% 4,709.37 14.31% 94.73 0.29% 4,061.88 12.34% 1,313.21 3.99% 1,293.06 3.93% 139.62 0.85% 
2001 37,213.49 17,606.98 47.31% 5,278.58 14.18% 5,429.57 14.59% 94.52 0.25% 5,663.50 15.22% 1,415.47 3.80% 1,583.29 4.25% 141.68 0.80% 
2002 43,499.91 18,877.35 43.40% 5,987.43 13.76% 6,519.19 14.99% 138.19 0.32% 8,328.81 19.15% 1,685.43 3.87% 1,765.33 4.06% 198.19 1.05% 
2003 55,566.62 21,661.02 38.98% 8,009.49 14.41% 7,720.13 13.89% 187.97 0.34% 12,733.58 22.92% 2,533.71 4.56% 2,375.09 4.27% 345.70 1.60% 
2004 70,477.45 25,027.62 35.51% 9,965.73 14.14% 9,880.55 14.02% 217.55 0.31% 17,697.90 25.11% 3,854.02 5.47% 3,113.50 4.42% 720.59 2.88% 
2005 88,773.61 29,666.92 33.42% 11,969.65 13.48% 13,890.65 15.65% 229.59 0.26% 23,535.96 26.51% 4,657.06 5.25% 3,767.32 4.24% 1,056.47 3.56% 
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The	 true	 ownership	 of	 collective‐owned,	 joint‐ownership,	 and	 share	
holding	 companies	 are	 harder	 to	 determine.	 Sometimes	 these	 ownership	 are	
combined	 and	 classified	 as	 non‐state‐owned	 sector,	 if	 we	 combined	 private‐
ownership	 with	 the	 non‐state‐owned	 sector,	 we	 would	 see	 that	 in	 the	 year	
2002,	 their	 combined	 share	of	 investment	 in	 fixed	 asset	 has	 surpass	 those	of	
the	 state‐owned	 sector.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 non‐state	 sector	will	 be	 the	main	
driver	of	China’s	future	growth.	If	we	look	at	table	3.2	closely,	we	can	see	this	is	
largely	the	result	of	significant	increase	in	the	share	holding	companies,	which	
is	mainly	the	result	of	restructuring	state‐owned	enterprises	during	the	reform.	
The	central	government	restructured	a	number	of	state‐owned	enterprises	as	
shareholding	 companies	 and	 list	 them	 on	 the	 stock	 exchange.	 The	 central	
government	started	to	take	a	passive	role	in	these	new	companies.	During	the	
early	 year	 of	 the	 reform,	 the	 candidates	 for	 listing	 in	 the	 stock	 exchange	 are	
recommended	 by	 the	 local	 governments	 and	 confirmed	 by	 the	 central	
government.	Until	2004,	private	firms	rarely	have	the	opportunity	to	be	listed	
in	 one	 of	 the	 two	 stock	 exchanges	 in	 China.	 These	 reform	 processes	 also	
deprive	 the	 private	 enterprises’	 opportunity	 for	 funding	 from	 the	 capital	
market.		
	
Foreign	 funded	units	also	show	a	decline	 in	 the	share	of	 investment	 in	
fixed	asset	in	the	early	2000	from	7.77%	to	3.8%,	but	gradually	climb	back	in	
recent	 years	 to	 around	 5%.	 	 Firms	 with	 funds	 from	 Hong	 Kong,	 Macao,	 and	
Taiwan’s	share	of	investment	in	fixed	asset	are	very	stable	at	around	4%	over	
the	 ten	 year	 period.	 In	 sum,	 foreign‐invested	 firms	 only	 accounts	 for	 a	 small	
share	of	investment.		
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3.3.3	Sources	of	investment	funding	
	
Figure	 3.4	 and	 table	 3.3	 present	 the	 major	 sources	 of	 funding	 for	 fixed	
investment	in	China.	NBS7	China	classified	investment	funding	into	four	major	
categories:	 state	budget,	 domestic	 loans,	 foreign	 investment,	 self‐raised	 funds	
and	others.	
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Figure 3.4 Financing of fixed investment in China 
Sources: NBS; and Authors’ estimation. 
 
From	 figure	3.4,	 it	 is	 clearly	 that	 state	budget	no	 longer	plays	 a	major	
role	in	terms	of	financing	fixed	investment	in	China,	it	only	accounts	for	around	
4%	 of	 total	 funding	 of	 fixed	 investment	 (table	 3.3).	 At	 first	 this	 might	 seem	
confusing	 in	 light	 of	 the	 results	 in	 section	 3.3.2	 where	 SOEs	 are	 the	 major	
investors	in	fixed	asset	investment,	the	low	level	of	state	budget	as	a	source	of	
funding	is	due	to	the	fact	that	most	SOEs	do	not	have	to	contribute	their	profits	
to	the	state	budget	but	instead	are	allowed	to	keep	them	as	a	source	of	funding	
for	continuing	expansion.  
                                                 
7 National bureau of statistics of China 
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Year State Domestic Foreign Self-raising 
  Budget Loans Investment Fund and others 
1995 3.00% 20.50% 11.20% 65.30% 
1996 2.70% 19.60% 11.80% 66.00% 
1997 2.80% 18.90% 10.60% 67.70% 
1998 4.20% 19.30% 9.10% 67.40% 
1999 6.22% 19.24% 6.74% 67.79% 
2000 6.40% 20.30% 5.10% 68.20% 
2001 6.70% 19.10% 4.60% 69.60% 
2002 7.00% 19.70% 4.60% 68.70% 
2003 4.60% 20.50% 4.40% 70.50% 
2004 4.40% 18.50% 4.40% 72.70% 
2005 4.39% 17.25% 4.21% 74.15% 
2006 3.93% 16.47% 3.64% 75.96% 
 
Table	3.3:	Sources	of	Funds	of	Total	Investment	in	Fixed	Assets	in	China	
1995‐2006	
S NBS Chi St ti ti Y b k i i
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Based	on	 the	 share	of	 funding	 from	 foreign	 investment,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
the	majority	 of	 the	 investment	 is	 financed	 domestically.	 The	 share	 of	 foreign	
investment	 funding	has	been	declining	 from	a	peak	of	11.2%	 in	1995	 to	only	
3.64%	 in	 2006	 (table3.2).	 Furthermore,	 comparing	 the	 share	 of	 fixed	 asset	
investment	by	 foreign	investors	and	source	of	 funding	 from	foreign	 investors,	
we	see	that	foreign	investors8	accounts	for	around	9.49%	of	fixed	investment	in	
China	 (table	 3.2),	 where	 funding	 from	 foreign	 investors	 only	 accounts	 for	
3.64%.	 This	 suggests	 that	 foreign	 firms	may	 be	 starting	 to	 obtain	 finance	 for	
investment	 in	China,	which	 implies	 that	 foreign	 firms	 could	be	 competing	 for	
funds	with	domestic	firms.	
	
Domestic	bank	loans	are	the	second	largest	sources	of	financing	in	China,	
but	they	only	accounts	for	around	20%	of	the	total	investment	funding.	Due	to	
the	 tightening	 of	monetary	 policy	 in	 2004	 and	 2005,	 the	 availability	 of	 bank	
loans	 has	 declined	 to	 only	 16.47%	 of	 the	 total	 investment	 funds.	 Given	 the	
underdeveloped	stock	market	and	negligible	corporate	bond	market,	it	is	clear	
that	 China’s	weak	 capital	market	 is	 unable	 to	 support	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 the	
economy	 and	 investment.	 The	 largest	 component	 of	 funding	 for	 fixed	 asset	
investment	is	self‐raised	funds,	where	it	accounts	for	around	65%	in	1995	and	
gradually	increases	to	around	75%	of	the	total	funding	for	investment.	This	is	a	
major	problem	for	Chinese	firms,	where	self‐raised	and	internal	funding	is	the	
most	 important	source	of	 funding.	Moreover	 it	 is	 likely	 that	private	 firms	will	
be	discriminated	 in	the	capital	markets.	The	 lack	of	access	to	external	 finance	
may	impose	a	significant	obstacle	to	private	firm’s	expansion	and	China’s	future	
                                                 
8 Investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are also classified as foreign investors. 
83 
 
growth.	 The	 heavy	 reliance	 of	 self‐raising	 funds	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	
hypothesis	of	financial	constraints	where	firms’	investment	is	strongly	related	
to	 the	 cash	 flow	 they	 are	 able	 to	 generate.	We	will	 test	 for	 the	 hypothesis	 of	
financial	constraints	in	the	later	section	of	this	paper.	
	
3.3.4	Regional	disparity	in	Investment	
	
Another	 interesting	 fact	 about	 China’	 fixed	 investment	 is	 the	 strong	 regional	
disparity.	 Table	 3.4	 reports	 the	 share	 of	 fixed	 asset	 investment	 by	 different	
regions.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 trend	 to	 be	 more	 traceable,	 we	 classify	 the	 32	
provinces	 into	 three	 regions:	 East/Coastal,	 Central,	 and	West;	 based	 on	 their	
geographical	 locations.	 This	 classification	 also	 has	 significant	 political	 and	
economic	 implications.	 The	 East/coastal	 region	 contains	 the	 experimental	
provinces	that	the	central	government	used	to	test	out	its	development	policy	
at	the	early	stage	of	the	transition.	The	provinces	in	these	regions	tend	to	enjoy	
substantial	 favourable	 policies	 and	 special	 treatments	 from	 the	 central	
government.	The	 local	governments	also	enjoys	a	higher	 level	of	autonomy	in	
their	decision	making	process.		
	
From	table	3.4,	we	can	see	 that	 fixed	 investment	 in	 the	Eastern/Costal	
region	 accounts	 for	 more	 than	 55	 %	 of	 the	 national	 total	 fixed	 investment	
consistently	 over	 the	 ten	 year	 period,	 while	 the	 central	 region	 accounts	 for	
around	20%	of	total	fixed	investment	and	western	region	accounts	for	15%	of	
total	fixed	investment.	This	indicates	there	is	a	significant	imbalance	in	the	level	
of	 economic	 development	 across	 the	 three	 regions.	 The	 Chinese	 government	
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has	always	concerned	about	the	wide	wealth	gap	between	the	urban	and	rural	
area,	and	in	particular	the	difference	between	the	eastern	and	western	regions.	
Both	the	“go	west”	policy	and	the	on‐going	5	years	plan	put	a	huge	emphasis	on	
the	developing	of	western	regions.	We	can	see	the	west	region’s	share	of	fixed	
investment	gradually	increased	over	the	years	from	a	mere	12.46%	in	1995	to	
around	17.68%	in	2004	as	a	result	of	the	policy	to	develop	the	west.	
	
Table	 3.5	 provides	 us	with	more	 evidence	 on	 the	 substantial	 regional	
differences	in	fixed	asset	investment.	Based	on	the	provincial	level	data	of	fixed	
investment	in	China	from	year	2004,	we	provide	data	on	three	regions	as	well	
as	 individual	 provinces’	 fixed	 investment	 by	 different	 ownership	 groups.	We	
can	identify	very	interesting	patterns	from	these	data.	State‐owned	enterprises	
tends	 to	 be	 the	 major	 investment	 forces	 in	 the	 central	 and	 western	 region,	
accounting	 for	 about	 more	 than	 40%	 of	 the	 total	 provincial	 fixed	 asset	
investment.	 In	particular	SOEs	presence	 is	 the	highest	 in	 the	western	regions.	
The	 SOEs’	 share	 of	 fixed	 investment	 is	 lower	 in	 the	 Eastern	 region,	 which	 is	
now	more	market	oriented	and	developed.	On	the	other	hand,	 foreign	 funded	
investment	 have	 taken	 an	 opposite	 patterns	 to	 the	 SOEs.	 Foreign	 funded	
investment	 is	 highest	 in	 the	Eastern	 region	 and	 is	 lowest	 in	 the	West	 region,	
where	for	some	provinces	the	foreign	funded	investment	accounts	for	less	than	
3%	of	the	provincial	level	total	fixed	investment.	Again,	table	3.5	reinforces	the	
idea	that	there	are	significant	disparities	in	investment	in	different	regions	and	
for	different	ownership	types.	
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Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
East 12369.46 13816.26 14743.93 16369.71 17330.27 18752.47 20874.16 24183.47 32140.13 40411.49 
 59.10% 58.16% 57.47% 56.77% 57.13% 56.40% 55.88% 56.01% 57.86% 57.81% 
Central 3958.4 4829.28 5315.46 6023.32 6217.05 7033.54 8058.98 9336.21 11620.72 15129 
 18.91% 20.33% 20.72% 20.89% 20.49% 21.15% 21.57% 21.62% 20.92% 21.64% 
West 2608.17 3114.14 3597.97 4443.22 4788.98 5463.33 6419.87 7658.45 9788.25 12355.55 
 12.46% 13.11% 14.02% 15.41% 15.79% 16.43% 17.19% 17.74% 17.62% 17.68% 
Total 20931.03 23755.68 25654.36 28834.25 30335.3 33249.34 37354.01 43180.13 55552.1 69900.04 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table	3.4:	Fixed	investment	in	China	by	regions,	1995‐2004.	(100	million	RMB)	
Sources: NBS China Statistics Yearbooks; various issues 
 
Eastern region: Beijing, Tianjing, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi, Hebei.  
Central region: Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan.  
Western region: Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. 
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Region State-owned Collective Individuals Joint Share Foreign Others Total 
  Units   Economy Ownership Holding Funded Ownership   
 National Total 35.51% 14.14% 14.02% 0.31% 25.11% 9.89% 1.02% 100.00% 
         
East 29.50% 18.46% 12.95% 0.37% 23.75% 13.95% 1.03% 100.00% 
 Beijing                       29.05% 9.49% 6.58% 0.10% 38.79% 15.45% 0.55% 100.00% 
 Tianjin                       38.85% 9.33% 6.66% 0.12% 26.19% 14.44% 4.41% 100.00% 
 Hebei                         32.02% 21.02% 13.63% 0.80% 23.79% 6.81% 1.93% 100.00% 
 Liaoning                      31.23% 10.96% 17.57% 0.20% 29.89% 9.28% 0.88% 100.00% 
 Shanghai                      29.81% 10.12% 8.30% 0.87% 21.07% 26.84% 2.98% 100.00% 
 Jiangsu                       30.55% 23.76% 13.70% 0.09% 16.86% 14.73% 0.32% 100.00% 
 Zhejiang                      26.21% 28.53% 10.77% 0.08% 26.34% 7.46% 0.61% 100.00% 
 Fujian                        30.21% 12.44% 15.40% 0.29% 17.84% 22.91% 0.90% 100.00% 
 Shandong                      25.11% 23.22% 13.81% 0.69% 27.74% 8.47% 0.96% 100.00% 
 Guangdong                     29.29% 15.30% 14.41% 0.42% 16.98% 23.10% 0.50% 100.00% 
 Hainan                        31.67% 4.40% 8.74% 0.50% 34.68% 19.11% 0.89% 100.00% 
 Guangxi                       43.33% 3.70% 22.47% 0.18% 22.71% 6.92% 0.69% 100.00% 
         
Central 40.33% 8.67% 16.66% 0.28% 27.94% 4.88% 1.80% 100.00% 
 Shanxi                        38.56% 8.27% 13.17% 0.84% 37.26% 1.52% 0.37% 100.00% 
 Inner Mongolia               48.72% 2.54% 12.04% 0.01% 34.21% 2.06% 0.42% 100.00% 
 Jilin                         39.04% 4.58% 13.81% 0.09% 32.19% 9.36% 0.94% 100.00% 
 Heilongjiang                  44.85% 3.34% 15.31% 0.02% 30.89% 2.45% 3.15% 100.00% 
 Anhui                         37.03% 9.44% 20.79% 0.05% 26.67% 4.79% 1.23% 100.00% 
 Jiangxi                       42.26% 9.38% 18.83% 0.21% 22.08% 6.81% 0.43% 100.00% 
 Henan                         35.26% 13.17% 19.90% 0.18% 24.99% 5.46% 1.03% 100.00% 
 Hubei                         40.97% 8.00% 14.50% 0.67% 26.44% 6.92% 2.50% 100.00% 
 Hunan                         40.34% 12.95% 17.50% 0.37% 23.72% 4.21% 0.92% 100.00% 
         
West 45.96% 7.56% 15.57% 0.15% 26.86% 3.10% 0.79% 100.00% 
 Chongqing                     40.19% 7.29% 18.02% 0.20% 26.70% 6.83% 0.76% 100.00% 
 Sichuan                       35.57% 13.27% 15.81% 0.09% 31.26% 3.28% 0.72% 100.00% 
 Guizhou                       58.27% 4.43% 15.50% 0.24% 19.48% 1.88% 0.21% 100.00% 
 Yunnan                        46.99% 4.87% 19.34% 0.06% 24.95% 2.32% 1.46% 100.00% 
 Tibet                         84.41% 0.71% 5.92% 0.04% 5.43% 0.07% 3.41% 100.00% 
 Shaanxi                       53.72% 4.72% 14.24% 0.34% 23.50% 2.29% 1.19% 100.00% 
 Gansu                         60.86% 6.56% 12.64% 0.11% 16.66% 2.46% 0.71% 100.00% 
 Qinghai                       51.51% 3.64% 9.86% 0.06% 31.39% 3.11% 0.44% 100.00% 
 Ningxia                       36.65% 10.21% 20.65% 0.27% 29.88% 2.35% 0.00% 100.00% 
 Xinjiang                      45.26% 4.75% 12.26% 0.02% 35.86% 1.63% 0.22% 100.00% 
Table	3.5:	Share	of	provincial	fixed	investment	by	ownership	in	year	2004. (Foreign funded include investment from HK, Macau and 
Taiwan) Sources: NBS China Statistics Yearbooks; 2005, and authors’ calculations 
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3.3.4	The	performance	and	profitability	of	private	firms	and	SOEs	
	
The	 last	 commonly	 noticed	 fact	 is	 that	 in	 China	 the	 private	 sector	 tends	 to	
perform	 better	 than	 the	 state	 sector.	 Figure	 3.5	 is	 adapted	 from	 the	 OECD	
country	 study	 on	 China	 (OECD	 2004),	 based	 on	 the	 return	 of	 total	 physical	
assets	(ROA)	results	over	the	period	of	1999‐2003,	for	private	industrial	firms	
and	 state	 controlled	 industrial	 firms.	 We	 can	 see	 that	 private	 firms’	 ROA	
consistently	outperformed	 that	of	 the	state	controlled	 firms	by	3.5%	 in	every	
year	during	the	period.	This	has	raised	concerns	that	state	owned	enterprises	
are	much	less	efficient	than	private	firms.		
	
Combined	 with	 the	 high	 investment	 rate	 conducted	 by	 state	 owned	
firms,	we	would	suspect	 that	a	 large	amount	of	 capitals	 invested	by	SOEs	are	
inefficient.	If	we	could	shift	these	resources	to	the	private	sector,	we	would	see	
a	 significant	 improvement	 of	 the	 overall	 efficiency	 of	 the	whole	 economy,	 or	
China	could	sustain	its	current	 level	of	economic	growth	with	 less	 investment	
and	 its	 people	 could	 spend	 more	 on	 consumption.	 This	 result	 is	 also	 an	
indication	of	the	existence	of	a	lending	bias	among	different	ownership	groups.	
The	inefficient	state	owned	enterprises	are	able	to	continuously	obtain	funding	
for	 their	 investment	 despite	 their	 low	 efficiency	 and	 profitability,	 while	 the	
more	profitable	private	firms	are	unable	to	obtain	enough	financial	resource	for	
expansion.	 	 In	the	next	section	we	will	explore	why	such	a	 lending	bias	exists	
among	different	ownership	types.		
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Figure 3.5:  Financial performance of industrial companies:  
private vs State controlled, 1999-2003.  
Source: OECD Country study (2004) 
Return of Asset (ROA) is defined as Net Income divided by total physical assets. 
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3.4	Financial	constraints	in	China	
	
In	 this	 section,	we	will	 explore	 the	 various	 causes	of	 financial	 constraints	 for	
firms	in	China	and	we	will	form	hypothesises	to	be	tested	with	firms	level	data.	
In	particular,	we	will	 focus	on	how	 firms	with	different	ownership	 types	may	
face	 different	 levels	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 whether	 there	 is	 regional	
heterogeneity	for	financial	constraints.	Last,	we	will	explore	whether	the	recent	
popular	 view	of	 foreign	direct	 investment	 alleviating	 financial	 constraints	 for	
firms	in	China.	
	
3.4.1	Ownership,	lending	bias	and	financial	constraints	
	
In	 this	 study,	we	classify	 firms	 into	 five	different	ownership	groups.	They	are	
state‐owned	enterprises,	private	 firms,	 collective	owned	 firms,	 foreign‐owned	
firms	 and	 listed	 firms.	 State‐owned	 firms	 are	 firms	 that	 are	 directly	 and	
indirectly	controlled	by	the	central	government	(state	government).	Collective	
owned	 firms	were	 formally	 local	 government‐owned,	which	were	 later	partly	
privatised.	Most	 of	 the	 collective	 firms	 remain	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 local	
government.	 They	 mainly	 operate	 in	 the	 form	 of	 township	 and	 village	
enterprises	(TVEs)9.	Private	firms	are	firms	controlled	by	private	entity	such	as	
individuals,	domestic	 legal	persons.	Foreign	owned	 firms	are	 firms	controlled	
by	foreign	investors	including	those	from	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan	and	Macau.	The	
last	 group	 of	 firms	 is	 listed	 firm,	 which	 in	 technical	 sense	 is	 not	 a	 type	 of	
                                                 
9 TVEs are defined as all rural collectively owned enterprises. They are major components of the 
collective owned enterprises. TVEs are particularly successful in the Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. 
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ownership.	 We	 group	 them	 together	 as	 a	 type	 of	 ownership	 for	 three	 main	
reasons.	First,	most	of	the	firms	listed	on	the	stock	exchange	prior	to	2004	are	
former	 state‐owned	 enterprise	 and	 the	 right	 to	 be	 listed	 is	 based	 on	 a	 quota	
system	 allocated	 to	 different	 provinces.	 They	 tend	 to	 share	 a	 common	 status	
and	 behave	 in	 a	 similar	 ways.	 Second,	 once	 these	 firms	 are	 listed,	 they	 are	
subject	 to	 very	 tight	 scrutiny	 from	 the	 investors	 in	 terms	 of	 operations	 and	
financial	decisions,	in	which	they	behave	like	firms	in	market	economy.	Third,	
including	 the	 listed	 firms	 as	 a	 group	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 direct	 comparison	
between	listed	firms	and	unlisted	firms	in	China.	
	
In	 recent	 studies	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy,	 there	 is	 a	 common	 concern	
that	 capital	 and	 resources	 are	 possibly	 misallocated	 across	 firm	 ownership	
types.	 In	 particular	 there	 is	 a	 lending	 bias	 in	 China’s	 financial	 system	which	
gives	preferential	access	to	finance	by	state‐owned	firms,	and	creates	political	
induced	obstacles	for	private	firms	to	obtain	finance	(Boyreau‐Debray	and	Wei	
2005;	 Dollar	 and	 Wei	 2007).	 	 Huang	 (2004),	 in	 his	 book	 “Selling	 China”,	
characterised	 this	 type	 of	 policy	 induced	 liquidity	 constraints	 for	 different	
ownership	type	as	“political	pecking	order”	for	finance.	There	are	a	number	of	
causes	 for	 the	 “political	 pecking	 order”	 for	 credit	 in	 China.	 We	 will	 explore	
some	of	the	major	causes	here.	
	
3.4.1.1	State‐owned‐enterprise	
	
In	China,	 the	 lending	bias	 is	a	persistent	phenomenon,	which	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	
state‐dominated	financial	system.	The	state‐owned	commercial	banking	system	
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was	set	up	in	the	late	1970s.	Commercial	banks	were	first	set	up	to	specialize	in	
a	particular	 sector.	The	Agricultural	Bank	of	China	 specialized	 in	 rural	 credit,	
the	Construction	Bank	of	China	in	fixed	asset	investment,	the	Bank	of	China	in	
the	foreign	exchange	business	and	the	Industrial	and	Commercial	Bank	of	China	
was	set	up	to	serve	a	target	client	base	consisting	of	industrial	and	commercial	
enterprises.	 In	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 high	 demand	 of	 diversified	 financing	 of	
enterprises,	 the	 sector	 barriers	 have	 been	 removed	 gradually.	 In	 1994,	 three	
policy	 banks	 were	 set	 up	 to	 carry	 out	 policy	 financing,	 with	 each	 of	 them	
specialized	in	financing	of	fixed	asset	investment,	agricultural	procurement	and	
international	trade.		
	
In	 order	 to	 allow	 the	 ‘big	 four’	 state‐owned	 banks	 to	 operate	
independently,	 the	 commercial	banking	 law	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
was	promulgated	 in	1995	 to	provide	a	 legal	 framework	 for	 standardizing	 the	
operations	 of	 commercial	 banks	 in	 China.	 To	 further	 improve	 the	 strength	 of	
the	state‐owned	commercial	banks,	four	asset	management	companies	were	set	
to	 absorb	 the	 non‐performing	 loans	 from	 the	 four	 state‐owned	 commercial	
banks.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	also	undertook	a	number	of	reforms	
to	 increase	 the	 capital	 adequacy	 and	 the	 scope	 of	 business	 of	 state‐owned	
commercial	 banks.	Alongside	with	 the	 reform	of	 the	 state‐owned	 commercial	
banking	 system,	 a	 number	 of	 other	 new	 financial	 institutions	 have	 been	
developed.	
	
Banks	with	different	ownership	structures	have	been	set‐up,	as	well	as	
various	 non‐banking	 financial	 institutions	 such	 as	 securities,	 insurance,	 trust	
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and	 finance	companies.	However,	 the	Big	 four	state‐owned	banks	are	still	 the	
dominated	players	in	the	financial	system.	Until	1998,	state‐owned	commercial	
banks	operated	on	a	credit	quota	system,	in	which	loans	could	only	be	allocated	
to	state‐owned	entities.	Therefore,	before	1998	private	firms	are	excluded	from	
the	 formal	 financial	system.	Since	1998,	 the	People’s	Bank	of	China	(PBC)	has	
abolished	the	credit	quota	system,	and	transform	to	an	 indirect	control	of	 the	
total	supply	of	money	and	credit.	From	then,	private	firms	have	gained	the	legal	
recognition	 in	 the	 formal	 banking	 system.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	 this	 persistent	
lending	 bias	would	 have	 been	 alleviated	 significantly	 by	 now,	 but	 it	will	 still	
have	 a	 long	 term	 effects	 on	 the	 lending	 behaviour	 of	 state‐owned	 banks	
towards	 private	 enterprises.	 As	 a	 result,	 we	would	 expect	 that	 the	 SOEs	will	
continuously	enjoy	preferential	access	to	finance.	
	
SOEs	had	multiple	roles	in	the	early	stage	of	reform	and	transition.	Some	
smaller	 SOEs	 that	 operate	 in	 the	 less	 important	 sector	 are	 being	 gradually	
privatised,	 while	 other	 larger	 or	 SOEs	 that	 operates	 in	 key	 industries	 are	
remaining	under	the	control	of	the	central	government.	Despite	the	long	period	
of	 reform,	 SOEs	 still	 dominate	 the	 economy.	 During	 the	 earlier	 period	 of	
transition,	SOEs	were	subject	to	restrictions	on	firing	workers	and	there	is	no	
working	 social	 security	 system	 in	 China.	 The	 SOEs	 have	 significant	
responsibilities	 to	maintain	 the	 employment	 level	 and	provide	welfare	 in	 the	
whole	 economy	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 economy(Bai	 et	 al.	
2006).	 Moreover,	 privatising	 the	 inefficient	 SOEs	 may	 have	 a	 significant	
negative	 impact	 on	 the	 overall	 economies.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 in	 the	 state’s	 best	
interest	 to	 have	 them	 under	 control	 instead	 of	 privatising	 them	 In	 order	 for	
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SOEs	 to	 fulfil	 their	 job	 in	 providing	 social	 stability,	 the	 state	 needs	 to	
continuously	provide	them	with	large	amounts	of	external	funding	in	the	forms	
of	grants	and	bank	loans.	Given	this	legacy	of	SOEs,	the	banks	will	continue	to	
provide	funds	to	SOEs.	
	
Another	major	 cause	 for	 lending	bias	 is	 that	 banks	perceive	 that	 SOEs	
are	essentially	less	risky	than	their	private	counter	parts.	In	the	events	of	SOEs	
failing	to	pay	for	their	loans,	banks	believe	that	the	government	will	bail	them	
out,	 and	 it	 is	 typically	 politically	 acceptable	 to	 lend	 to	 SOEs.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	
more	 cost	 effective	 for	 banks	 to	 lend	 to	 SOEs	 than	 to	 private	 enterprises.	 In	
general,	 due	 to	 the	 short	 period	 of	 establishment,	 private	 enterprises	 are	
relatively	 small	 and	have	 shorter	 history	which	makes	 lending	 to	 them	more	
risky	and	expansive	to	lend	to.		
	
Taking	 into	 account	 these	major	 causes	 of	 lending	 bias,	 it	 is	 apparent	
that	 private	 enterprises	 are	 facing	 significant	 obstacles	 to	 obtain	 finance	 for	
their	 growth	 and	 investment	 despite	 their	 better	 performance.	 We	 would	
expect	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 more	 financially	 constrained	 than	 state‐owned	
enterprises.	 Given	 the	 low	 efficiency	 and	 profitability	 of	 the	 SOEs,	 we	would	
interpret	 the	 evidence	 of	 no	 financial	 constraints	 of	 SOEs	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 soft	
budget	constraint.	
	
3.4.1.2	Collective‐Owned‐Enterprise	
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Collective	owned	enterprises	(COE)	are	also	an	interesting	group	to	look	at	 in	
terms	of	 financial	 constraints.	 Collective	owned	enterprise	 is	 one	of	 the	most	
distinctive	 institutional	 features	 of	 China’s	 economic	 transition.	 COEs	 were	
highly	profitable	during	the	early	reform	period.	They	took	advantage	of	rising	
demand	resulted	from	the	rapid	income	growth,	by	filling	in	the	niches	that	the	
state‐owned	 sector	 had	 neglected.	 Collective	 owned	 firms	 or	 TVEs	 are	
industrial	or	commercial	enterprises	regulated	by	the	government	at	the	town‐
village	 level.	 They	 are	 owned	 by	 the	 community	 or	 administrated	 by	 town‐
village	governments.	COEs	have	some	special	characteristics.	They	do	not	have	
well‐specified	property	 right,	where	 the	 firms	are	 conceptually	owned	by	 the	
people	of	a	community,	but	do	not	have	specific	identifiable	owners.	Typically	
COEs	are	set	up	by	pooling	the	funds	and	assets	from	the	community	and	partly	
with	local	government	loans.	While	the	people	of	the	community	own	the	COE,	
they	do	not	have	the	right	to	directly	share	the	profit	from	the	COEs	unless	they	
are	its	employees,	and	subsequently	compensated	with	wages.	The	COE	capital	
cannot	be	transferred	and	sold	freely.	Individuals	that	leave	the	community	will	
automatically	lose	their	share	of	common	ownership	of	the	COEs	(Tian	2000).		
	
The	 managers	 of	 collective	 firms	 are	 typically	 appointed	 by	 local	
government	leaders,	who	constantly	monitor	them	and	participate	in	the	firms’	
decision	 making	 process.	 The	 performances	 of	 local	 COEs	 are	 closely	 linked	
with	the	local	government	leaders’	future	career	development.	Therefore	COEs	
are	 subjected	 to	 close	monitoring	 by	 the	 local	 government	 leaders,	 who	will	
also	 tend	 to	 provide	 extra	 support	 to	 the	 local	 COEs	 such	 as	 giving	 them	
discretionary	tax	cuts.		In	practice,	their	resources	are	likely	to	be	controlled	by	
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local	 government	 officials	 and	 profits	 of	 the	 COEs	 are	 accruing	 to	 the	 local	
government.	 Moreover,	 Park	 and	 Shen(2003)	 showed	 that	 bank	 lending	 to	
TVEs	and	the	share	of	TVE	lending	in	total	rural	lending	grew	substantially	over	
the	 year	 and	 almost	 all	 rural	 enterprise	 lending	went	 to	 TVEs.	 Based	 on	 the	
survey	 they	 conduct	 in	 the	 Jiangsu	 and	 Zhejiang	 provinces,	 they	 found	 that	
township	 leaders	 often	 played	 an	 active	 role	 in	 loan	 applications	 and	 in	
ensuring	repayments	of	loans.		
	
The	urban	COEs	have	similar	characteristics,	but	instead	of	being	owned	
by	 the	 people	 of	 the	 community,	 they	 were	 set	 up	 by	 the	 SOEs,	 during	 the	
reform	era,	as	subsidiaries	to	reach	out	to	retail	and	wholesale	businesses.	They	
were	also	considered	as	an	alternative	solution	to	the	use	of	the	surplus	labour	
due	to	the	firing	restrictions	imposed	by	the	central	government	(Huang	2003).	
The	COEs	operates	differently	from	SOEs,	as	the	state	does	not	directly	appoint	
their	managers.	The	managers	of	 the	COEs	are	appointed	by	 the	parent	 SOEs	
and	its	operation	is	under	direct	control	of	the	SOEs	instead	of	the	state.	
	
The	 unique	 status	 of	 COEs	 and	 the	 explicit	 or	 implicit	 guaranteed	 of	
loans	provided	by	the	local	government	helps	them	to	gain	a	higher	position	in	
the	 “political	 pecking	 order”	 of	 credit.	 We	 expect	 that	 collective	 owned	
enterprises	will	be	relatively	 less	financially	constrained	than	private	firms	or	
face	no	financial	constraints	at	all.	
	
3.4.1.3	Foreign	Direct	Investment	
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The	benefits	of	 foreign	direct	 investment	 (FDI)	 including	 technology	 transfer,	
employee	training	and	tax	revenues	in	China	are	well	recognised.	China	now	is	
one	 of	 the	 top	 recipients	 of	 FDI	 in	 the	world.	 Huang	 (2003)	 proposed	 that	 a	
major	 driving	 force	 of	 this	 substantial	 amount	 of	 FDI	 in	 China	 is	 due	 to	 the	
“political	pecking	order”	in	the	credit	market.	Private	firms,	being	ranked	at	the	
lowest	 level	of	 the	“political	pecking	order”,	are	highly	credit	constrained	and	
unable	 to	 secure	 finance	 to	 exploit	 the	 existing	 business	 opportunities.	 This	
institutional	 distortion	 forces	 private	 firms	 in	 China	 to	 seek	 finance	 from	
alternative	sources,	such	as	FDI.	Foreign	firms,	especially	multinationals,	which	
locate	 in	 foreign	 countries,	 have	 relative	 easy	 access	 to	 capital	 markets	 and	
bank	 finance.	 By	 forming	 joint	 ventures	with	 foreign	 firms,	 private	 firms	 can	
reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 Guariglia	 and	 Poncet	 (2008),	 using	
provincial	 level	 data,	 provide	 evidence	 that	 FDI	 could	 be	 used	 to	 reduce	 the	
negative	 impact	of	 the	 financial	distortions	on	economic	growth.	By	 the	same	
token,	we	would	expect	firms	with	a	significant	amount	of	foreign	ownership	to	
be	 less	 financially	constrained	than	the	private	 firms	that	do	not	have	 foreign	
ownership.	Moreover,	the	presence	of	foreign	ownership	may	help	to	alleviate	
the	level	of	financial	constraints.	
	
In	 sum,	due	 to	 the	 inherent	 institutional	distortion	 there	 is	 a	 “political	
pecking	 order”.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 China’s	 formal	 financial	 system	
discriminates	 against	 firms	 according	 to	 their	 ownership	 structure,	 whereby	
SOEs	received	the	most	favourable	treatment,	and	private	firms	face	significant	
difficulties	 in	obtaining	 finance.	One	of	 the	main	objectives	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	
test	for	the	presence	of	“political	pecking	order”.	Furthermore	we	will	also	test	
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whether	 the	 presence	 of	 foreign	 ownership	 helps	 to	 reduce	 financial	
constraints.	
	
3.4.2	Regional	disparities	
	
Regional	disparity	is	particularly	relevant	and	interesting	for	China,	due	to	the	
sheer	 size	 of	 the	 country.	 At	 national	 level,	 China’s	 growth	 performance	 has	
been	 phenomenal,	 but	 actual	 economic	 conditions	 tend	 to	 vary	 substantially	
across	 regions.	As	we	have	discussed	 in	 section	3,	China’s	 fixed	 investment	 is	
subjected	to	significant	regional	disparities.		
	
The	 significant	 regional	 disparity	 is	 mainly	 a	 result	 of	 China’s	
development	 policy.	 In	 the	 early	 years	 of	 reform,	 the	 state	 government	 has	
concentrates	its	development	policy	on	the	coastal	region	at	the	expense	of	the	
central	 and	 western	 regions 10 .	 Given	 the	 relatively	 well‐developed	
infrastructure,	 readily	 accessible	 geographical	 location	 and	 natural	
endowments,	 the	 coastal	 region	 offered	 a	 much	 higher	 rate	 of	 return	 on	
investment.	 By	 establishing	 special	 economic	 zones	 and	 giving	 regional	
governments	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 in	 terms	 of	 local	 policy	 setting,	 the	
central	 government	 has	 allow	 the	 coastal	 region	 to	 successfully	 attract	 large	
quantities	 of	 FDI	 and	 to	 achieve	 unprecedented	 level	 of	 economic	 growth.	
However,	the	rapid	growth	of	the	coastal	region	has	continued	to	widen	the	gap	
with	the	central	and	western	region	in	all	areas	of	economic	development.		
	
                                                 
10 Demurger (2002) provides a detailed account of the preferential policies in China. 
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According	to	conventional	views,	the	level	of	financial	development	has	
a	significant	impact	on	the	level	of	financial	constraints.	High	levels	of	financial	
development	 help	 to	 promote	 economic	 growth	 by	 reducing	 financial	
constraints	that	would	otherwise	distort	the	efficient	allocation	of	investment.	
Using	 firm	 level	 data	 from	 36	 countries,	 Love(2003)	 provides	 evidence	 that	
financial	 development	 affects	 a	 firm’s	 investment	 via	 their	 ability	 to	 obtain	
external	finance.	Based	on	the	measure	complied	by	Demurger	et	al.	(2002)	and	
Fan	 et	 al.(2000),	 we	 can	 get	 an	 approximate	 picture	 of	 the	 regional	 level	 of	
financial	 development	 in	 China.	 Demurger	 et	 al.	 (2002)	 use	 the	 preferential	
policies	 granted	 to	 each	 provinces	 by	 the	 central	 government	 to	 develop	 the	
PPI	 (preferential	 policies	 index)	 to	 captures	 the	 extent	 of	 marketization	 and	
internalization	 of	 a	 local	 economy.	 Fan	 et	 al.(2000)	 developed	 the	 NERI	
marketization	index	by	examining	the	level	of	marketization	based	on	the	local	
and	central	government	relationship,	the	development	level	of	the	product	and	
factor	markets	 and	 the	 legal	 environment,	 law	enforcement.	Table	3.6	 adapts	
the	two	indexes	of	Fan	et	al	(2000)	and	Demurger	et	al.(2002).	We	can	see	that	
provinces	 of	 the	 East/Coastal	 region	 score	 relatively	 high	 in	 both	 indexes	
compared	to	their	counter	parts	in	the	central	and	western	regions.			Table	3.7	
provides	the	mean	level	for	both	the	NERI	and	PPI	indexes	for	each	of	the	three	
regions..	 Based	 on	 both	 measures,	 coastal	 region	 is	 significantly	 more	
developed	and	receive	more	preferential	policies	from	the	central	government.	
Western	region	 is	the	 least	developed	 in	terms	of	 the	 level	of	 institutions	and	
financial	development,	while	the	central	region	falls	between	the	coastal	region	
and	the	western	region.	
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If	the	hypothesis	that	the	level	of	financial	development	helps	to	reduce	
the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 promote	 economic	 growth,	 we	 would	
expect	that	east	region	suffers	 least	 from	the	problem	of	 financial	constraints,	
and	west	region	facing	the	highest	level	of	financial	constraints.		
	
However,	 the	 case	 of	 China	 might	 be	 counter	 intuitive	 to	 the	
conventional	thinking	of	financial	development	and	financial	constraints.		Qian	
and	 Xu	 (1993)	 describe	 China	 as	 a	 case	 of	 de	 facto	 federalism,	 involving	 a	
decentralized	 economic	 system	 in	 which	 each	 region	 can	 be	 considered	 an	
autonomous	economic	entity.	The	decentralized	system	has	significant	 impact	
on	Chinese	economy.	If	 the	economy	is	not	fully	 integrated	over	time,	 it	could	
build	up	a	collection	of	highly	protected	and	locally	fragmented	markets.		
	
Those	 studies	 focus	 on	 the	 goods	 market	 show	 that	 the	 speed	 of	
convergence	 towards	 one	 price	 is	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 the	 United	 States,	
which	 suggests	 that	 China	 has	 a	 highly	 integrated	 domestic	 goods	 market	
(Huang	 and	 Wei	 2001).	 	 However,	 the	 capital	 market	 in	 China	 is	 much	 less	
integrated	 than	 the	 domestic	 goods	 market.	 There	 is	 enduring	 regional	
segmentation	of	 the	Chinese	capital	markets,	which	prevent	capital	 to	 flow	to	
the	 more	 productive	 regions	 (Boyreau‐Debray	 and	 Wei	 2005).	 There	 are	 a	
number	 of	 significant	 regional	 barriers	 that	 stop	 capital	 from	 flowing	 freely	
between	 regions.	 The	 incentive	 of	 the	 local	 government	 to	 preserve	 capital	
within	 their	 own	 regions	 to	 boost	 local	 government	 revenue	 and	provide	 job	
opportunities	 stops	 local	 enterprises	 to	 conduct	 cross‐regional	 investment.	
Moreover,	the	cross‐regional	lending	by	the	banking	sector	is	also	limited.	The	
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inter‐bank	market	 was	 created	 in	 1996.	 Before	 then	 the	 interest	 rate	 ceiling	
does	not	facilitate	capital	mobility.	Boyreadu‐Debray	and	Wei	(2005)	provides	
evidence	 that	 capital	 mobility	 is	 low	 across	 Chinese	 regions	 which	 indicates	
that	Chinese	capital	market	are	fragmented.		
	
Other	empirical	studies	also	provide	indirect	evidence	that	the	Chinese	
capital	 markets	 are	 fragmented,	 Cull	 and	 Xu	 (2000)	 find	 that	 there	 was	 a	
deterioration	 in	capital	allocation	over	 the	1990s,	Dollar	and	Wei	 (2007)	also	
documented	that	certain	regions	and	sectors	have	consistently	lower	returns	to	
capital	than	other	regions	and	sectors	which	suggests	that	capital	 is	unable	to	
flow	 to	 the	 more	 productive	 regions.	 In	 fact	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	
government	 systematically	 allocates	 capital	 away	 from	 more	 productive	
regions	and	towards	the	less	productive	ones.	In	2000,	the	central	government	
initiated	a	new	policy	focusing	on	the	development	of	the	western	region	with	
the	 aim	 to	 close	 the	 regional	 gap	 and	 inequality	 between	 the	western	 region	
and	the	coastal	region.	
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Region NERI PPI 
 National Total   
East   
 Beijing                       6.3 0.67 
 Tianjin                       6.58 1.43 
 Hebei                         6.7 1.24 
 Liaoning                      5.6 1.24 
 Shanghai                      6.59 1.76 
 Jiangsu                       7.04 1.43 
 Zhejiang                      8.24 1.43 
 Fujian                        7.28 2.71 
 Shandong                      6.22 1.43 
 Guangdong                     8.33 2.86 
 Hainan                        5.65 1.57 
 Guangxi                       5.28 1.24 
Central   
 Shanxi                        4.57 0.33 
 Inner Mongolia                3.45 0.67 
 Jilin                         4.51 0.67 
 Heilongjiang                  3.97 0.67 
 Anhui                         5.4 0.62 
 Jiangxi                       5.12 0.33 
 Henan                         5.97 0.33 
 Hubei                         5.53 0.62 
 Hunan                         5.99 0.33 
West   
 Chongqing                     5.57  
 Sichuan                       5.29 0.62 
 Guizhou                       3.86 0.33 
 Yunnan                        3.39 0.67 
 Tibet                         0.33 
 Shaanxi                       4.48 0.33 
 Gansu                         4.02 0.33 
 Qinghai                       2 0.33 
 Ningxia                       2.69 0.33 
 Xinjiang                      2.9 0.67 
 
Table	3.6:	NERI	and	PPI	indexes	as	indicators	of	financial	development. 
Source: NERI index is adapted from Fan et al (2000). PPI index is adapted from Demurger et 
al.(2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
  East Central West National 
NERI 6.65 4.95 3.8 5.284 
PPI 1.58 0.51 0.44 0.917 
 
Table	3.7:	Mean	level	of	NERI	and	PPI	for	three	regions	and	for	the	whole	
country	
Source: Fan et al(2000), Demurger el al (2002) and author’s calculation. 
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If	 Chinese	 capital	 markets	 are	 indeed	 fragmented	 and	 the	 cross‐
provincial/	cross‐regional	mobility	is	low,	and	the	government	is	systematically	
shifting	 resources	 from	other	 regions	 towards	 the	western	 regions,	we	might	
obtain	 an	 opposite	 prediction	 from	 the	 financial	 development	 theory.	 We	
conjecture	 that	 we	 are	 likely	 to	 find	 that	 the	 coastal	 region	 will	 be	 more	
financially	 constrained	 than	western	 and	 central	 region.	 There	 are	 two	main	
reasons	 for	 this	 prediction.	 First,	 since	 the	 capital	market	 is	 fragmented	 and	
with	low	capital	mobility,	the	availability	of	finance	is	limited	by	the	amount	of	
local	resources,	firms	locate	in	the	coastal	region	faces	significantly	higher	level	
of	competition	for	funding	among	themselves	than	firms	located	in	the	Western	
and	Central	regions.	Secondly,	the	new	central	government	policy	of	developing	
the	western	region	tends	to	shift	valuable	funding	away	from	the	“rich	regions”	
towards	the	western	regions,	which	would	decrease	the	availability	of	funds	for	
coastal	regions.	This	would	increase	the	level	of	financial	constraints	facing	by	
the	 coastal	 regions.	 However,	 FDI	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 barriers	 of	
capital	mobility.	It	tends	to	flow	to	regions	where	it	can	obtain	a	higher	return	
to	 capital.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	 our	 argument	 that	 FDI	may	 help	 to	 reduce	
financial	constraints.	
	
3.5	Estimation	framework	
	
3.5.1	Euler	equation	specification	
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One	 of	 the	main	 reasons	why	we	 choose	 to	 use	 the	 Euler	 equation	 approach	
over	 the	 popular	Q	model	 is	 that	 the	Q	model	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 2	 suffers	
from	 a	 number	 of	 problems.	 Moreover	 the	 Chinese	 Stock	 market	 is	 highly	
distorted,	 and	 we	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 obtain	 accurate	 measures	 of	 Q.	
Furthermore,	 in	 our	 dataset,	 we	 have	 a	 large	 number	 of	 unquoted	 firms,	 for	
which	we	are	unable	to	compute	the	Q	variable.	Using	Euler	equation	approach	
allows	us	to	bypass	these	obstacles	to	test	the	hypothesis	develops	 in	the	 last	
section.	
	
		 The	 Euler	 equation	 specification	 is	 derived	 explicitly	 from	 a	 dynamic	
optimization	problem	with	symmetric	and	quadratic	 costs	of	adjustment.	The	
Euler	equation	model	captures,	under	the	maintained	structure,	the	influence	of	
expectations	of	future	profitability	on	current	investment	decisions.	Therefore,	
current	 and	 lagged	 financial	 variables	 are	 unlikely	 to	 enter	 the	 equation	 as	
proxies	for	future	profitability.	
	
The	version	of	Euler	equation	investment	model	we	used	here	is	similar	
to	models	used	in	previous	studies	of	 financial	constraints	((Bond	and	Meghir	
1994;	 Bond	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Harrison	 and	McMillan	 2003)).	 Our	model	 describes	
below	follows	closely	the	specification	in	Harrison	and	McMillan	(2003).		
	
The	firm	is	assumed	to	maximize	its	present	discounted	value	of	current	
and	future	net	cash	flows.	Let	 itL 	denotes	for	variable	factor	inputs,	and	 itw 	the	
price	of	variable	 factor	 inputs,	 Iitp 	be	the	price	of	 the	 investment	good,	 itp 	the	
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price	 of	 output,	 and	 tt j  	the	 nominal	 discount	 factor	 between	 period	 t 	and	
period t j ,	 and	 	the	 depreciation	 rate,	 and	 Kit	 denotes	 capital,	 Iit	 denotes	
investment.	 ( , )it itF K L is	 the	 production	 function	 gross	 of	 adjustment	 costs,	
( , )it itG I K is	the	adjustment	cost	function	and	 ( )E  	is	the	expectations	operator.	
Conditional	on	information	available	in	period t ,	 the	firm	borrows	the	amount	
itD 	at	 time	 t 	,	 and	 pays	 interest	 on	 the	 debt	 by	 iti .	 Finally	 it 	denotes	 the	
inflation	rate.	The	firm	solves	
	
	 															  , , ,max ,tt t j i t j i t j i t j
j
E R K L I           																																																			(1)	
							s.t.			 , 1 ,(1 )it i t i tK K I    																																																																	(a)	
							 *it itD D 																																																																																																		(b)	
							 0itD  																																																																																																					(c)	
1 1 1 , 1( , ) ( , ) (1 )
I
it it it it it it it it it it it t it it t i tR p F K L p G K L w L p I i D D D           						(d)	
	 																							 0itR  																																																																																																							(e)	
	
Constraint	 (a)	 is	 the	 accounting	 identity	 for	 the	 firm’s	 capital	 stock,	
where	 capital	 stock	 at	 time	 t	 is	 equal	 to	 last	 periods	 of	 capital	 stock	 net	 of	
depreciation	 plus	 the	 current	 period’s	 investment.	 Constraints	 (b)	 and	 (c)	
model	 the	 credit	 constraint	 with	 a	 borrowing	 ceiling	 and	 that	 debt	 must	 be	
greater	 than	or	equal	 to	 zero.	Constraint	 (d)	describes	 the	 firm’s	net	 revenue	
and	 constraint	 (e)	 implies	 that	 there	 is	 a	 premium	on	outside	 equity	 finance,	
which	has	the	same	effect	as	a	restriction	on	new	share	issues.	
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Solving	this	problem,	we	can	obtain	the	Euler	equation	that	models	the	
optimal	investment	path	by	relating	the	marginal	adjustment	costs	in	adjacent	
period.	Firms	that	 faced	 financial	constraints	 face	a	higher	discount	rate	 for	a	
given	 level	 of	 adjustment	 costs	 today.	 Therefore,	 financial	 constrained	 firms	
will	delay	today’s	investment	and	substitute	it	with	tomorrow’s	investment.	As	
Harrison	 and	 McMillan	 (2003),	 assuming	 the	 investment	 is	 immediately	
productive,	the	marginal	cost	of	investment	today	net	of	the	marginal	increase	
in	output	(right‐hand	side	of	equation	(2)),	is	equal	to	the	present	value	of	the	
marginal	 adjustment	 cost	 of	 investing	 tomorrow	 (left‐hand	 side	 of	 equation	
(2)):	
	
						 1 ,
, 1 , ,
(1 ) (1 )tt i t
i t i t i t
R R RE
I I K
  

                         
																																						(2)	
		
,i t 	represents	the	shadow	value	of	the	financial	constraints.	In	the	absence	
of	 financial	 constraints,	 ,i t 	would	 equal	 to	 zero.	 Following	 Bond	 and	Meghir	
(1994)	 we	 can	 use	 the	 quadratic	 adjustment	 cost	
      2, / 2 * /it it ititG I K b I K c K    	which	 is	 linearly	 homogenous	 in	
investment	and	capital.	Therefore,	the	derivatives	of	net	revenue	with	respect	
to	I	(investment)	and	K	(capital)	can	be	written	as:	
	
			 1 It t t
t t
R b p bc p p
I K
              																																																												(3)	
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In	 equation	 (3)	 and	 (4),	 Y F G  	represents	 the	 net	 outputs	
and  1 1/ 0    .	 The	 price	 elasticity	 of	 demand	 ( 0)  	is	 assumed	 to	 be	
constant.	And	Y	 is	assumed	to	be	 linearly	homogeneous	 in	K	and	L.	Assuming	
that	there	are	no	credit	constraints ( 0)it  ,	by	combining	equation	(3)	and	(4)	
we	can	derive	our	first	estimating	equation:	
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                                 				(5)	
	
Equation	 (5)	 is	 derived	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	 no	 financial	
constraints ( 0)it  ,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 expected	 future	 investment	 is	
positively	related	to	current	investment	and	negatively	related	to	the	square	of	
current	 investment.	 Future	 investment	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	 current	 cash	
flow	 and	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 current	 output.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 the	
negative	 coefficient	 for	 the	 cash	 flow,	 as	 suggested	by	Harrison	and	McMillan	
(2003),	 is	 that	 a	higher	 level	 of	 current	 cash	 flow	 implies	 lower	net	marginal	
adjustment	costs	today.	Therefore	it	would	lead	to	lower	expected	investment	
tomorrow.	However,	under	the	alternative	assumption	that	the	capital	market	
is	imperfect,	future	investment	may	be	positively	related	to	cash	flow	through	
the	effect	of	financial	constraints.	This	provides	us	with	the	first	framework	of	
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testing	for	 financial	constraints.	 It	 is	expected	that	equation	(5)	will	describes	
the	optimal	 investment	path	of	 firms	 that	 are	not	 financially	 constrained,	but	
the	 model	 will	 be	 rejected	 for	 firms	 that	 are	 financially	 constrained,	 in	
particular	 we	 expect	 to	 observe	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 future	
investment	and	current	cash	flow	as	the	result	of	financial	constraints.	In	order	
to	test	for	financial	constraints	across	ownership	group	and	regions,	we	create	
and	interact	the	dummy	variables	 indicating	the	ownership	types	and	regions	
with	 the	 measure	 of	 cash	 flow.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 private	 firms	 will	 display	
higher	sensitivity	of	cash	flow	to	investment	than	foreign	and	state	owned	firms	
due	to	“political	pecking	order”.	And	we	also	expect	that	the	coastal	region	will	
display	a	lower	level	of	cash	flow	sensitivity,	but	if	the	capital	markets	in	China	
are	 indeed	 fragmented	 firms’	 in	 the	coastal	 region	may	not	be	 less	 financially	
constrained	than	firms	located	in	the	central	and	western	regions.	
	
3.5.2	Alternative	test	of	financial	constraints	using	the	Euler	equation	
	
An	 alternative	 test	 of	 financial	 constraints	 using	 Euler	 equation	 is	 to	 find	
empirical	 proxies	 for ,i t ,	 the	 shadow	 value	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 With	
imperfect	 capital	 markets,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 ,i t 	depends	 on	 some	 state	
variables,	 and	 could	 be	 identified	 with	 some	 observable	 firm	 characteristics.		
Previous	 literature	relied	on	observable	 indicators	of	a	 firm’s	 financial	health,	
Whited	(1992)	use	the	coverage	ratio	and	debt	to	asset	ratios	to	proxy	for	the	
shadow	value	of	financial	constraints.		
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Following	Harrison	and	McMillan	 (2003),	we	can	 linearize	 the	product	
of	 (1 ) 	with	the	derivative	of	net	revenue	with	respect	to	investment,	using	a	
Taylor	expansion.	We	can	then	take	 ,i t 	to	the	right‐hand	side	of	equation	(5)	
and	use	two	firm‐level	measures	of	financial	constraints:	the	debt	to	fixed	asset	
ratio,	and	the	interest	coverage	ratio.	In	the	absence	of	imperfect	capital	market	
and	 financial	 constraints,	 these	 financial	 constraint	measures	 should	 have	 no	
impact	on	 future	 investment	 at	 all.	On	 the	other	hand,	 if	 financial	 constraints	
exist,	 then	 the	 measures	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 financial	 factors	 are	
expected	to	be	positively	related	to	future	investment.	For	firms	that	have	high	
debt	to	asset	ratios	and	interest	coverage	ratios,	are	likely	to	have	used	up	their	
debt	capacities.	Thus,	they	are	more	likely	to	delay	their	investment	to	the	next	
period.	
	
The	debt	to	asset	ratio	(also	known	as	leverage	ratio,	LEV)	is	the	ratio	of	
the	 book	 value	 of	 the	 firm’s	 debt	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 firm’s	 fixed	 assets.	 This	
ratio	 is	 typically	 used	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 a	 firm’s	 lack	 of	 collateral	 for	 its	
borrowing	and	the	amount	of	debt	capacity	that	has	been	used	up.	The	interest	
coverage	ratio	is	defined	as	the	ratio	of	the	firm’s	interest	expense	to	the	sum	of	
the	firm’s	interest	expense	plus	cash	flow.	 	The	coverage	ratio	(COV)	indicates	
the	 level	of	resources	that	are	used	to	service	 the	 firm’s	debt,	and	 increase	 in	
the	 interest	 coverage	 ratio	 indicate	 that	 current	 financing	 cost	 puts	 a	 larger	
pressure	 on	 firm’s	 cash	 flow,	 and	 leads	 to	 a	 higher	 probability	 of	 financial	
distress.	 After	 augmenting	 equation	 (5)	 with	 the	 two	 measures	 of	 financial	
constraints,	the	new	estimating	equation	will	look	as	follows:	
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We	will	 also	 create	ownership	and	 regional	 interaction	 terms	with	 the	
two	 new	 financial	 constraints	 measures	 to	 access	 the	 differential	 level	 of	
financial	 constraints	 among	 ownership	 and	 regions.	 This	 second	 framework	
provides	us	with	an	additional	test	for	the	financial	constraints	under	the	Euler	
equation	framework.		
	
3.5.3	Estimation	methodology	
	
The	 user	 cost	 of	 capital	 is	 typically	 unobservable.	 Therefore	 we	 will	 assume	
that	it	can	be	captured	by	firm	fixed	effects,	which	we	will	allow	for	and	control	
for	 in	 the	 estimation.	 Using	 standard	methods	 of	 regression,	 such	 as	 OLS	 or	
fixed‐effects,	 to	 estimate	 equation	 (5)	 and	 (6)	 is	 problematic.	 Many	 of	 the	
independent	 variables	 in	 the	 Euler	 equation	 model	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 jointly	
endogenous,	 where	 they	 are	 simultaneously	 determined	 with	 the	 dependent	
variable	 or	 subject	 to	 two‐way	 causality.	 Moreover,	 the	 dynamic	 investment	
model	 with	 the	 lagged	 endogenous	 variable	 for	 investment	 will	 bias	 the	
coefficient	estimates.	
	
To	eliminate	these	problems,	we	use	a	first	differenced	GMM	estimator	
developed	by	Arellano	and	Bond	(1991),	and	Arellano	and	Bover	(1995).	This	
estimator	 takes	 first	difference	 for	each	of	 the	variables	 in	order	 to	eliminate	
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the	 firm‐specific	 effects,	 and	 then	 use	 lagged	 levels	 (2	 time	 or	 more)	 of	 the	
variables	as	instruments.	The	first‐difference	GMM	estimator	takes	into	account	
both	firm‐specific	heterogeneity	and	the	potential	endogeneity	problems	of	the	
regressors.	We	 rely	 on	 the	m2	 test	 and	 the	Hansen/Sargan	 test	 to	 assess	 the	
validity	 of	 the	model	 and	 instruments.	 The	m2	 test	 is	 a	 test	 of	 second‐order	
serial	 correlation.	 It	 is	 asymptotically	 distributed	 as	 a	 standard	 normal	
distribution	 under	 the	 null	 of	 no	 second‐order	 serial	 correlation	 of	 the	
residuals.	 The	 GMM	 estimator	 is	 consistent	 if	 there	 is	 no	 second‐order	 serial	
correlation	 in	 the	 residuals.	 The	 Hansen/Sargan	 J	 statistic	 is	 a	 test	 of	
overidentifying	restrictions.	The	J	statistic	is	asymptotically	distributed	as	chi‐
square	 distribution,	 under	 the	 null	 of	 instrument	 validity,	 with	 degrees	 of	
freedom	equal	to	the	number	of	instruments	minus	the	number	of	parameters.		
As	a	general	rule	of	thumb,	if	the	p‐values	for	the	Sargan’s	test	and	the	m2	test	
are	 greater	 than	 0.05,	 the	 instruments	 are	 valid	 and	 there	 is	 no	 gross	
misspecification	the	model.	
	
	
3.6	Data	and	Summary	statistics	
	
3.6.1	Data	
	
The	data	we	use	to	carry	out	the	empirical	study	are	drawn	from	the	ORIANA	
database	 published	 by	 Bureau	 van	Dijk,	which	 contains	 financial	 information	
for	public	 and	private	 companies	 in	 the	Asia‐Pacific	 region.	We	 focus	only	on	
data	from	China.	By	allowing	firms	to	entry	and	exit	the	sample,	we	have	a	large	
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unbalanced	firm‐level	dataset	covering	the	year	between	1998	and	2005.	The	
unbalanced	 panel	 structure	 has	 the	 benefit	 of	 partially	 mitigating	 potential	
selection	 and	 survival	 bias	 problems	 (Carpenter	 and	Guariglia	 2008).	 	 In	 this	
study,	we	focus	on	firms	operate	in	the	manufacturing	sectors	only.			
	
Firms	 that	 have	 missing	 values	 of	 the	 key	 regression	 variables	 are	
dropped	 from	 the	 dataset.	 Sales,	 total	 assets,	 fixed	 assets	 can’t	 be	missing	 or	
negative.	 Following	 the	 standard	 panel	 regression	method	 to	 control	 for	 the	
potential	 influence	of	outliers,	we	also	drop	one	percentile	 from	each	tails	 for	
each	of	 the	regression	variables.	Table	3A1‐3A3	presents	 the	structure	of	our	
panel	 data.	 Our	 final	 dataset	 covers	 22,274	 firms	 which	 are	 mainly	 unlisted	
firms,	 corresponding	 to	 114,098	 observations.	 The	 panel	 is	 unbalanced,	with	
number	 of	 observations	 ranging	 from	 a	minimum	of	 9,910	 in	 year	 1998	 to	 a	
maximum	of	17,460	in	200511.	
	
The	dataset	provides	a	continuous	measure	of	ownership	composition12.	
The	measure	of	 ownership	 is	 not	 time	variant13.	 In	 contemporary	 theories	 of	
the	firm,	Hart(1995)	argues	that	ownership	should	be	defined	in	terms	of	what	
shareholder	 controls	 the	 “residual	 rights”	 of	 the	 firm,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 who	
dictates	unforeseen	contingencies.	Typically	this	role	is	the	responsibility	of	the	
major	shareholders.	Following	Cull	et	al.	 (2007),	we	classified	 firms,	based	on	
the	 average	 majority	 ownership,	 into	 five	 different	 groups:	 state,	 foreign,	
                                                 
11 See the Appendix for details about the structure of our panel, and complete definitions of all 
variables used. 
12 See section 4 for discussion for definition and characteristics of different ownership.  
13 Since we are not studying the effects of ownership change on financial constraints, the time 
invariant ownership does not affect our study. 
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private,	 collective	 and	 listed	 The	 ownership	 type	 of	 the	 firms	 follows	 the	
dominant	 owner’s	 ownership	 status	 based	 on	 paid‐in‐capital.	 Foreign	 firms	
include	 those	 firms	 with	 investors	 from	 Hong‐Kong,	 Macao,	 Taiwan.	 Private	
firms	include	both	individuals	and	legal	entities.	Our	measure	of	ownership	is	
better	 than	 identifying	 ownership	 based	 on	 registration	 status,	 which	 is	
unreliable.	As	actual	ownership	does	not	always	correspond	to	the	ownership	
type	 on	 the	 firm’s	 business	 registration	 due	 to	 change	 of	 ownership	 after	
registration	(Dollar	and	Wei	2007).			
	
Table	 3A4	 reveals	 some	 interesting	 trends	 in	 ownership	 type	 change	
over	the	study	period.	The	SOEs	share	of	total	observation	in	each	year	shows	a	
steadily	 decline	 from	23.45%	 in	 1998	 to	 13.68%	 in	 2005,	while	 private	 firm	
displays	 a	 steadily	 increase	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 share	 of	 total	 observation	 from	
37.85%	in	1998	to	44.86%	in	2005.	Collective‐owned	enterprises	also	show	a	
steady	 decline.	 Foreign	 and	 Listed	 firms’	 annual	 share	 of	 total	 observation	
number	are	roughly	unchanged.	These	changes	of	ownership	composition	are	
in	line	with	changes	of	fixed	investment	by	different	ownership	type	based	on	
aggregate	data	presents	in	Table3.2.	These	significant	changes	in	the	ownership	
composition	 of	 our	 dataset	 reflect	 the	 significant	 on‐going	 restructuring	 of	
firms	in	China	in	the	past	10	years,	where	private	firms	are	gradually	emerging	
as	major	players	in	the	economy.	
	
There	are	31	provinces	or	province‐equivalent	municipal	cities	in	China.	
In	order	to	examine	the	regional	disparity	in	the	 level	of	 financial	constraints,	
we	 group	 firms	 into	 three	 main	 regions:	 the	 East/Costal,	 Central,	 and	West.	
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Table	3A5	provides	the	detailed	allocation	of	provinces	or	province‐equivalent	
municipal	cities	 into	 the	 three	regions.	Table	3A6	presents	 the	distribution	of	
observations	 by	 ownerships	 in	 the	 three	 regions.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 that	
SOEs’	 observation	 represents	 a	 much	 larger	 proportion	 of	 total	 regional	
observations	in	the	central	and	western	region,	than	in	the	Coastal	region.	The	
majority	 of	 foreign	 firms	 are	 located	 in	 the	 coastal	 regions	 account	 for	more	
than	30%	of	the	total	observations	in	the	coastal	region,	while	foreign	firms	has	
a	relatively	small	role	in	the	central	and	western	region14.		
	
	
3.6.2	Descriptive	Statistics	
	
Table3.8	 reports	 the	 summary	 statistics	 of	 the	 firms	 for	 the	 key	 regression	
variables	used	in	the	regression	for	the	whole	sample	and	different	ownership	
groups.	 Investment	 (Iit)	 in	our	 study	 is	defined	as	 the	 change	 in	 real	 tangible	
fixed	 assets	 plus	 depreciation.	 Focusing	 on	 tangible	 fixed	 assets	 allows	 us	 to	
reduce	 the	 distortion	 in	 the	 valuation	 and	 measurement	 error	 of	 intangible	
assets	 such	 as	 goodwill,	 patents,	 trademarks,	 etc.	 In	 order	 to	 compare	 and	
control	the	size	scale	effects,	we	scale	the	key	variables	with	lagged	fixed	assets	
(Kit).	All	variables	are	deflated	using	provincial	level	GDP	deflators	taken	from	
the	 China	 Statistical	 Yearbook.	 Using	 provincial	 level	 deflators	 allow	 us	 to	
control	the	differential	pricing	across	different	regions.		
	
                                                 
14 This reflects the early “open-up” policy focus on the coastal region. The governments invest 
heavily in infrastructure and provide favourable policies to attract foreign investors.  
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The	first	row	of	table3.8	reports	the	investment	to	tangible	fixed	assets	
ratio	 which	measures	 how	much	 investment	 each	 group	 invested	 relative	 to	
their	asset	base.	This	ratio	can	be	thought	of	as	the	intensity	of	investment	for	
the	 firms.	 If	 this	 ratio	 is	 high	 the	 firm	 is	 investing	 heavily.	 Based	 on	 this	
measure,	private	firms,	 foreign	firms	and	listed	firms	are	all	 investing	heavily.	
The	private,	foreign	and	the	listed	firms	invest	14.1%,	12.4%	and	16.3%	of	their	
total	 tangible	 fixed	 assets	 each	 year	 respectively.	 In	 contrast,	 SOEs	 and	
collective	 firms	 are	 only	 investing	moderately	with	 investment	 ratio	 of	 7.7%	
and	9.7%	respectively.		
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Ownership State Private Foreign Collective Listed All 
(Iit/K)it-1 0.077 0.141 0.124 0.097 0.163 0.124 
 (0.335) (0.372) (0.325) (0.372) (0.269) (0.347) 
(Iit/Kit)2 0.118 0.158 0.121 0.148 0.099 0.136 
 (0.490) (0.472) (0.422) (0.516) (0.296) (0.455) 
Sit/Kit 2.680 7.352 8.635 9.044 3.227 6.751 
 (3.893) (10.112) (11.715) (12.493) (5.485) (10.062) 
CFit/Kit 0.154 0.362 0.470 0.451 0.252 0.356 
 (0.281) (0.499) (0.654) (0.653) (0.342) (0.535) 
Coverage ratio 0.260 0.189 0.080 0.083 0.120 0.158 
 (11.392) (2.698) (2.813) (5.511) (1.208) (5.394) 
Leverage ratio 0.366 0.239 0.114 0.253 0.284 0.229 
 (0.510) (0.750) (0.502) (0.638) (0.399) (0.626) 
Number of  
observations 13866 33279 23351 5799 6171 82466 
 
Table	3.8:	Descriptive	statistics	for	key	regression	variables	by	ownership.		
The table reports sample mean, corresponding standard deviations are presented in parentheses.  I represents real investment, S represents real sales and 
CF represents cash flow, all these variables are scaled by real fixed assets K. Coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of the firm’s interest expense to the sum of 
the firm’s interest expense plus cash flow. Leverage ratio is calculated as book value of total long term liabilities divided by firm’s fixed assets. 
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ownership SOE Private Foreign Collective Listed 
Net Profit Margin -0.0042 0.030269 0.030124 0.029376 0.035238 
 (0.164709) (0.103383) (0.118742) (0.081865) (0.208629) 
ROA 0.009516 0.04704 0.049566 0.078413 0.023577 
 (0.062637) (0.093409) (0.141299) (0.171627) (0.075596) 
Real sales 3329.373 1912.772 2231.529 1417.875 16240.07 
 (13723.06) (8793.897) (8451.208) (3792.614) (110179.6) 
Real Total Assets 5747.948 2221.667 1834.87 1165.375 20330.13 
 (21057.92) (10165.13) (5085.146) (3300.742) (119776.7) 
Number of Employee 3025.23 1085.377 925.2114 1028.562 4588.927 
 (8642.347) (2405.971) (1538.812) (1736.519) (20137.63) 
Number of  
observations 13866 33279 23351 5799 6171 
Table	3.9:	Summary	statistics	for	profitability	and	size	measures	by	ownership.	
The table reports sample mean, corresponding standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Net profit Margin is calculated as net income divided by net sales. ROA (return on total asset) is 
calculated by dividing net income by total assets. Real sales and Real total assets are deflated by provincial GDP deflator, it is measured at (Thousands of Yuan RMB). Number of employee is 
the reported number of employee employed by the firm. 
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The	sales	to	capital	ratio	can	be	seen	as	fixed	asset	turnover	ratio,	which	
measures	 the	 operational	 efficiency	 of	 the	 firm.	 The	 SOEs	 and	 Listed	 firms	
perform	poorly	compare	to,	with	S/K	equals	 to	2.68	and	3.22,	private,	 foreign	
and	 collective‐owned	 firms	with	 sales	 turnover	 ratios	 equal	 to	7.35,	8.63	and	
9.04	 respectively.	 This	 reflects	 private,	 foreign	 and	 collective‐owned	 firms	
operate	 more	 efficiently	 than	 SOEs	 and	 listed	 firms.	 The	 cash‐flow	 ratio	 is	
particularly	 high	 for	 private,	 foreign	 and	 collective	 firms,	 (which	 equals	 to	
36.2%,	47%	and	45.1%),	while	it	is	relatively	low	for	SOEs	(15.4%).	The	cash‐
flow	ratio	is	relative	high	compare	to	firms	in	the	US	and	Europe,	Carpenter	and	
Petersen(2002)	reports	a	comparable	cash	flow	to	capital	ratio	of	0.06	for	the	
US	firms;	Bond	et	al.(2003)	using	sample	from	Belgium,	France,	Germany,	and	
the	UK	found	that	this	ratio	is	ranging	from	0.11	to	0.13.		
	
The	 interest	coverage	ratio	 is	defined	as	 the	ratio	of	 the	 firm’s	 interest	
expense	to	the	sum	of	the	firm’s	interest	expense	plus	cash‐flow.	The	SOEs	have	
the	highest	interest	coverage	ratios	of	0.26,	which	partly	reflects	their	inability	
to	 generate	 cash‐flow.	 The	 private	 firms	 has	 the	 second	 highest	 ratio	 of	
coverage	ratio	(0.189),	given	the	large	amount	of	cash	flow	being	generated	by	
those	firms.	The	mean	coverage	ratio	for	foreign	firms,	collective	owned	firms	
and	 listed	 firms	 are	 0.08,	 0.083	 and	 0.12,	which	 are	 lower	 than	 those	 of	 the	
SOEs	and	private	firms.		
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Leverage	ratio	in	our	study	is	calculated	as	the	book	value	of	total	long	
term	 liabilities	 divided	 by	 firm’s	 fixed	 assets15.	 Similar	 definition	 of	 leverage	
can	be	found	in	Lang	et	al	 (1996).	 It	provides	an	 indication	on	the	firm’s	debt	
capacity.	 A	 higher	 leverage	 ratio	 implies	 that	 firm	 is	 near	 its	 debt	 capacity.	
Again,	SOEs	have	the	highest	leverage	ratio	of	0.366,	which	indicates	they	that	
SOEs	have	taken	out	a	large	amount	of	debts.	Moreover,	it	may	also	reflect	that	
SOEs	are	able	to	take	up	more	debts	than	other	ownership	type.	The	leverage	
ratios	 for	 private	 firms,	 foreign	 firms,	 and	 collective	 owned	 firms	 are	 0.239,	
0.114,	0.253	and	0.284	respectively.	The	foreign	owned	firms	have	the	lowest	
level	of	leverage	ratio.	
	
In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 differences	 among	 different	
ownership	 group,	 we	 will	 look	 at	 some	 profitability	 measures	 and	 size	
measures.	Table	3.9	reports	summary	statistics	of	 the	profitability	and	size	of	
firms	by	ownership.	Net	profit	margin	 is	 calculated	 as	net	 income	divided	by	
net	 sales,	 and	 ROA	 (return	 on	 assets)	 is	 calculated	 as	 net	 income	 divided	 by	
total	assets.	According	to	these	two	profitability	measures,	SOEs	are	the	worst	
performers	among	the	different	ownership	group.	SOEs	have	a	negative	mean	
net	profit	margin	of	 ‐0.0042	and	 a	 very	 small	ROA	of	 0.009.	 Private,	 Foreign,	
Collective‐owned	 are	 having	 a	 similar	 level	 of	 average	 net	 profit	 margin	 of	
around	0.03,	while	listed	firms	have	a	slightly	better	net	profit	margin	of	0.035.	
The	 collective‐owned	 firms	 outperform	 all	 other	 ownership	 type	 in	 terms	 of	
return	on	asset	(0.078).	Again	private	and	foreign	firms	have	a	similar	level	of	
                                                 
15 As the market value of the long term debt is not available, we use the book value of total long term 
liabilities to proxy the market value of the long term debt. 
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return	on	assets	of	0.047	and	0.049,	respectively.	The	return	on	assets	for	listed	
firms	is	0.0235.	
	
Table	 3.9	 also	 reports	 real	 sales,	 real	 total	 assets	 and	 number	 of	
employees	 as	 indicators	 of	 firm	 size.	 All	 three	 measures	 indicate	 that	 listed	
firms	 are	 the	 largest	 firms	 in	 our	 sample,	with	mean	 real	 sales	 of	 16	million	
yuan,	mean	real	total	assets	of	20	million	yuan.	Listed	firms	on	average	employ	
4588	 employees.	 Other	 than	 listed	 firms,	 SOEs	 are	 the	 largest	 firms	 with	
average	real	sales	of	3.3	million	yuan	and	average	real	total	assets	of	5.7	million	
yuan.	 SOEs	 on	 average	 employ	 3025	 employees.	 Private,	 foreign	 and	
collectively‐owned	 firms	 are	 much	 smaller	 than	 SOEs	 and	 listed	 firms.	 The	
average	 real	 total	 sales	 for	 private	 owned	 firms,	 foreign	 owned	 firms	 and	
collectively‐owned	are	1.9	million,	2.2	million	and	1.4	million,	respectively.	The	
private	 owned	 firms,	 foreign	 owned	 firms	 and	 collectively	 owned	 firms	 on	
average	employ	1085,	925	and	1028	employees,	respectively.	
	
	
3.7	Results	and	Discussion	
	
3.7.1	Regression	results	for	baseline	specification	
	
Table	 3.10	 presents	 estimates	 of	 the	 baseline	 specification	 (equation	 (5))	 for	
the	whole	sample	without	controlling	for	ownership	and	regions.	Equation	(5)	
is	estimated	with	OLS,	within	fixed‐effect	and	first‐differenced	GMM	estimator.	
Due	 to	 the	 specification	 and	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 our	 empirical	
120 
 
equation,	we	would	 expect	 that	 some	 regressors	 of	 our	 specification	may	 be	
endogeneously	 determined	 which	 lead	 to	 potential	 sources	 of	 bias.	 	 The	
endogeneity	 problems	 of	 the	 regressors	 are	 likely	 upward	 bias	 the	 OLS	
estimate	 of	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variable,	 while	 the	 fixed	 effects	 estimators	
would	 lead	 to	 a	 downward	 bias	 of	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variable.	 The	 first‐
differenced	 GMM	 estimators	 are	 useful	 in	 simultaneously	 controlling	 for	
unobserved	heterogeneity	and	endogeneity	problems	by	using	first‐differenced	
transformation	 to	 control	 for	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 sample,	 and	 used	 lagged	
values	of	the	regressors	as	instruments	to	control	for	endogeneity	problems.		
	
Blundell	and	Bond(1998)	indicates	that	the	first‐difference	GMM	suffers	
from	finite‐sample	bias	when	instruments	are	weak.	Bond	et	al.(2003)	suggests	
a	 simple	 way	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 finite‐sample	 bias	 by	 comparing	 the	
coefficients	 of	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variable	 from	 GMM	 estimators	with	 the	
results	from	OLS	and	Fixed‐effects	estimators.	If	we	can	find	evidence	that	the	
lagged	 dependent	 variable’s	 coefficient	 lies	 above	 the	 Fixed‐effects	 estimates	
and	 lies	 below	 the	 OLS	 estimates,	 we	 can	 then	 tentatively	 conclude	 that	 the	
finite‐sample	bias	due	to	weak	instruments	is	unlikely	to	be	a	major	problem.		
	
The	results	 from	table	3.10	 indicates	 that	 the	regression	coefficients	of	
the	lagged	dependent	variables	from	OLS,	Fixed‐effects	and	GMM	are	‐0.002,	‐
0.249	 and	 ‐0.054,	 respectively.	 The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 lagged	 dependent	
variables	 indeed	 lies	 above	 the	 fixed‐effects	 estimates	 and	 below	 the	 OLS	
estimates.	This	 indicates	the	finite‐sample	bias	would	not	be	a	major	problem	
for	 our	 study.	 Therefore,	 from	 this	 point	 onwards	 we	 will	 estimate	 all	 our	
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specifications	with	our	preferred	 first‐difference	GMM	estimator.	The	 focus	of	
the	baseline	estimation	is	the	coefficient	for	the	lagged	cash	flow	terms.	Under	
the	 assumption	 of	 no	 credit	 constraints,	 investment	 should	 be	 negatively	
related	to	lagged	cash	flow.	The	main	structure	of	the	Euler	equation	model	is	
maintained16.	 Sales	 are	 positive	 and	 highly	 significant.	 The	 estimates	 of	 the	
three	 different	 estimators	 show	 that	 the	 lagged	 cash	 flow	 terms	 are	
consistently	positive	and	significant	at	1%	level.	This	is	the	first	evidence	that	
firms	are	financially	constrained	in	China.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                 
16 However, the lagged investment term is negative and significant, which is different from 
the prediction of the theoretical model. This may be caused by the large number of firm-years that are 
making negative investment during the restructuring period. If we control for all the negative 
investment observations, we obtain the theoretical prediction of the Euler equation model. Yet, 
deleting these observations significantly reduces our sample size and coverage of firms. We choose 
preserve the observations with negative investment, because there represents about 20% of our 
observations.  
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Dependent variables  
Iit/Kit 
OLS 
Estimator 
 
Within 
Estimator 
 
First-differenced
GMM 
 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.002 -0.249*** -0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.041*** 0.058*** 0.017 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.015) 
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.004*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
N 64709 64709 44771 
R square 0.041   
rho  0.468  
M2   0.138 
J (p-value)   0.567 
 
Table	3.10:	Baseline	specification	of	Euler	equation	estimation.  
 
Time dummies were included in all specifications. M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under 
the null of instrument validity. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
The first differenced GMM estimator use lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. For all 
specifications time dummies and  industry dummies are included. 
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3.7.2	Regression	results	for	different	ownership	status	
	
Table	3.11	presents	the	estimation	of	equation	(5)	by	controlling	for	ownership	
status.	We	first	run	split	sample	regressions	based	on	ownership	status.	All	the	
results	from	table	3.11	are	estimated	by	GMM	first	differenced	estimator	with	
all	 the	 right	hand	variables	dated	 t‐2	as	 instruments17.	An	 interesting	pattern	
emerges	 from	the	results.	The	cash	 flow	terms	for	 the	SOEs	and	COEs	are	not	
statistically	significant,	while	they	are	highly	positive	and	significant	at	1%	level	
for	 private	 firms,	 foreign	 firms	 and	 listed	 firms.	 These	 indicate	 that	 private	
firms,	foreign	firms	and	listed	firms	in	China	are	subject	to	financial	constraints.			
	
By	 closely	 examining	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 cash	 flow	 coefficient	 for	
private	firms	(0.118),	foreign	firms	(0.05)	and	listed	firms	(0.224),	we	find	that	
foreign	firms’	investment	displays	lowest	sensitivities	to	cash	flows	(about	only	
half	 of	 that	 of	 the	 private	 firms).	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	
hypothesis	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 “lending	 bias”	 and	 “political	 pecking	 order”.	 It	
appears	 that	 SOEs	 firms’	 investments	 are	 not	 constrained	 to	 their	 level	 of	
internal	cash	flow.	Along	with	the	evidence	that	SOEs	are	inefficient,	we	would	
believe	that	SOEs	 in	China	are	still	subject	 to	“soft	budget	constraints”,	where	
the	 state	 dominated	 banking	 system	 continuous	 to	 prefer	 to	 lend	 to	 State	
owned	 enterprises	 and	 its	 close	 resemblance,	 the	 COEs.	 The	 evidence	 that	
private	firms	are	relatively	more	financially	constrained	than	the	less	efficient	
SOEs,	 given	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 more	 efficient	 and	 able	 to	 achieve	 higher	
                                                 
17 The	m2	tests	(the	test	for	second	order	serial	correlation	of	the	residuals)	indicate	no	second	
order	 serial	 correlation	 of	 the	 residuals	 and	 the	 p	 value	 of	 the	 Hansen/Sargan’s	 tests	 of	
overidentification	 restriction	 indicate	 the	 instruments	 are	 valid	 and	 the	model	 are	 correctly	
specified	for	all	the	first	differenced	GMM	regressions	in	table	3.11.	
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returns	 from	 their	 investment,	 suggests	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 being	
discriminated	 by	 the	 formal	 financial	 system.	 The	 evidence	 suggests	 that	
foreign	 firms	 may	 not	 be	 financially	 constraints	 or	 are	 less	 financially	
constrained,	possibly	because	they	can	obtain	funds	from	their	parent	company.		
	
As	 a	 robustness	 test,	 we	 create	 interaction	 terms	 of	 ownership	 status	
and	 interact	 the	 ownership	 status	 dummies	 with	 cash	 flow	 terms	 to	 see	 the	
relative	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 across	 different	 ownership.	 The	 use	 of	
interaction	terms	approach	allows	us	 to	utilise	 the	whole	sample	of	data.	The	
results	from	the	interaction	regression	are	consistent	with	the	finding	from	the	
split	 sample	 regression.	 The	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 are	 positive	 and	 highly	
significant	 for	 listed	 firms	and	private	 firms,	 except	now	 foreign	 firms	are	no	
longer	 showing	 signs	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 This	 further	 confirms	 our	
hypothesis	of	 “political	pecking	order”,	where	private	 firms	rank	behind	SOEs	
and	foreign	firms	in	terms	of	access	to	finance.	This	suggests	private	firms	are	
the	most	financially	constrained	in	China.	
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Dependent 
variables  
Iit/Kit  
SOEs 
 
 
Private 
 
 
Foreign 
 
 
Collective
 
 
Listed 
 
 
Whole 
Sample 
 
Interaction
with 
ownership
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.068*** -0.042*** -0.096*** -0.100*** 0.103*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031) (0.010) (0.010) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.050** 0.018 -0.026 -0.006 0.082** 0.017 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.056) (0.037) (0.010) (0.011) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.008 0.118*** 0.050** 0.190 0.224*** 0.086***  
 (0.093) (0.025) (0.020) (0.124) (0.044) (0.015)  
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.033*** 0.015*** 0.008** 0.018** -0.008 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
SOEs       0.080 
       (0.113) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Private       0.133*** 
       (0.033) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Foreign       0.037 
       (0.024) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Collective       0.224 
       (0.196) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Listed       0.107*** 
       (0.044) 
N 7642 17506 13019 3146 3458 44771 42995 
M2 0.938 0.228 0.253 0.452 0.298 0.138 0.203 
J (p-value) 0.144 0.768 0.364 0.924 0.987 0.567 0.134 
 
Table	3.11:	Euler	equation	estimation	controlling	for	ownership.  
 
Time dummies were included in all specifications. M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under 
the null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
For all specifications time dummies and  industry dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first 
differenced GMM estimator which used lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. The figure 
reported in parenthesis is asymptotic standard error. 
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Dependent 
variables  
Iit/Kit 
Whole sample 
 
 
SOE 
 
 
Private 
 
 
Foreign 
 
 
Collective 
 
 
Listed 
 
 
Ownership 
interactions
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.097*** -0.100*** 0.096*** -0.054***
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031) (0.010) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.017 0.053** 0.017 -0.027 -0.005 0.088** 0.017 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.056) (0.037) (0.011) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.087*** 0.028 0.112*** 0.048*** 0.189 0.250***  
 (0.015 (0.093) (0.026) (0.020) (0.124) (0.043)  
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.018** -0.003 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) 
COVt--1 0.001 0.088*** -0.043 -0.040 0.082 -0.060  
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.061) (0.057)  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
SOEs       0.069 
       (0.112) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Private       0.134*** 
       (0.034) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Foreign       0.037 
       (0.024) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Collective       0.209 
       (0.187) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Listed       0.129*** 
       (0.043) 
COVt—1* 
SOEs       0.070** 
       (0.028) 
COVt—1* 
Private       -0.022 
       (0.031) 
COVt—1* 
Foreign       -0.048 
       (0.026) 
COVt—1* 
Collective       0.105 
       (0.098) 
COVt—1* 
Listed       -0.043 
       (0.059) 
M2 (p-value) 0.142 0.871 0.225 0.267 0.495 0.195 0.24 
J (p-value) 0.521 0.059 0.791 0.459 0.959 0.835 0.061 
Number of 
observations 44750 7638 17500 13017 3144 3451 42980 
Table	3.12:	Euler	equation	estimation	controlling	for	ownership	augmented	
with	coverage	ratios.  
 
Time dummies were included in all specifications. M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under 
the null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
For all specifications time dummies and  industry dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first 
differenced GMM estimator which used lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. The figure 
reported in parenthesis is asymptotic standard error. COV is the coverage ratio defined as interest payment divided 
by interest payment plus cash flow. 
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Dependent 
variables 
      Iit/Kit 
 
 
 
 
Whole Sample 
 
 
 
 
SOE 
 
 
 
 
Private 
 
 
 
 
Foreign 
 
 
 
 
Collective 
 
 
 
 
Listed 
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
Interaction
 
 
 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.052*** -0.066*** -0.040*** -0.095*** -0.100*** 0.106*** -0.052*** 
  (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031) (0.010) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.017* 0.050** 0.018 -0.026 -0.006 0.083** 0.017* 
  (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.057) (0.035) (0.010) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.086*** 0.009 0.122*** 0.050** 0.186 0.225***  
  (0.015) (0.094) (0.025) (0.020) (0.125) (0.044)  
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.020** -0.007 0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) 
Leveraget-1 0.027** 0.022 0.052*** 0.005 -0.037 0.105  
  (0.012) (0.033) (0.016) (0.019) (0.067) (0.070)  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
SOEs       0.091 
        (0.111) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Private       0.136*** 
        (0.033) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Foreign       0.043* 
        (0.023) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Collective       0.142 
        (0.169) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Listed       0.112*** 
        (0.043) 
Leveraget-1* 
SOEs       0.018 
        (0.033) 
Leveraget-1* 
Private       0.052*** 
        (0.016) 
Leveraget-1* 
Foreign       0.005 
        (0.020) 
Leveraget-1* 
Collective       -0.042 
        (0.079) 
Leveraget-1* 
Listed       0.080 
        (0.082) 
M2 (p-value) 0.13 0.933 0.224 0.249 0.507 0.285 0.216 
J (p-value) 0.646 0.227 0.763 0.253 0.886 0.993 0.176 
Number of 
observations 44771 7642 17506 13019 3146 3458 42995 
Table	 3.13:	 Euler	 equation	 estimation	 controlling	 for	 ownership	 augmented	 with	
leverage	ratios.  
Time dummies were included in all specifications. M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the 
null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. For all 
specifications time dummies and  industry dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first differenced 
GMM estimator which used lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. The figure reported in 
parenthesis is asymptotic standard error. Leverage ratio is calculated as total long term liabilities divided by firm’s 
fixed assets. 
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Table	3.12	and	table	3.13	present	the	estimates	of	equation	(6)	which	augment	
equation	(5)	with	two	new	measures	of	financial	constraints:	the	coverage	ratio	
and	 the	 leverage	 ratio.	 Table	 3.14	 presents	 the	 estimates	 of	 equation	 (6),	 by	
augmenting	 the	 baseline	 equation	 with	 the	 two	 new	 financial	 measures.	
Coverage	 ratio	 can	be	 understood	 as	 a	 solvency	based	 ratio,	which	measures	
the	firm’s	ability	to	serve	its	debt.	The	coverage	ratio	in	our	studies	is	defined	
as	 interest	 costs	 divided	 by	 interest	 costs	 plus	 cash	 flow.	 The	 inability	 to	
generate	cash	to	service	the	interest	cost	will	lead	firms	into	insolvency.	On	the	
other	 the	 hand	 the	 leverage	 ratio,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 total	 long‐term	
liabilities	 divided	 by	 total	 fixed	 assets.	 The	 leverage	 ratio	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
collateral	based	measure	of	financial	constraints.	Given	the	underdevelopment	
of	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 China,	 bankruptcy	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 carry	 out.	
Hence,	banks	tend	to	lend	on	the	basis	of	collateral	which	are	mainly	land	and	
building.	Other	types	of	collateral	are	less	acceptable,	since	property	rights	tend	
not	to	be	well‐defined	and	costly	to	enforce.	This	puts	increasing	pressures	on	
private	firms,	which	have	relatively	low	level	of	total	fixed	assets	in	the	form	of	
land	and	building	as	collateral	to	secure	a	debt	from	the	banks.	
	
Table	3.12	reports	the	results	of	the	augmented	Euler	equation	with	the	
coverage	ratio.	Including	the	coverage	ratio	in	the	regressions	only	has	a	small	
impact	on	the	coefficients	of	cash	flow,	for	example	private	firms’	coefficient	for	
cash	 flow	 is	 now	0.112,	 compare	 to	 0.118	 in	 table	 3.11.	 The	 cash	 flow	 terms	
continue	 to	 be	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 for	 private	 firms,	 foreign	
firms	and	listed	firms.	Column	(2)	of	table	3.12	presents	us	with	an	interesting	
result:	 although	 SOEs	 are	 not	 financially	 constrained	 by	 the	measure	 of	 cash	
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flow,	 SOEs	 are	 the	 only	 ownership	 group	 that	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	measures	 of	
coverage	ratio.	The	regression	result	in	column	(7)	of	table	3.12	also	indicates	
the	 same	 results	 by	 interacting	 the	 cash	 flow	 ratio	 and	 coverage	 ratio	 with	
ownership	 dummies.	 The	 coverage	 ratio	 is	 only	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	
SOEs.	 This	 suggest	 that	 although	 SOEs	 do	 not	 suffered	 from	 financial	
constraints,	 they	still	 follow	some	rules	 to	maintain	 themselves	solvent,	given	
that	 their	 inability	 to	 generate	 cash	 flows,	 the	 coverage	 ratio	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	 to	 their	 investment	 decisions.	 This	 result	 hints	 that	 the	 budget	
constraints	 are	 gradually	 hardening	 for	 SOEs	 as	 the	 Chinese	 financial	 system	
continues	to	reform.		
	
Table	 3.13	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 augmented	 Euler	 equation	with	 the	
leverage	 ratio.	 The	 results	 indicate	 that,	 for	 the	whole	 sample,	 leverage	 is	 an	
important	 determinant	 of	 the	 investment	 decisions.	 After	 we	 control	 for	
ownership	group	by	running	split	sample	regression	with	the	augmented	Euler	
equation.	 Private	 firms	 appear	 to	 be	 the	 only	 group	 that	 is	 affected	 by	 the	
leverage	 ratio.	 By	 adding	 the	 leverage	 ratio	 into	 the	 regression	 leads	 to	 an	
increase	 the	 in	 the	 cash	 flow	 terms	 to	 0.122.	 This	 again	 confirms	 the	 finding	
that	 private	 firms	 are	 financially	 constrained.	 The	 positive	 relationship	
between	private	firms’	investment	and	leverage	ratio	is	consistent	with	the	idea	
that	private	firms	are	unable	to	obtain	loans	without	enough	collateral.	Banks	
in	China	 typically	 require	 the	debt	 to	be	 “over	collateralized”	 to	protect	 them	
from	the	drop	in	value	of	the	collateral.	Due	to	the	limited	tangible	fixed	assets	
that	private	firms	can	use	as	collateral,	they	will	find	it	difficult	to	secure	loans	
and	are	very	sensitive	to	the	leverage	measure.		
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Iit/Kit 
 
Full sample 
 
SOE 
 
Private 
 
Foreign 
 
Collective 
 
Listed 
  
Ownership 
Interaction 
 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.053*** -0.063*** -0.042*** -0.096*** -0.099*** 0.100*** (Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031)  (0.010) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.017 0.054** 0.017 -0.027 -0.006 0.089** (Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.018* 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.057) (0.036)  (0.010) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.087*** 0.028 0.117*** 0.048** 0.189 0.252*** (Sit/Kit) t-1 0.014*** 
 (0.015) (0.095) (0.025) (0.020) (0.126) (0.044)  (0.002) 
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.020*** -0.004 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
SOEs 0.085 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.110) 
COVt--1 0.0002 0.089*** -0.044 -0.040 0.083 -0.061 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Private 0.136*** 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.061) (0.057)  (0.033) 
Leveraget-1 0.026** 0.018 0.052*** 0.005 -0.038 0.113* 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Foreign 0.041* 
 (0.012) (0.033) (0.016) (0.019) (0.067) (0.069)  (0.023) 
       
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Collective 0.144 
        (0.166) 
       
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Listed 0.135*** 
        (0.042) 
       
COVt—1* 
SOEs 0.073*** 
        (0.028) 
       
COVt—1* 
Private -0.023 
        (0.030) 
       
COVt—1* 
Foreign -0.046 
        (0.026) 
       
COVt—1* 
Collective 0.070 
        (0.089) 
       
COVt—1* 
Listed -0.040 
        (0.058) 
       
Leveraget-1* 
SOEs 0.007 
        (0.032) 
       
Leveraget-1* 
Private 0.053*** 
        (0.016) 
       
Leveraget-1* 
Foreign 0.005 
        (0.020) 
       
Leveraget-1* 
Collective -0.044 
        (0.077) 
       
Leveraget-1* 
Listed 0.092 
        (0.084) 
M2 (p-value) 0.133 0.865 0.22 0.263 0.556 0.182  0.248 
J (p-value) 0.585 0.114 0.803 0.331 0.937 0.942  0.071 
N 44750 7638 17500 13017 3144 3451  42980 
Table	3.14:	Euler	equation	estimation	controlling	for	ownership	and	
augmented	with	leverage	ratios	and	coverage	ratio.  
M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation The Hansen J 
statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 
5% level, and 1% level respectively. For all specifications time dummies and  industry dummies are included, all specification are 
estimated with first differenced GMM estimator which used lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. The 
figure reported in parenthesis is asymptotic standard error.  
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By	 bringing	 together	 both	 the	 coverage	 ratio	 and	 leverage	 ratio,	 table	
3.14	 presents	 the	 result	 of	 equation	 (6).	 Similar	 results	 emerged:	 SOEs	 and	
COEs	 are	 not	 financially	 constrained	 in	 terms	 of	 cash	 flow	 measure,	 while	
private	 firms	 and	 listed	 firms	 are	 financially	 constrained.	 SOEs	 and	 Private	
firms’	investment	reacts	to	different	financial	measures.	SOEs’	investments	are	
affected	 by	 the	 coverage	 ratios,	 while	 Private	 firms’	 investments	 are	 mainly	
affected	by	the	leverage	ratios.		
	
However,	 from	 the	 results	 of	 table	 3.11	 to	 3.14,	 one	 peculiar	 result	
emerges	 persistently:	 listed	 firms	 are	 always	 displaying	 the	 highest	 level	 of	
investment	cash‐flow	sensitivities.	Generally,	 listed	 firms	are	much	 larger	and	
more	 transparent	 which	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 asymmetric	 information.	 They	
should	be	less	financially	constrained	than	the	private	firms,	which	are	smaller	
and	suffers	from	high	level	of	asymmetric	information	and	agency	costs.	Some	
possible	 explanations	 for	 this	 finding	 are	 as	 follows:	 1)	 the	 strict	
requirements18	set	 by	 the	 government	 make	 refinancing	 very	 costly	 and	
difficult	 to	 conduct	 for	 the	 listed	 firms	 in	 China;	 2)	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	
operation	 for	 listed	 firms	 and	 strict	 regulation	 stop	 them	 from	 obtaining	
financial	resources	from	alternative	routes	such	as	informal	finance,	which	falls	
on	the	grey	area	in	law.	
	
3.7.3	Regression	results	for	Regional	disparity	
	
                                                 
18 In order to refinance by issuing new shares, Chinese listed firms need to be profitable continuously 
for three years. If the firm has already issued new shares in the past 24 months, the operating profit 
can’t decrease more than 50% in the year of new shares issue. 
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Table	 3.15	 presents	 our	 empirical	 tests	 of	 regional	 disparities	 in	
financial	 constraints.	By	 creasing	 three	 regional	dummies19:	East,	 Central	 and	
West,	and	interact	these	regional	dummies	with	the	cash	flow	terms	to	assess	
the	differential	level	of	financial	constraints	across	the	three	regions.	Table	3.15	
column	 (1)	 presents	 the	 results	 based	 on	 the	 whole	 sample.	 The	 cash	 flow	
terms	are	positive	and	significant	at	1%	level	of	 the	eastern	region,	while	 the	
cash	 flow	 terms	 are	 not	 statistically	 significant	 for	 the	 central	 and	 western	
regions.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	 eastern	 region	 suffers	 most	 from	 financial	
constraints.	This	result	supports	our	conjecture	in	section	4.2	that	we	are	likely	
to	 find	 that	 eastern/coastal	 region	 will	 be	more	 financially	 constrained	 than	
western	and	central	region.	In	our	opinion,	this	is	due	to	the	combine	effects	of	
fragmented	 capital	market	 and	 central	 government’s	 continuous	 allocation	 of	
resources	from	the	eastern	region	towards	the	western	and	central	regions	to	
narrow	the	development	gap.		
	
Furthermore,	in	table	3.15	we	also	run	a	split	sample	regression	for	each	
individual	 ownership	 group	with	 regional	 dummies	 interaction.	We	 find	 that	
SOEs	and	COEs	are	continue	to	be	unaffected	by	cash	flows	in	all	regions,	while	
only	 private	 firms	 and	 foreign	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	 regions	
appear	 to	be	 financially	constrained.	This	 is	 likely	caused	by	 the	 fact	 than	the	
demand	 for	 funds	 are	 very	 high	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	 regions,	 where	many	
firms	are	competing	for	limited	amount	of	funds.	
	
                                                 
19 See Table 3A5 for classification details. 
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Another	interesting	fact	from	table	3.15	is	the	regression	based	on	listed	
firms,	 the	coastal	 region	appears	 to	 suffer	 the	 least	 from	 financial	 constraints	
and	western	region	suffers	the	most	from	financial	constraints,	and	the	central	
region	falls	in	between.	This	result	is	consistent	with	the	theory	that	the	level	of	
local	 financial	 development	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	
This	 is	 likely	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 listed	 firms	mainly	 rely	on	 formal	 source	of	
finance,	 and	 listed	 firms	 located	 in	 region	with	 better	 financial	 development	
may	benefit	from	easier	access	to	finance.	
	
Table	3.16	presents	the	Euler	equation	estimation	augmented	with	both	
coverage	 ratio	 and	 leverage	 ratio.	 We	 interact	 cash	 flow,	 coverage	 ratio	 and	
leverage	ratio	with	three	regional	dummies	to	test	 for	the	regional	disparities	
of	 financial	 constraints	 across	 different	 ownership	 type.	 The	 result	 indicates	
that	cash	flow	terms	are	positive	and	significant	only	for	private	firms,	foreign	
firms	 located	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	 region.	 Cash	 flow	 terms	 are	 positive	 and	
significant	 for	all	 three	regions	 for	 the	 listed	firms.	Listed	 firms	 located	 in	the	
western	 region	 display	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities,	 which	
suggests	that	western	region	is	more	financially	constrained	for	the	listed	firms.	
	
Moreover,	 the	 results	 continue	 to	 suggest	 that	 SOEs	 and	 collectively	
owned	 firms	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 financial	 constraints.	 However,	 the	 coverage	
ratios	are	positive	and	significant	for	SOEs	located	in	the	eastern/coastal	region	
and	 the	central	 region.	This	 suggests	 that	SOEs	 located	 in	 the	eastern/coastal	
and	 the	 central	 regions	 are	 subject	 to	 some	 form	 of	 hardening	 budget	
constraints.	 The	 coverage	 ratio	 is	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	 private	 firms	
134 
 
located	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	 region	 only.	 Last,	 the	 leverage	 ratio	 is	 positive	
and	 significant	 only	 for	 private	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	 regions.	
Overall,	 the	 result	 suggests	 that	 private	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 eastern/coastal	
region	are	most	financially	constrained.	
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Iit/Kit 
 
  
Whole  
Sample 
 
SOE 
 
 
Private 
 
 
Foreign 
 
 
Collective 
 
 
Listed 
 
 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 -0.047*** -0.064*** -0.041*** -0.094*** -0.108*** 0.105*** 
  (0.009) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.016* 0.048* 0.019 -0.026 0.000 0.085** 
  (0.009) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.060) (0.036) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
East 0.092*** 0.177 0.127*** 0.054*** 0.163 0.196*** 
  (0.017) (0.228) (0.031) (0.020) (0.196) (0.061) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Central 0.052 0.137 0.084 0.003 -0.046 0.235*** 
  (0.067) (0.162) (0.113) (0.199) (0.109) (0.045) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 
Western 0.069 -0.220 0.079 0.095 0.378 0.334*** 
  (0.054) (0.165) (0.077) (0.150) (0.251) (0.082) 
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.012* -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) 
        
              
M2 (p-value) 0.16 0.878 0.297 0.406 0.358 0.278 
J (p-value) 0.25 0.059 0.698 0.249 0.65 0.971 
Number of  
observations 42995 7315 16901 12472 3059 3248 
 
Table	3.15:	Euler	equation	estimation	controlling	for	regional	disparities	
across	different	ownership	
 
 M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation 
The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. For all specifications time dummies and  industry 
dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first differenced GMM estimator which used lagged 
values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments.  
 
East region: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Guangxi. Central region: Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. Western region: 
Neimenggu, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shannxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet 
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Iit/Kit 
Whole  
SOE Private Foreign Collective Listed Sample 
  
(Iit/Kit)t-1 ‐0.0541***  ‐0.0626*  ‐0.0424**  ‐0.0954***  ‐0.111**  0.0993** 
  (0.00994)  (0.0252)  (0.0151)  (0.0193)  (0.0380)  (0.0312) 
  
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.0175  0.0405  0.0192  ‐0.0127  ‐0.00576  0.0862* 
   (0.00994)  (0.0260)  (0.0152)  (0.0181)  (0.0571)  (0.0358) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.0878***  0.328  0.117***  0.0552**  0.156  0.227*** 
East (0.0177)  (0.270)  (0.0314)  (0.0198)  (0.186)  (0.0651) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.105  0.109  0.0825  ‐0.0865  0.0600  0.233*** 
Central (0.0739)  (0.156)  (0.121)  (0.227)  (0.0825)  (0.0478) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.0779  ‐0.288  0.0834  0.0840  0.372  0.312*** 
Western (0.0578)  (0.175)  (0.0771)  (0.146)  (0.247)  (0.0829) 
  
COVt—1* ‐0.0232  0.126*  0.0858*  ‐0.0238  0.111  ‐0.0520 
East (0.0191)  (0.0497)  (0.0366)  (0.0257)  (0.0959)  (0.0658) 
  
COVt—1* 0.0320  0.110*  0.0185  ‐0.187  ‐0.00792  ‐0.145 
Central (0.0398)  (0.0495)  (0.0797)  (0.137)  (0.0972)  (0.140) 
  
COVt—1* 0.0278  0.0519  0.00432  ‐0.0970  ‐0.105  0.0880 
Western (0.0297)  (0.0444)  (0.0524)  (0.0860)  (0.120)  (0.109) 
  
Leveraget-1* 0.0386  0.0472  0.145**  0.0463  ‐0.0126  0.0651 
East (0.0199)  (0.0644)  (0.0557)  (0.0340)  (0.0817)  (0.0879) 
  
Leveraget-1* ‐0.0159  ‐0.00348  0.0158  ‐0.208  ‐0.148  0.266 
Central (0.0477)  (0.0709)  (0.0684)  (0.209)  (0.121)  (0.178) 
  
Leveraget-1* 0.0681  ‐0.0497  0.0441  0.0864  0.0289  0.0469 
Western (0.0406)  (0.0797)  (0.0276)  (0.183)  (0.127)  (0.156) 
  
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.0138***  0.0372**  0.0146***  0.00909**  0.0166**  0.000935 
   (0.00189)  (0.0122)  (0.00235)  (0.00285)  (0.00628)  (0.00798) 
M2 (p-value) 0.163  0.938  0.298  0.236  0.590  0.154 
J (p-value) 0.233  0.0961  0.110  0.380  0.491  0.868 
Number of 
observations 42455  7168  16692  12373  3016  3206 
Table	3.16:	Euler	equation	estimation	controlling	for	regional	disparities	across	
different	ownership.  
See notes from table 3.14 and 3.15 
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3.7.4	Regression	results	for	foreign	ownership	and	financial	
constraints	
	
A	popular	view	in	the	literature	of	 financial	constraints	argues	that	the	
presence	 of	 foreign	 capital	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	
This	 is	 because	 the	 foreign	 investors	 are	 typically	 large	multinationals	which	
can	help	 firms	 to	obtain	 funds	 from	their	parent	companies.	Moreover,	 in	 the	
firms	with	 foreign	 ownership	 typically	 receive	 preferential	 policy	 treatments	
from	the	 local	and	central	government,	such	as	reduction	 in	 tax	 level.	Last,	as	
Huang	 (2003)	 proposed	 that	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 High	 FDI	 provinces	 have	
better	 access	 to	 extra	 source	 of	 finance,	while	 firms	 located	 in	 region	 of	 FDI	
provinces	only	have	access	to	limited	sources	of	finance.	He	further	argues	that	
private	firms	rely	more	on	FDI	than	other	ownership	types,	as	they	rank	at	the	
end	 of	 the	 political	 pecking	 order	which	makes	 them	 very	 difficult	 to	 obtain	
external	finance.		
	
In	this	section	we	conduct	a	test	to	see	whether	the	presence	of	foreign	
capital	indeed	helps	firms	to	alleviate	the	level	of	financial	constraints.	We	use	
the	 average	 ownership	 data	 to	 divide	 firms	 into	 two	 groups:	 1)	 firms	 with	
foreign	 ownership20	(WF)	 and	 2)	 firms	 without	 foreign	 ownership21	(NF).		
Table	3.16	presents	our	test	results	on	whether	the	presence	of	foreign	capital	
using	 the	baseline	Euler	equation	 specification.	Column	 (1)‐(3)	utilise	 the	 full	
                                                 
20 Firms are defined as WF if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is greater than 
zero. 
21 Firms are defined as NF if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is equal to zero. 
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sample	of	data22.	 	Column	(1)	 is	 for	 firms	without	 the	presence	of	 the	 foreign	
ownership,	the	cash	flow	term	is	0.126	and	statistically	significant	at	1%.	The	
cash	flow	term	for	firms	with	the	presence	of	foreign	ownership	is	0.0681	(only	
half	 the	 size	 of	 the	 cash	 flow	 terms	 for	 firm	without	 foreign	 ownership)	 and	
statistically	 significant	 at	1%	 level.	This	 suggests	 that	 the	presence	of	 foreign	
ownership	helps	to	reduce	the	level	of	financial	constraints	in	China.	In	column	
(3)	 of	 table	 3.17,	 we	 interact	 the	 cash	 flow	 with	 two	 dummy	 variables	
indicating	the	presence	of	foreign	ownership	in	a	firms	share	capital:	1)	NF=1	if	
the	 actual	 share	 of	 foreign	 capital	 in	 the	 firm’s	 equity	 is	 equal	 to	 zero,	 NF=0	
otherwise;	2)	WF=1	if	the	actual	share	of	foreign	capital	in	the	firm’s	equity	is	
greater	than	zero,	WF=0	otherwise.	From	column	(3)	of	table	3.17,	we	find	that	
for	the	full	sample	of	data,	the	cash	flow	term	for	NF	firms	is	0.133,	while	the	
cash	flow	term	for	WF	firms	is	0.0621	(only	half	the	size	of	the	NF	firms’	cash	
flow	term).	This	evidence	indicates	that	firms	with	foreign	ownership	are	less	
financially	constrained	than	firms	without	foreign	ownership.	
	
Given	the	findings	that	private	firms	are	the	most	financially	constrained	
ownership	 type	 in	 China.	 Therefore,	 column	 (4)‐(6)	 of	 table	 3.17	 focus	 on	
private	firms	exclusively.	We	can	see	that	cash	flow	terms	for	NF	private	firms	
and	WF	private	firms	are	0.131	and	0.114	respectively.	The	cash	flow	terms	are	
statistically	 significant	 at	 1%	 level.	 The	 result	 in	 column	 (6)	 confirms	 the	
finding	 that	private	 firms	without	 foreign	ownership	displaying	a	higher	 level	
of	investment	cash	flow	sensitivities.		
                                                 
22 As	we	do	not	have	ownership	details	for	the	listed	firms,	listed	firms	are	excluded	in	this	
regression. 
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Table	 3.18	 reports	 the	 result	 of	 the	 Euler	 equation	 augmented	 with	
coverage	ratio	and	leverage	ratio	as	a	robustness	check.	Again,	column	(1)‐(3)	
utilise	the	full	sample	of	data.	We	can	see	that	the	cash	flow	term	for	NF	firms	
continues	 to	 be	 about	 twice	 as	 large	 as	 the	 cash	 flow	 term	 for	 the	WF	 firms.	
However,	neither	coverage	ratio	nor	leverage	ratio	appear	to	be	significant	for	
both	 types	of	 firms.	Column	(4)‐(6)	of	 table	3.18	 focus	only	private	 firms,	 the	
result	suggests	that	the	cash	flow	terms	are	positive	and	significant	for	both	NF	
firms	and	WF	firms,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	cash	flow	terms	are	also	similar	
(0.121	 for	NF	 firms	vs.	0.11	 for	WF	firms	 in	column(6)	of	 table	3.18).	A	more	
interesting	result	is	that	leverage	continues	to	be	positive	and	significant	for	NF	
private	firms.	This	suggests	the	presence	of	the	foreign	ownership	does	help	to	
alleviate	private	firms’	financial	constraints	problem.	
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   Full sample Full sample Private Private 
   WF=0 WF=1 WF=0 WF=1 
Iit/Kit (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  
(Iit/Kit)t-1 
‐
0.0471***  ‐0.0864***  ‐0.0632***  ‐0.0352*  ‐0.0772*  ‐0.0420** 
   (0.0141)  (0.0158)  (0.0104)  (0.0177)  (0.0302)  (0.0152) 
  
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.0231  ‐0.00323  0.0122  0.0285  ‐0.0174  0.0188 
   (0.0145)  (0.0147)  (0.0104)  (0.0182)  (0.0287)  (0.0154) 
  
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.0177***  0.00977***  0.0137***  0.0150***  0.00625  0.0143*** 
   (0.00300)  (0.00265)  (0.00191)  (0.00289)  (0.00466)  (0.00236) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.126***  0.0681***  0.131***  0.114** 
   (0.0365)  (0.0177)  (0.0390)  (0.0356) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.133**  0.123** 
NF (0.0434)  (0.0465) 
  
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.0621**  0.116** 
WF (0.0205)  (0.0385) 
  
M2 (p-value) 0.107  0.291  0.113  0.145  0.919  0.297 
J (p-value) 0.167  0.829  0.714  0.542  0.282  0.916 
Number of 
observations 21937  18845  39205  13028  4254  16668 
Table	3.17:	Euler	equation	estimation	for	firms	with	and	without	foreign	
ownership	
 
M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of instrument validity.  *, 
**, *** denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. For all specifications time 
dummies and  industry dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first differenced GMM 
estimator which used lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. 
 
WF=1: if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is greater than zero. 
WF=0: if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is equal to zero. 
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   Full sample Full sample Private Private 
   WF=0 WF=1 WF=0 WF=1 
Iit/Kit (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(Iit/Kit)t-1 ‐0.0447**  ‐0.0860***  ‐0.0626***  ‐0.0311  ‐0.0798**  ‐0.0425** 
   (0.0139)  (0.0155)  (0.0103)  (0.0174)  (0.0299)  (0.0151) 
(Iit/Kit)2 t-1 0.0243  ‐0.00292  0.0127  0.0302  ‐0.0122  0.0207 
   (0.0144)  (0.0145)  (0.0103)  (0.0178)  (0.0280)  (0.0151) 
(Sit/Kit) t-1 0.0183***  0.00987***  0.0138***  0.0161***  0.00698  0.0144*** 
   (0.00291)  (0.00254)  (0.00191)  (0.00278)  (0.00441)  (0.00235) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1 0.134***  0.0668***  0.122***  0.120** 
   (0.0361)  (0.0175)  (0.0355)  (0.0376) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.133**  0.121* 
NF (0.0433)  (0.0469) 
(CFit/Kit) t-1* 0.0615**  0.110** 
WF (0.0204)  (0.0388) 
COVt—1* 0.0266  ‐0.0461  ‐0.0334  ‐0.0965 
   (0.0183)  (0.0245)  (0.0288)  (0.0655) 
Leveraget-1* 0.0283  0.0468  0.112*  0.0419 
   (0.0209)  (0.0273)  (0.0491)  (0.0252) 
COVt—1* 0.0213  ‐0.0480 
NF (0.0201)  (0.0302) 
COVt—1* ‐0.0429  ‐0.0438 
WF (0.0254)  (0.0728) 
Leveraget-1* 0.0488  0.120* 
NF (0.0274)  (0.0514) 
Leveraget-1* 0.0236  0.0377 
WF (0.0215)  (0.0254) 
            
M2 (p-value) 0.127  0.489  0.115  0.177  0.779  0.284 
J (p-value) 0.147  0.610  0.386  0.583  0.253  0.520 
Number of 
observations 21081  18115  39196  12539  4125  16664 
 
Table	3.18:	Euler	equation	estimation	augmented	with	coverage	ratio	and	
leverage	ratio	for	firms	with	and	without	foreign	ownership	
 
M2 tests for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation 
The Hansen J statistics tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the null of instrument validity.  *, **, *** 
denotes significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. For all specifications time dummies and  
industry dummies are included, all specification are estimated with first differenced GMM estimator which used 
lagged values of all right side variables dated t-2 as instruments. 
 
WF=1: if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is greater than zero. 
WF=0: if the actual share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is equal to zero. 
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3.8	Conclusions	
	
Based	on	a	large	firm‐level	dataset,	which	mainly	consists	of	unlisted	firms	over	
the	 period	 of	 1998‐2005,	 using	 the	 Euler	 equation	 investment	 model	 we	
investigate	whether	Chinese	firms	are	financially	constrained.	In	particular	we	
focus	 on	 assessing	 the	 impact	 of	 ownership,	 regional	 disparities	 and	 the	
presence	of	foreign	ownership	on	the	level	of	financial	constraints.	
	
By	 dividing	 firms	 into	 five	 ownership	 groups,	we	 find	 strong	 evidence	
indicating	 there	 is	 a	 “lending	 bias”	 at	 work.	 The	 SOEs	 and	 COEs	 are	 least	
financially	 constrained,	 while	 the	 private	 firms	 are	 the	 most	 financially	
constrained.	 This	 is	 largely	 the	 result	 of	 significant	 distortion	 in	 the	 financial	
system	 cause	 by	 the	 state‐dominated	 banking	 system	 that	 favours	 SOEs	 over	
private	ownership.	There	is	evidence	that	SOEs	are	still	enjoying	the	benefits	of	
“soft	budget	constraints”	even	after	30	years	of	transition.		
	
A	surprising	result	from	the	study	is	that	listed	firms	in	China	are	subject	
to	severe	financial	constraints,	which	contradicts	the	traditional	view	that	listed	
firms,	are	subject	to	less	asymmetric	information	problems,	and	should	be	less	
financially	constrained.	The	causes	of	this	result	deserve	further	research.		
	
By	augmenting	the	Euler	equation	investment	model	with	two	financial	
measures:	the	coverage	ratio	and	the	leverage	ratio;	we	find	evidence	that	SOEs	
are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 solvency	 based	 coverage	 ratio,	 and	 the	 private	 firms	 are	
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sensitive	to	the	collateral	based	financial	measure,	the	leverage	ratio.	This	may	
suggest	 that	 banks	 and	 other	 lenders	 place	 different	 lending	 criteria	 on	
different	 ownership	 groups.	 The	 foreign	 firms,	 COEs	 and	 listed	 firms	 do	 not	
appear	to	be	affected	by	these	two	ratios.	
	
Moreover,	we	also	 find	that	 there	are	significant	regional	disparities	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 We	 find	 evidence	 that	 the	
eastern/coastal	 regions	are	more	 financially	 constrained	 than	 the	 central	 and	
western	 regions,	 which	 support	 the	 conjecture	 that	 capitals	 are	 highly	
immobilize	in	China.	Government’s	allocation	of	resources	from	eastern	regions	
towards	 the	 less	 developed	 western	 and	 central	 regions	 creates	 more	
distortion	 in	 the	 financial	 markets.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints	in	the	less	developed	region	is	reduced	at	the	cost	of	the	economic	
growth	potential	in	the	eastern/coastal	regions.	
	
Last,	we	also	 find	evidence	 the	presence	of	 foreign	ownership	helps	 to	
reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 Because	 foreign	 firms	 are	 less	
dependent	 on	 the	 local	 capital	 markets,	 they	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 avoid	 the	
lending	bias	in	China	and	obtain	valuable	financial	resources	from	abroad.	
	
The	more	efficient	and	profitable	private	firms	have	been	the	engine	of	
growth	 in	the	Chinese	economy.	However,	due	to	 lending	bias	 in	the	 financial	
system,	private	firms	are	severely	discriminated	against	by	the	banking	sector	
and	 facing	 high	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints,	 which	 eventually	 turn	 into	 a	
slowdown	 in	 the	economic	growth.	The	 continuous	distortion	 in	 the	 financial	
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markets	 and	 misallocation	 of	 capital	 by	 the	 government	 will	 prevents	 the	
financial	market	to	develop	and	help	the	economy	to	achieve	full	efficiency.		
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Data	Appendix	3A:	
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel full sample 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A1: Number of observations by year. (1998-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of observations  
per firm 
Number of firms 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
 
1 249 1.12 1.12 
2 2,245 10.08 11.2 
3 1,895 8.51 19.7 
4 1,975 8.87 28.57 
5 3,060 13.74 42.31 
6 3,074 13.8 56.11 
7 1,356 6.09 62.2 
8 8,420 37.8 100 
Total 22,274 100  
 
Table 3A2: Number of firms by year. (1998-2005) 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of 
 observations 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
 
1998 9,910 8.69 8.69 
1999 10,716 9.39 18.08 
2000 12,753 11.18 29.25 
2001 14,556 12.76 42.01 
2002 15,422 13.52 55.53 
2003 16,306 14.29 69.82 
2004 16,975 14.88 84.7 
2005 17,460 15.3 100 
Total 114,098 100  
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Table 3A3: Number of observations for listed firms by year. (1999-2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A4: Distribution of observations by ownership type. (1999-2005) 
Note: the numbers in Bold are percentages; other numbers are number of observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of 
 observations
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
 
1999 638 10.07 10.07 
2000 662 10.45 20.51 
2001 782 12.34 32.85 
2002 936 14.77 47.63 
2003 1,000 15.78 63.41 
2004 1,142 18.02 81.43 
2005 1,177 18.57 100 
Total 6,337 100  
year SOE Private Foreign Collective Listed Total 
1998 2,324 3,751 2,907 928 0 9,910 
 23.45 37.85 29.33 9.36 0 100 
1999 2,329 3,819 2,998 932 638 10,716 
 21.73 35.64 27.98 8.7 5.95 100 
2000 2,626 4,813 3,612 1,040 662 12,753 
 20.59 37.74 28.32 8.15 5.19 100 
2001 2,586 6,102 3,956 1,130 782 14,556 
 17.77 41.92 27.18 7.76 5.37 100 
2002 2,795 6,469 4,055 1,167 936 15,422 
 18.12 41.95 26.29 7.57 6.07 100 
2003 2,683 6,997 4,463 1,163 1,000 16,306 
 16.45 42.91 27.37 7.13 6.13 100 
2004 2,504 7,404 4,905 1,020 1,142 16,975 
 14.75 43.62 28.9 6.01 6.73 100 
2005 2,389 7,833 5,101 960 1,177 17,460 
 13.68 44.86 29.22 5.5 6.74 100 
Total 20,236 47,188 31,997 8,340 6,337 114,098 
 17.74 41.36 28.04 7.31 5.55 100 
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Table 3A5: Detailed regions classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region SOE Private Foreign Collective Listed Total 
Costal 10.72% 40.76% 36.56% 6.95% 5.01% 100.00% 
Central 30.39% 44.49% 6.82% 8.66% 9.63% 100.00% 
West 33.46% 48.46% 4.64% 5.23% 8.22% 100.00% 
Whole 
 Sample 16.67% 42.38% 27.91% 6.93% 6.10% 100.00% 
 
Table 3A6: Distribution of observations by ownership type and regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region 1: 
Costal/East 
Region 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi  
Region 2: 
Central 
Region 
Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan 
Region 3: 
Western 
Region 
Neimenggu, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shannxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet 
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Data	Appendix	3B:	
	
Definitions	of	variables	
Iit:	 investment	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 change	 in	 real	 tangible	 fixed	 assets	 plus	
depreciation	
CFit:	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 sum	 of	 net	 income	 plus	 depreciation	 plus	 the	
amortization	of	other	long‐term	assets,	intangible	assets	and	long‐term	prepaid	
expense.	
Kit: Capital is proxy by real tangible fixed assets.  
Sit:	Sales	is	the	total	real	sales	turnover	of	the	firm.	
	Deflators:	the	provincial	level	deflators	are	extracted	from	the	China	Statistical						
Yearbook	published	by	 the	National	Bureau	of	 Statistics	of	 China.	The	 capital	
stock	 (i.e.	firm’s	tangible	fixed	assets)	 is	deflated	with	 the	provincial	ex‐factory	
price	indexes.	All	other	variables	are	deflated	with	the	provincial	GDP	deflator.			
COV ratio:	is	defined	as	the	ratio	of	the	firm’s	interest	expense	to	the	sum	of	the	
firm’s	interest	expense	plus	cash	flow	
Leverage ratio: is	 calculated	 as	 the	 book	 value	 of	 total	 long	 term	 liabilities	
divided	by	firm’s	fixed	assets.	
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Chapter	4:	Financial	constraints	and	Inventory	
investment:	Evidence	from	China	
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4.1	Introduction	
 
The	 importance	of	 the	 role	of	 inventory	 investment	has	often	been	neglected	by	
economists.	 The	 interest	 in	 inventory	 behaviour	 is	 ignited	 by	 Metzler’s	 (1941)	
paper,	 which	 demonstrates	 that	 inventory	 behaviour	 can	 helps	 to	 explain	 the	
business	 cycle.	Nowadays,	 it	 is	 commonly	 understood	 that	 inventory	 investment	
plays	a	prominent	role	in	the	business	cycle.	Despite	of	its	small	magnitude	relative	
to	total	production,	the	reduction	of	inventory	during	economic	recession	accounts	
for	a	significant	portion	of	the	reduction	in	the	gross	domestic	product	(GDP).		
	
Blinder	 and	 Maccini	 (1991)	 show	 that,	 in	 a	 purely	 arithmetical	 sense,	
inventory	investment	reduction	has	accounted	for	around		87%	of	the	drop	in	GNP	
during	 the	 average	 post‐war	 recession	 in	 the	United	 States.	 Cunningham	 (2004)	
finds	 even	 more	 significant	 results	 for	 Canada.	 She	 shows	 that	 inventory	
investment	declines	by	almost	200%	more	than	decline	in	output	over	an	average	
business	 cycle.	 Based	 on	 these	 startling	 results,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	inventory	investment	behaviour	at	both	the	micro	level	and	
macro	level	will	help	us	to	gain	better	understanding	of	the	business	cycle	and	the	
micro	behaviour	of	the	firms.	In	recent	recessions,	inventory	investment	reduction	
has	 been	 widely	 cited	 as	 an	 important	 component	 of	 leading	 business	 cycle	
indicators.	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 the	 significant	 magnitude	 of	 the	 volatility	 of	
inventory	 investment,	 economists	believe	 that	policies	 that	 reduce	 the	 inventory	
fluctuations	could	dampen	the	business	cycle.		
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At	 the	 micro	 level,	 when	 companies	 face	 shocks,	 they	 have	 a	 number	 of	
adjustments	to	the	shocks,	such	as	change	in	employment	 level,	 fixed	investment	
etc.	However,	 inventory	 investment	 is	 typically	 considered	 to	be	 the	 first	 choice,	
since	 the	 adjustment	 costs	 for	 inventories	 are	 relatively	 low	 compare	 to	 other	
forms	 of	 investment	 adjustment23 .	 The	 understanding	 of	 firms’	 inventory	
adjustment	will	also	offer	insights	to	the	monetary	policy	transmission	mechanism.	
Inventory	 investment	 behaviour	 has	 been	 widely	 studied	 in	 the	 context	 of	
developed	 economies	 such	 as	US	 and	UK,	 yet	 there	 isn’t	 any	 study	 on	 inventory	
investment	 in	the	context	of	China.	This	study	aims	to	 fill	 this	gap	by	empirically	
study	whether	financial	variables	play	an	important	role	in	 inventory	investment	
decisions	 of	 Chinese	 firms.	 Specifically	 we	 would	 like	 to	 see	 whether	 financial	
factors	 have	 different	 impacts	 on	 inventory	 investment	 decisions	 of	 firms	 with	
different	ownership	and	different	firm	characteristics.	
	
4.2	Inventory	investment	and	financial	constraints:	a	literature	
review	
	
The	studies	of	financial	constraints	and	inventory	investment	are	motivated	by	the	
theoretical	research	of	capital	market	imperfection,	which	argues	that	the	internal	
finance	and	net	worth	will	have	a	significant	impact	on	firm	behaviour	if	external	
                                                 
23 For example, fixed investment and R&D investment face very high adjustment costs. 
152 
 
finance	is	not	perfect	substitute	for	internal	finance.	The	details	of	the	theoretical	
arguments	 of	 the	 capital	 market	 imperfection	 are	 documented	 in	 the	 second	
chapter	 of	 this	 thesis.	 In	 this	 chapter	 we	 focus	 on	 testing	 the	 linkage	 between	
inventory	investment	and	internal	finance	and	how	these	linkages	different	across	
firms	 with	 different	 characteristics.	 In	 this	 section	 we	 provide	 a	 review	 of	 the	
existing	 studies	 on	 the	 financial	 constraints	 and	 inventory	 investment	 based	 on	
aggregate	data	and	firm‐level	panel	studies.	
	
In	 the	 presence	 of	 capital	market	 imperfection,	 firms’	might	 have	 limited	
access	 to	 external	 finance.	 This	will	 affect	 firms’	 ability	 to	 achieve	 their	 optimal	
level	of	inventories	and	lead	to	excess	fluctuations	in	inventory	investment.	Earlier	
paper	on	the	link	between	financial	factors	and	inventory	investment	is	motivated	
by	the	fact	that	monetary	policy	can	affect	firm’s	ability	to	obtain	finance	for	their	
investment	 behaviours	 (including	 inventory	 investment).	 Using	 aggregate	 data	
from	US	 in	between	1964	and	1989,	Kashyap,	Stein	and	Wilcox(1993)	show	that	
financial	factors,	proxy	by	the	prime	commercial	paper	spread	and	the	mix	of	bank	
loans	 and	 commercial	 paper,	 have	 a	 significant	 predictive	 power	 of	 inventory	
investment.	 Moreover,	 they	 find	 that	 monetary	 tightening	 does	 reduce	 the	 loan	
supply	and	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	real	activities	in	the	economy.		
	
Based	 on	 a	 less	 aggregated	 time‐series	 data	 taken	 from	 the	 Quarterly	
Financial	Report	 for	Manufacturing	Corporations	(QFR)	between	1960	and	1991,	
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Gertler	 and	 Gilchrist	 (1994)	 analyse	 the	 response	 of	 manufacturing	 firms	 in	
different	size	groups	to	the	change	in	monetary	policy.	They	find	that	small	firms	
account	 for	 a	 significant	 large	 proportion	 or	 reduction	 in	 inventory	 investment	
relative	 to	 large	 firms	 after	monetary	 tightening.	 Using	 firm	 size	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	
capital	market	 access	 and	 coverage	 ratio	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 financial	 factors,	 Gertler	
and	Gilchrist	 (1994)	 find	 that	 coverage	 is	 a	highly	 significant	predictor	 for	 small	
firm	 inventory	 investment	 but	 not	 for	 large	 firms.	 They	 interpret	 their	 result	 as	
supportive	evidence	of	 liquidity	 constraints	on	small	 firms	due	 to	capital	market	
imperfection	faced	by	small	firms.			
	
In	 a	 related	 paper	 Kashyap,	 Lamont	 and	 Stein(1994),	 motivated	 by	 the	
“lending	 view”	 of	 monetary	 policy	 transmission,	 use	 cash	 stock	 (cash	 plus	
marketable	securities)	as	a	measure	of	liquidity	to	proxy	financial	factor,	and	find	
that	 cash	 stock	 is	 a	 significant	 determinants	 of	 the	 inventory	 growth	 for	 firms	
without	bond	ratings.	They	also	show	that	financial	constraints	appear	to	be	much	
more	 important	 during	 recessionary	 episodes.	 The	 main	 difference	 between	
Kashyap,	Lamont	and	Stein’s	(1994)	paper	and	the	previous	two	papers	is	that	KLS	
utilizes	a	 cross‐section	of	 firms	 instead	of	 aggregate	 time‐series	data.	Due	 to	 the	
importance	 of	 firm	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 test	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 capital	
market	 imperfection,	 less	 aggregated	 data	 can	 provide	 more	 insights	 to	 the	
problem	of	interest.		
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With	the	wider	availability	of	firm	level	panel	dataset,	researchers	start	to	
resort	 to	micro	dataset	 to	study	 the	 link	between	 financial	 factors	and	 inventory	
investment.	The	use	of	 firm‐level	panel	data	presents	a	number	of	advantages	 to	
study	inventory	investment.	For	example,	firm	level	panel	data	allows	us	to	include	
firm	fixed	effects	and	disaggregated	industry	time	dummies.	The	fixed	effects	can	
control	the	time‐invariant	determinants	of	inventory	investment	that	differ	across	
firms.	The	industry	specific	time	dummies	allow	the	researchers	to	control	for	the	
cost	 or	 technological	 shocks	 at	 industry	 level.	 Carpenter,	 Fazzari	 and	 Petersen	
(1994)	is	the	first	paper	that	exploit	panel	data	of	firms	to	study	the	links	between	
inventory	 investment	 and	 internal	 finance.	 Using	 quarterly	 data	 for	 US	
manufacturing	firms	from	Compustat,	their	results	strongly	support	the	 idea	that	
financial	factors	have	a	significant	impact	on	firms’	inventory	investment	for	both	
small	and	large	firms	and	the	effect	is	significantly	stronger	for	small	firms	than	for	
large	firms.	They	have	also	obtained	similar	result	when	they	separate	the	sample	
according	to	whether	firms	have	bond	rating	or	not,	where	they	find	firms	without	
bond	rating	display	higher	cash	flow	sensitivities.		
	
The	 literatures	 on	 financial	 constraints	 and	 inventory	 investment	 have	
employed	a	number	of	different	financial	variables	to	test	which	channels	financial	
constraints	operate	 through.	Gertler	and	Gilchrist	 (1994)	employs	coverage	ratio	
to	test	for	the	presence	of	“balance	sheet	channel”	of	monetary	policy	transmission	
mechanism	for	monetary	policy,	while	Kashyap,	Lamont	and	Stein(1994)	use	cash	
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stock	 to	 test	 the	 presence	 of	 “bank	 lending	 channel”	 of	 monetary	 policy	
transmission,	 and	 Carpenter,	 Fazzari	 and	 Petersen	 (1994)	 use	 cash	 flow	 to	
emphasize	the	 importance	of	 internal	 finance	on	 inventory	 investment	decisions.	
Despite	 the	different	proxies	used	 in	 these	 studies,	 the	 results	 generally	 support	
the	 existence	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 indicate	 that	 financial	 factor	 is	 a	
significant	determinant	of	inventory	investment.		
	
In	 order	 to	 compare	 the	 performance	 of	 these	 three	 financial	 variables,	
Carpenter,	 Fazzari	 and	Petersen	 (1998a)	 test	 these	 three	 financial	 variables	 in	 a	
common	econometric	framework	with	an	identical	sample	of	quarterly	firm	panel	
data	from	US	manufacturing	sectors.	They	find	that	cash	stocks	and	coverage	ratio	
have	a	weaker	 impact	on	 inventory	 investment	 compare	 to	 cash	 flow.	Cash	 flow	
helps	to	explain	different	inventory	behaviour	not	only	across	firms	with	different	
firm	size,	but	also	across	three	different	inventory	cycles.		
	
Guariglia	 (2000)	 analyse	 the	 relation	 between	 financial	 constraints	 and	
inventory	investment	in	a	structural	generalized	linear	quadratic	model,	instead	of	
reduced	 form	 regression	 in	 previous	 studies.	 She	 finds	 that	 financial	 constraints	
are	important	determinant	of	inventory	decisions	for	UK	manufacturing	firms	who	
have	 high	 short‐term	 debt	 to	 inventories	 ratios	 or	 low	 coverage	 ratios,	 but	
financial	constraints	are	not	binding	for	firms	with	strong	balance	sheets.		
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Blinder	 and	 Maccini	 (1991)	 note	 that	 raw	 materials	 and	 work‐in‐progress	
inventory	held	by	firms	are	the	most	volatile	components	of	inventory	investment.	
This	point	is	also	raised	by	Carpenter,	Fazzari	and	Petersen	(1994),	who	find	firms	
use	 the	 stock	 of	 raw	materials	 and	 delay	 reordering	 to	 increase	 their	 liquidity.	
Despite	 these	 facts,	 most	 of	 earlier	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 works	 focus	 on	
manufacturers’	inventories	of	finished	goods.			
	
Guariglia	 (1999)	addresses	 this	problem	 in	her	 study	using	a	panel	of	UK	
manufacturing	firms	from	1968	to	1991.	She	classified	firms’	inventory	investment	
into	 three	different	groups:	work‐in‐process	 inventories,	 raw	materials	 and	 total	
inventories.	She	shows	that	the	effect	of	financial	constraints	is	particularly	strong	
for	work‐in‐process	 and	 raw	material	 inventories	which	 have	 lower	 adjustment	
costs	relative	to	finished	goods.		
	
Further	 evidence	 on	 inventory	 investment	 and	 cash	 flow	 from	 the	 UK	 is	
provided	 by	 Small	 (2000),	 who	 finds	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 cash	 flow	 on	 inventory	
investment	 is	 concentrated	 among	 firms	 that	 are	 identified	 as	 financially	
constrained	on	the	basis	of	either	their	financial	policy	or	their	current	ratio,	only	
cash	 flow	 still	 has	 an	effect	 on	 inventory	 investment	of	 unconstrained	 firms.	His	
study	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 no	 unique	 criterion	 for	 identifying	 financially	
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constrained	firms.	Contrary	to	other	studies,	he	finds	that	 firm	size	and	coverage	
ratio	are	not	good	indicators	of	whether	a	firm	is	financially	constrained	or	not.		
Benito	(2005)	conducts	a	comparative	study	of	the	inventory	investment	by	firms	
in	UK	and	Spain.	He	finds	evidence	that	cash	flow	effects	and	liquidity	effects	are	
presence	for	both	countries	in	the	study.	These	effects	are	stronger	in	the	UK	than	
in	 Spain.	 Benito	 (2005)	 suggest	 this	 is	 due	 to:	 firs,	 Spanish	 banks	 have	 good	
liquidity	 buffers	 that	 allow	 them	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 interest	 rate	 change	 without	
significant	 impact	 on	 the	 credit	 supply;	 second,	 the	 direct	 involvement	 of	 the	
Spanish	 banks	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 Spanish	 companies	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	
information	problems.	
	
Using	a	modified	version	of	Lovell’s	(1961b)	stock	adjustment	model,	Bo	et	
al	(2002),	show	that	inventory	investment	of	Dutch	firms	are	motivated	by	stock‐
out	 avoidance	 and	 capital	market	 imperfection.	 Failing	 to	 consider	 the	 effects	 of	
capital	 market	 imperfection	 would	 underestimate	 the	 accelerator	 effect	 and	 the	
adjustment	 speed	 for	 financially	 unconstrained	 firms	 and	 overestimate	 these	
effects	 for	 financially	 constrained	 firms.	 	 Contrary	 to	 most	 of	 the	 studies,	
Cunningham	 (2004)	 finds	 no	 evidence	 of	 link	 between	 cash	 flow	 and	 inventory	
investment	 for	Canadian	manufacturing	 firms	over	 the	period	of	1992‐1999.	The	
author	 believes	 this	 is	 likely	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Canadian	 economy	 did	 not	
suffer	 from	any	recession	during	the	study	period,	which	makes	it	hard	to	detect	
the	effects	of	financial	constraints.	
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Guariglia	and	Mateut	(2006)	extends	the	study	of	financial	constraints	and	
inventory	investment	to	test	for	the	existence	of	trade	credit	channel	of	monetary	
transmission	 in	 UK	 over	 the	 period	 1980‐2000.	 By	 estimating	 error‐correction	
inventory	investment	equations	augmented	with	coverage	ratio	and	trade	credit	to	
assets	 ratio	 for	 financially	 constrained	 and	 financially	 unconstrained	 firms,	 they	
find	that	both	credit	and	trade	credit	channels	of	transmission	of	monetary	policy	
operate	side	by	side	in	the	UK	and	the	use	of	trade	credit	could	offset	the	liquidity	
constraints.	 Guariglia	 and	 Mateut	 (2009)	 further	 show	 that	 global	 engagement	
substantially	 reduces	 financial	 constrained	 firms’	 sensitivities	 of	 inventory	
investment	 to	 financial	 composition	variable.	They	conclude	 that	participation	of	
global	engagement	helps	to	shield	firms	from	financial	constraints.	
	
4.3	Baseline	specification	and	Estimation	methodology	
4.3.1	Baseline	specification	
 
In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 link	 between	 financial	 factors	 and	 inventory	 investment,	we	
use	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 Lovell’s	 target‐adjustment	 model	 (1961a).	 The	 target	
adjustment	model	suggests	that,	 in	general,	firms’	have	a	desired	or	optimal	level	
of	inventories	level	(equilibrium	level)	relative	to	sales	they	would	like	to	maintain.	
Firms	 typically	 find	 it	difficult	 to	maintain	 their	 inventories	at	 the	desired	 target	
level	 due	 to	 sales	 shocks	 and	 forecasting	 errors.	 In	 a	 simple	 sales	 accelerator	
model,	 firms	 would	 attempt	 to	 immediately	 adjust	 their	 inventories	 to	 the	 new	
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equilibrium	level.	However,	this	 is	unrealistic	 in	the	real	world	situation	due	to	a	
number	 of	 reasons.	 First,	 orders	 in	 small	 bunch	 and	 fast	 delivery	 will	 typical	
impose	a	premium	on	the	cost	of	the	purchases.	Moreover,	as	suggested	in	Lovell	
(1961),	 due	 to	 the	 heterogeneous	 nature	 of	 stocks,	 stocks	 are	 replaced	 at	 a	 less	
frequent	 interval.	 Therefore,	 firms	 only	 make	 partial	 adjustment	 towards	 the	
equilibrium	 level.	 	 	 Based	 on	 these	 ideas,	 a	 partial	 target	 adjustment	 is	 a	 more	
suitable	 choice	 than	 the	 standard	 sales	 accelerator	 model.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	
derive	 a	 reduced	 form	 error‐correction	 inventory	 investment	 model	 for	 our	
empirical	studies24.		
	
Abstracting	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 sales	 shocks,	 cost	 factors	 and	 liquidity	
constraints,	we	assume	that	the	desired(target)	level	of	inventories	 *,i tI of	firm	 i	at	
time	t	is	positively	related	to	sales	 ,i tS 	at	time	t	in	equation	(1),	where	 *,i tI 	and	 ,i tS 	
are	real	inventory	stock	and	real	sales	in	logarithm	forms	respectively.	
	 *, 0 1 ,i t i tI S   	 (1)	
α1	 in	 equation	 (1)	 has	 a	 number	 of	 interpretations:	 1)	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	
marginal	desired	stock	coefficient;	2)	it	is	also	a	sales	accelerator	effect;	when	sales	
are	expected	to	increase	so	will	the	inventory	stock	target.	Equation	(1)	is	a	basic	
representation	of	how	firms	set	the	target	inventory	investment.	If	the	inventory	to	
sales	ratio	is	stable,	the	target	inventory	model	implies	that	α1	=1.	
                                                 
24 Our model follows closely to that of Guariglia and Mateut (2009), who use a similar model to study the 
impacts of global engagement on inventory investment. 
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Let	 itI be	 the	 logarithm	of	 the	 actual	 stock	 of	 inventories	 for	 firm	 i	at	 time	 t	 and	
itI represents	the	actual	inventory	investment	at	time	t.	Based	on	the	assumption	
of	partial	adjustment,	we	further	assume	that	current	inventory	investment	 ,i tI is	
a	fraction	δ	of	the	gap	between	target	level	of	inventory	investment	 *,i tI and	actual	
level	of	investment	in	last	period	( , 1i tI  )	:	
	 *, , , 1 , , 1( )i t i t i t i t i tI I I I I      	 (2)	
Substituting	(1)	into	(2)	and	rearranging	yields:	
	 , , , 1(1 )i t i t i tI S I       	 (3)	
In	order	to	take	into	accounts	the	dynamic	nature	of	investment	behaviour	
and	capture	the	slow	effects	of	adjustment	towards	target	level	of	inventories,	we	
nested	the	simple	partial	target	adjustment	model	in	an	autoregressive	distributed	
lag	specification	with	second‐order	dynamics25.	This	yields:	
	 , 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 4 , 1 4 , 2 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i j t t i tI I I S S S v v v e                	 (4)	
	 In	 equation	 (4),	 we	 include	 iv to	 control	 for	 firm‐specific	 effects,	 ,j tv to	
control	 for	 industry‐time	specific	effects,	 tv to	control	 time‐specific	effects	and ,i te ,	
which	 is	 the	 idiosyncratic	component.	 	Rearranging	equation	(4)	 into	differenced	
forms	to	study	the	growth	of	inventory	investment:	
                                                 
25 An ADL(2, 2) model.  
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	 , 1 , 1 1 2 , 2 3 , 3 4 , 1
3 4 5 , 2 , ,
( 1) (1 ) ( )
                                  ( )
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i j t t i t
I I I S S
S v v v e
     
  
  

            
        	 (5)	
We	 further	 impose	 the	 restriction	 of 3 4 5 1 2( ) / (1 ) 1         	under	 the	
assumption	 that	 there	 is	 a	 unit	 elasticity	 of	 inventory	 stocks	 with	 respect	 to	
sales26.	 This	 ensures	 a	 long‐run	 equilibrium	 behaviour	 of	 the	 inventories	
investment	 to	 sales.	 	 We	 can	 reparameterize	 equation	 (5)	 by	
replacing 1 , 1 1i t    , 2 3  ,	 3 3 4( )    and	 4 1 2(1 )     into	 an	 error‐
correction	format:	
	
	 , 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 2 , 2 , ,( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i j t t i tI I S S I S v v v e                   	 (6)		
	 Equation	 (6)	 forms	 the	 basic	 conventional	 error‐correction	 model	 of	
inventory	 investment	without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 factors,	
where	 , 2 , 2( )i t i tI S  is	the	error	correction	term.	The	coefficient	 4 associates	with	
the	error‐correction	term	should	be	negative,	in	the	sense	that	if	current	inventory	
level	is	higher	(lower)	than	sales	the	firm	should	decrease	(increase)	their	future	
inventory	stock.	 1 captures	the	short‐term	dynamics	of	the	inventory	investment	
from	 last	 period.	 	 Current	 and	 lagged	 differenced	 log	 sales	 are	 included	 as	
                                                 
26 See Bond et alBond S, Elston JA, Mairesse J, Mulkay B. (2003). "Financial Factors and Investment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company Panel Data." 
Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 153-165. and Guariglia and MateutGuariglia A, Mateut S. (2009). 
"Inventory investment, global engagement, and financial constraints in the UK: Evidence from micro 
data." Journal of Macroeconomics In Press, Corrected Proof. for similar assumption in fixed investment 
and inventory investment studies. 
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important	control	for	accelerator	effects	and	stock	adjustment	effects,	as	well	as	to	
capture	 the	 short	 term	dynamic	effects	of	 sales	on	 inventory	 investment.	 If	 2 or	
3 is	negative,	it	indicates	that	inventories	are	used	to	buffer	production	from	sales	
shocks.	However,	 empirical	 evidence	 typically	 finds	 that	 production	 varies	more	
than	sales,	inventories	and	sales	are	positively	related	and	there	is	little	evidence	
for	production	smoothing	behaviour.	As	emphasize	in	Ramey	and	West	(1997),	the	
two	empirical	regularities	for	inventories	are	that	inventories	are	pro‐cyclical	and	
the	movements	are	quite	persistent,			these	implies	that	 2 or	 3 should	be	positive	
or	at	least	that	 2 3( ) 0   .	
	
4.3.2	Measures	of	financial	factors	
	
In	order	to	assess	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	and	financial	factors	on	firms’	
inventory	 investment	 behaviours,	 we	 augment	 equation	 (6)	 with	 measure	 of	
financial	 factors	 ( ,i tFF ),	 which	 reflect	 the	 financial	 pressure	 experienced	 by	 a	
company,	 in	 equation	 (7)	 below,	 which	 is	 our	 baseline	 specification	 of	 the	
empirical	studies.				
	 , 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 2 , 2 5 , , ,( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i j t t i tI I S S I S FF v v v e                     	 (7)	
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The	 literature	 of	 financial	 constraints	 and	 inventory	 investment	 typically	
augmenting	 equation	 (7)	 with	 three	 main	 financial	 variables:	 coverage	
ratio/borrowing	 ratio,	 leverage,	 and	 cash	 flow	 to	 identify	 the	 main	 financial	
influences	on	inventories.	These	different	financial	variables	tend	to	be	correlated	
with	each	other,	but	each	emphasizes	a	different	channel	through	which	financial	
constraints	operate	through.	
	
Borrowing	ratio	is	defined	as	the	ratio	of	interest	payments	to	cash	flow,	a	
financial	measure	used	by	Nickell	and	Nicolitsas	(1999b)	to	analyse	the	impact	of	
financial	pressure	on	employment,	wage	growth	and	productivity		for	UK	firms.	It	
is	 essentially	 a	 measure	 of	 interest	 burden	 to	 firm’s	 cash	 flow.	 A	 tightening	 of	
monetary	policy	and	increase	in	borrowing	cost	would	reflect	in	this	measure.	The	
borrowing	ratio	is,	in	fact,		the	inverse	of	the	coverage	ratio	used	by	Carpenter	et	al		
(1998a)	and	Guariglia	(1999;	2000).		
	
Leverage	ratio	 is	a	stock	measure	instead	of	a	flow	measure	like	the	other	
financial	indicators.	Leverage	is	defined	as	the	total	liabilities	over	total	assets.	In	
general,	if	the	leverage	is	too	high,	the	bankruptcy	risk	will	increase	and	leads	to	a	
reduction	 of	 spending	 to	 reduce	 debt	 level.	 This	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 negative	
relationship	between	the	inventory	investment	and	the	leverage	measures.	
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Cash	 flow	 has	 long	 been	 the	 most	 popular	 measures	 of	 internal	 finance	 and	 is	
widely	used	in	the	study	of	financial	constraints	and	firm	behaviours.	It	represents	
the	 internal	 finance	 available	 to	 a	 firm	 to	 spend	 on	 investment	 in	 fixed	 capital	
(Fazzari	 et	 al.	 1988),	 inventory	 investment	 and	 employment.	 If	 firms	 are	 indeed	
financially	constrained,	cash	flow	should	have	a	positive	and	significant	impact	on	
their	 inventory	 investment	 decision.	 In	 a	 comparative	 study	 by	 Carpenter	 et	 al	
(1998a),	 they	 find	 cash	 flow	 is	more	 successful	 than	 cash	 stocks	 or	 coverage	 in	
explaining	 inventory	 investment.	 We	 consider	 internal	 finance	 to	 be	 a	 major	
source	of	 finance	 for	 firms	 in	China,	Therefore,	 for	 the	purpose	of	 this	 study	we	
choose	to	use	cash	flow	as	our	measures	of	financial	factors	to	test	for	the	effects	of	
financial	constraints	on	inventory	investment.	
	
4.3.3	Estimation	methodologies	
	
All	 equations	 are	 estimated	 using	 differenced	 Generalized	 Methods	 of	 Moments	
(GMM)	approach	(Arellano	and	Bond	1991).	The	differenced	GMM	is	an	effective	
method	to	control	for	firm‐specific	and	time	invariant	fixed	effects.	Given	that	our	
regression	 equations	 includes	 lagged	 dependent	 variables	 and	 the	 possible	
endogeneity	of	regressors,	GMM	method	use	all	the	regressors	lagged	two	periods	
as	instruments.		
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To	 test	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 instruments	 and	 the	 model	 is	 correctly	
specified,	 we	 use	 the	 test	 for	 serial	 correlation	 in	 the	 differenced	 residuals.	We	
assess	the	presence	of	nth‐order	serial	correlation	in	the	differenced	residuals	using	
the	M(n)	test,	which	is	asymptotically	distributed	as	a	standard	normal	under	null	
of	no	serial	correlation	of	the	differenced	residuals.	Since	all	our	specification	use	
variables	 lagged	 twice	 as	 instruments,	 we	 rely	 on	 the	 M2	 test	 to	 test	 for	 the	
second‐order	 serial	 correlation	 in	 the	 first	 differenced	 residuals.	 The	 absence	 of	
the	second‐order	serial	correlation	in	the	first	differenced	residuals	indicates	that	
our	results	are	valid	and	the	model	is	adequate.	
	
	Another	widely	used	test	in	the	literature	of	the	validity	of	the	instruments	
is	 the	Hansen/Sargan	statistics	 (J	test),	 a	P‐value	 greater	 than	0.05	 indicates	 that	
our	instruments	are	valid.	However,	the	test	power	of	the	Hansen/Sargan	statistics	
is	 weak	 when	 a	 very	 large	 cross‐sectional	 sample	 of	 data	 is	 used.	 The	
Hansen/Sargan	 statistics	 (J	 test)	 tends	 to	 over‐reject	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
instruments	 in	 large	 panel	 data	 estimation	 (Blundell	 et	 al.	 2001;	 Benito	 2005;	
Guariglia	et	al.	2010).	The	results	of	Nickell	and	Nicolitsas’s	(1999a)	UK	study	all	
indicate	 a	 significant	 Hansen/Sargan	 test	 statistics.	 Benito	 (2005)	 also	 report	
several	results	with	significant	Hansen/Sargan	test	statistics	in	their	comparative	
study	 of	UK	 and	 Spain.	 Given	 our	 very	 large	panel	 data	 size,	 the	Hansen/Sargan	
test	would	 tend	 to	 over‐reject	 the	 validity	 of	 our	 instruments.	 Therefore	 in	 this	
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study	we	tend	to	rely	on	the	M2	test	for	the	validity	of	the	instruments	and	model	
specification.	
		
As	 an	 additional	 check	 of	 whether	 the	 GMM	 estimator	 in	 our	 analysis	
suffers	finite	sample	bias,	we	compare	the	GMM	estimates	of	the	coefficient	on	the	
lagged	dependent	variable	with	the	OLS	levels	and	the	Within	Groups	estimates	of	
the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variable	 in	 the	 baseline	 regression	
equation	 (7).	 	 Nickell	 (1981)	 shows	 the	 Within	 Groups	 estimator	 tends	 to	
downward	biased	 the	 coefficient	on	 the	 lagged	dependent	variable.	And	 the	OLS	
estimates	 are	 likely	 to	 bias	 upwards.	 Therefore	we	would	 expect	 the	 coefficient	
estimates	 on	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variable	 from	 GMM	 to	 lie	 above	 the	 within	
estimates	 and	 below	 the	 OLS	 estimates.	 The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 section	 7	
along	with	the	empirical	results.	Bond	et	al	(2003)	use	similar	approach	to	assess	
whether	 there	 is	 finite‐samples	 bias	 in	 their	 studies	 of	 financial	 factors	 and	
investment.	
	
4.4	Sample	partition	criteria	and	the	development	of	hypothesis	
 
One	 of	 the	 important	 factors	 in	 the	 study	 of	 financial	 constraints	 is	 firm	
heterogeneity.	It	is	likely	that	all	firms	will	face	certain	level	of	financial	constraints	
or	at	least	at	some	point	in	their	operation,	but	the	level	of	the	constraints	might	
differ	significantly	across	firms	with	different	characteristics.	Fazzari,	Hubbard	and	
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Petersen(1988)	 points	 out	 that	 firm	 heterogeneity	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 to	
consider	 in	 the	 use	 of	 firm	 panel	 data	 to	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 capital	 market	
imperfections.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 firms	with	 different	 characteristics	
tend	to	face	different	level	of	information	problems	and	therefore	different	level	of	
financial	 constraints.	 Subsequent	 studies	 of	 financial	 constraints	 typically	 focus	
more	on	the	differential	impact	of	imperfect	capital	market.	This	is	typically	done	
by	 partition	 the	 sample	 of	 firms	 into	 groups	 that	 are	 more	 or	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
financially	constraints	using	a	priori	criteria	that	are	derived	from	sound	economic	
reasoning.	
	
In	order	to	gain	better	understanding	of	the	differential	impacts	of	financial	
constraints	 on	 inventory	 investment,	 in	 this	 study,	 we	 classify	 our	 firms	 into	
different	 groups	 according	 to	 a	 number	 of	 different	 criteria	 and	 firm	
characteristics	 that	 may	 lead	 to	 differential	 response	 to	 financial	 constraints.	
These	criteria	are	closely	related	to	the	different	level	of	information	problems	and	
allow	us	to	exploit	the	importance	of	firm	heterogeneity.	
	
4.4.1	Ownership	and	financial	constraints	
 
Despite	more	 than	 two	 decades	 of	 reform	 and	 development,	 Chinese	 economy’s	
transition	 to	market	economy	 is	still	 largely	 incomplete.	The	central	government	
continues	 to	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	allocation	of	 resources,	 in	particular	 in	
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the	 credit	 allocation	 in	 the	 banking	 sectors.	 Based	 on	 data	 in	 city	 level	 between	
1989	and	1991,	Wei	and	Wang	(1997)	find	evidence	that	state	owned	commercial	
banks27	favour	 state‐owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	 over	 other	 ownership	 type.	 They	
also	find	cities	with	a	higher	SOEs’	share	in	output	tend	to	have	a	faster	growth	in	
loans.	 Cull	 and	 Xu	 (2003)	 find	 that,	 between	 1980	 and	 1994,	 there	 is	 a	 positive	
relationship	between	bank	finance	and	SOE	profitability.	This	link	grew	stronger	in	
the	 1980s,	 but	 became	 weaker	 in	 the	 1990s	 due	 to	 the	 shift	 of	 bailout	
responsibilities	 from	 the	 government	 to	 banks.	 This	 suggests	 that	 SOEs	 might	
continue	 to	 face	 soft	 budget	 constraints.	 Bai	 et	 al(2006)	 argues	 that	 this	 soft	
budget	 constraint	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 SOEs’	multi	 responsibilities	 to	 handle	 the	
social	 responsibility	 and	 political	 responsibility	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 social‐
economic	costs	incurred	in	the	early	period	of	reforms.	We	expect	SOEs’	inventory	
investments	 not	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 financial	 factors,	 as	 these	 firms	 are	 not	
financially	constrained.		
	
Allen	et	al(2005)	show	that		the	recognition	of	being	an	integral	part	of	the	
economy	by	the	communist	party,	private	firms	are	typically	being	discriminated	
against	for	access	to	external	finance	compare	to	their	less	profitable	counter‐parts	
with	 significant	 state	 ownership.	 We	 consequently	 hypothesise	 that	 private	
enterprises	will	be	significantly	affected	by	the	financial	factors	and	are	financially	
                                                 
27 The 'Big Four’ state-owned commercial banks: namely, the Bank of China (BOC); the Construction 
Bank of China (CBC); the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC); and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC). 
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constrained.	This	is	largely	due	to	the	lending	bias	that	persists	in	China’s	banking	
sector	and	financial	market.		
	
Collective‐owned	 enterprises	 (COEs)	 are	 a	 special	 ownership	 type,	 which	
are	 the	 special	 products	 of	 the	 early	 reforms.	 COEs	were	 very	 successful	 in	 the	
1980s	with	a	number	of	special	 treatments,	such	as	tax	advantages	and	access	to	
external	bank	 finance.	 In	 the	early	years,	 they	shared	 the	characteristics	of	SOEs	
and	 possibly	 enjoyed	 certain	 level	 of	 soft	 budget	 constraints.	 However,	 COEs	
became	less	competitive	in	the	1990s	as	the	special	treatments	granted	to	them	by	
the	government	were	stripped	away.	 	Furthermore,	the	banking	reforms	have	led	
the	COEs	to	face	hardened	budget	constraints.	COEs	are	expected	to	be	financially	
unconstrained	 in	 the	 early	 period,	 but	 progressively	 facing	 hardening	 budget	
constraints.	 We	 also	 expect	 that	 COEs	 will	 be	 less	 financially	 constrained	 than	
private	firms.	
	
Foreign	 firms	 are	 the	 last	 ownership	 group	 that	we	will	 consider.	During	
the	reform	era,	foreign	owned	firms	enjoyed	a	superior	treatment	than	the	private	
firms	 in	China.	 Central	 and	 local	 governments	 have	 granted	 a	 number	 of	 special	
policies	 to	 foreign	 firms	to	attract	 them	to	 invest	 in	China	 to	help	 to	develop	the	
local	 economy	 (Naughton	 2007).	Moreover,	 foreign	 firms	 are	 less	 dependent	 on	
the	local	financial	system	for	funding	in	China.	Foreign	firms	mainly	rely	on	other	
sources	of	 funds	 to	 finance	 their	 growth,	 and	 they	have	 the	 advantage	of	 having	
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access	to	 funds	 from	their	overseas	parent	company	and	foreign	capital	markets.	
Therefore,	foreign	firms	are	less	likely	to	suffer	from	financial	constraints.	Using	a	
China	 firm‐level	 dataset	 between	 1998‐2005,	 Poncet	 et	 al	 (2010)	 show	 that	
foreign‐owned	firms	are	not	credit	constrained	in	China,	and	the	geographical	and	
sectorial	presence	of	 foreign	capital	help	 to	alleviates	 credit	 constraints	 faced	by	
private	 firms.	 	 Similar	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 also	 found	 in	 the	 literature	 studying	
other	 transition	 economies:	 using	 a	 financial	 and	 constraints	 and	 investment	
framework,	Perotti	and	Luka	(2004)	and	Harrison	and	McMillan	(2003)	also	find	
that	 foreign	 firms	 are	 not	 financially	 constrained	 for	 Hungary	 and	 Ivory	 Coast	
respectively.	 In	 this	paper,	we	also	hypothesise	 that	 foreign	owned	 firms	are	not	
financially	constrained.	
	
We	 group	 firms	 into	 four	 different	 ownership	 groups	 according	 to	 the	
majority	average	ownership	shares.	If	the	average	share	of	the	paid‐in‐capital	of	a	
firm	is	from	private	investors	over	the	study	period	is	greater	than	50%,	then	this	
firm	 is	 classified	 as	 private	 owned.	 The	 same	 rule	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 other	 three	
ownership	types:	SOEs,	foreign	and	collectively‐owned	firms28.		
	
4.4.2	Geographical	regions	and	financial	constraints	
	
                                                 
28 The ownership distribution over the period 2000 and 2007 is reported in table 4A4 in the data appendix 
4A. 
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The	 second	 key	 sample	 partition	 criterion	 is	 geographical	 region.	 There	 are	 31	
provinces	 in	 China.	We	 divide	 them	 into	 three	 broad	 regions	 according	 to	 their	
geographical	locations	(costal,	central	and	west).	 	We	expect	firms	from	the	three	
regions29	to	display	different	level	of	financial	constraints	to	inventory	investment.	
First	 of	 all,	 the	 internal	 capital	 market	 of	 china	 is	 possibly	 segmented	 due	 to	
informal	 interference	 of	 the	 local	 government.	 Boyreau‐Debray	 and	Wei	 (2005)	
provide	evidence	that	the	degree	of	internal	financial	integration	appears	to	have	
decreased	 rather	 than	 increased	 in	 the	 1990s	 compare	 to	 previous	 periods.	
Secondly,	the	central	government	tends	to	reallocate	capital	from	more	productive	
regions	 toward	 less	 productive	 one	 to	 induce	 development.	 For	 example,	 the	
“China	 Western	 Development”	 project,	 initiated	 in	 2000,	 has	 spent	 a	 total	 of	 1	
trillion	Yuan	on	building	 infrastructure	 in	western	China	by	2006.	As	 a	 result	 of	
these	 policies,	 we	 expect	 firms	 located	 in	 western	 region	 to	 be	 less	 financially	
constrained.	While	the	firms	in	the	Coastal	region	will	face	very	high	competition	
for	 access	 to	 external	 finance,	 which	 lead	 them	 to	 face	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	
	
4.4.3	Firm	size	and	financial	constraints	
	
Size	 of	 the	 firms	 is	 the	 most	 widely	 used	 proxy	 for	 the	 level	 of	 capital	 market	
imperfection	 firm	 faced	 by	 the	 firm	 and	 used	 as	 an	 a	priori	 criterion	 to	 classify	
                                                 
29 See data appendix for details of composition for each regions. 
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firms	into	groups	of	financially	constrained	and	unconstrained	firms	(Carpenter	et	
al.	1994;	Chow	and	Fung	1998;	Cleary	1999;	Bond	et	al.	2003).	Small	firms	tend	to	
face	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 asymmetric	 information	 and	 more	 risky	 than	 large	 firms.	
They	 also	 face	 higher	 transaction	 costs	 for	 external	 finance,	 thus	 they	 generally	
face	higher	premium	in	accessing	external	 finance	than	 large	firms.	 In	this	study,	
we	 use	 two	methods	 to	 classify	 firm	 size.	 First,	we	 classify	 firms	 in	 the	 top	 25th	
percentile	of	real	sales	in	their	industry	in	a	given	year	as	large	firms	and	the	rest	
as	small	firms.	Therefore,	essentially	we	are	working	with	firm‐years	which	allow	
firms	to	switch	between	“constrained”	and	“unconstrained”	regimes.	Secondly,	we	
also	 use	 real	 total	 assets	 to	 divide	 the	 sample	 as	 a	 robustness	 test.	 Firms	 with	
employment	 falling	 in	 the	 top	25th	percentile	of	 employment	 in	 a	 given	year	 are	
classified	as	large	firms,	and	the	rest	of	them	as	small	firms.	We	expect	small	firms	
are	more	financially	constrained	than	large	firms.	
	
4.4.4	Sectoral	difference	and	financial	constraints	
	
	An	important	sectoral	difference	in	the	cyclical	pattern	of	inventory	investment	is	
that	 there	 is	 a	 much	 larger	 cyclical	 movement	 in	 durable	 inventory	 investment	
compared	with	nondurables	(Zarnowitz	1985).	Carpenter	et	al	(1998a)	is	the	first	
paper	to	explore	the	ability	of	financing	constraints	to	explain	inventory	behaviour.	
However,	 they	 find	 inconclusive	 evidence	 using	 high‐frequency	 panel	 data	 with	
different	financial	variables	over	different	inventory	cycles.	Carpenter	et	al	(1998)	
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find	no	 significant	differences	between	 the	durable	 and	nondurable	 sector	when	
the	 regression	 is	 augmented	with	 cash	 stocks	and	coverage	 ratio	as	measures	of	
financial	 factor,	but	 they	do	find	that,	when	augmented	with	cash	flows,	 the	cash	
flow	sensitivities	are	at	least	as	large	for	durable	as	nondurables.	This	is	possibly	
due	to	the	fact	that	firms	operating	in	the	durable	sector	tight	up	a	higher	amount	
of	capital	in	their	production	than	nondurable	sector,	and	the	adjustment	costs	for	
the	durable	sector	are	much	higher	than	nondurable	sector.	This	suggests	durable	
sector	firm	is	possibly	more	sensitive	to	cash	flow	than	nondurable	firms.		
	
We	 define	 durable	 and	 nondurable	 firms	 according	 to	 the	 two‐digit	 SIC	
categories.	 Nondurable	 manufacturing	 consists	 of	 SIC	 codes	 20‐23	 and	 26‐31.	
Durable	 firms	 consists	 of	 SIC	 codes	 24‐25	 and	 32‐38.	We	 deleted	miscellaneous	
manufacturing	firms	with	SIC	code	3930.		In	this	paper	we	will	test	whether	durable	
and	nondurable	firms	face	different	levels	of	financial	constraints.	
	
4.4.5	Political	affiliation	and	financial	constraints	
	
Political	affiliation	(lishu)	is	a	measure	indicating	whether	the	firm	is	affiliated	with	
the	 central	 or	 provincial	 government.	 It	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 business	
operation	 in	China.	A	higher	 level	of	political	affiliation	could	benefit	businesses’	
                                                 
30 We follow Carpenter et al (1998)’s approach to define durable and nondurable firms, see data appendix 
for details. 
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access	to	the	key	departments	and	resources	that	are	controlled	by	the	party	and	
government.	This	is	consistent	with	the	 idea	of	political	pecking	order	of	 finance,	
where	bank	preferred	to	lend	to	state	owned	enterprises.	Moreover,	governments	
can	also	grant	firms	affiliated	with	them	with	additional	benefits	such	as	waivers	of	
import	 tariffs,	 tax	reductions.	Therefore,	 firms	may	reduce	their	 level	of	 financial	
constraints	 by	 obtaining	 political	 affiliation.	We	 expect	 firms	 with	 high	 political	
affiliation	will	be	less	financially	constrained,	as	political	affiliation	will	give	them	
wider	access	to	bank	loans	and	other	forms	of	supports,	while	 firms	without	any	
political	affiliation	will	be	more	financially	constrained.	
	
In	our	sample,	we	divide	 firms	 into	 three	groups:	high	political	affiliation,	
low	 political	 affiliation	 and	 no	 political	 affiliation.	High	 political	 affiliation	 group	
includes	firms	politically	affiliated	at	the	central	and	provincial	level,	low	political	
affiliation	 group	 includes	 firms	politically	 affiliated	 at	 the	 city	 or	district	 level	 to	
village	 level,	 and	 no	 political	 affiliation	 group	 includes	 firms	 report	 no	 political	
affiliation	at	any	government	level.	
	
4.4.6	Time	periods	and	financial	constraints	
	
Last,	we	also	will	divide	our	sample	 into	two	periods	with	year	2003	as	a	cut‐off	
point.	Since	our	data	span	between	2000	and	2007,	we	have	four	years	in	each	of	
the	sub‐period.	We	choose	2003	as	the	cut	off	point	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	
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since	 1998	 the	 authorities	 have	 continues	 to	 issue	 strict	 guidelines	 on	 bank	
lending	(Fung	et	al.	2000),	which	often	are	pure	quantitative	restrictions	on	bank	
lending.	Until	2004,	the	last	step	in	interest	rate	liberalisation	was	taken	in	October	
2004,	when	 commercial	 banks’	 lending	 rates	 start	moving	 freely	with	 the	 lower	
limit	 for	 deposit	 rates	 removed.	 Second,	 China’s	 monetary	 policy	 committee	
conducted	a	tightening	of	monetary	policy	between	late	2003	and	June	2007.	Prior	
to	this	monetary	tightening,	PBOC	has	followed	an	expansionary	monetary	policy	
between	 1998	 and	 2002.	 This	monetary	 cycle	 offers	 us	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	
test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 a	 tightening	 of	 monetary	 policy	 will	 leads	 to	 stronger	
effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 in	 China’s	 context.	 	 By	 dividing	 firms	 into	 two	
subsamples	using	year	2003	as	cut‐off	point,	we	are	able	to	test	whether	 level	of	
financial	constraints	change	over	time.	
			
4.5	Data		
	
The	data	for	this	study	 is	based	on	the	financial	data	filed	by	the	 industrial	 firms	
with	 the	 NBS	 for	 the	 period	 over	 the	 period	 of	 2000‐2007.	 This	 unique	 dataset	
consists	 of	 firms	 with	 different	 ownership	 (including	 state‐owned	 enterprises,	
private	 ownership,	 collectively‐owned	 firms	 and	 foreign	 owned	 firms)	 and	with	
annual	 total	 revenue	above	of	 five	million	Chinese	RMB31.	These	 industrial	 firms	
                                                 
31 An equivalent of $735,000 US dollar at the exchange rate of 6.8RMB/USD. (Exchange rate in Jan 2010) 
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are	from	the	manufacturing	and	mining	sectors	across	31	provinces	in	China.	For	
the	purpose	of	this	study,	we	limit	our	attention	to	the	manufacturing	firms	only.		
	
Before	we	report	 the	descriptive	statistics	and	analysis,	we	perform	a	number	of	
consistency	checks	to	control	for	the	errors	and	anomalies	within	the	dataset.	First,	
we	eliminate	the	number	that	is	not	sensible	accounting	practice	and	our	analysis,	
such	 as	negative	 figures	 for	 total	 assets,	 negative	 sales.	 Secondly,	we	delete	 firm	
years	 with	 negative	 shareholder’s	 fund.	 The	 shareholder’s	 fund	 can	 be	 negative	
due	to	two	main	reasons:	these	firms	are	continuing	loss	making	firms	or	there	are	
mistakes	during	the	process	of	data	collection.	Thirdly,	we	eliminate	firm‐years	for	
which	displaying	real	asset	or	sales	growth	 in	excess	of	100%,	which	allow	us	to	
control	 the	 influence	 of	 major	 merger	 and	 acquisition	 among	 firms	 during	 the	
period.	Furthermore,	we	also	delete	1%	of	observations	from	each	tail	of	the	key	
regression	variables,	this	allows	us	to	control	for	the	influence	of	outliers.	Last,	due	
to	the	dynamic	nature	and	lag	structure	of	our	empirical	regression,	we	only	keep	
firms	with	more	 than	 4	 years	 of	 continuous	 data	 for	 all	 the	 relevant	 regression	
variables.		
	
The	final	dataset	is	an	unbalanced	panel	of	firms	with	between	5	to	8	years	
of	observations	between	2000	and	2007.	Appendix	4A	provides	information	on	the	
data	structure	and	ownership	structure	distribution	over	 the	study	period.	From	
table	4A1	and	4A2,	we	can	see	there	are	401,247	firm‐year	observations	between	
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2000	and	2007,	each	firm	with	at	least	5	years	of	observations	and	at	most	8	years	
of	observations.	There	are	62,195	firms	in	our	sample.	
	
Table	 4A3	 shows	 the	 ownership	distribution	 of	 firms	 over	 the	 study	 period.	We	
classify	 ownership	 groups	 based	 on	 the	 shareholding	 information	 of	 China’s	
National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics.	 Instead	 of	 using	 the	 ownership	 group	 indicates	 by	
their	 business	 registration,	 we	 classify	 ownership	 based	 on	 the	 average	
shareholding	 by	 different	 categories	 of	 shareholder	 over	 the	 period.	 We	 group	
them	 into	 four	different	 ownership	 groups	 as	we	discussed	 in	 section	5	namely:	
SOEs,	 private,	 COEs	 and	 Foreign	 firms.	 Table	 A3	 provides	 some	 insights	 of	 the	
ownership	dynamics	in	China;	State	owned	enterprises	representation	is	gradually	
decline	 overtime,	 a	 reduction	 from	 14.39%	 to	 only	 7.06%.	 Collective	 firms	 also	
display	a	reduction	 in	 the	share	of	 sample	 from	11.96%	to	9.87%	 .	Private	 firms	
share	of	sample	have	increased	dramatically	from	50.44%	of	the	sample	towards	
62.08%	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2007,	 while	 foreign	 owned	 firms	 share	 remain	 relatively	
stable	at	around	10%.	This	pattern	of	ownership	transition	is	consistent	with	the	
trend	from	the	aggregate	data	presented	in	chapter	3,	where	the	number	of	private	
firms	is	growing	steadily	overtime	in	China.	
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4.6	A	descriptive	analysis	of	firms’	inventory	behaviour	in	China	
and	descriptive	statistics	
	
4.6.1	Inventory	to	sales	ratio	
	
In	recent	studies	of	inventory	investment,	empirical	evidences	show	that	modern	
inventory	control	methods	(such	as	just‐in‐time	practice)	have	improved	overtime.	
This	leads	to	a	significant	decrease	in	inventory	to	sales	ratio.	Benito(2005)	finds	
that	 the	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 for	 UK	 firms	 has	 fallen	 steadily	 over	 time	 from	
21.7%	 in1979	 to	 12.6%	 in	 2000.	While	 for	 Spanish	 firms,	 the	 inventory	 to	 sales	
ratio	 has	 fallen	 from	 15.1%	 to	 13.4%	 between	 1985	 and	 2000.	 Our	 sample	 of	
Chinese	 manufacturing	 firms	 also	 display	 significant	 drop	 in	 inventory	 to	 sales	
ratio.	Figure	4.1	reports	the	median	inventory	to	sales	ratio	for	the	full	sample	and	
across	four	different	ownership	groups	between	year	2000	and	2007	(Table	4A4	
provides	detail	numbers	for	each	sample	year	across	the	ownership	groups).	The	
median	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 drops	 from	 17.9%	 to	 12.1%	 for	 the	 full	 sample	
over	the	study	period.	Moreover,	we	find	significant	heterogeneity	in	terms	of	the	
inventory	to	sales	ratio	across	ownership	groups.	
	
SOEs	 have	 the	 highest	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
sample	period	with	30.5%	of	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio.	This	 ratio	has	decrease	by	
around	 11%	 to	 19.4%	 in	 2007	 for	 SOEs.	 Private	 firms	 and	 Collective	 firms	 also	
display	 significant	 decrease	 in	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio,	 the	 ratio	 decrease	 from	
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16.3%	 to	 10.4%	and15.6%	 to	 9.8%,	 respectively	 for	 private	 firms	 and	 collective	
firms.	Contrary	to	the	trend,	foreign	firms’	inventory	to	sales	ratio	is	relative	stable.	
The	ratio	decreases	from	16.8%	to	15%.		
	
	
	
Figure 4.1: Median inventory to sales ratio across ownership between 2000-2007 
	
This	dramatic	different	behaviour	in	inventory	sales	ratio	could	have	a	number	of	
implications	 for	 our	 studies.	 Given	 that	 the	modern	 inventory	 control	method	 is	
widely	available,	we	would	expect	all	firms	display	similar	reduction	in	inventory	
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to	sales	ratio.	The	differential	behaviours	indicate	there	are	other	factors	at	work.	
One	the	main	factor	related	to	this	study	is	the	financial	pressure.	As	we	discussed	
in	section	4.4.1,	SOEs	are	favoured	by	the	banking	sector	and	may	still	facing	soft	
budget	 constraints.	 Therefore,	 they	 can	 afford	 to	 hold	 more	 inventories	 and	
operate	at	a	less	efficient	mode.	The	dramatic	decrease	in	inventory	to	sales	ratio	
for	collective	firms	may	reflect	the	hardened	budget	constraints	to	the	COEs	due	to	
the	banking	 reforms.	The	 changing	 financial	 pressure	 forces	COEs	 to	work	more	
efficiently	and	free	up	the	funding	for	other	firm	activities.		
	
The	same	logic	applies	to	the	private	firms.	Despite	the	continuous	reform	
of	 the	 banking	 sector,	 private	 firms	 still	 lack	 of	 effective	 external	 financing	
channels	 for	 their	 growth	 and	 expansion.	 Private	 firms	 can	 only	 overcome	 this	
obstacle	by	working	more	efficiently,	and	utilising	 internal	 funds	 to	 finance	 their	
growth.	Foreign	firms	enjoy	a	relatively	stable	financing	channel,	mainly	from	their	
parent	 companies	 from	aboard.	There	 is	no	apparent	 external	 financial	pressure	
forcing	them	to	work	more	effectively	and	they	are	often	perceived	to	be	the	most	
efficient	group.	This	could	explain	their	relative	stable	inventory	to	sales	ratio	for	
foreign	firms.	
	
The	decline	 in	 inventory	to	sales	ratio	could	have	an	 important	 impact	on	
our	 empirical	 results.	 Since,	 firms	 now	 are	 able	 to	 control	 their	 inventory	more	
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effectively.	 Inventory	 investment	 would	 demands	 less	 funding	 and	 possibly	
displays	a	lower	level	of	inventory	investment	cash‐flow	sensitivities.	
	
	
	
4.6.2	Descriptive	statistics	
		
Table	 4.0	 presents	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 some	 key	 variable	 for	 the	 full	
sample	 and	 reports	 the	 subsample	 descriptive	 statistics	 according	 to	 ownership	
group	 and	 regions.	 The	 average	 real	 sales	 and	 average	 real	 total	 assets	 of	 the	
sample	 average	 are	 1,434,200RMBs	 and	1,377,600RMBs.	 The	 SOEs	 appear	 to	 be	
the	largest	amount	the	four	ownership	groups.	The	average	real	sales	and	real	total	
assets	 of	 SOEs	 are	 2,577,000RMBs	 and	 3,590,000RMBs,	 compare	 to	 only	
1,078,000RMBs	 and	 1,018,400RMBs	 for	 those	 of	 private	 firms.	 The	 average	 real	
sales	 and	 real	 total	 assets	 for	 foreign	 firms	 fall	 between	 those	 of	 the	 SOEs	 and	
private	firms.	Collective	owned	firms	are	much	smaller	 in	terms	of	real	sales	and	
real	 total	 assets	 compare	 to	 the	 other	 three	 groups.	 There	 is	 no	 significant	
difference	 in	the	average	real	sales	and	average	real	 total	assets	across	the	three	
regions.	
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	 SOEs	are	still	the	largest	employers	among	the	four	ownership	groups.	The	
average	 number	 of	 employees	 for	 the	 SOEs	 is	 878,	 which	 is	 at	 least	 two	 times	
larger	than	those	for	private,	foreign	and	collective	ownership	firms	(350,	488	and	
292	 employees,	 respectively).	 The	 average	 number	 of	 employees	 (398)	 is	 the	
lowest	for	the	eastern	region.	This	partly	reflects	the	fact	that	a	larger	number	of	
private	firms	located	in	the	eastern	region.	
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Full	Sample	 SOEs	 Private	 Foreign	 Collective	 East	 Central	 West	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
                 
Real	Sales	 1434.2	 2577.7	 1078.7	 1976.3	 643.9	 1480.9	 1396.9	 1143.7	
(11402.0)	 (19914.9)	 (7330.6)	 (14574.6)	 (4146.3)	 (12045.6)	 (10637.2)	 (6451.2)	
Real	Assets 1377.6	 3590.2	 1018.4	 1510.6	 498.7	 1315.3	 1601.5	 1561.0	
(10322.2)	 (26497.1)	 (5995.6)	 (6549.7)	 (3061.7)	 (10247.7)	 (11990.9)	 (8580.8)	
	 	 	
No	of		 430.0	 878.0	 350.4	 488.7	 292.6	 398.0	 562.9	 502.8	
employees	 (1503.0)	 (3585.5)	 (972.7)	 (1295.9)	 (746.0)	 (1403.7)	 (1975.2)	 (1537.5)	
Ii,t	/	Si,t	 0.231	 0.404	 0.200	 0.228	 0.226	 0.212	 0.271	 0.318	
(0.322)	 (0.554)	 (0.270)	 (0.267)	 (0.340)	 (0.292)	 (0.409)	 (0.391)	
∆Ii,t	 0.0459	 ‐0.0217	 0.0570	 0.0697	 0.00594	 0.0550	 0.0151	 0.0165	
(0.668)	 (0.585)	 (0.690)	 (0.637)	 (0.688)	 (0.670)	 (0.685)	 (0.630)	
∆Si,t	 0.0907	 0.0276	 0.108	 0.0889	 0.0687	 0.0942	 0.0888	 0.0682	
(0.364)	 (0.382)	 (0.364)	 (0.354)	 (0.361)	 (0.359)	 (0.385)	 (0.370)	
Ii,t‐1‐	Si,t‐1	 ‐2.046	 ‐1.441	 ‐2.190	 ‐1.916	 ‐2.146	 ‐2.116	 ‐1.964	 ‐1.642	
(1.178)	 (1.142)	 (1.184)	 (1.022)	 (1.280)	 (1.161)	 (1.288)	 (1.072)	
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1	 0.400	 0.133	 0.416	 0.451	 0.461	 0.435	 0.335	 0.231	
(0.741)	 (0.445)	 (0.714)	 (0.780)	 (0.944)	 (0.768)	 (0.702)	 (0.527)	
  	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 401247	 39375	 218943	 84726	 37575	 307771	 50517	 42959	
Table	4.0:	Descriptive	statistics.		
This	 table	 reports	 the	 sample	mean	and	standard	deviations	 (in	bracket)	 for	 the	 full	 sample	
and	divides	firms	into	subsample	according	to	ownership	and	region.	Real	sales,	real	assets	are	
total	sales	and	total	assets	deflated	by	provincial	level	GDP	deflator.	They	are	in	1,000s	of	yuan	
RMB.	Ii,t	/	Si,t		is	the	inventory	to	sales	ratio.	∆Ii,t:	is	the	change	in	log	inventories,	which	is	the	
inventory	 growth.	∆Si,t	:is	 the	 change	 log	 real	 sales.	 Ii,t‐1‐	Si,t‐1	 :is	 the	 change	 in	 log	 real	 sales.	
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1:	is	the	cash	flow	divide	by	capital	stock.		
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The	SOEs	have	the	highest	 level	of	 inventory	to	sales	ratio.	They	maintain	
an	average	inventory	level	equal	to	about	40%	of	their	sales.	The	inventory	to	sales	
ratios	 for	 private,	 foreign	 and	 collective	 are	 0.2,	 0.228	 and	 0.226,	 respectively.	
There	 is	 not	 any	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 across	 the	
three	different	regions.	The	sample	average	inventory	growth	rate	(∆Ii,t)is	4.59%.	
The	SOEs	have	a	negative	growth	rate	of	 ‐2.17%.	This	 is	possibly	due	 to	 the	 fact	
that	 the	 SOEs	 are	 trying	 to	 be	 more	 efficient	 in	 their	 inventory	 control.	 The	
inventory	 growth	 rate	 for	 collective‐owned	 firms	 is	 also	 very	 low	 (0.59%).	 The	
average	inventory	growth	rate	is	the	highest	for	foreign	firms	(6.97%),	followed	by	
private	firms	(5.7%).	An	interesting	fact	is	that	the	mean	inventory	growth	rate	is	
much	 higher	 in	 the	 eastern	 region	 (5.5%)	 than	 in	 the	 central	 (1.51%)	 and	 the	
western	region	(1.65%).	
	
The	sample	average	sales	growth	(∆Si,t)is	very	high	at	9.07%.	As	the	future	
engine	 of	 growth,	 private	 firms	 have	 a	 mean	 sales	 growth	 rate	 of	 10.8%,	 in	
contrast	 to	 only	 2.76%	 for	 SOEs.	 	 The	mean	 sales	 growth	 rates	 for	 foreign	 and	
collective	 firms	 are	 8.89%	 and	 6.87%,	 respectively.	 Both	 the	 eastern	 region	 and	
central	 region	 has	 a	 high	 average	 sales	 growth	 rate	 (9.42%	 and	 8.88%,	
respectively).		The	average	sales	growth	rate	for	the	western	region	is	only	6.82%.	
This	partly	reflects	the	regional	development	disparity	across	the	three	regions.	
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The	 sample	 average	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 is	 40%.	 The	 SOEs	 has	 the	
lowest	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 (13.3%),	while	 the	 collective‐owned	 firms	 have	
the	highest	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 (46.1%).	The	cash	 flow	 to	capital	 ratios	 for	
private	 firms	 and	 foreign	 firms	 are	 41.6%	and	 45.1%,	 respectively.	 The	 firms	 in	
eastern	 and	 central	 regions	 have	 a	 significantly	 higher	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	
(43.5%	and	33.5%)	than	firms	located	in	the	western	region	(23.1%).		
	
4.7	Empirical	results	and	discussion	
4.7.1	Baseline	specification	
	
Table	 4.1	 reports	 the	 results	 of	 the	 baseline	 regression	 equation	 (7)	 augmented	
with	 cash	 flow.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 section	 4.3.3,	 we	 can	 test	 whether	 the	 GMM	
estimator	 suffers	 from	 finite	 sample	bias	by	 comparing	 the	coefficients	of	 lagged	
dependent	variables	from	GMM	to	those	of	OLS	and	within	fixed	effect	estimator.	
The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 lagged	 dependent	 variables	 from	 GMM	 is	 ‐0.565	 and	
significant,	which	is	greater	than	the	within	estimation	of	‐0.684	and	less	than	the	
OLS	estimation	of	‐0.318.		All	the	control	variables	are	significant	and	with	correct	
signs.	Based	on	this	result,	we	can	tentatively	conclude	that	GMM	estimator	in	our	
study	 does	 not	 suffer	 from	 serious	 finite	 sample	 bias.	 The	 M2	 suggests	 the	
instruments	 are	 valid	 and	 no	 gross	 misspecification	 in	 our	 model.	 Given	 GMM	
estimator’s	 superior	 ability	 to	 control	 for	 the	 problem	 of	 endogeneity	 and	more	
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efficient	than	the	IV	estimator,	we	will	use	the	differenced	GMM	estimator	 for	all	
our	subsequent	analysis.		
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  OLS GMM Fixed effects
   
∆Ii,t‐1	 ‐0.318*** ‐0.565*** ‐0.684***
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
∆Si,t 0.221*** 0.363*** 0.349*** 
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
∆Si,t‐1 0.181*** 0.490*** 0.451*** 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.132*** ‐0.495*** ‐0.656***
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1  ‐0.023*** 0.036 ‐0.037***
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
   
R2  0.117 0.326 
M2(p‐value)  0.137  
rho  0.605 
N  316650 251671 316650 
Table	4.1	Baseline	specification	with	OLS,	GMM	and	Fixed	effects	estimators	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is ∆Ii,t. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic 
standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test 
statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all the regressors 
lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table	4.2a	reports	the	results	of	the	baseline	regression	with	the	full	sample.	
Column	1	and	2	include	only	the	current	period	cash	flow	terms,	while	column	3	
and	4	 includes	cash	 flow	 lagged	one	period.	This	allows	us	 to	 test	whether	 firms	
based	their	 inventory	investment	on	current	or	previous	period	of	cash	flow.	 	All	
the	control	variables	are	significant	and	with	the	correct	signs.	In	particular,	both	
the	current	sales	growth	coefficients	(0.363,	0.380	for	column	1	and	2,	respectively)	
and	 lagged	 sales	 growth	 coefficients	 (0.49	 and	 0.492	 for	 column	 1	 and	 2,	
respectively)	are	positive	and	significant	at	1%	level.	This	indicates,	Chinese	firms	
base	 their	 inventory	 investment	 decision	 on	 the	 current	 and	previous	 sales,	 and	
that	 inventory	 investments	 in	 China	 are	 pro‐cyclical.	 However,	 none	 of	 the	 cash	
flow	terms	are	significant.		
	
Adding	 the	 lagged	cash	 flow	 term	 into	 the	 regression	makes	 little	 change,	
the	coefficient	for	cash	flow	in	column	1	increases	from	0.036	to	0.059	in	column3,	
and	the	cash	flow	coefficient	in	column	2	increases	from	0.041	to	0.065	in	column4.	
Yet,	 the	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 remain	 insignificant.	 Column	 2	 and	 4	 also	 test	
whether	 including	 time	 interact	with	 industry	 dummy	will	make	 and	 significant	
improvement	over	the	results.	We	do	not	find	this	is	the	case.	The	M2	test	indicates	
there	 is	no	second	order	serial	 correlation	 in	 the	differenced	residuals.	Based	on	
this	preliminary	result,	there	is	no	evidence	of	any	relationship	between	inventory	
investment	and	cash	flow	in	China.	However	the	true	relationship	could	be	mask	
by	 the	 aggregation	 of	 the	 sample,	 at	 firm	 level	 data,	 heterogeneity	 plays	 an	
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important	role.	Next	we	will	look	at	whether	ownership	will	provide	us	with	more	
insights.
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
  1 2 3  4
   
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.565*** ‐0.566*** ‐0.565***  ‐0.566***
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
∆Si,t  0.363*** 0.380*** 0.356***  0.372***
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.11)
∆Si,t‐1  0.490*** 0.492*** 0.491***  0.492***
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.495*** ‐0.497*** ‐0.496***  ‐0.497***
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1  0.036 0.041 0.059  0.065
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.05)
CFi,t‐1/Ki,t‐2  ‐0.006  ‐0.007
  (0.01)  (0.01)
   
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Industry interact with time No Yes No  Yes
M2(p‐value)  0.137 0.143 0.136  0.143
N  251671 251671 251671  251671
Table	4.2a:	Baseline	regression	for	full	sample		
 
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is ∆Ii,t. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic 
standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test 
statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all the regressors 
lagged 2 periods. M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. N: is the number of observations. 
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4.7.2	Regression	results	based	on	ownership	groups	
	
Table	 4.2b	 reports	 the	 inventory	 investment	 and	 cash	 flow	 regression	
differentiated	by	ownership	groups.	All	the	control	variables	are	highly	significant	
with	 correct	 signs	 and	 similar	 magnitude	 across	 ownership	 groups,	 with	 the	
exception	of	the	current	sales	growth	is	not	significant	for	the	collective	firms.	The	
cash	 flow	 term	 is	 ‐0.157	and	marginally	 significant	at	10%	 level	 for	 state	owned	
firms.	 This	 finding	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 SOEs	 in	 China	 are	 facing	 soft	
budget	constraints.	The	non‐financially	constrained	SOEs	obtain	funds	that	are	not	
necessary	for	their	investment	and	channel	their	funds	for	other	benefits.		Perotti	
and	Gelfer	(2001)	has	found	similar	negative	relationship	between	cash	flow	and	
fixed	investment	for	firms	in	the	bank‐led	groups	in	Russian	during	the	transition	
period.	 	 Perotti	 and	 Gelfer	 (2001)	 suggests	 this	 possibly	 due	 to	 the	 close	
relationship	 between	 bank‐led	 group	 firms	 enables	 them	 to	 raise	 investment	
funding,	while	constraining	the	use	of	free	cash	flow.		
	
The	cash	flow	coefficient	 is	positive	and	significant	at	5%	level	for	private	
firms,	while	insignificant	for	foreign	and	collective	firms.	This	results	is	consistent	
with	 Poncet	 et	 al	 (2010),	 who	 show	 that	 private	 firms	 in	 China	 are	 the	 most	
financially	 constrained,	 while	 foreign	 firms	 and	 SOEs	 are	 not	 financially	
constrained.	 The	 result	 suggests	 that	 private	 firm’s	 inventory	 investments	 are	
financially	 constrained.	 This	 effects	 is	 not	 only	 statistical	 significant,	 but	 also	
191 
 
economically	 significant.	 A	 one	 standard	 deviation	 increase	 of	 the	 cash	 flow	 to	
capital	 ratio	 for	 private	 firms	will	 increase	 their	 inventory	 investment	 by	 7.7%.	
This	effect,	is	consistent	with	the	findings	in	Guariglia	and	Mateut	(2010),	who	find	
a	 one	 standard	 deviation	 increase	 in	 the	 “Mix32”	 ratio,	 the	 inventory	 investment	
would	rise	by	5.2%	for	firms	in	UK.		
	
In	 column	 5	 of	 table	 4.2b,	 we	 interact	 the	 cash	 flow	 terms	 with	 four	
ownership	dummies	and	include	them	in	the	regression	as	a	robustness	test.	This	
exercise	 allows	 us	 to	 provide	 a	 direct	 comparison	 between	 the	 cash	 flow	
coefficients	across	ownership	groups.	This	approach	also	gives	us	more	degree	of	
freedom	in	our	regression.	We	find	that	the	inventory	to	cash	flow	sensitivities	for	
SOEs	drops	from	‐0.157	to	‐0.126	and	no	 longer	significant,	but	the	private	firms	
continue	 to	 show	 a	 positive	 and	 significant	 inventory	 to	 cash‐flow	 sensitivity	 of	
0.115,	which	 confirms	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 financially	 constrained.	 The	 results	
from	table	generally	support	our	hypothesis	 in	section	4.4.1	that	SOEs,	Collective	
firms	and	foreign	firms	are	not	financially	constrained,	while	private	firms	tend	to	
be	 the	 most	 financially	 constrained33.	 These	 results	 suggest	 a	 possible	 “lending	
bias”	is	operating	in	China.	
	
	
                                                 
32 Mix: ratio of short-term debt to short-term debt plus trade credit (Guariglia and Mateut 2010).  
33 The F-test of equality of cash flow coefficients indicate that the cash flow coefficients for private firms 
is significantly different from the other three ownership groups at 1% level.  
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  State  Private Foreign Collective  Interaction
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.638*** ‐0.556*** ‐0.557*** ‐0.554***  ‐0.569***
  (0.05)  (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.01)
∆Si,t  0.562**  0.214* 0.409* 0.176  0.391***
  (0.19)  (0.10) (0.19) (0.21)  (0.09)
∆Si,t‐1  0.568*** 0.469*** 0.501*** 0.475***  0.496***
  (0.06)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.02)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2 ‐0.579*** ‐0.487*** ‐0.494*** ‐0.492***  ‐0.500***
  (0.06)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.02)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1 ‐0.157*  0.110** 0.055 ‐0.076 
  (0.08)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
CFi,t/Ki,t1*
SOEs 
    ‐0.126
      (0.08)
CFi,t/Ki,t1*	
Private
    0.115*
      (0.04)
CFi,t/Ki,t1*	
Foreign
    ‐0.009
      (0.05)
CFi,t/Ki,t1*	
Collective
    ‐0.02
      (0.10)
M2  0.363  0.219 0.248 0.544  0.107
N  21788  142480 52905 22058  251656
Table	4.2b:	Inventory	investment	regression	across	ownership	group		
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is ∆Ii,t. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic 
standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test 
statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all the regressors 
lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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4.7.3	Regression	results	based	on	Regions	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 section	 4.4.5,	 due	 to	 the	 immobility	 of	 capital	 in	 China	 and	 the	
intervention	 of	 government	 policy	 will	 lead	 to	 different	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints	across	different	regions	(East/Coastal,	Central	and	West).	Column	1‐3	
of	 table	 4.3	 reports	 the	 regression	 results	 based	 on	 regional	 differentiation.	 The	
structure	 of	 the	 error	 correction	 model	 is	 well	 maintained.	 Lagged	 inventory	
growth,	 sales	 growth	 and	 lagged	 sales	 growth	 are	 all	 positive	 and	 precisely	
determined	 for	 all	 three	 regions.	 The	 error	 correction	 terms	 are	 negative	 and	
precisely	 determined.	 The	 cash	 flow	 coefficient	 is	 positive	 and	 significant	 at	 5%	
level	 for	 the	 coastal	 region	 only,	while	 the	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 for	 central	 and	
western	regions	are	insignificant.	The	M2	test	does	not	suggest	any	problem	with	
our	 model	 specifications	 and	 the	 instrument	 sets	 used.	This	 confirms	 our	 early	
hypothesis	 that	 firms	 in	 the	 Coastal	 region	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 financially	
constrained	than	the	other	two	regions.		
As	 a	 robustness	 test	we	 create	 interaction	dummies	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	
regions	and	interact	with	the	cash	flow	terms.	Column	(4)	of	table	4.3	reports	the	
result	 for	 the	 interaction	 regression.	 The	 sensitivity	 of	 inventory	 to	 cash	 flow	 is	
only	 significant	 for	 the	 coastal	 region.	 A	 one	 standard	 deviation	 increase	 in	 the	
cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 for	 firms	 in	 the	 coastal	 region	 the	 inventory	 growth	
would	rise	by	2.5%.	Given	that	the	average	inventory	growth	rate	for	the	coastal		
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region	is	5.5%,	an	additional	2.5%	inventory	growth	translate	into	a	50%	increase	
for	inventory	growth	rate.	We	can	see	this	effect	is	economically	significant	for	the	
coastal	region.	
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  Region       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Coastal  Central  West  Interaction 
         
∆Ii,t‐1 ‐0.553***  ‐0.753***  ‐0.608***  ‐0.550*** 
  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
∆Si,t 0.391***  0.567***  0.580*  0.271** 
  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.27)  (0.08) 
∆Si,t‐1 0.481***  0.697***  0.544***  0.471*** 
  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.486***  ‐0.708***  ‐0.533***  ‐0.479*** 
  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1  0.055*  0.038  ‐0.017   
  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.06)   
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*        0.033* 
Coastal       (0.02) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*        ‐0.117 
Central       (0.08) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*        0.079 
West       (0.09) 
         
M2  0.255  0.62  0.212  0.139 
N  194304  30188  27179  251671 
Table	4.3:	Inventory	investment	regression	across	regions	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is ∆Ii,t. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic 
standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test 
statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all the regressors 
lagged 2 periods.  m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. East, Central and West are interaction dummy equal to one if the firm 
located in the respective region, and equal to zero otherwise. 
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4.7.4	Regression	results	based	on	sectorial	differences:	durable	vs.	
nondurable	
	
There	 are	 important	 sectoral	 differences	 in	 the	 cyclical	 pattern	 of	 inventory	
investment.	 In	 particular,	 there	 tend	 to	 be	 much	 larger	 cyclical	 movements	 in	
durable	 inventory	 investment	 compared	 to	 nondurable	 inventory	 investment.	
Carpenter	et	al	(1998a)	finds	that	the	sum	of	the	cash	flow	coefficients	are	at	least	
as	 large	 for	durables	 as	 for	nondurables,	which	 indicates	 that	 firms	operating	 in	
durable	 industries	 tend	 to	 be	 at	 least	 as	 financial	 constrained	 as	 the	 firms	
operating	in	the	nondurable	sector,	if	not	more	financial	constrained.	In	our	study	
we	 follow	 Carpenter	 et	 al	 (1998)’s	 approach	 to	 classify	 firms	 into	 durable	 and	
nondurable	industries34.			
	
Column	 1‐2	 of	 table	 4.4	 reports	 the	 result	 of	 the	 regression	 based	 on	
durable	 and	 nondurable	 sample	 splits.	 The	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 appear	 to	 be	
insignificant	 for	 both	 the	 durable	 and	 nondurable	 sector,	 while	 the	 lagged	
                                                 
34 We define durable and nondurable firms with the two-digit SIC categories. Nondurable manufacturing 
consists of SIC codes 20-23 and 26-31. Durable firms consists of SIC codes 24-25 and 32-38. We deleted 
miscellaneous manufacturing firms with SIC code 39. 
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inventory	growth,	 sales	growth,	 lagged	sales	growth	and	error	corrections	 terms	
are	 precisely	 determined	with	 correct	 signs.	 Column	 3	 of	 table	 4.4	 presents	 the	
results	with	the	 interaction	of	durable	and	nondurable	 industry	dummy	with	the	
cash	 flow.	 The	 inventory	 investment	 cash	 flow	 sensitivity	 is	 now	 positive	 and	
significant	 for	 the	durable	 sector,	but	 it	 remains	 insignificant	 for	 the	nondurable	
sector.		The	cash	flow	coefficient	is	much	larger	for	the	durable	sector	(0.88)	than	
the	nondurable	 sector	 (‐0.013).	This	 result	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 idea	 that	 firms	
operate	 in	durable	 sector	 are	more	 financially	 constrained	 than	 firms	operate	 in	
nondurable	sector		
In	table	4.5	we	further	split	the	sample	based	on	the	four	ownership	group.	
State	 and	 collective	 firms	 continue	 to	 show	no	 signs	of	 cash‐flow	 sensitivities	 to	
inventory	investment	across	the	durable	and	nondurable	sectors.	Yet,	private	firms	
and	 foreign	 firms	 operating	 in	 the	 durable	 sector	 display	 significant	 cash‐flow	
sensitivities	of	0.14	and	0.102	respectively,	while	the	cash	flow	coefficients	for	the	
nondurable	 sector	 firms	 are	 insignificant	 and	 much	 smaller	 than	 those	 of	 the	
durable	 sector.	 As	 all	 previous	 regression,	 all	 the	 control	 variables	 are	 highly	
significant	and	have	the	correct	signs.	The	M2	test	shows	no	sign	of	second	order	
serial	 correlation	 for	 all	 ownership.	 The	 overall	 results	 from	 table	 4.4‐4.5	 that	
firms	 operating	 in	 the	 durable	 sector	 tend	 to	 face	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	After	controlling	for	ownership,	we	find	that	this	case	applies	only	to	
private	firms	and	foreign	firms	operate	in	the	durable	sector.	
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  Durable  Nondurable  Interaction 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.574***  ‐0.572***  ‐0.569*** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
∆Si,t 0.306*  0.534***  0.415*** 
(0.13)  (0.16)  (0.09) 
∆Si,t‐1  0.496***  0.503***  0.494*** 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Ii,t‐2‐ Si,t‐2  ‐0.506***  ‐0.501***  ‐0.498*** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1  0.05  0.033   
(0.04)  (0.03)   
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*      0.088* 
Durable      (0.04) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*      ‐0.013 
Nondurable      (0.05) 
M2 0.078  0.891  0.09 
N 123475  123303  245501 
Table	 4.4:	 Inventory	 investment	 regression	 across	 durable	 and	 nondurable	
industry	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Durable: dummy variable equal to one if the firm is operating in the durable sector, equal to zero otherwise. 
Nondurable: dummy variable equal to one if the firm is operating in the durable sector, equal to zero otherwise. 
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  State Private Foreign  Collective
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Ii,t‐1 ‐0.638*** ‐0.555*** ‐0.573***  ‐0.575***
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.04)
∆Si,t 0.604*** 0.223* 0.477**  0.295
  (0.18) (0.10) (0.16)  (0.20)
∆Si,t‐1 0.568*** 0.467*** 0.508***  0.507***
  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.05)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.577*** ‐0.485*** ‐0.507***  ‐0.517***
  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.05)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.157 0.140* 0.102*  ‐0.071
Durable  (0.13) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.08)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.125 0.045 0.031  ‐0.021
Nondurable  (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.10)
 
M2	 0.287 0.201 0.173  0.475
N	 21520 139370 50724  21692
Table	4.5:	Inventory	investment	regression	for	durable	and	nondurable	industry	
across	different	ownership	groups.	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 period.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Durable: dummy variable equal to one if the firm is operating in the durable sector, equal to zero otherwise. 
Nondurable: dummy variable equal to one if the firm is operating in the durable sector, equal to zero otherwise. 
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4.7.4	Regression	results	based	on	political	affiliation		
	
Column	1‐3	of	table	4.6	reports	the	regression	results	for	firms	with	high	political	
affiliation,	 low	 political	 affiliation	 and	 no	 political	 affiliation	 respectively.	 The	
structure	 of	 the	 error	 correction	model	 is	 well	 maintained.	 The	 result	 indicates	
that	cash	flow	is	an	important	determinant	of	inventory	investment	for	firms	with	
no	 political	 affiliation	 only.	 	 The	 cash	 flow	 coefficient	 for	 firms	with	 no	 political	
affiliation	is	0.065,	compare	to	those	of	firms	with	high	political	affiliation	(0.007)	
and	low	political	affiliation	(‐0.003).	This	suggests	firms	with	no	political	affiliation	
are	financially	constrained.	
	
We	 create	 three	 interaction	 terms	 to	 indicate	 firm’s	 political	 affiliation	
status:	high	affiliation,	low	affiliation	and	no	affiliation.	For	example,	high	affiliation	
equals	to	one	if	a	firm	is	politically	affiliated	to	the	central	and	provincial	level,	and	
equals	to	zero	otherwise.	The	same	rule	applies	to	the	other	two	interaction	terms	
as	 well.	 	 We	 interact	 the	 cash	 flow	 with	 each	 of	 these	 three	 political	 affiliation	
indicators	to	further	test	the	 impact	of	political	affiliation	on	inventory	cash	flow	
sensitivities.	Column	4	of	table	4.6	shows	no	evidence	of	 financial	constraints	for	
firms	with	different	level	of	political	affiliation.	
	
In	table	4.7,	we	further	take	into	account	the	ownership	dimension	to	study	
the	 impact	 of	 political	 affiliation	 on	 the	 inventory	 to	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities.	 	We	
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find	that	SOEs,	Foreign	firms	and	Collective	firms	show	no	signs	of	significant	cash	
flow	 coefficient,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 collective	 firms	 with	 high	 political	
affiliation	 display	 a	 negative	 and	 significant	 cash	 flow	 coefficient.	 This	 suggests	
that	collective	firms	with	high	political	affiliation	may	enjoy	soft	budget	constraints.		
	
A	more	 interesting	result	 is	reported	 in	column	2	of	 table	4.7,	where	cash	
flow	 coefficient	 for	 the	 private	 firms	 with	 high	 level	 political	 affiliation	 is	
insignificant.	 Given	 the	 finding	 from	 table	 4.2	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 always	
financially	constrained,	the	result	may	suggest	that	high	level	of	political	affiliation	
helps	 to	 alleviate	 private	 firm’s	 financial	 constraints.	 Yet,	 private	 firms	 with	
medium	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation	 attract	 a	 positive	 cash	 flow	 coefficient.	
Moreover,	 the	 cash	 flow	coefficient	 for	private	 firms	with	 low	political	 affiliation	
(0.121)	is	higher	than	those	of	private	firms	without	political	affiliation	(0.099).	A	
test	 of	 equality	 of	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 among	 the	 three	 different	 political	
affiliation	level	for	private	firms,	with	F‐test,	indicates	the	cash	flow	coefficients	for	
private	firms	with	high	political	affiliation	are	significantly	different	from	those	of	
private	 firms	with	 low	or	no	political	 affiliation35.	But,	 no	 evidence	 suggests	 any	
significant	 difference	 in	 the	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 to	 inventory	 between	 private	
firms	with	low	political	affiliation	and	private	firms	with	no	political	affiliation.	
	
                                                 
35 The F statistics for CFK*High affiliation=CFK*Low affiliation is F(1, 34138)=5.09 with p-value of 
0.024.The F statistics for CFK*High affiliation=CFK*No affiliation is F(1, 34138)=3.13 with p-value of 
0.07. The F statistics for CFK*Low affiliation=CFK*No affiliation is F(1, 34138)=0.46 with p-value of 
0.49. 
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  High affiliation Low affiliation No affiliation  Interaction
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.534*** ‐0.596*** ‐0.564***  ‐0.567***
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
∆Si,t  0.689*** 0.468** 0.359**  0.374***
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09)
∆Si,t‐1  0.465*** 0.525*** 0.489***  0.493***
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2 ‐0.440*** ‐0.527*** ‐0.498***  ‐0.497***
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1 0.007 ‐0.003 0.065*  
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.03)  
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*   ‐0.079
High	affiliation    (0.04)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*   0.037
Low	affiliation    (0.03)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*   0.056
No	affiliation    (0.03)
     
M2  0.087 0.31 0.778 0.124
N  19266 88040 144365 251671
Table	 4.6:	 Inventory	 investment	 regression	 with	 different	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all 
the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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  Political affiliation interact with ownership 
  State  Private  Foreign  Collective 
         
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.642***  ‐0.556***  ‐0.559***  ‐0.577*** 
  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
∆Si,t  0.526**  0.229*  0.404*  0.302 
  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
∆Si,t‐1  0.572***  0.469***  0.504***  0.508*** 
  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.585***  ‐0.486***  ‐0.497***  ‐0.518*** 
  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.153  ‐0.029  0.079  ‐0.166* 
High	affiliation  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.154  0.121***  0.009  ‐0.064 
Low	affiliation  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1* ‐0.086  0.099*  0.058  0.065 
No	affiliation  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
         
M2  0.394  0.215  0.269  0.597 
N  21788  142480  52905  22058 
Table	 4.7:	 Inventory	 investment	 regression	 with	 different	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation	across	ownership	groups	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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4.7.4	Regression	results	based	on	firm	size		
	
Table	4.8	presents	the	results	based	on	firm	size.	We	use	two	measures	of	firm	size	
as	a	robustness	test	of	our	results.	Firms	are	classified	as	large	firms	if	the	firm’s	
real	total	sales/real	total	assets	fall	in	the	two	25th	percentile	in	their	industry	in	a	
given	year,	and	a	 firm	 is	classified	as	small	 if	 the	 firm’s	real	 total	 sales/real	 total	
assets	fall	in	the	bottom	75th	percentile	in	their	industry	in	a	given	year36.	For	our	
regression	with	interaction	terms,	we	create	interaction	dummy	large	equal	to	1	if	
a	 firm‐year	 is	 classified	 as	 a	 large	 firm	 and	 equal	 to	 zero	 otherwise.	 Interaction	
term	small	equals	to	1	if	a	firm‐year	is	classified	as	small	firms,	and	equal	to	zero	
otherwise.	This	same	rule	applies	to	both	the	classification	based	on	real	total	sales	
and	real	total	assets.	
	
For	all	six	specifications	in	table	4.8,	the	structure	for	the	error‐correction	
models	 is	 well	maintained.	 Lagged	 inventory	 growth,	 sales	 growth,	 lagged	 sales	
growth	 and	 the	 error‐correction	 terms	 are	 all	 highly	 significant	with	 the	 correct	
signs.	 However,	 cash	 flow	 terms	 for	 all	 six	 specifications	 in	 table	 4.8	 are	
insignificant.	These	results	suggest	there	is	no	evidence	of	financially	constraints.	
This	is	possibly	due	to	we	failed	to	take	into	account	the	ownership	status	of	firms.	
In	table	4.9,	we	explore	whether	this	is	the	case.	
	
                                                 
36 We have also experimented with different cut-off point such as 30% and 50% as robustness test. The 
different cut-off points do not alternate the results significantly. We do not report them here for brevity. 
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  Based	on	Real	total	assets	 Based	on	Real	sales	
  Large	 Small	 Interaction Large	 Small	 Interaction
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.569***  ‐0.559***  ‐0.570***  ‐0.642***  ‐0.536***  ‐0.566*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
∆Si,t  0.537***  0.268*  0.439***  0.543***  0.287*  0.378*** 
  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
∆Si,t‐1  0.527***  0.474***  0.499***  0.584***  0.437***  0.493*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.497***  ‐0.491***  ‐0.500***  ‐0.582***  ‐0.459***  ‐0.497*** 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1  0.037  0.034    0.022  0.003   
  (0.04)  (0.03)    (0.04)  (0.03)   
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*      0.049      0.044 
Large	     (0.05)      (0.03) 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*      0.036      0.035 
Small      (0.03)      (0.03) 
             
M2  0.184  0.492  0.129  0.499  0.449  0.14 
N  65692  185979  251671  65101  186570  251671 
Table	4.8:	Inventory	investment	regression	with	different	firm	size	level	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Firms are classified as large firms if the firm’s real total sales/real total assets fall in the two 25th percentile in 
their industry in a given year, and a firm is classified as small if the firm’s real total sales/real total assets fall in 
the bottom 75th percentile in their industry in a given year. For our regression with interaction terms, we create 
interaction dummy large equal to 1 if a firm-year is classified as a large firm and equal to zero otherwise. 
Interaction term small equals to 1 if a firm-year is classified as small firms, and equal to zero otherwise. 
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  SOEs	 Private Foreign Collective
  Assets	 Sales Assets Sales Assets Sales	 Assets	 Sales
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.645***  ‐0.634***  ‐0.558***  ‐0.557***  ‐0.544***  ‐0.540***  ‐0.575***  ‐0.580*** 
  (0.0463)  (0.0461)  (0.0149)  (0.0143)  (0.0297)  (0.0307)  (0.0410)  (0.0413) 
                 
∆Si,t  0.531**  0.528**  0.277**  0.259**  0.314  0.286  0.295  0.310 
  (0.168)  (0.166) (0.100) (0.0984) (0.168) (0.176)  (0.195)  (0.189)
       
∆Si,t‐1  0.579***  0.566*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.491*** 0.485***  0.504***  0.512***
  (0.0581)  (0.0580) (0.0200) (0.0196) (0.0333) (0.0342)  (0.0532)  (0.0543)
       
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.590***  ‐0.575***  ‐0.487***  ‐0.486***  ‐0.483***  ‐0.478***  ‐0.516***  ‐0.523*** 
  (0.0581)  (0.0578)  (0.0181)  (0.0176)  (0.0331)  (0.0338)  (0.0521)  (0.0533) 
                 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.0524    0.0121    0.145**    0.0435   
Large  (0.210)    (0.0712)    (0.0550)    (0.170)   
       
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1* ‐0.111    0.110** ‐0.00966 ‐0.0568 
Small  (0.0775)    (0.0392) (0.0415) (0.0569) 
       
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*    ‐0.00209    0.0767    0.103*    0.0172 
Large    (0.162)    (0.0487)    (0.0478)    (0.0975) 
                 
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*    ‐0.112    0.108**    ‐0.0208    ‐0.0710 
Small    (0.0747)    (0.0393)    (0.0438)    (0.0566) 
                 
N  21788  21788 142480 142480 52905 52905  22058  22058
M2  0.453  0.425 0.174 0.180 0.299 0.259  0.496  0.497
Table	4.9:	Inventory	investment	regression	with	different	firm	size	level	across	
ownership	
 
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Firms are classified as large firms if the firm’s real total sales/real total assets fall in the two 25th percentile in 
their industry in a given year, and a firm is classified as small if the firm’s real total sales/real total assets fall in 
the bottom 75th percentile in their industry in a given year. For our regression with interaction terms, we create 
interaction dummy large equal to 1 if a firm-year is classified as a large firm and equal to zero otherwise. 
Interaction term small equals to 1 if a firm-year is classified as small firms, and equal to zero otherwise. 
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Table	 4.9	 reports	 the	 regression	 results	 for	 firms	 classified	 as	 small	 and	
large	firms	based	on	real	total	assets	and	real	total	sales	across	ownership.	Column	
1	 and	 2	 of	 table	 4.9	 report	 the	 results	 for	 SOEs.	 The	 error	 correction	 model’s	
structure	is	well	maintained.	Neither	do	the	M2	test	statistics	suggest	any	problems	
of	 the	 instruments	 and	 model	 specification.	 The	 results	 suggest	 no	 evidence	 of	
significant	cash	flow	coefficients	for	both	small	and	large	SOEs.	Column	7	and	8	of	
table	 4.9	 report	 the	 results	 for	 collective‐owned	 firms,	 again	 the	 cash	 flow	
coefficients	 are	 insignificant	 for	 both	 small	 and	 large	 firms.	 These	 evidences	 are	
consistent	with	the	 lending	bias	hypothesis	that	SOEs	and	collective	owned	firms	
are	not	 financially	 constrained	due	 to	 the	preferential	 treatments	 from	 the	 state	
dominated	financial	sectors.		
	
Column	 3	 and	 4	 of	 table	 4.9	 report	 the	 results	 for	 private	 firms.	 Small	
private	 firms	 display	 positive	 and	 significant	 cash	 flow	 coefficients	 in	 the	
specification	based	on	real	 total	assets	 (0.11)	and	the	specification	based	on	real	
total	sales	(0.108),	while	the	cash	flow	coefficients	for	the	large	private	firms	are	
small	 and	 not	 statistically	 significant	 in	 both	 specification.	 This	 suggests	 small	
private	 firms	may	 be	more	 financially	 constrained	 than	 large	 private	 firms,	 and	
cash	 flow	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	 small	 private	 firms’	 inventory	
investment37.			
                                                 
37 However, the F test of the equality of cash flow coefficients suggests that for column 3 of table 4.8, the 
cash flow coefficients are only marginally statistically significant different from each other. The F test of 
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The	results	 for	 foreign	owned	firms	differentiated	between	small	and	 large	 firms	
are	reported	in	column	5	and	6	of	table	4.9.	We	find	that	the	cash	flow	coefficients	
are	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	 large	 foreign	 firms,	while	 they	 are	 negative,	 very	
small	 in	 magnitude	 and	 insignificant	 for	 small	 foreign	 firms38.	 The	 results	 from	
column	5	and	6	of	 table	4.9	 suggest	 that	 large	 foreign	 firms	are	more	 financially	
constrained.	 Large	 foreign	 firms	 have	 significant	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 between	
0.145	and	0.103	at	5%	and	10%	significant	level.	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	findings	
from	 developing	 countries	 where	 small	 firms	 are	 typically	 more	 financially	
constrained.	However,	using	a	 sample	of	manufacturing	 firms	 in	Shanghai,	Chow	
and	 Fung	 (2000)	 also	 find	 evidence	 that	 small	 manufacturing	 firms	 are	 less	
financially	 constrained.	They	 suggest	 this	 is	possibly	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 smaller	
firms	 are	 better	 managed	 and	 more	 efficient,	 and	 may	 be	 smoothing	 their	
investment	 with	 working	 capital.	 Foreign	 firms	 typically	 rely	 on	 their	 parents	
aboard	 for	 funds	 instead	 of	 obtaining	 funds	 from	 local	 market.	 Foreign	 firms’	
demand	 for	 finance	might	 be	 easier	 to	 be	 satisfied	 by	parent	 company	 for	 small	
foreign	firms	than	large	foreign	firms.	Foreign	firms	may	find	it	difficult	to	access	
to	 local	 capital	 market,	 therefore	 large	 foreign	 firms	 might	 be	 more	 financially	
constrained.	
	
	
                                                                                                                                               
the equality of the cash flow coefficients for column 4 of table 4.8 indicates the cash flow coefficient for 
small and large firms are not significantly different. 
38 The F-test of equality of cash flow coefficients for column 5 and 6 of table 4.8 indicates that the cash 
flow coefficients for small and large firms are statistically different from each other. 
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4.7.5	Have	the	level	of	financial	constraints	changed	overtime?		
	
As	discussed	in	section	4.4.6,	we	choose	year	2003	as	a	cut‐off	point	for	the	sample	
to	explore	whether	the	level	of	financial	constraints	change	over	time.		In	order	to	
conduct	 the	empirical	analysis,	we	create	two	interaction	dummies:	Pre03	equals	
to	1	if	year	is	before	and	equal	to	2003	and	equal	to	0	otherwise;	Po03	equal	to	1	if	
year	 is	 after	 2003,	 and	 equal	 to	 zero	 otherwise.	 We	 then	 interact	 the	 two	
interaction	dummies	 to	compare	whether	 the	 levels	of	 financial	 constraints	have	
decreased	overtime	or	differential	 impacts	on	firms	with	different	characteristics	
have	changed.	
	
Table	 4.10	 presents	 the	 first	 piece	 of	 evidence	 between	 time	 and	
ownerships.	 In	column	1	of	table	4.10,	we	find	that,	 for	 the	full	sample,	 firms	are	
facing	 an	 increasing	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints,	 with	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	
increased	 from	0.058	 to	0.084.	The	F‐test	of	equality	of	 cash	 flow	constraints	 for	
pre2003	and	post	2003	is	F(1,	60944)	with	p‐value	of	0.028.	This	indicates	that	the	
level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 in	 the	 period	 after	 2003	 is	
significantly	higher	 than	the	period	before	2003.	There	are	a	number	of	possible	
reasons	for	this	finding.	First,	as	discussed	in	section	4.4.6,	PBOC39	has	conducted	a	
tightening	of	monetary	policy	between	late	2003	and	June	2007.	This	tightening	is	
likely	 to	 have	 significant	 impacts	 on	 firms’	 ability	 to	 obtain	 finance	 across	 all	
                                                 
39 People’s bank of China 
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ownership	 groups.	 Therefore,	 all	 firms	 may	 be	 more	 financially	 constrained.	
Second,	given	the	increasing	proportion	of	private	firms	in	the	sample,	it	is	likely	to	
observe	a	rise	in	the	level	of	financial	constraints.	
	
The	coefficients	 for	 cash	 flow	terms	remain	 insignificant	 for	 the	SOEs	and	
COEs	across	both	periods	 (column	2	and	5	of	 table	4.10).	This	 indicates	 that	 the	
Chinese	financial	market	continues	to	favour	the	state	sectors	(SOEs	and	collective	
firms)	 and	 provides	 them	 with	 preferential	 treatments.	 Column	 3	 of	 table	 4.10	
indicates	 that	 private	 firms	 are	 financially	 constrained	 in	 both	 periods.	 The	
inventory	to	cash	flow	sensitivity	increases	slightly	from	0.122	to	0.137.	However,	
the	F‐test	of	equality	of	coefficients	(CFK*pr03=CFK*po03)	 indicates	 they	are	not	
statistically	different	from	each	other.	Foreign	firms	are	facing	increasing	level	of	
financial	constraints;	while	in	the	period	prior	to	year	2003	foreign	firms	are	not	
financially	 constrained,	 yet	 foreign	 firms	 become	 financially	 constrained	 in	 the	
post	2003	period.		
	
In	table	4.11	we	examine	how	the	level	of	financial	constraints	change	over	
time	for	each	region	and	will	firms	with	different	ownership	face	some	change	in	
the	level	of	inventory	to	cash	flow	sensitivities.	For	this	purpose	we	interact	cash	
flow	terms	with	interaction	dummies	for	region	(r1:	East/coastal,	r2:	Central	and	
r3:	West)	and	time	dummies	pr03	and	po03.	Column	1	of	table	4.10	indicates	there	
is	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 from	 0.059	 to	 0.09	 in	 the	
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east/coastal	region	from	pre	2003	to	post	2003	periods	for	the	full	sample.	Column	
2	 of	 table	4.11	 indicates	 that	 SOEs	 face	 soft	 budget	 constraints	 in	 central	 region	
prior	 to	 2003,	 but	 this	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 case	 in	 the	 post	 2003	period.	Moreover,	
foreign	 firms	 display	 positive	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 in	 east/coastal	 region	 after	
year	 2003.	 Based	 on	 the	 results	 from	 table	 4.11,	 we	 see	 some	 evidence	 of	
tightening	 of	 budget	 constraints	 for	 SOEs	 and	 COEs,	 and	 increasing	 level	 of	
financial	constraints	for	foreign	firms	locate	in	the	coastal	region.	
	
In	 table	 4.12,	 we	 explore	 the	 dynamic	 change	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 political	
affiliation	 overtime	 across	 different	 ownership	 groups.	 The	 political	 affiliation	
interaction	 terms	 for	 high	 political	 affiliation,	 low	 political	 affiliation	 and	 no	
political	affiliation	are	labelled	as	L1,	L2	and	L3	respectively.	Column	1	of	tale	4.12	
indicates	that	for	the	full	sample,	firms	with	no	political	affiliation	are	experiencing	
significantly	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 over	 the	 study	 period.	 The	
inventory	 to	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 increases	 from	 0.77	 to	
0.12140.	 This	 indicates,	 for	 the	 full	 sample,	 firms	 without	 any	 levels	 of	 political	
affiliation	 are	 facing	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	
political	 pecking	order	 is	 still	 operating	 in	China	 and	obtaining	 finance	 for	 firms	
without	any	political	affiliation	become	more	difficult	in	the	recent	period.		
	
                                                 
40 The F-test indicates the two cash flow coefficients are statistically different from each other at 1% level. 
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State	 owned	 firms	 with	 medium	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 were	
experiencing	soft	budget	constraints	prior	to	2003,	but	this	soft	budget	constraint	
appears	 to	 be	 weaker	 in	 the	 later	 study	 period.	 Similar	 result	 is	 also	 found	 for	
collective	firms	with	high	political	affiliation.	In	general,	SOEs	and	collective	firms	
do	not	appear	 to	 suffer	 from	 financial	 constraints.	Yet,	 there	are	some	evidences	
suggesting	 the	 budget	 constraints	 are	 hardening	 over	 time	 for	 the	 SOEs	 and	 the	
collective	owned	firms.	
Focusing	on	private	firms,	in	column	3	of	table	4.12	we	again	confirm	that	
firms	with	high	level	of	political	affiliation	show	no	sign	of	financial	constraints	in	
both	 sub	 sample	 periods.	 Yet,	 for	 private	 firms	 without	 any	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation	 are	 facing	 significantly	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 The	
inventory	 to	 cash	 flow	 sensitivities	 for	 private	 firms	with	 no	 political	 affiliation	
increased	from	0.137	 in	the	pre‐2003	period	to	0.196	 in	the	post‐2003	period.	A	
one	 standard	 deviation	 increase	 in	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 for	 private	 firms	
without	 political	 affiliation,	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 rise	 of	 15%	 in	 inventory	 growth.	 A	
more	interesting	result	is	for	private	firms	with	low	level	of	political	affiliation.	The	
cash	flow	coefficients	(0.13)	for	private	firms	with	low	level	of	political	affiliation	is	
positive	 and	 significant	 in	 the	 pre‐2003	 period,	 while	 it	 becomes	 small	 and	
insignificant	 (0.061)	 in	 the	 post‐2003	 period.	 These	 evidences	 suggest	 political	
affiliation	 helps	 private	 firms	 to	 alleviate	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints.	
Moreover,	in	the	post‐2003	period,	low	level	of	political	affiliation	also	becomes	an	
effective	way	to	lower	private	firms’	level	of	financial	constraints.	
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  Whole	sample State Private Foreign	 Collective
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.568***  ‐0.636*** ‐0.558*** ‐0.555***  ‐0.561***
  (0.01)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.04)
∆Si,t  0.355***  0.447* 0.212* 0.393*  0.181
  (0.10)  (0.19) (0.10) (0.19)  (0.21)
∆Si,t‐1  0.495***  0.568*** 0.471*** 0.498***  0.487***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.06)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.500***  ‐0.581*** ‐0.489*** ‐0.492***  ‐0.502***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.06)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.058*  ‐0.127 0.122** 0.064  ‐0.072
Pr03  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.084**  ‐0.019 0.137** 0.088*  ‐0.053
Po03  (0.03)  (0.10) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.07)
     
M2	 0.135  0.493 0.203 0.22  0.529
N	 251671  21788 142480 52905  22058
Table	4.10:	Inventory	investment	regression	with	time	period	interaction	across	
ownership	groups	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all 
the regressors lagged 2 periods. M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Pr03: is the interaction dummy equals to 1 if year is less than or 
equal to 2003, and equals zero, otherwise. Po03: is the interaction dummy equals to 1 if year is greater than 2003, 
and equals zero, otherwise. 
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  Full	Sample	 State	 Private	 Foreign	 Collective	
           
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.558***  ‐0.659*** ‐0.540*** ‐0.558***  ‐0.585***
  (0.01)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.04)
∆Si,t  0.307***  0.459** 0.165 0.404*  0.232
  (0.09)  (0.18) (0.09) (0.16)  (0.18)
∆Si,t‐1  0.482***  0.601*** 0.447*** 0.502***  0.521***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.06)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.489***  ‐0.615*** ‐0.467*** ‐0.496***  ‐0.534***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.06)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.059*  0.017 0.094 0.063  ‐0.045
R1*Pr03  (0.03)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.07)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.090*  0.189 0.105 0.087*  ‐0.014
R1*Po03  (0.04)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.07)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.074  ‐0.474* ‐0.079 0.063  0
R2*Pr03  (0.08)  (0.22) (0.09) (0.11)  (0.09)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.104  ‐0.191 ‐0.126 0.103  0.048
R2*Po03  (0.08)  (0.16) (0.08) (0.11)  (0.09)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.058  ‐0.223 0.152 0.018  ‐0.285
R3*Pr03  (0.11)  (0.18) (0.11) (0.09)  (0.27)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.089  ‐0.083 0.143 0.029  ‐0.207
R3*Po03  (0.13)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.09)  (0.31)
	      
M2	 0.147  0.629 0.242 0.23  0.462
N	 251671  21788 142480 52905  22058
Table	4.11:	Inventory	investment	regression	with	time	periods	and	regional	
interaction	across	ownership	groups	
	
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are 
all the regressors lagged 2 periods.  M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. R1 indicates costal region, r2 indicates central region, 
and r3 indicates western region, pr03 indicates year<=2003, po03indicates year>2003 
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  Whole	sample	 State	 Private	 Foreign	 Collective	
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
∆Ii,t‐1  ‐0.571***  ‐0.641*** ‐0.562*** ‐0.560***  ‐0.580***
  (0.01)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.04)
∆Si,t  0.385***  0.446** 0.235* 0.396*  0.285
  (0.09)  (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)  (0.18)
∆Si,t‐1  0.500***  0.574*** 0.478*** 0.504***  0.513***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.06)
Ii,t‐2‐	Si,t‐2  ‐0.503***  ‐0.588*** ‐0.494*** ‐0.499***  ‐0.523***
  (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.05)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.114  ‐0.141 ‐0.046 0.105  ‐0.161*
L1*Pr03  (0.06)  (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.08)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  ‐0.137  ‐0.055 ‐0.06 0.103  ‐0.089
L1*Po03  (0.09)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.09)  (0.15)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.052  ‐0.165* 0.130** 0.04  ‐0.062
L2*Pr03  (0.03)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.034  ‐0.055 0.061 0.128  ‐0.072
L2*Po03  (0.06)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)  (0.07)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.077*  ‐0.037 0.137** 0.064  0.01
L3*Pr03  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.11)
CFi,t/Ki,t‐1*  0.121**  0.058 0.196** 0.071  0.126
L3*Po03  (0.04)  (0.22) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.13)
     
M2	 0.125  0.472 0.223 0.26  0.609
N	 251671  21788 142480 52905  22058
Table	4.12:	Inventory	investment	regression	with	time	periods	and	political	
affiliation	interaction	across	ownership	groups	
 
Notes: The dependent variable for all specification is change in log stocks. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard 
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments for all GMM estimation are all 
the regressors lagged 2 periods.M2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. L1 indicates high political affiliation, L2 indicates medium level of 
political affiliation, and L3 indicates no political affiliation, pr03 indicates year<=2003, po03indicates year>2003 
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4.8	Conclusions		
	
In	this	paper,	we	find	that	inventory	to	sales	ratio	decline	significantly	overtime	in	
China	 over	 the	 study	 period.	 Part	 of	 this	 decline	 is	 due	 to	 improvement	 of	
inventory	 control	methods.	However	we	observe	 significant	heterogeneity	 in	 the	
decline	of	inventory	to	sales	ratio	across	different	ownership	groups.	This	has	led	
us	to	focus	on	the	level	of	financial	constraints	across	different	ownership	groups.	
We	 have	 found	 that	 SOEs	 and	 Collectively	 owned	 firms	 are	 not	 financially	
constrained,	 so	 their	 inventory	 investment	 decisions	 are	 not	 determined	 by	 the	
availability	 of	 internal	 finance.	 For	 some	 case,	we	 have	 identified	 that	 SOEs	 and	
COEs	 have	 negative	 inventory	 cash‐flow	 sensitivities,	 which	 in	 the	 literature	 is	
interpreted	 as	 soft	 budget	 constraints.	 By	 dividing	 the	 study	 period	 into	 two	
periods,	we	also	 find	some	evidences	that	SOEs	and	COEs	are	no	 longer	enjoying	
the	 soft	 budget	 constraints.	 But	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 they	 are	 financially	
constrained	in	any	dimensions.	This	strongly	supports	the	idea	of	political	pecking	
order,	where	 the	state‐dominated	 financial	 sector	continues	 favour	 the	SOEs	and	
collectively	owned	firms.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	private	firms	are	the	most	financially	constrained	firms.	
Cash	flow	is	an	important	determinant	 for	private	 firms’	 inventory	decisions.	We	
find	 a	 one	 standard	 deviation	 increase	 in	 cash	 flow	 to	 capital	 ratio	 lead	 to	 an	
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additional	2.5%	inventory	growth	for	private	firms.	We	further	shows	that	political	
affiliation	helps	to	alleviate	the	problems	of	financial	constraints	for	private	firms.	
Private	 firms	 with	 high	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation	 show	 no	 signs	 of	 financial	
constraints.	Yet,	private	firms	without	any	political	affiliation	are	facing	increasing	
level	of	financial	constraints	over	time.	Our	results	also	indicate	that	firms	located	
in	the	coastal	region	are	 facing	 increasing	 level	of	 financial	constraints	over	time	
and	this	is	particularly	true	for	private	firms	and	foreign	firms.	This	suggests	that	
reform	of	banking	sector	and	capital	market	has	not	been	completed	and	capital	
markets	continue	to	be	fractured.	 
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Data	appendix	4A1:	Variable	definition	
 
Definitions of the variables used: 
 
Inventories: firm’s total stock of inventories includes finished goods and work in 
progress 
Sales: firm’s total sales 
Total assets: is the sum of total fixed assets and total current assets 
Capital stock: is proxy with tangible fixed assets 
Durable and nondurable firms: we define durable and nondurable firms with the 
two-digit SIC categories. Nondurable manufacturing consists of SIC codes 20-23 
and 26-31. Durable firms consists of SIC codes 24-25 and 32-38. We deleted 
miscellaneous manufacturing firms with SIC code 39. 
Borrowing ratio: is defined as interest payment over cash flow 
Coverage ratio: is defined as the sum of cash flow and interest payment over interest 
payment 
Leverage:  is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
CF/K : is defined by real cash flow over real tangible fixed assets 
Dlogstock:  is the change in ln(stock), which proxies stock growth 
Dlogsales: is the change in ln(sales), which proxies sales growth 
Pic: the error correction terms in the regression. It is defined as the log difference of 
inventory and sales 
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Data	appendix	4A2:	Data	structure	of	the	unbalanced	Panel	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4A1  Data distribution 
year  Freq.  Percent 
2000  36,532  9.1 
2001  35,819  8.93 
2002  46,220  11.52 
2003  60,069  14.97 
2004  59,857  14.92 
2005  56,557  14.1 
2006  54,578  13.6 
2007  51,615  12.86 
Total  401,247  100 
Table 4A1 Sample distribution for all firms 
Table 4A2  Number of observations 
noy  Freq.  Percent 
5  106,695  26.59 
6  85,788  21.38 
7  25,900  6.45 
8  182,864  45.57 
Total  401,247  100 
Table 4A2:Number of Observations 
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Table 4A3  Ownership distribution over year     
year  State  Private  Foreign  Collective  Total 
2000  14.39  50.44  23.21  11.96  100 
2001  14.3  50.38  23.35  11.96  100 
2002  12.23  53.26  23.41  11.1  100 
2003  9.96  58.85  21.52  9.66  100 
2004  10.1  58.78  21.5  9.62  100 
2005  9.18  59.95  21.74  9.13  100 
2006  8.53  60.73  22.03  8.71  100 
2007  7.06  62.08  22.38  8.48  100 
Total  10.34  57.52  22.26  9.87  100 
Table 4A3: Ownership distribution over year 
 Ownership classification is based on the majority average shareholding 
Inventory to sales analysis         
           
Table 4A4  Median inventory to sales ratio across ownership and time 
  State  Private  Foreign  Collective  Full Sample 
           
2000  30.5%  16.3%  16.8%  15.6%  17.9% 
2001  30.4%  15.7%  16.5%  15.0%  17.4% 
2002  27.4%  13.9%  16.0%  13.7%  15.6% 
2003  24.9%  11.6%  15.0%  12.4%  13.5% 
2004  24.0%  12.1%  15.9%  12.5%  13.9% 
2005  22.2%  11.1%  15.3%  11.2%  12.9% 
2006  19.7%  10.3%  14.9%  10.3%  12.0% 
2007  19.4%  10.4%  15.0%  9.8%  12.1% 
Table 4A4 Median inventory to sales ratio across ownership 
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Table 4A5 Detailed region classification 
 
 
Region	1:	
Costal/East	
Region	
Beijing,	Tianjin,	Hebei,	Liaoning,	Shanghai,	Jiangsu,	Zhejiang,	Fujian,	Shandong,	
Guangdong,	Hainan,	Guangxi		
Region	2:	
Central	
Region	
Shanxi,	Jilin,	Heilongjiang,	Anhui,	Jiangxi,	Henan,	Hubei,	Hunan	
Region	3:	
Western	
Region	
Neimenggu,	 Sichuan,	 Chongqing,	 Guizhou,	 Yunnan,	 Shannxi,	 Gansu,	 Qinghai,	
Ningxia,	Xinjiang,	Tibet	
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Chapter	5:	Financial	factors	and	exports:	
micro‐evidence	from	China	
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5.1	Introduction		
 
Exports	 have	 long	 been	 perceived,	 by	 the	 academic	 community	 and	 policy	
makers,	 to	 have	 a	 stimulating	 influence	 across	 the	 developed	 and	developing	
countries	 in	 the	 form	 of	 technological	 spillovers	 and	 other	 positive	
externalities41	leading	 to	 productivity	 improvements	 and	 economic	 growth.	
Exporters	 are	 typically	 more	 efficient	 than	 non‐exporter,	 and	 have	 higher	
incentives	 to	 innovate	 and	 refine	 the	 production	 process	 to	 stand	 up	 to	 the	
increased	 competition	 from	 international	 trade.	 Moreover,	 the	 increase	
specialization	of	exporters	also	allows	them	to	benefit	from	economies	of	scale.	
The	 export	 performance	 is	 now	 considered	 an	 important	 indicator	 of	 a	
country’s	economic	performance.	As	a	result,	policy‐makers	around	the	world	
devote	 significant	 efforts	 into	 development	 and	 implement	 trade	 promotion	
programs.	 The	 effectiveness	 of	 these	 programs	 depends	 on	 our	 clear	
understanding	of	the	determinants	of	export	decision.		
The	determinants	 of	 trade	participation	have	been	 extensively	 studied	
in	recent	years	(Bernard	and	Bradford	Jensen	1999;	Bernard	and	Wagner	2001;	
Levinsohn	and	Petrin	2003).	The	important	theoretical	contribution	by	Melitz	
(2003)	 rationalizes	 the	 link	 between	 heterogeneous	 firms	 and	 industry	
productivity,	 and	 provides	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	 study	 of	 firms’	 export	
participation.	Melitz	 (2003)	 shows	 that	 both	 firm	heterogeneity	 and	 the	 suck	
cost	 of	 entry	 into	 export	 market	 are	 relevant	 in	 analyzing	 firms	 export	
decisions.	 Chaney	 (2005)	 extends	 Melitz’s	 (2003)	 model	 with	 imperfect	
financial	markets	to	introduce	financial	constraints	into	the	model.	This	shows	
                                                 
41 The positive externalities include increase stock of knowledge, improve technology and local 
infrastructures, and human capital level in the local economy. 
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that	 not	 all	 valuable	 industrial	 projects	 are	 financed,	 which	 helps	 to	 explain	
why	 in	 some	 industry	 firms	with	high	productivity	do	not	export.	This	model	
shows	financial	variables	can	play	an	important	role	in	the	export	decision.		
Financial	health	and	access	to	finance	affects	firms’	export	behavior	for	a	
number	of	reasons.	First,	starting	to	export	can	be	very	expensive	for	firms	in	
the	 form	 of	 sunk	 cost,	where	 firms	 needs	 to	 set	 up	 offices	 overseas,	 to	 learn	
about	 foreign	markets,	establish	new	distribution	channels,	redesign	products	
to	 fit	 the	 foreign	 markets	 and	 so	 on.	 Das	 et	al	 (2007)	 report	 that	 estimated	
export	 entry	 costs	 for	 Columbian	 exporters	 are	 as	 high	 as	 430,000	 USD.	
Secondly,	although	continuing	to	export	involve	substantially	lower	costs	than	
the	entry	cost,	the	firms	still	need	to	devote	a	significant	amount	of	resources	to	
maintain	current	knowledge	of	 foreign	markets,	 to	maintain	and	comply	with	
the	local	and	foreign	regulations.	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 a	growing	number	of	 studies	have	 formalized	 the	
link	between	financial	constraints	and	firm’s	export	behavior,	only	a	handful	of	
empirical	papers	have	directly	estimated	the	relationship.	Our	paper	attempts	
to	fill	the	gap	using	a	large	sample	of	micro	level	data	from	China	between	2000	
and	2007.	China	is	particularly	suitable	for	the	study	of	this	relevant	question	
for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 China’s	 growth	 model	 has	 often	 been	 classified	 as	
export‐led.	 Export	 is	 playing	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	Chinese	 economy,	with	
China’s	 total	 export	 accounting	 for	 38.47%	of	 its	 GDP	 in	 2007.	 Secondly,	 our	
data	 indicates	 that	 only	 around	 27%	 of	 manufacturing	 firms	 are	 exporters,	
which	 is	 substantially	 lower	 than	 in	 developed	 countries.	 Third,	 China’s	
financial	market	is	still	relatively	underdeveloped:	a	large	number	of	firms	are	
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excluded	from	the	formal	financing	channels.	Private	firms,	small	and	medium	
firms	are	often	financially	constrained.		
This	paper	provides	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	impact	of	financial	health	
on	firms	export	participation	decisions,	by	exploring	the	differential	impact	on	
firms	with	different	ownership,	political	affiliation	and	firm	characteristics.	The	
study	has	 important	 policy	 implication.	 It	 provides	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	
the	relationship	between	financial	health	and	firms’	export	participation,	with	
emphasis	 on	 firm	 heterogeneity.	 This	 helps	 to	 shape	 the	 export	 promoting	
policy	to	target	firms	that	needs	the	help	most.	
The	remainder	of	the	chapter	is	organized	as	follows.	In	Section	5.2,	we	
provide	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 China’s	 aggregate	 international	 trade	 trends.	
Section	 5.3	 reviews	 the	 development	 of	 the	 related	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	
literatures.	In	Section	5.4,	we	introduce	our	dataset	and	present	some	summary	
statistics.	 Section	 5.5	 presents	 our	 empirical	 analysis	 and	 results.	 Section	 5.6	
concludes	the	paper.	
	
5.2	Exports	in	China	
	
China’s	economy	has	experienced	phenomenal	level	of	economic	growth	in	the	
past	 three	 decades.	 Its	 unique	 approach	 of	 experimental	 gradualism	 by	
gradually	moving	towards	a	market	economy	has	helped	the	country	to	surpass	
many	obstacles	and	helped	to	improve	the	living	standards	of	over	one	billion	
Chinese	citizens.	The	gradual	 trade	 liberalization	 initiated	 in	1978	has	played	
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an	 indisputable	 important	 role	 for	 china’s	 miracle	 economic	 growth.	 In	 this	
section	we	provide	a	brief	review	of	the	trends	and	patterns	of	China’s	export	
and	trade	as	a	background	of	our	empirical	study	of	the	relationship	between	
financial	constraints	and	exports42.	
Figure	 5.1	 presents	 the	 annual	 total	 exports	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 by	
China	in	constant	2000	US$	between	1978	and	2007.	The	total	exports	of	goods	
and	services	by	China	 increased	rapidly	since	1978	 from	merely	37.48	billion	
USD	to	1175.5	billion	USD	in	2007.	Exports	started	to	play	an	important	role	in	
China’s	economy	after	the	initial	trade	liberalization.	Exports’	share	of	China’s	
GDP	grew	from	6.6%	in	1978	to	a	peak	of	38.41%	in	2005.	China’s	total	imports	
of	 goods	 and	 services	 echoed	 those	 of	 exports.	 Figure	 5.2	 shows	 that	 the	
imports	also	rapidly	increased	from	27	billion	USD	in	1978	to	835billion	USD	in	
2007.	 Imports’	share	of	GDP	has	grown	from	7.06%	to	the	peak	of	31.55%	in	
2005,	and	slowly	declined	to	29.6%	in	2007.	
Figure	5.3	presents	 the	 annual	 growth	 rates	of	 imports	 and	exports	 in	
China.	The	growth	rates	 for	both	 imports	and	exports	have	been	very	volatile	
before	1990s,	and	the	annual	growth	rates	for	both	 imports	and	exports	have	
stood	 at	 above	10%	 level.	 	 The	 average	 annual	 growth	 rates	 for	 imports	 and	
exports	are	13.69%	and	13.13%	between	1979	and	2007.	If	we	restrict	the	time	
period	to	those	of	2001	and	2007,	the	average	annual	growth	rates	for	imports	
and	exports	are	18.97%	and	22.92%,	respectively.	This	significant	 increase	 in	
annual	growth	rate	reflects	the	effects	of	China’s	assertion	to	WTO.		
                                                 
42 All the numbers, except percentages, reported in this section are in constant 2000 USD$.  
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Figure	5.4	reports	 the	 trade	balance	of	China	between	1978	and	2007.		
China	continues	to	run	a	trade	surplus	over	the	period	of	20	years	after	1998.	
The	trade	surplus	increased	rapidly	from	25	billion	USD	in	2001	to	a	staggering	
level	of	340.4	billion	USD	in	2007.	The	trade	surplus	is	about	13.8%	of	real	GDP	
in	 2007.	 There	 are	 two	main	 reasons	 for	 this	 high	 level	 of	 surplus.	 First,	 the	
continuous	 tight	exchange	 rate	 control	 of	 the	Chinese	yuan	helps	 to	maintain	
the	 competitiveness	of	Chinese	products	at	 the	global	markets.	 Second,	 a	 less	
notice	factor	 is	 the	possibility	that	the	 import	suppliers	are	being	replaced	by	
domestic	suppliers.	This	can	be	traced	from	the	sharp	difference	in	the	annual	
growth	 rate	 of	 imports	 and	 exports	 since	 2004.	 The	 imports	 growth	 rate	 is	
significantly	below	that	of	exports	growth	rate.	After	three	decades	of	learning	
and	exporting,	china’s	producers	now	manage	to	domestically	produce	inputs,	
which	can	substitute	the	input	that	previously	needs	to	be	imported.		
Last,	figure	5.5	presents	some	brief	overview	of	the	structure	of	China’s	
exports.	 The	merchandise	 trade’s	 share	 of	 GDP	 grows	 rapidly	 from	 14.2%	 of	
GDP	 to	 around	 62.3%	 of	 GDP.	 Moreover,	 manufactures	 exports	 share	 of	
merchandise	 exports	 increases	 drastically	 from	 26.4%	 in	 1985	 to	 93.07%	 in	
2007.	This	reflects	that	China’s	exports	are	undergoing	the	process	of	increase	
sophistication.	 The	 raw	materials	 exports	 share,	 food	 exports	 share	 and	 fuel	
exports	 share	 of	 merchandise	 exports	 are	 all	 declining	 significantly	 over	 the	
period	and	shift	to	manufactures	exports.	Last,	Figure	5	also	shows	that	China’s	
merchandise	exports	increasingly	rely	on	high‐income	economies.	The	share	of	
merchandise	exports	to	high‐income	economies.	In	2007,	78%	of	merchandise	
exports	are	exported	to	high	income	countries.	
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Another	 notable	 fact	 regards	 to	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 inflow	 of	 foreign	
direct	 investment.	 Figure	 5.6	 reports	 the	 annual	 inflow	 of	 FDI	 to	 China	 and	
annual	inflow	of	FDI	as	percentage	of	GDP	between	1985	and	2007.	The	annual	
inflow	 of	 FDI	 to	 China	 has	 grown	 from	 merely	 5	 billion	 USD	 in	 1985	 to	 an	
astonishing	74.7	billion	USD	in	2007.	If	we	compare	figures	5.1,	5.2	and	5.6,	we	
can	see	that	China’s	total	exports,	imports	and	inflow	of	FDI	all	started	to	grow	
sharply	from	1991.	This	suggests	the	high	inflow	of	FDI	may	have	helped	China	
to	evolve	in	the	global	trade	markets	and	to	promote	China’s	exports.	Moreover,	
it	also	reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 foreign	 firms	are	outward	oriented,	 they	 invest	 in	
China	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 utilize	 China’s	 low	 cost	 labour	 to	 produce	 goods	
which	are	then	sold	to	other	countries.	
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Figure 5.1: Exports of goods and services  
(left axis, 100s million USD, constant 2000 USD). China’s Exports of goods and services as 
percentage of GDP (right axis). Sources: World development indicators database, World Bank and 
author’s calculation. 
 
 
	
Figure 5.2: Imports of goods and services  
(left axis, 100s million USD, constant 2000 USD). China’s Imports of goods and services as 
percentage of GDP (right axis). Sources: World development indicators database, World Bank and 
author’s calculation. 
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Figure 5.3: Annual growth rate of China’s imports and exports  
(All numbers are in percentage). Sources: World development indicators database, World Bank and 
author’s calculation. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: China’s Trade balance:  
(left scale, constant 2000 US$).China’s trade balance as percentage of GDP (right scale).  Sources: 
World development indicators database, World Bank and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 5.5: Manufactures exports as percentage of merchandise exports,  
Merchandise exports to high-income economies as percentage of total merchandise exports. 
Merchandise trade as percentage of GDP (all number reported are percentage).  Sources: World 
development indicators database, World Bank and author’s calculation. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: China’s FDI inflow: 
 (left scale, constant 2000 US$). China’s FDI inflow as percentage of GDP(right scale). Sources: 
World development indicators database, World Bank and author’s calculation. 
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5.3	Literature	Review	of	financial	constraints	and	export	
5.3.1	Theoretical	background	
 
In	the	last	decade,	the	trade	literature	has	recognized	firm	heterogeneity	as	an	
important	element	in	the	study	of	firm’s	export	behavior.	A	number	of	papers	
have	 formalized	 firm	heterogeneity	 the	 international	 trade	 theoretical	models	
(Eaton	 and	 Kortum	 2002;	 Melitz	 2003).	 Melitz	 (2003)	 constructs	 a	 dynamic	
industry	model	with	heterogeneous	firms	under	the	monopolistic	competition	
assumption	 in	 a	 general	 equilibrium	 framework	 .	 In	 Melitz’s	 (2003)	 model,	
firms	are	heterogeneous	 in	productivity	and	face	a	 fixed	cost.	Only	firms	with	
productivity	 above	 the	 average	 productivity	 threshold	 level	 are	 able	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 export	 market.	 This	 model	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 firm	
heterogeneity	 and	 sunk	 cost	 as	 determinants	 of	 firms’	 export	 participation	
decisions.		
Chaney	(2005)	extends	Melitz’s	(2003)	model	by	formally	incorporating	
the	 role	 of	 financial	 constraints	 along	 with	 firm	 heterogeneity	 in	 firm	
productivity.	 	 He	 shows	 that	 financial	 constraints	 are	 a	 key	 determinant	 of	
firms’	extensive	margin	of	export	when	firms	are	facing	significant	sunk	cost	to	
participate	in	export	market.	 	Only	those	sufficiently	productive	firms	that	are	
able	to	overcome	financial	constraints	can	export.	The	ability	to	overcome	the	
financial	 constraints	 is	modeled	 as	 endogenously	 determined,	 and	 the	model	
also	 assumes	 that	 firms	 cannot	 borrow	 externally.	 Firms	 finance	 the	 export	
sunk	costs	via	liquidity	inherited	from	the	past	and	cash	flow	generate	from	the	
domestic	 activities.	 Chaney’s	 (2005)	 model	 also	 proposes	 that	 the	 extensive	
margin	 responds	 differently	 to	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuation	 in	 the	 presence	 of	
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financial	 constraints.	 An	 appreciation	 of	 the	 domestic	 currency	may	 improve	
aggregate	export	as	the	value	of	firms’	domestic	assets	abroad	increases	due	to	
the	currency	appreciation,	and	they	are	now	able	to	pledge	more	collateral	 to	
finance	the	sunk	cost	 for	export.	This	would	encourage	more	 firms	to	start	 to	
export,	 which	 could	 compensate	 the	 drop	 in	 exports	 from	 existing	 exporters	
and	achieve	a	net	increase	in	export	at	the	aggregate	level.	Chaney	(2005)	also	
points	out	that	financial	constraints	are	not	related	to	firms’	intensive	margins	
of	 export.	Once	 firm	overcomes	 the	 finance	 obstacle	 of	 export,	 the	 volume	of	
export	is	determined	by	productivity.	
Also	 inspired	by	Melitz	 (2003),	Manova	 (2010)	develops	a	model	with	
credit	constrained	heterogeneous	 firms	to	study	the	variation	of	 international	
trade	 flows	 across	 countries	 and	 sectors	 with	 different	 level	 of	 financial	
development.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Chaney	 (2005)	 who	 focuses	 on	 the	 impact	 of	
internal	 finance	 on	 exports,	 Manova	 (2008)	 assumes	 that	 firms	 can	 finance	
variable	 costs	 internally,	 but	 need	 to	 finance	 the	 export	 fixed	 costs	 by	
borrowing	 externally.	 The	 model	 predicts	 that	 larger	 and	 more	 productive	
firms	are	less	likely	to	be	financially	constrained	and	are	more	likely	to	export.	
Firms	 who	 are	 productive	 enough	 to	 profitably	 export,	 but	 not	 productive	
enough	to	obtain	 the	external	 finance	necessary	 to	 fund	the	export	 fixed	cost,	
will	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 export	market.	 	 By	 extending	 the	 assumption	 that	
firm	now	need	to	finance	both	fixed	costs	and	variable	costs	externally,	Manova	
(2010)	shows	that	financial	constraints	would	also	affect	the	intensive	margin	
of	export	which	is	contrary	to	Chaney	(2005).		Moreover,	the	model	also	shows	
that	 firms	 located	 in	more	 financially	 developed	 countries	 are	more	 likely	 to	
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export,	 export	 at	 a	 greater	 volume,	 and	 export	 to	 more	 trading	 partners.		
Essentially,	credit	constraints	have	significant	impact	to	both	the	intensive	and	
extensive	margin	of	export.	
Muûls	(2008)	combines	the	assumptions	from	both	Chaney	(2005)	and	
Manova	(2010)	by	considering	both	internal	financing	and	external	financing	in	
one	unified	model.	This	allows	a	firm	to	have	three	different	sources	of	funds	to	
finance	 the	 sunk	 cost	 for	 export.	 	 Muûls’s	 (2008)	 model	 makes	 similar	
prediction	to	Manova	(2010),	where	financially	constrained	firms	are	excluded	
from	 participating	 in	 export	 market	 even	 if	 it	 is	 profitable	 to	 export.	
Furthermore,	 financial	 constraints	 also	 prevent	 firms	 from	 serving	 more	
destinations,	even	if	it	is	profitable	to	do	so.	The	model	shows	a	pecking	order	
of	 trade	 where	 financial	 constraints	 force	 firms	 to	 export	 according	 to	 the	
decreasing	order	of	trade	cost	weighted	market	size.	
A	more	recent	theoretical	contribution	from	Li	and	Yu(2009)	introduces	
two	additional	sources	of	heterogeneous	financial	constraints	into	the	Melitz’s	
(2003)	theoretical	model.	They	introduce	a	project	specific	risk	which	creates	
heterogeneity	in	firm’s	borrowing	capability.	They	further	extend	the	model	to	
allow	foreign	invested	enterprises	to	obtain	capital	 from	foreign	parent	 firms.	
Their	 model	 shows	 that	 firms	 with	 a	 higher	 probability	 of	 project	 success,	
easier	access	to	external	financing,	and	additional	external	funding	source	from	
parent	are	more	likely	to	enter	to	the	export	market.			
Despite	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 assumptions	 made	 on	 the	 form	 of	 the	
credit	 constraints	 and	 sources	 of	 external	 funds,	 the	 theoretical	 literature	
points	to	a	consistent	theme,	where	firm	productivity	and	credit	constraints	are	
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the	 main	 determinants	 of	 firm	 export	 behavior.	 As	 firms	 face	 significant	 up	
front	 fixed	 entry	 cost	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 export	market,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	
credit	constraints,	profitable	firms	are	prevented	from	exporting	due	to	lack	of	
funding	 sources	 to	 overcome	 the	 fixed	 cost	 obstacles.	 Credit	 constraints	 will	
also	affects	the	intensive	margins	of	export	when	firms	face	credit	constraints	
in	financing	the	variable	costs,	which	leads	firm	to	export	lower	volumes,	serve	
fewer	destinations,	and	create	a	pecking	order	of	trade.	
	
5.3.2	Empirical	literature	
5.3.2.1	Country	level	and	Sector	level	empirical	evidence	
 
Despite	 the	 theoretical	 advancement	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 financial	
constraints	and	firm	export	behavior,	only	a	handful	of	papers	have	empirically	
examined	the	relationship	due	 lack	of	suitable	 firm	 level	data	sources.	Earlier	
empirical	 studies	 on	 the	 links	 between	 finance	 and	 international	 trade	 are	
based	on	aggregate	data	at	country	level	and	industry	level.	These	studies	use	
the	 level	 of	 financial	 development	 to	 proxy	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	
faced	by	firms.	
Using	30	years	of	country	level	panel	data	for	65	countries,	Beck	(2002)	
studies	the	link	between	the	level	of	financial	development	and	the	structure	of	
international	 trade.	They	provides	 evidence	 that	 financial	development	 is	not	
only	a	statistically	significant	determinants	of	the	trade	of	manufactured	goods	
but	also	economically	significant.	His	 results	show	that	a	10%	 increase	 in	 the	
financial	 development	measurement	 leads	 to	 a	 16%	 increase	 in	 the	 share	 of	
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manufactured	 exports	 in	 GDP43.	 Beck	 (2003)	 uses	 industry	 level	 data	 for	 36	
industries	and	56	countries	over	1980s	 to	 further	reinforce	his	early	 findings	
based	on	country	 level	data.	Adopting	the	 techniques	pioneered	by	Rajan	and	
Zingales	 (1998),	 he	 provides	 evidences	 that	 sectors	 depending	 heavily	 on	
external	 finance	 in	 countries	 with	 better	 financial	 development	 have	 higher	
export	share	in	GDP	and	total	trade	balance.		
More	 recently,	 Manova	 (2010)	 explores	 many	 other	 aspects	 of	
international	trade.	Using	sectorial	data	from	27	sectors	and	107	countries,	she	
shows	the	 level	of	 financial	development	 leads	to	higher	probability	to	export	
and	conditional	on	the	export	status	higher	level	of	financial	development	leads	
to	greater	export	volume.	Consistent	with	Beck’s	 (2003)	 finding,	 these	results	
are	more	pronounced	 in	 sectors	heavily	 depends	 on	 external	 finance	 or	with	
lowers	 level	 of	 collateral.	Moreover,	more	 financially	developed	 countries	 are	
able	to	export	more	types	of	products	and	to	a	larger	number	of	destinations44.	
Her	 results	 also	 show	 that	 export	 starters	 account	 for	 one	 third	 of	 the	 total	
impact	of	 credit	 constraints	on	export	volume,	while	 the	other	 two	 thirds	are	
due	to	adjustments	 in	 firm	level	exports.	This	 indicates	that	 financial	 factor	 is	
an	 important	 determinant	 of	 the	 intensive	 margin	 and	 extensive	 margin	 for	
firms’	export	decisions.	
	
	
                                                 
43 Financial development is defined as credit to the private sector by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP. 
44 This is also known as the pecking order of trade, where firms export to additional destinations in 
decreasing order of market size until they exhaust their financial resources.  
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5.3.2.2	Firm	level	empirical	evidence	
5.3.2.2.1	Firm	level	empirical	evidence:	indirect	test	of	financial	
constraints	and	exports	
 
Campa	 and	 Shaver	 (2002)	 use	 a	 stratified	 representative	 sample	 for	 the	
Spanish	manufacturing	sector	between	1990	and	1998	to	test	the	link	between	
financial	constraints	and	exports.	Under	the	framework	of	investment	cash	flow	
sensitivities	studies	pioneered	by	Fazzari	et	al	(1988),	they	show	that	exporters	
display	a	much	 lower	 fixed	 investment	cash	 flow	sensitivities	 relative	 to	non‐
exporters.	 By	 focusing	 on	 firms	 who	 switch	 exporting	 status,	 they	 find	 that	
firms	 are	 significantly	 less	 constrained	 during	 periods	 in	 which	 they	 are	
exporting	compare	to	the	period	of	not	exporting.	They	further	investigate	the	
role	of	the	intensive	margin	of	export	and	conclude	that	 investment	cash	flow	
sensitivity	 is	only	driven	by	 the	export	status.	The	 intensive	margin	of	export	
has	no	significant	effects	on	firm’s	investment	cash	flow	sensitivity.	This	is	the	
first	paper	that	provides	evidence	that	exporting	is	not	just	an	outcome	of	firm	
characteristics	 and	 external	 environment,	 but	 exporting	 also	 allows	 firms	 to	
overcome	certain	level	of	financial	constraints.		
By	 focusing	 on	 the	 inventory	 investment	 and	 financial	 variables,	
Guariglia	and	Mateut	(2010)	investigates	the	role	of	global	engagement	status	
of	 firms	 and	 their	 financial	 health	with	 a	 large	panel	 of	UK	 firm	 level	 data	 of	
manufacturing	 firms	 between	 1993	 and	 200345.	 In	 this	 study,	 they	 find	 that	
financial	factors	only	affect	the	inventory	investment	of	the	firm‐years	that	do	
not	export	and	conclude	that	exporting	helps	to	alleviate	the	 level	of	 financial	
constraints.	Using	similar	firm	level	data	between	1997	and	2002,	Bridges	and	
                                                 
45 Global engagement status includes export status, and whether the firm is foreign owned. 
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Guariglia	 (2008)	 explore	 the	 links	 between	 global	 engagement	 and	 firm	
survival	 probabilities	 by	 estimating	 a	 Logit	model	 for	 the	 probability	 of	 firm	
failure	 augmented	with	 financial	 variables.	 The	 result	 indicates	 that	 financial	
factors	 such	 as	 collateral	 and	 leverage	 either	 do	 not	 significantly	 affect	 the	
survival	of	firms	that	are	exporting	or	are	foreign	owned,	or	have	only	a	small	
impact	on	 them	 than	on	purely	domestic	owned	 firms.	These	 results	 indicate	
that	 exporting	 helps	 to	 shield	 firms	 from	 financial	 constraints	 and	 increase	
firms’	survival	probabilities.		
The	 findings	describe	above	all	 indicates	 that	exporting	 is	beneficial	 to	
firms	 financially.	 Exporting	 could	 help	 firms	 to	 reduce	 their	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	These	authors	put	forward	three	main	explanations	to	these	effects.	
First,	 exporting	 creates	 a	 diversification	 benefit.	 Assuming	 that	 the	 business	
cycles	are	not	perfectly	related	across	countries,	by	selling	to	multiple	countries	
would	 reduce	 the	 cash	 flow	 volatility	 and	 allow	 firms	 to	 have	 a	more	 stable	
capital	expenditure	path	to	expand	the	firms.	Second,	one	of	the	main	causes	of	
imperfect	capital	market	is	information	asymmetries.	In	general,	only	the	most	
competitive	 firms	 with	 high	 productivity	 are	 able	 to	 export.	 Therefore,	
exporting	has	a	signaling	effect.	Last,	exporting	also	allows	some	exporters	 to	
gain	access	to	international	financial	markets.		
	
5.3.2.2.2	Firm	level	empirical	evidence:	direct	test	of	financial	
constraints	and	exports	
 
	The	three	studies	presented	above	can	only	be	considered	as	an	indirect	test	of	
the	 relationship	 between	 financial	 constraints	 and	 exports.	 They	 don’t	 show	
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how	financially	constraints	affect	the	decisions	to	export	and	its	impact	on	the	
volume	and	 intensity	of	exports.	Greenaway	et	al	 (2007)	 introduce	a	 financial	
dimension	 of	 firm	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 study	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 export	
market	 participation.	 Using	 a	 firm	 level	 panel	 dataset	 for	 UK	 manufacturing	
firms	between	1993	and	2003,	 they	explore	 the	causal	nexus	between	export	
and	financial	health.		They	use	liquidity	ratios	and	leverage	ratios	as	measures	
of	 financial	health.	The	results	 indicate	that	 larger	firms,	 foreign	owned	firms,	
firms	with	subsidiaries,	firms	with	liquidity	and	lower	leverage	are	more	likely	
to	 export.	 In	 their	 results,	 both	 the	 total	 factor	 productivity	 and	 labor	
productivity	are	insignificant	determinants	of	firm’s	decisions	to	export.	This	is	
in	contrast	with	theoretical	prediction	and	other	empirical	studies.	By	dividing	
firms	 into	 continuous	 exporters	 and	 starters,	 they	 find	 that	 the	 positive	
relationship	between	financial	health	and	export	participation	is	only	applied	to	
continuous	 exporters,	 while	 export	 starters	 display	 a	 negative	 relationship	
between	financial	health	and	export	participation.	They	argue	that	this	is	due	to	
starter	 having	 to	 draw	 down	 liquidity	 or	 increase	 borrowing	 to	 pay	 for	 the	
foreign	market	entry	costs.	They	find	no	evidence	that	firms	enjoying	better	ex‐
ante	 financial	health	are	more	 likely	 to	participate	 in	export	market,	but	 they	
find	 strong	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 export	 participation	 enhance	 ex	 –post	
financial	health.	They	conclude	that	the	causality	runs	from	export	participation	
to	financial	health.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	the	indirect	studies	by	Campa	
and	 Shaver	 (2002),	 Guariglia	 and	 Mateut	 (2010)	 and	 Bridges	 and	 Guariglia	
(2008)	 according	 to	 which	 exporting	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	
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Bellone	et	al	(2010)	study	the	relationship	between	financial	constraints	
and	 firm	 export	 behavior	 by	 combining	 the	 EAE	 survey	 and	DIANE	 database	
from	Bureau	van	Dijk	for	the	French	manufacturing	firms	for	the	period	1993‐
2005.	The	introduce	two	financial	constraints	score	indexes	using	the	method	
developed	 by	 Musso	 and	 Schiavo	 (2008)	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 two	 financial	
variables	 used	 by	 Greenaway	 et	 al	 (2007).	 The	 two	 score	 indexes	 exploit	
information	 from	 seven	 variables	 including:	 size,	 profitability,	 liquidity,	 cash	
flow	 generating	 ability,	 solvency,	 trade	 credit	 over	 total	 assets,	 and	 repaying	
ability.	They	argue	these	two	measures	capture	firms’	access	to	finance	better.	
Contrary	to	Greenaway	et	al	(2007),	they	find	firms	starting	to	export	display	a	
significant	 ex	 ante	 financial	 advantage	 compared	 to	 their	 non‐exporting	
counterparts.	 This	 confirms	 the	 idea	 that	 external	 finance	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	 of	 export	 participation.	 They	 further	 show	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	
that	export	participation	leads	to	improvements	in	the	financial	health	of	firms.	
They	 conclude	 that	 exporting	 is	 not	 associated	with	 better	 access	 to	 external	
finance.		
Bellone	 et	al	 (2010)	 also	 estimate	 a	 time	 duration	 model	 for	 firm	 to	
participate	in	the	export	market.		The	result	indicates	financial	constraints	are	
statistically	significant,	but	the	economic	relevance	is	relatively	small	compared	
to	other	variables	such	as	wage,	productivity	and	 firm	size.	Furthermore	 they	
find	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 financial	 health	 and	 export	 intensity	 for	
export	starters.	They	argue	that	export	intensity	can	be	a	proxy	for	the	number	
of	 destinations	 firms	 selling	 to.	 The	negative	 relationship	 indicates	 that	 firms	
need	to	pay	for	large	sunk	cost	to	penetrate	into	new	markets	which	leads	to	a	
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deterioration	of	a	firm’s	financial	health.	This	is	consistent	with	Greenaway	et	al	
(2007)’s	finding	of	a	negative	relationship	between	financial	health	and	export	
participation.		
Muûls	 (2008)	explores	 the	 impact	of	 financial	 factors	on	export	status,	
export	 destinations,	 and	 numbers	 of	 different	 products	 with	 manufacturing	
firms’	 balance	 sheet	 data,	 and	with	 detailed	 trade	 data	 from	Belgium	 for	 the	
period	 between	 1999	 and	 2005.	 She	 uses	 Coface	 score	 supplied	 by	 a	 credit	
insurance	 company	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 financial	 constraints46.	 Consistent	 with	
other	empirical	results,	 there	is	a	negative	relationship	between	export	status	
and	 financial	 constraints.	She	 further	shows	 the	number	of	destinations	 firms	
serve	 and	 total	 exports	 are	 also	 negatively	 related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	 Firms	 with	 better	 financial	 health	 will	 be	 able	 to	 serve	 more	
markets	than	financially	constrained	firms.	However,	the	number	of	product	is	
not	related	to	the	level	of	 financial	constraints.	Muûls	(2008)	further	tests	the	
hypothesis	of	pecking	order	of	trade,	which	predicts	firms	will	choose	to	export	
to	 the	 largest	 and	 closest	 market	 first47.	 The	 results	 confirm	 that	 more	
productive	 and	 less	 financially	 constrained	 firms	will	 export	 to	more	 further	
away	and	smaller	markets.	
Berman	 and	 Héricourt	 (2010)	 construct	 a	 cross‐country	 firm	 level	
dataset	 containing	 5000	 firms	 from	 9	 developing	 and	 emerging	 economies	
between	1998	and	2004	 to	examine	how	 financial	 factors	affect	 firm’s	export	
decisions	 and	 the	 amount	 exported	 by	 firms.	 As	 firms	 from	 developing	
                                                 
46 The Coface score is constructed as a bankruptcy risk measure with information that banks use 
when making lending decision. 
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countries	 and	 emerging	 economies	 are	 more	 financially	 constrained,	 this	
dataset	 is	 particularly	 suitable	 for	 the	 empirical	 study	 related	 to	 financial	
constraints.	 They	 used	 the	 ratio	 of	 total	 debt	 over	 total	 assets	 and	 cash	 flow	
over	total	assets	to	proxy	for	the	level	of	financial	constraints	and	use	the	ratio	
of	private	credit	over	GDP	to	proxy	the	 level	of	 financial	development	of	each	
country.	 The	 result	 indicates	 financial	 constraint	 is	 an	 important	 impact	 on	
firms	 export	 participation	 decision.	 Once	 firms	 become	 exporters,	 financial	
factors	no	longer	have	any	impact	on	the	probability	to	remain	an	exporter	or	
on	 the	 intensity	 margin	 of	 export.	 A	 more	 interesting	 result	 provided	 by	
Berman	 and	 Héricourt	 (2010)	 is	 that	 financial	 constraints	 might	 create	 a	
disconnection	 between	 firms’	 productivity	 and	 export	 participation.	 When	
firms	 are	 financially	 constrained,	 productivity	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 significant	
determinant	 of	 the	 export	 decision.	 The	 importance	 of	 productivity	 will	
increase	 as	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 decrease.	 This	 result	 could	 shed	
some	lights	on	some	earlier	empirical	studies	that	find	no	role	of	productivity	
on	 the	 export	 participation	 decision.	 This	 paper	 also	 provides	 firm	 level	
evidence	 that	 financial	 development	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints,	hence	increasing	the	number	of	firms	participate	in	export	market.	
Zia	(2008)	employs	an	unique	loan‐level	dataset		from	the	textile	sector	
in	Pakistan	between	1998	and	2003.	This	data	allows	him	to	assess	the	impact	
of	an	exogenous	change	of	credit	availability	due	to	the	removal	of	a	subsidized	
export	 credit	 in	 the	 Pakistan	 textile	 sector	 on	 export	 growth.	 He	 finds	 a	
significant	 heterogeneous	 result	 across	 different	 types	 of	 firms.	 Exports	 of	
financially	unconstrained	firms	such	as	large,	public	listed	and	group	affiliated	
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firms	 are	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 subsidize	 export	 credit,	 but	 the	
export	 of	 private	 firms	 are	 significantly	 affected.	 The	 estimated	 reduction	 is	
also	 economically	 significant,	where	 a	 6%	change	 in	 the	market	 lending	base	
due	 to	 the	 removal	of	 subsidy	 leads	 to	 a	29%	reduction	 in	 firm	exports.	This	
result	 reemphasizes	 the	 significant	 impact	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 export	
behavior.	Moreover,	Zia	(2008)	also	find	significant	misallocation	in	subsidized	
export	credit.	This	call	for	a	more	careful	design	of	export	support	policies.	
A	 recent	 study	 by	 Li	 and	 Yu	 (2009)	 use	 a	 large	 panel	 data	 of	 Chinese	
manufacturing	 firms	 for	 the	 period	 2000‐2007	 to	 examine	 the	 impact	 of	
financial	constraints	on	firms’	export	decisions.	They	use	interest	expenditures	
as	an	 index	of	 firms’	capability	 to	obtain	 loans.	The	results	show	that	 interest	
expenditure	is	an	import	determinant	of	the	export	decisions	and	the	intensity	
of	export.	Moreover,	foreign	owned	firms	are	more	likely	to	export	and	export	
higher	volumes	than	domestic	owned	firms.	The	export	decision	and	the	export	
intensity	 of	 foreign	 owned	 firms	 and	 state	 owned	 firms	 are	 less	 sensitive	 to	
interest	expenditures.	They	explain	this	as	the	result	of	easier	access	to	finance	
for	these	types	of	firms.		
In	general,	the	empirical	results	consistently	confirm	the	important	role	
of	financial	factors	on	firms’	export	participation	decisions.	However,	different	
results	 are	 found	 in	 terms	 of	 weather	 there	 are	 ex	ante	 or	 ex	post	 benefit	 of	
financial	health	 for	export	participation.	The	role	of	 financial	 factors	on	 firms’	
export	 intensity	 is	 also	 controversial.	 The	 literature	 suggests	 a	 possible	
interaction	 between	 productivity	 and	 financial	 factors.	 When	 firms	 face	
significant	financial	constraints,	financial	factors	play	a	dominant	role	in	export	
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participation	determination	over	productivity.	As	 the	 financial	health	of	 firms	
improve,	the	role	of	productivity	increases.	
	 In	this	study,	we	use	a	large	firm	level	panel	data	of	manufacturing	firms	
from	China	to	study	the	relationship	between	financial	constraints	and	exports.	
We	 aim	 to	provide	 additional	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
financial	factors	and	exports	in	China.	In	particular,	we	focus	on	the	impacts	of	
financial	 constraints	 on	 the	 extensive	 margin	 of	 exports	 in	 the	 institutional	
context	 of	 China.	 We	 explore	 whether	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	
different	across	different	ownership	groups.		
	
5.4	Data	and	Key	variables	
5.4.1	The	dataset	
 
The	data	used	in	this	study	is	a	large	census	firm‐level	panel	dataset	produced	
by	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China	(NBS).	 It	 is	a	survey	of	 industrial	
firms	 conducted	 by	 NBS	 annually.	 This	 dataset	 includes	 all	 “above	 scale”	
industrial	firms	with	sales	over	RMB	5	million48.	One	unique	advantage	of	this	
dataset	 is	 that	 it	 includes	 all	 the	 state‐owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	 in	 China.		
There	 are	 around	 1,805,803	 observations	 for	 541,436	 firms	 for	 the	 period	
between	2000	and	2007	from	31	provinces	operating	in	49	different	two‐digits	
manufacturing	 industries.	 The	 dataset	 starts	 initially	 with	 149,606	
observations	 in	2000	and	quickly	 increases	 to	327,038	observations	 in	2007.	
This	 increase	 in	coverage	 is	 largely	due	 to	 the	rapid	growth	 in	 firm	sales	and	
firms	becoming	“above	scale”.	 	The	dataset	includes	all	the	key	variables	from	
                                                 
48 This is equivalent to around $750,000 USD at the exchange rate of 1USD=6.6RMB. 
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the	 financial	 statements,	 measures	 of	 output,	 intermediate	 outputs,	 and	
political	 affiliation	 information.	 Furthermore,	 the	 data	 of	 ownership	 share	 is	
also	 included.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 allocate	 firms	 into	 four	 different	 ownership	
groups:	 state	 owned	 enterprise	 (SOEs),	 foreign	 owned	 enterprise	 (FOEs),	
private	 owned	enterprises	 (POEs)	 and	 collective	owned	enterprises	 (COEs)49.	
We	use	 the	same	rules	used	 in	chapter	3	and	chapter	4	 to	classify	ownership	
groups.	Firms	are	allocated	into	one	of	the	four	ownership	groups	based	on	the	
majority	 average	ownership	 share50.	 For	 instance,	 a	 firm	 is	 classified	as	 state	
owned	enterprise,	if	the	state’s	share	of	the	average	paid‐in	capital	of	the	firm	is	
at	 least	 50%.	 The	 average	 ownership	 share	 is	 calculated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
fraction	of	capital	paid	in	by	different	ownership	groups	in	each	year.			
Since	1995,	the	NBS	has	used	this	data	to	compile	the	“Industry”	section	
of	the	China	Statistical	Yearbook.	As	the	data	are	directly	collected	by	NBS,	the	
dataset	 should	 be	more	 reliable	 than	 data	 collected	 by	 local	 governments	 as	
there	 is	 no	 clear	 incentive	 for	 firm	 to	 provide	 false	 information	 (Cai	 and	 Liu	
2009).	Despite	its	reliability,	Cai	and	Liu	(2009)	and	Jefferson	et	al	(2008),	who	
use	 the	 same	dataset	 from	2000	 to	 2005	 to	 study	 tax	 evasion	 incentives	 and	
productivity	 growth	 respectively,	 point	 out	 that	 the	 data	 is	 noisy	 with	 some	
firms	reporting	abnormally	large	or	small	values	for	certain	variables.	
We	clean	the	data	and	reduce	outliers	by	the	following	rules:	1)	the	key	
variables,	such	as	sales,	total	assets,	fixed	assets	cannot	be	missing	or	negative;	
2)	the	variables	for	export	cannot	be	missing;	3)	the	total	assets	must	be	higher	
than	 liquid	 assets;	 4)	 the	 leverage	 ratio	 cannot	 be	 less	 than	 zero;	 5)	we	 also	
                                                 
49 They are also known as mixed-ownership firms or joint stock companies. 
50 See Dollar and Wei( 2007) and  Guariglia and Liu (2010) for similar approach. 
246 
 
delete	the	observations	in	the	0.5	percentile	tails	of	each	regression	variables	to	
control	for	outliers	 in	the	regression.	This	allows	us	to	eliminate	observations	
that	might	be	 involved	 in	 large	mergers,	 coding	 errors,	 and	 special	 shocks	 to	
the	firms.	Moreover,	we	also	delete	observations	with	fewer	than	10	employees.	
This	 is	 because	 very	 small	 firms	 are	 typically	more	 likely	 to	 create	 errors	 in	
their	reported	financial	information.	Levinsohn	and	Petrin	(2003)	use	a	similar	
criterion	in	their	study	of	Chilean	plants	where	they	include	only	firms	with	at	
least	 10	workers.	 Using	 a	 similar	 dataset,	 Jefferson	 et	al	(2008)exclude	 firms	
with	fewer	than	8	employees	in	their	study	of	productivity	growth	in	China.		
After	 following	 these	 strict	 criteria	 to	 clean	 the	 data,	 we	 have	 an	
unbalanced	panel	data	with	1,755,477	observations	for	531,700	firms	spanning	
between	2000	and	2007.	The	details	of	the	unbalanced	panel	are	presented	in	
appendix	 5A3.	 The	 number	 of	 firms	 included	 in	 the	 data	 each	 year	 increases	
steadily	over	the	study	period	from	144,502	firms	in	2000	to	318,341	firms	in	
2007.	 	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 a	 large	 number	 of	 new	 firms	 in	 the	 data.	
According	to	table	5A3.1	in	the	appendix,	57.91%	of	the	firms	included	in	our	
database	have	less	than	3	observations.	
	
5.4.2	Trends	in	Export	at	firm	level	data	in	China	
 
27.04%	of	observations	have	positive	exports	 in	our	cleaned	sample	between	
2000	and	2007.	The	percentage	of	exporter	is	relatively	low	compared	to	those	
studies	based	on	developed	countries.	In	Bellone	et	al	(2010)	and	Greenaway	et	
al	(2007),	 the	number	of	observations	 that	are	exporter	 is	well	above	50%	in	
France	and	UK	respectively.		
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In	 order	 to	 have	 a	 glance	 of	 the	 export	 status	 of	 Chinese	 firms	 in	 our	
sample	we	differentiate	 the	export	 status	 into	 four	categories:	1)	Starters	are	
firms	that	did	not	export	in	last	period	(t‐1),	but	export	in	the	current	period	(t);	
2)	 Continuous	 exporters	 are	 firms	 that	 exporting	 in	 current	 and	 all	 previous	
periods;	3)	Leavers	are	firms	that	exported	in	the	previous	periods	but	stopped	
exporting;	4)	Non‐exporters.	
The	percentage	of	firms	in	different	categories	for	the	full	sample	of	each	
year	 between	 2001	 and	 2007	 is	 presented	 in	 table	 5.1a.	 Due	 to	 the	 fact	 the	
sample	starts	 from	2000,	we	report	 the	results	 from	year	2001	onwards.	The	
number	 of	 starter	 increases	 steadily	 from	 8.96%	 in	 2001	 to	 a	 peak	 level	 of	
15.47%	in	the	2004,	and	declines	to	5.22%	in	2007.	This	is	consistent	with	the	
idea	 that	 China’s	 entry	 to	 WTO	 has	 encouraged	 firms	 to	 start	 exporting.	
However,	 there	 is	 a	 large	 number	 firms	 (70.29%)	 have	 never	 export	 in	 the	
study	period	
Table	 5.1b‐5.1e	 reports	 the	 detailed	 export	 status	 for	 each	 of	 our	 four	
ownership	 groups.	 We	 find	 striking	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 export	 status	 and	
export	transition	dynamics	across	ownership	groups.	The	number	of	firms	that	
start	to	export	is	significantly	lower	for	state	owned	enterprises	and	collective	
owned	enterprises	than	for	private	owned	firms	and	foreign	owned	firms.	Only	
4.91%	of	the	state‐owned	firm	years	and	4.05%	of	collectively	owned	firms	are	
classified	 as	 starter,	 while	 starter	 observations	 for	 foreign	 firms	 and	 private	
firms	accounted	 for	20.39%	and	8.21%	respectively.	A	 large	number	of	 firms	
start	 to	 export	 in	 year	 2004	 and	 2005,	 the	 corresponding	 percentage	 for	
starters	for	SOEs,	POEs,	Privately	owned	firms	and	foreign	owned	firms	in	2004	
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are	 4.25%,	 4.8%,	 12.54%	 and	 34.42%	 respectively.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	
lagged	effects	of	China’s	entry	to	WTO	in	late	200151.		Foreign	owned	firms	have	
the	 highest	 number	 of	 continuous	 exporters.	 State	 owned	 enterprise	 and	
collective	owned	enterprises	have	the	 lowest	amount	of	continuous	exporters	
with	 8.02%	 and	 7.73%	 respectively	 compared	 to	 47.19%	 for	 foreign	 owned	
firms.	 The	 percentage	 of	 continuous	 exporters	 for	 privately	 owned	 firms	 is	
13.04%.	 This	 result	 indicates	 that	 foreign	 owned	 firms	 are	 more	 export	
oriented	and	set	up	with	the	objective	to	export.	
Moreover,	 there	 are	 around	 84%	 of	 firm‐years	 of	 state	 owned	
enterprises	never	export.	Collectively	owned	enterprises	and	privately	owned	
firms	also	display	high	percentage	of	firm‐years	that	never	export	with	84.67%	
and	76.15%,	 respectively.	Yet,	 the	percentage	of	 firm‐years	 that	never	 export	
for	foreign	owned	enterprises	is	only	28.46%.	
Table	5.1f	presents	 the	aggregate	export	 status	 for	 the	 full	 sample	and	
each	of	 the	 four	ownership	groups.	Expdum	is	a	dummy	equal	 to	1	 if	 the	 firm	
reports	 a	 positive	 amount	 of	 exports	 in	 the	 year	 t	 and	 equal	 zero	 if	 the	 firm	
reports	 no	 export	 in	 the	 given	 year.	 There	 are	 27.04%	 of	 firm‐years	 are	
exporter	between	2000	and	2007	 in	our	sample.	Consistent	with	our	analysis	
above,	foreign	owned	firms	have	the	highest	number	of	firm	years	classified	as	
exporters.	67.59%	of	foreign	owned	firm	years	are	exporters,	compare	to	only	
12.94	 %	 and	 13.57%	 for	 state	 owned	 enterprise	 and	 collective	 owned	
enterprises.	The	percentage	of	exporting	firm‐years	for	privately	owned	firms	
is	21.25%.	Table	2f	also	shows	a	steady	increase	of	the	percentage	of	exporters	
                                                 
51 It typically take two to three years for China to start the actual sales in the international market, this 
could explain why the number of firms start to export peaked in 2004. 
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between	2000	and	2005,	but	the	percentage	of	firm	years	classified	as	exporter	
start	to	decline	from	2006	for	all	ownership	groups,	except	for	SOEs.	
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Year	 Starter	 Continuous	Exporter	 Exit	 Never export  Total	
2001	 8.96	 17.03	 2.18	 71.84	 100.00	
2002	 7.81	 19.07	 2.37	 70.75	 100.00	
2003	 7.85	 19.77	 2.07	 70.32	 100.00	
2004	 15.47	 14.39	 1.74	 68.9	 100.00	
2005	 7.51	 21.56	 4.70	 66.23	 100.00	
2006	 6.17	 21.23	 2.80	 69.8	 100.00	
2007	 5.22	 19.14	 3.62	 72.06	 100.00	
Total	 9.61	 17.43	 2.67	 70.29	 100.00	
Table	5.1a:	Export	status	for	the	full	sample.		All	numbers	reported	are	percentage.	
Year	 Starter	 Continuous	Exporter	 Exit	 Never	export	 Total	
2001	 2.58	 9.04 1.89 86.47	 100
2002	 2.49	 9.25 1.93 86.33	 100
2003	 2.14	 10.68 1.72 85.46	 100
2004	 4.25	 8.49 1.97 85.29	 100
2005	 5.2	 11.01 2.39 81.4	 100
2006	 2.67	 13.13 2.5 81.71	 100
2007	 2.37	 13.59 3.94 80.1	 100
Total	 4.91	 8.02 1.69 85.38	 100
Table	 5.1b:	 Export	 status	 for	 State	 owned	 firms	 (SOEs).	 All	 numbers	 reported	 are	
percentage.	
Year	 Starter	 Continuous	Exporter	 Exit	 Never	export	 Total	
2001	 18.63	 49.2	 4.1	 28.07	 100	
2002	 15.53	 51.64	 4.4	 28.44	 100	
2003	 16.89	 50.46	 3.06	 29.5	 100	
2004	 34.42	 38.49	 2.1	 24.99	 100	
2005	 9.49	 57.52	 8.18	 24.81	 100	
2006	 11.89	 54.37	 4.12	 29.62	 100	
2007	 12.43	 52.41	 3.55	 31.62	 100	
Total	 20.39	 47.19	 3.96	 28.46	 100	
Table	5.1c:	Export	status	for	Foreign	owned	firms	(FOEs).	All	numbers	reported	are	
percentage	
	
251 
 
	 Starter	 Continuous	Exporter	 Exit	 Never	export	 Total	
2001	 9.91	 12.72	 1.8	 75.57	 100	
2002	 8.22	 14.98	 2.07	 74.37	 100	
2003	 7.52	 15.08	 1.95	 75.45	 100	
2004	 12.54	 10.05	 1.61	 75.8	 100	
2005	 7.27	 15.3	 4.23	 73.2	 100	
2006	 5.38	 15.5	 2.57	 76.55	 100	
2007	 4.1	 13.29	 3.58	 79.03	 100	
Total	 8.21	 13.04	 2.6	 76.15	 100	
Table	5.1d:	Export	status	for	Private	owned	firms	(POEs).	All	numbers	reported	are	
percentage.	
	
	 Starter	 Continuous	Exporter	 Exit	 Never	export	 Total	
2001	 4.05	 10.16	 1.72	 84.07	 100	
2002	 3.38	 10.63	 1.91	 84.08	 100	
2003	 2.53	 10.89	 1.58	 84.99	 100	
2004	 4.8	 7.16	 1.89	 86.15	 100	
2005	 6.82	 8.52	 2.56	 82.1	 100	
2006	 2.25	 10.24	 2.5	 85.01	 100	
2007	 1.42	 7.66	 3.58	 87.34	 100	
Total	 5.84	 7.73	 1.76	 84.67	 100	
Table	5.1e:	Export	status	 for	Collective	owned	 firms	 (COEs).	All	numbers	 reported	
are	percentage.	
	
Full	Sample	 SOEs	 FOEs	 POEs	 COEs	
Year	 Expdum=0	
Expdu
m=1	
Expdu
m=0	
Expdu
m=1	
Expdu
m=0	
Expdu
m=1	
Expdu
m=0	
Expdu
m=1	
Expdu
m=0	
Expdu
m=1	
2000	 74.83	 25.17	 88.09	 11.91	 31.98	 68.02	 77.32	 22.68	 84.36	 15.64	
2001	 74.01	 25.99	 88.37	 11.63	 32.17	 67.83	 77.36	 22.64	 85.79	 14.21	
2002	 73.12	 26.88	 88.26	 11.74	 32.83	 67.17	 76.8	 23.2	 85.98	 14.02	
2003	 72.39	 27.61	 87.18	 12.82	 32.56	 67.44	 77.4	 22.6	 86.58	 13.42	
2004	 70.64	 29.36	 87.27	 12.73	 27.09	 72.91	 77.41	 22.59	 88.04	 11.96	
2005	 70.93	 29.07	 83.79	 16.21	 32.98	 67.02	 77.43	 22.57	 84.66	 15.34	
2006	 72.6	 27.4	 84.2	 15.8	 33.74	 66.26	 79.12	 20.88	 87.51	 12.49	
2007	 75.68	 24.32	 84.05	 15.95	 35.16	 64.84	 82.61	 17.39	 90.92	 9.08	
Total	 72.96	 27.04	 87.06	 12.94	 32.41	 67.59	 78.75	 21.25	 86.43	 13.57	
Table	5.1f:	Export	and	Non‐Export	 for	 full	sample	and	different	ownerships.	All	
numbers	reported	are	percentage.	
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5.4.3	Key	Empirical	variables:	
5.4.3.1	Measures	of	financial	constraints	
 
In	 the	 empirical	 literature	 a	 number	 of	 different	 financial	 ratios	 are	 used	 to	
proxy	for	the	 level	of	 financial	constraints.	 In	this	paper,	we	use	two	different	
financial	 variables	widely	 used	 in	 previous	 studies,	 to	 conduct	 our	 empirical	
analysis.	This	makes	our	results	more	comparable	with	previous	studies.	After	
controlling	for	all	other	important	factors,	if	financial	factors	are	still	important	
determinants	 of	 export	 decisions,	 then	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 financial	
constraints	are	an	important	determinant	of	export	decisions.		
The	first	measure	of	financial	constraints	is	leverage,	which	is	defined	as	
the	ratio	of	total	debt	over	total	assets.	Leverage	ratios	is	used	by	Bridges	and	
Guariglia	(2008),	Greenaway	et	al	(2007),	Bellone	et	al	(2010)	and	Berman	and	
Héricourt	 (2010)	 to	 study	 the	 relationship	 between	 financial	 constraint	 and	
export	decision.	Leverage	ratio	generally	turns	out	to	be	a	significant	impact	of	
export	 decisions.	 There	 are	 two	 main	 interpretations	 for	 the	 leverage	 ratio.	
First,	 it	 is	 a	measure	of	 firms’	 indebtedness.	A	high	 leverage	 ratio	 indicates	 a	
firm	 has	 taken	 up	 too	 much	 debt,	 therefore	 the	 firm	 has	 limited	 amount	 of	
assets	 to	 pledge	 as	 collateral	 for	 extra	 external	 finance.	A	 high	 leverage	 ratio	
reflects	a	deterioration	of	the	firm’s	balance	sheet;	increasing	the	possibility	of	
moral	hazard	and	adverse	selection	problems.	This	would	prevent	 firms	 from	
obtaining	the	finance	needed	for	exporting.		Therefore,	leverage	is	expected	to	
be	negatively	related	to	export	participation.	Firms	with	high	leverage	are	less	
likely	to	start	exporting	as	they	are	unable	to	obtain	enough	external	finance	to	
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overcome	 the	 fixed	 costs	 of	 export.	 Second,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 China,	 a	 high	
leverage	 could	 indicate	 firm’s	 ability	 to	 obtain	 finance.	 Due	 to	 the	 significant	
lending	 bias	 and	 less	 developed	 financial	 market,	 firms	 with	 high	 leverage	
could	have	superior	ability	to	obtain	external	finance	to	overcome	the	fixed	cost	
hurdle	of	export.	If	this	is	the	case,	export	decisions	and	leverage	ratio	would	be	
positively	 related.	 Therefore,	 the	 true	 relationship	 should	 be	 revealed	 by	 the	
empirical	analysis.	
The	second	measure	of	financial	constraints	is	the	liquidity	ratio,	which	
is	 defined	 as	 the	 differences	 of	 the	 firm’s	 total	 current	 assets	 and	 current	
liabilities	over	 total	assets.	 In	general,	 liquidity	 ratio	 is	a	measure	of	 financial	
health.	 Firms	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 liquid	 assets	 are	 considered	 less	 risky	 by	
creditors	 and	 lenders,	 because	 the	 liquid	 assets	 provides	 additional	 buffer	 to	
the	 creditors	 and	 lenders.	 	 A	 higher	 liquidity	 ratio	 indicates	 the	 firm	 is	 in	 a	
better	financial	health;	hence	less	likely	to	be	financially	constrained.	They	will	
have	 easier	 access	 to	 short	 terms	 finance.	We	 expect	 export	 decisions	 to	 be	
positively	related	to	the	liquidity	ratio.	Firms	in	better	financial	health	are	more	
likely	to	be	able	to	have	enough	funds	to	pay	for	the	sunk	costs	of	export.		This	
ratio	is	also	the	main	financial	ratio	used	by	Greenaway	et	al	(2007),	Bellone	et	
al	(2010).	 They	 found	 consistent	 evidence	 that	 export	 is	 positively	 related	 to	
liquidity	for	firms	in	the	UK	and	France.	
	
5.4.3.2	Measures	of	productivity	
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As	 discussed	 in	 section	 two,	 from	 a	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view,	 only	 the	most	
productive	 firms	 would	 self‐select	 themselves	 into	 the	 export	 markets.	 The	
literatures	argues	that	a	high	productivity	level	allows	firms	to	overcome	sunk	
costs	and	start	to	export	(see	Clerides	et	al	(1998)	and	Melitz	(2003)).	Bernard	
and	 Jensen	 (1999)	 use	 both	 a	 labor	 productivity	measure	 and	 a	 Total	 Factor	
Productivity	 (TFP)	 measure	 show	 that	 there	 is	 significant	 difference	 in	
productivity	 between	 exporters	 and	 non‐exporters.	 They	 further	 argue	 that	
productivity	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 firms’	 export	 participation	 decisions.	
Bernard	 and	 Jensen	 (2004)	 provide	 further	 evidence	 supporting	 similar	
conclusions.	 These	 studies	 indicate	 that	 productivity	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	 of	 export	 decisions.	 Therefore,	 properly	 controlling	 for	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 productivity	 is	 crucial	 for	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	
financial	factors	on	exports.		
Following	 Bernard	 and	 Jensen	 (1999),	 our	 study	 uses	 both	 labor	
productivity	 and	 total	 factor	 productivity	 calculated	 using	 the	 Levinsohn	 and	
Petrin	(2003)	method	as	key	control	measures	of	productivity	for	the	analysis.	
The	 labor	 productivity	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 ratio	 of	 real	 sales	 to	 number	 of	
employees,	where	sales	 is	deflated	by	the	provincial	 level	GDP	deflator.	Labor	
productivity	 is	 used	 in	Bernard	and	 Jensen	 (1999)and	Berman	and	Héricourt	
(2010)	as	the	main	control	variable	for	productivity.	
The	standard	approach	of	estimating	the	TFP	(total	factor	productivity)	
is	 by	 estimating	 a	 production	 function	 and	 generating	 predicted	 output	 from	
the	estimation.	The	 residual	of	 the	 actual	 and	predicted	output	 is	 retained	as	
the	 measure	 of	 firm	 level	 total	 factor	 productivity.	 However,	 traditional	
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methods	 of	 estimation	 such	 as	 OLS	 suffer	 from	 a	 number	 of	 methodological	
issues	 such	 as	 simultaneity	 or	 endogeneity	 problems,	 where	 firms	 input	
decisions	may	be	closely	related	to	its	level	of	productivity	and	so	is	the	product	
choice	(Ilke	Van	2007).		Olley	and	Pakes	(1996)and	Levinsohn	and	Petrin	(2003)	
propose	 to	 use	 a	 semiparametric	 estimator	with	 investment	 or	 intermediate	
inputs	 as	 proxy	 variables	 to	 substitute	 for	 unobserved	 productivity	 in	 the	
estimation	of	production	function	in	their	study	to	address	the	endogeneity	and	
selection	bias	problems.	Essentially,	Olley	and	Pakes	(1996)	and	Levinsohn	and	
Petrin	 (2003)	 approaches	 are	 similar	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 choice	 for	
proxies.	Olley	and	Pakes	(1996)	approach	relies	on	positive	investment	in	the	
estimation,	 observations	 with	 negative	 level	 of	 investment	 will	 be	 dropped	
from	 the	estimation	 causing	 significant	 reduction	 in	 the	estimation	efficiency,	
while	 Levinsohn	 and	 Petrin’s	 (2003)	 approach	 only	 requires	 the	 presence	 of	
positive	 level	 of	 intermediate	 inputs.	 About	 25%	 of	 firm	 observations	 in	 our	
dataset	 have	 a	 negative	 level	 of	 investment,	 which	 indicate	 that	 Olley	 and	
Pakes’s	 (1996)	approach	 is	not	a	suitable	estimator	of	TFP	 for	 this	study.	We	
therefore	 estimate	 TFP	 using	 the	 Levinsohn	 and	 Petrin	 (2003)	 approach	 for	
each	 of	 the	 10	 2‐digit	 industries	 independently	 to	 allow	 for	 technological	
heterogeneity	across	different	 industry	sectors.	This	produces	consistent	 firm	
level	TFP	measures	for	the	empirical	analysis52.		
	
5.4.3.3	Other	Control	Variables	
 
                                                 
52 A brief illustration of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach of TFP estimation is provided in 
the appendix 5B of this chapter. 
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As	 suggest	 by	 the	 trade	 literatures	 firms’	 export	 decisions	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
determined	 by	 a	 number	 of	 other	 factors.	 Bernard	 and	 Jensen	 (2004)	 and	
Greenaway	 and	 Kneller	 (2007)	 show	 that	 exporters	 are	 generally	 more	
productive,	bigger	in	total	assets,	have	more	employees,	older	and	more	capital	
intensive.	Moreover,	firms	with	foreign	ownership,	firms	with	subsidiaries	and	
part	 of	 a	 business	 group	 or	 consortium	 are	more	 likely	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
export	markets.	We	 include	 the	 natural	 log	 of	 the	 number	 of	 employees	 as	 a	
control	for	firm	size.	Capital	intensity	is	controlled	for	by	the	ratio	of	real	fixed	
assets	to	number	of	employees.		The	empirical	literature	shows	that	firms	with	
high	 capital	 intensity	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 export.	 Age	 is	 also	 included	 as	 an	
control	 variables,	 as	 older	 firms	 have	 higher	 learning	 ability	 and	 more	
established	structure	helps	them	to	compete	in	the	global	market	place.	
Due	to	the	Chinese	 institutional	setting	and	the	political	pecking	order,	
we	also	include	ownership	dummies	to	control	for	ownership	status.	Firms	are	
classified	into	state	owned	enterprise	(SOEs),	foreign	owned	enterprise	(FOEs),	
private	 owned	 enterprises	 (POEs)	 and	 collective	 owned	 enterprises	 (COEs).	
The	classification	is	based	on	the	average	share	of	paid	in	capital,	e.g.	if	50%	of	
a	 firm’s	 average	 share	 is	 owned	 by	 foreigner	 then	 the	 firm	 is	 classified	 as	
foreign	owned.	The	same	rules	apply	to	the	other	three	ownership	groups.	As	
the	 average	 share	 of	 paid	 in	 capital	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 firm	 ownership,	 firm	
ownership	types	do	not	vary	over	the	time.	The	ownership	types	for	firms	are	
fixed	for	the	sample	period.	
Furthermore,	 earlier	 studies	 indicate	 that	 regions	 in	 China	 have	
significant	differences	in	terms	of	 infrastructure,	 institutions,	 level	of	 financial	
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developments	 and	 special	 policy.	We	generate	 geographical	 dummy	variables	
to	indicate	which	region	the	firm	locates	in.	We	divide	firms	into	three	regions:	
the	 coastal	 regions,	 the	 central	 regions	 and	 the	 west	 region53.	 Last,	 we	 also	
include	industrial	sector	dummies	to	control	for	sectorial	fixed	effects.	Annual	
time	dummies	are	also	included	as	a	control	for	common	trends	and	business	
cycle	effects	faced	by	firms.	
	
5.4.4	Descriptive	statistics	
 
Table	5.2a‐5.2b	presents	descriptive	statistics	for	the	key	regression	variables	
used	 in	 our	 empirical	 study,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 some	 variables	 related	 to	 firm	
characteristics.	 We	 report	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 each	 of	 the	 four	
ownership	 groups	 and	 the	 full	 sample	 in	 table	 5.2a.	 In	 table.5.2b,	we	 further	
differentiating	firms	between	exporters	and	non‐exporters.	Expdum	equals	to	1	
if	a	firm	exports,	and	equal	to	0	otherwise.	Column	(3),	(6),	(9)	and	(12)	of	table	
5.2b	reports	 the	p‐values	of	 the	 test	 statistics	 for	 the	equality	of	 the	means	of	
each	variable	between	exporters	and	non‐exporters.		
	 Column	 (1)	 of	 table	 5.2a	 reports	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 full	
samples.	 An	 average	 firm	 in	 our	 sample	 has	 real	 annual	 total	 sales	 of	 79.3	
million	yuan	RMB,	and	real	total	assets	of	72.9	million	yuan	RMB.	The	average	
number	of	employees	for	the	full	sample	is	271	and	the	average	age	of	firms	is	
8.9.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	Chinese	firms	are	still	relatively	young	compared	
to	firms	in	other	studies	based	on	developed	countries,	the	average	age	for	UK	
firms	 in	 their	 sample	 is	 27.7	 years	 old,	 e.g.	 in	Greenaway	(2007).	 The	 export	
                                                 
53 The details of allocation of provinces into the three regions are provided in the appendix 5A2. 
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ratio,	which	is	defined	as	the	total	exports	divided	by	total	sales,	is	only	17.5%	
for	the	full	sample.	The	cash	flow	to	total	assets	ratio	is	9.62%.	The	return	on	
assets,	which	is	defined	as	net	income	divided	by	total	assets,	is	only	6.4%	for	
the	full	sample.	
	 Column	(2)‐(5)	of	table	5.2a	reports	the	descriptive	statistics	across	the	
four	ownership	groups.	The	state	owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	and	foreign	owned	
enterprises	 (FOEs)	 are	much	 larger	 than	 privately	 owned	 enterprises	 (POEs)	
and	 collectively	 owned	 enterprises	 (COEs)	 in	 terms	 of	 real	 sales,	 real	 total	
assets	and	the	number	of	employees.	Moreover,	SOEs	and	COEs	are	much	older	
than	POEs	and	FOEs.	The	corresponding	age	for	SOEs,	FOEs,	POEs	and	COEs	are	
25.62,	 6.627,	 6.884	 and	 14.74.	 	 The	 export	 ratio,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	 total	
exports	divided	by	 total	sales,	 is	 the	highest	 for	FOEs	with	50.2%.	The	export	
ratio	 for	 SOEs,	 POEs	 and	 COEs	 are	 6.56%,	 12.7%	 and	 8.15%.	 These	 results	
reflect	that	FOEs	are	more	export	oriented,	while	SOEs	and	COEs	are	less	export	
oriented.		
	 Mover	 to	measures	of	 financial	health,	 table	5.2a	 shows	 that	SOEs	and	
COEs	have	much	higher	leverage	ratio	than	FOEs	and	POEs.	The	liquidity	ratio	
is	negative	 for	SOEs	of	 ‐0.0795,	while	 the	 liquidity	 ratios	 for	FOEs,	POEs,	 and	
COEs	 are	 0.146,	 0.0552	 and	 0.068.	 Furthermore,	 SOEs	 have	 the	 lowest	 cash	
flow	ratio	and	return	assets	compare	to	other	ownership	groups.		
	 Table	5.2b	differentiating	firms	into	exporters	and	non‐exporters	across	
the	four	ownership	groups	and	compare	their	firm	characteristics.	The	results	
indicate	 that	 exporters	 are	 much	 larger	 than	 non‐exporters	 across	 all	
ownership	 groups.	 For	 example,	 for	 SOEs,	 the	 real	 total	 sales	 and	 real	 total	
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assets	 of	 exporters	 are	 about	 10	 times	 higher	 than	 non‐exporters.	Moreover,	
exporters	 tend	 to	 employ	more	 employees	 than	non‐exporters.	 Exporters	 are	
also	older	 than	their	counter	part.	Based	on	TFP	calculated	by	Levinsohn	and	
Petrin	 (2003)	 methods,	 exporters	 are	 more	 productive	 than	 non‐exporters	
across	all	ownership	groups.	This	result	is	consistent	with	the	trade	literature,	
which	 suggests	 that	 only	 the	most	 productive	 firms’	 export.	 Yet,	 the	 patterns	
are	 less	 clear	 cut	 for	 labour	productivity	measure,	where	 for	FOEs,	POEs	and	
COEs	exporters	are	less	productive	than	non‐exporters.		
	 In	 terms	 of	 financial	 measures,	 the	 POEs’	 and	 COEs’	 exporters	 have	
higher	 leverage	 ratios	 than	 non‐exporters,	while	 FOEs’	 exporters	 have	 lower	
leverage	 ratios.	 The	 mean	 leverage	 is	 not	 statistically	 different	 between	
exporters	 and	 non‐exporters	 for	 SOEs.	 Table	 5.2b	 further	 indicates	 that	
exporters	 of	 POEs	 and	 COEs	 have	 lower	 liquidity	 ratios	 than	 non‐exporters,	
while	 exporters	 of	 SOEs	 and	 FOEs	 are	 in	 better	 liquidity	 position	 than	 non‐
exporters.	Last,	exporters	appear	to	have	 lower	cash	 flow	ratio	and	return	on	
assets	 than	non‐exporters	 for	FOEs,	POEs,	 and	COEs,	while	exporters	of	 SOEs	
have	higher	cash	flow	ratio	and	return	on	assets	than	non‐exporters.		
	 The	p‐value	of	the	tests,	of	the	equality	of	mean	between	exporters	and	
non‐exporters	 for	 each	 variable,	 suggests	 that	 exporters	 and	 non‐exporters’	
characteristics	are	significantly	different.	 In	next	section,	we	will	 formally	test	
the	relationship	between	financial	factors	and	firms’	export	status.	
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Full sample  SOEs  FOEs  POEs  COEs 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Real sales  79276.8  158641.3  136422.4  58816.4  43098.4 
(1192395.3)  (1886189.2)  (1569826.6)  (1049514.4)  (314779.8) 
Real assets  72979.1  240806.0  102741.9  48988.7  32818.9 
(665740.9)  (1852151.1)  (481886.1)  (408372.0)  (207076.1) 
Number of employee  271.1  753.8  351.5  200.5  227.6 
(1331.9)  (4018.1)  (946.9)  (715.8)  (569.4) 
Age  8.907  25.62  6.627  6.884  14.74 
(10.51)  (17.62)  (4.294)  (8.278)  (11.49) 
Capital Intensity  89.09  107.5  140.9  78.31  57.19 
(269.4)  (261.8)  (409.4)  (225.2)  (114.1) 
Ln(employee)  4.758  5.187  5.123  4.614  4.786 
(1.111)  (1.499)  (1.134)  (1.024)  (1.035) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  6.262  5.350  6.637  6.318  5.925 
(1.396)  (2.085)  (1.368)  (1.226)  (1.513) 
Ln(Laboru Productivity)  5.127  3.979  5.339  5.245  4.887 
(1.141)  (1.478)  (1.118)  (1.005)  (1.175) 
Export Ratio  0.175  0.0656  0.502  0.127  0.0815 
(2.096)  (7.026)  (0.634)  (0.934)  (0.323) 
Leverage  0.577  0.706  0.498  0.575  0.608 
(0.283)  (0.329)  (0.269)  (0.271)  (0.295) 
Liquidity  0.0594  ‐0.0795  0.146  0.0552  0.0680 
(0.302)  (0.335)  (0.292)  (0.291)  (0.314) 
Collateral  34.86  42.64  30.82  35.01  34.04 
(22.27)  (23.12)  (22.31)  (21.95)  (22.14) 
Cash flow/Assets  0.0962  0.0253  0.0871  0.106  0.107 
(0.145)  (0.0906)  (0.128)  (0.149)  (0.165) 
Return on Assets  0.0644  0.000433  0.0499  0.0738  0.0780 
(0.137)  (0.0803)  (0.123)  (0.140)  (0.157) 
Number of Observations  1755463  132434  255053  1162270  141660 
Table	5.2a:	Descriptive	statistics.	This	table	reports	the	sample	mean	and	standard	deviations	
(in	bracket)	for	different	ownership	groups.	Real	sales,	real	assets	are	total	sales	and	total	assets	deflated	
by	provincial	 level	GDP	deflator.	 They	 are	 in	 1,000s	 of	yuan	RMB.	Age	 is	 the	number	 of	 years	 firm	has	
established.	Capital	intensity	is	defined	as	real	fixed	assets	divided	by	number	of	employees.	Ln(employee)	
is	 the	 natural	 log	 of	 number	 of	 employees.	 Ln(TFP)‐LP	 is	 the	 natural	 log	 of	 total	 factor	 productivity	
calculated	using	Levinsohn	&	Petrin	(2003)	method.	Ln(Labour	productivity)	is	the	natural	log	of	labour	
productivity.	Export	ratio	is	defined	as	total	exports/total	sales.	Leverage	is	defined	as	total	debt	divided	
by	total	assets.	Liquidity	is	defined	as	(current	assets‐current	liabilities)/total	assets.	Collateral	is	defined	
as	 tangible	 fixed	assets/total	assets.	Collateral	 is	 reported	 in	percentage.	Cash	 flow/Assets	 is	defined	as	
cash	flow	over	total	assets.		
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SOEs  FOEs  POEs 
Expdum=0  Expdum=1  Diff  Expdum=0  Expdum=1  Diff  Expdum=0  Expdum=1 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Real sales  73587.1  731150.7  0.00  94157.4  156693.3  0.00  44412.0  112185.2 
(709701.7)  (4872320.1)  (2093735.8)  (1241993.6)  (1074829.3)  (947955.4) 
Real assets  121416.5  1044430.6  0.00  79448.7  113913.7  0.00  34125.0  104059.2 
(854621.0)  (4567752.1)  (270365.1)  (555107.9)  (194221.2)  (800648.1) 
Number of employee  482.1  2583.1  0.00  201.4  423.5  0.00  156.0  365.5 
(2745.6)  (8380.9)  (484.4)  (1094.6)  (437.5)  (1291.1) 
Age  25.11  29.17  0.00  5.884  6.982  0.00  6.591  8.021 
(17.11)  (20.44)  (4.207)  (4.290)  (7.868)  (9.619) 
Capital Intensity  103.1  137.2  0.00  185.2  119.6  0.00  81.77  65.52 
(257.1)  (289.6)  (533.2)  (332.0)  (237.9)  (169.5) 
Ln(employee)  4.983  6.557  0.00  4.699  5.327  0.00  4.482  5.105 
(1.381)  (1.537)  (1.032)  (1.124)  (0.960)  (1.099) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  5.132  6.766  0.00  6.569  6.670  0.00  6.263  6.520 
(2.017)  (1.966)  (1.368)  (1.367)  (1.222)  (1.216) 
Ln(Labour Productivity)  3.884  4.621  0.00  5.568  5.229  0.00  5.274  5.137 
(1.488)  (1.235)  (1.124)  (1.099)  (1.025)  (0.921) 
Export Ratio  0  0.507  0.00  0  0.743  0.00  0  0.596 
(0)  (19.53)  (0)  (0.645)  (0)  (1.956) 
Leverage  0.707  0.700  0.20  0.501  0.496  0.0012  0.567  0.606 
(0.335)  (0.282)  (0.272)  (0.268)  (0.277)  (0.246) 
Liquidity  ‐0.0844  ‐0.0465  0.00  0.139  0.150  0.00  0.0569  0.0489 
(0.342)  (0.283)  (0.303)  (0.287)  (0.295)  (0.275) 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Collateral  43.31  38.10  0.00  31.56  30.46  0.00  36.22  30.53  0.00  34.36  31.98  0.00 
(23.65)  (18.59)  (28.06)  (18.94)  (22.63)  (18.56)  (22.49)  (19.64) 
Cash flow/Assets  0.0247  0.0289  0.00  0.0914  0.0850  0.00  0.109  0.0944  0.00  0.109  0.0945  0.00 
(0.0929)  (0.0732)  (0.135)  (0.124)  (0.154)  (0.130)  (0.167)  (0.154) 
Return on Assets  ‐0.0000205  0.00348  0.00  0.0563  0.0468  0.00  0.0761  0.0652  0.00  0.0799  0.0658  0.00 
(0.0824)  (0.0645)  (0.129)  (0.119)  (0.144)  (0.124)  (0.159)  (0.145) 
Number of 
Observations  115304  17130    82675  172378    915243  247027    122442  19218   
	
Table	5.2b:	Descriptive	statistics:	exporters	v.s.	non‐exporters.	This	table	reports	the	sample	mean	and	standard	deviations	(in	bracket)	for	different	ownership	
groups.	Real	sales,	real	assets	are	total	sales	and	total	assets	deflated	by	provincial	level	GDP	deflator.	They	are	in	1,000s	of	yuan	RMB.	Age	is	the	number	of	years	firm	has	established.	
Capital	intensity	is	defined	as	real	fixed	assets	divided	by	number	of	employees.	Ln(employee)	is	the	natural	log	of	number	of	employees.	Ln(TFP)‐LP	is	the	natural	log	of	total	factor	
productivity	calculated	using	Levinsohn	&	Petrin	(2003)	method.	Ln(Labour	productivity)	is	the	natural	log	of	labour	productivity.	Export	ratio	is	defined	as	total	exports/total	sales.	
Leverage	is	defined	as	total	debt	divided	by	total	assets.	Liquidity	is	defined	as	(current	assets‐current	liabilities)/total	assets.	Collateral	is	defined	as	tangible	fixed	assets/total	assets.	
Collateral	is	reported	in	percentage.	Cash	flow/Assets	is	defined	as	cash	flow	over	total	assets.	Diff:	is	the	p‐value	of	the	test	statistics	for	the	equality	of	the	means	of	each	variable	
between	exporter	and	non‐exporter.	Expdum=1	if	the	firm	exports,	Expdum=0	otherwise.		
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5.5	Empirical	models	and	Results	
5.5.1	Extensive	Margin	of	Export:	baseline	specification	
 
The	firm’s	empirical	model	that	we	estimate	focused	on	testing	the	 influences	
of	different	financial	factors	on	firms’	decision	to	export.	Given	the	richness	of	
the	 panel	 dataset,	 we	 utilize	 both	 the	 cross‐sectional	 and	 the	 time‐series	
dimension	of	the	dataset	with	a	focus	on	how	firm	heterogeneity	affects	firms	
export	decision.	We	not	only	want	to	examine	the	impact	of	financial	factors	on	
firms	 export	 decisions,	 but	 also	 explore	 whether	 financial	 factors	 have	 a	
differential	impact	on	the	export	decisions	due	to	different	firm	characteristics	
such	 as	 ownership	 status,	 location	of	 the	 firms	 and	different	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation.	
Closely,	following	the	works	by	Roberts	and	Tybout	(1997),	Bernard	and	
Wagner	(2001)	and	Greenaway	(2007),	we	test	the	relationship	between	export	
participation	and	financial	factors	with	a	reduced	form	model	of	the	following	
type:	
	
       , 0 2 3 4, -1 , -1 , -1 , -1
5 ,
,( 1) /
  
/i t i t i t i t i t
i t
i tExpdum b b Size b TFP b Liquidity Leverage
b Control industry dummies time dummies
LP

   
    						(1)	
	
Expdum	is	a	dummy	variable	equals	to	1	 if	 firm	 i	exports	 in	year	t,	and	
equals	 to	 0	 otherwise.	 Size	 is	measured	 by	 the	 natural	 log	 of	 the	 number	 of	
employees.	In	general,	larger	firms	tend	to	have	a	higher	probability	to	export.	
TFP	and	LP	are	respectively	the	natural	log	of	total	factor	productivities	and	the	
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natural	 log	 of	 labour	 productivities.54.	 	 We	 expect	 productivity	 is	 positively	
related	to	export	decisions.	Liquidity	and	Leverage	are	the	measures	of	financial	
health	of	firms.	They	are	the	focus	of	our	empirical	analysis.	We	expect	liquidity	
is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 extensive	 margins	 of	 exports,	 while	 leverage	 is	
negatively	related	to	the	extensive	margins	of	exports.		
Control	 is	 a	 vector	 of	 control	 variables	 including	 ownership,	 region,	
capital	intensity,	wage	rate.	We	expect	foreign	ownership	dummy	has	a	positive	
impact	 on	 firms’	 export	 decisions,	 while	 state	 and	 collective	 owned	 firms	
dummy	 have	 negative	 impact	 on	 firms’	 export	 decisions.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	
expected	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 western	 region	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 export.	
Therefore	we	 expect	dummy	variables	 for	 this	 region	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	
export	 decisions,	 while	 the	 coastal	 and	 central	 regions	 dummy	 variables	 are	
positively	 related	 to	 the	 export	 decisions.	 Capital	 intensity	 reflects	 the	
sophistication	of	the	exporting	products.	It	is	commonly	accepted	that	exports	
in	 China	 are	 more	 labour	 intensive.	 Therefore,	 we	 expect	 capital	 intensity	
would	 be	 negatively	 related	 to	 export	 decisions.	 	Moreover,	we	 expect	 firms’	
age	is	positively	related	to	export	decisions,	as	older	firms	are	typically	larger,	
with	longer	track	record	and	more	likely	to	export.	We	include	different	sets	of	
control	 variables	 in	 our	 empirical	 regressions	 to	 test	 the	 robustness	 and	
consistency	 of	 our	 empirical	 results.	 	 We	 also	 include	 industry	 dummies	 to	
control	sectorial	fixed	effects.	The	annual	time	dummies	are	included	to	control	
for	the	business	cycle	effects.		
                                                 
54 The details of TFP and LP are discussed in section 5.4.3.2. 
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Using	 contemporaneous	 variables	 in	 cross‐sectional	 estimation	 could	
create	an	endogeneity	problem	that	leads	to	inconsistent	results.	Therefore,	all	
the	explanatory	variables,	 except	 the	 time	 invariant	variables,	 in	equation	 (1)	
are	 lagged	once	 (see	Roberts	and	Tybout	 (1997),	Bernard	and	Wagner	 (2001),	
Bernard	 and	 Jensen	 (1999,	 2004),	 Greenaway	 et	 al	 (2007)	 for	 a	 similar	
approach).	 Since	 the	 export	 decision	 is	 a	 long	 term	 decision,	 planning	 and	
implementing	the	decision	takes	time.	 	The	 lagged	 independent	variables	also	
allow	for	a	time	lag	between	the	financial	health,	firm	characteristics,	and	firms’	
export	decisions.	All	the	variables	in	equation	(1)	are	measured	in	logs,	except	
dummy	variables.	
  Essentially,	equation	(1)	is	a	probability	response	model	with	the	export	
status	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable.	We	want	 to	 determine	 how	 the	 probability	
P(Expdum=1)	is	related	to	different	firm	characteristics	and	financial	variables.	
		
5.5.2	Empirical	results	on	Extensive	Margin	of	Export	for	full	sample	
 
In	this	section	we	present	our	regression	results	for	our	baseline	specification.	
We	estimate	 the	baseline	 specifications	with	 the	pooled	probit	 estimator	 and	
random	effects	probit	estimator	for	two	reasons.	First,	this	exercise	allows	us	to	
experiment	with	two	estimators	for	our	study,	which	we	subsequently	able	to	
choose	 one	 of	 them	 as	 our	 main	 regression	 method	 to	 further	 conduct	 our	
empirical	study.	Second,	it	also	provides	us	a	robustness	test	for	our	results.	 	
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	 Equation	(1)	is	first	estimated	with	a	pooled	probit	estimator	for	the	full	
sample.	 The	 estimates	 of	 equation	 (1)	 with	 liquidity	 as	 measure	 of	 financial	
constraints	are	reported	in	table	5.3.	The	pooled	probit	estimator	is	corrected	
for	 clustering	 at	 firm	 level.	 This	 allows	 the	 observations	 to	 be	 independent	
between	 firms,	 but	with	 the	possibility	 of	 being	 interdependent	within	 firms.	
Column	 (1)	and	 (2)	are	 the	benchmark	 regressions	with	 control	variables	 for	
size,	ownership	and	productivity,	time	dummies	and	industry	dummies	only.	As	
productivity	has	been	identified	as	one	of	the	most	important	determinants	for	
export,	 we	 use	 two	 different	 measures	 of	 productivity,	 namely	 labour	
productivity	and	total	factor	productivity,	to	test	the	robustness	of	our	results.	
We	also	control	for	ownership	with	ownership	dummies	for	state,	foreign	and	
collective	ownership.	The	private	ownership	dummy	 is	 the	omitted	 reference	
group.	 	The	results	in	column	(1)	and	column	(2)	of	table	5.3	indicate	the	size	
control	 variable	 is	 positive	 and	 highly	 significant.	 This	 indicates	 that	 larger	
firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 export	 than	 smaller	 firms.	 The	 coefficients	 on	
ownership	dummies	suggest	that	foreign	owned	firms	are	much	more	likely	to	
export	than	private	owned	firms.	This	reflects	the	export	oriented	objectives	of	
foreign	 firms.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 coefficients	 for	 state	 and	 collective	
dummies	are	negative	and	significant,	which	suggests	that	these	firms	are	more	
inward	oriented	and	are	less	likely	to	participate	in	the	export	markets.	Base	on	
the	size	of	the	coefficient,	state	owned	firms	are	least	likely	to	participate	in	the	
export	markets.	The	labour	productivity	and	total	factor	productivity	calculated	
using	Levinsohn	&	Petrin’s	(2003)	method	are	both	positive	and	significant	in	
column	(1)	and	(2)	respectively.	The	liquidity	ratios,	the	focus	of	this	study,	are	
both	positive	and	highly	significant.		
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	 The	specifications	of	column	(3)	and	column	(4)	in	table	5.3	include	two	
additional	 control	 variables:	 coastal	 region	 and	 central	 region.	 These	 two	
variables	are	dummy	variables	that	indicate	firms’	geographical	locations.	The	
western	 region	 is	 the	 omitted	 group.	 We	 consider	 these	 control	 variables	
capturing	 a	 number	 of	 effects.	 First,	 they	 are	 measures	 of	 trade	 distance	 to	
ports.	 Leamer	 and	 Levinsohn	 (1995)	 suggests	 that	 distance	 between	 regions	
are	an	important	determinants	of	the	size	of	trade	between	regions.	The	coastal	
region	 is	 closer	 to	ports	and	enjoys	better	 logistic	 services	and	 infrastructure	
than	 the	 central	 and	 western	 region.	 Therefore,	 firms	 in	 coastal	 region	 are	
facing	lower	trading	costs	and	are	more	likely	to	export.	Second,	a	large	number	
of	policies	to	promote	 international	trade,	 initiated	by	the	governments,	 focus	
heavily	towards	firms	located	in	the	coastal	region,	e.g.	setting	up	special	area	
zones,	 tax	 reduction,	 special	 policies	 to	 attract	 FDI	 etc.	 Last,	 coastal	 regions	
enjoy	 better	 financial	 development	 and	 higher	 income	 than	 the	 other	 two	
regions.	 These	 all	 suggests	 that	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 coastal	 region	 are	more	
likely	to	export	than	the	inland	regions.	It	 is	 important	for	us	to	take	this	 into	
consideration.	 The	 results	 in	 column	 (3)	 and	 (4)	 of	 table	 5.3	 confirmed	 our	
predictions,	 where	 coastal	 regions	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 export	 follow	 by	 the	
central	regions.	The	west	regions	are	least	 likely	to	export.	After	adding	these	
two	additional	control	variables,	the	magnitude	and	sign	of	all	the	other	control	
variables	display	little	change,	except	for	productivities.	The	magnitudes	of	the	
productivities	are	half	of	those	from	column	(1)	and	(2),	and	the	coefficient	on	
total	 factor	productivity	 is	 now	negative.	This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	prediction	
that	more	productive	firms	are	more	likely	to	export.	Similar	results	is	found	in	
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Bellone,	Musso	et	al	(2010)	and	Greenaway	et	al	(2007)55.	However,	the	labour	
productivity	 measures	 continue	 to	 be	 positive	 and	 highly	 significant.	 The	
coefficients	for	 liquidity	ratio	are	still	positive	significant	with	a	10%	increase	
in	magnitude.	
Last,	 in	 column	 (5)	 and	 (6)	 of	 table	 5.3	we	 include	 additional	 control	
variables:	 the	natural	 log	of	 the	wage	ratio	(Ln	(W/L)),	 the	natural	 log	of	 firm	
age	(Ln	(Age))	and	the	natural	log	of	the	capital	to	labour	ratio	(Ln	(K/L)).		The	
wage	 ratio	 captures	 two	 main	 effects.	 First,	 it	 provides	 a	 measure	 of	
productivity,	 firms	with	 higher	 labour	 productivity	 tend	 to	 have	 higher	wage	
per	 employee.	 Second,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 reflection	 of	 production	 costs,	 this	 is	
particular	relevant	for	China’s	context.	Exporters	in	China	are	mainly	involved	
in	labour	intensive	industry.	Higher	wage	per	labour	suggests	a	high	production	
cost.	Yet,	the	wage	ratio	is	positive	and	insignificant	in	the	regressions.		
The	age	of	firm	reflects	firm’s	experience	in	markets.	Firms	with	longer	
history	 have	 better	 knowledge,	 distribution	 channels,	 and	 easier	 access	 to	
finance.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 older	 firms	 are	more	 likely	 to	 export.	 The	 results	
suggest	that	age	is	positively	related	to	export,	but	its	magnitude	is	very	small	
relative	to	other	factors.	The	capital	per	labour	(Ln(K/L))	coefficient	is	negative	
and	 significant.	 This	 suggests	 less	 capital	 intensive	 firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
export,	which	 is	 consistent	with	Chinese	 special	 case.	China	 is	 abundant	with	
low	cost	labour	force,	early	FDI	operate	in	China	to	take	advantages	of	China’s	
labour	 resources	 and	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 labour	 intensive	 industries.	 Given	 the	
three	 additional	 control	 variables,	 the	 liquidity	 ratios	 is	 still	 positive	 and	
                                                 
55 The total factor productivity is negative, but insignificant in Greenaway (2007). The total factor is 
negative and significant in Bellone et al (2010) ‘s dynamic RE probit specification.  
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significant,	which	 suggests	 that	 firms	with	 higher	 liquidity	 are	more	 likely	 to	
export	in	the	future	period.		
Table	5.4	reports	the	pooled	probit	regression	results	with	leverage	as	a	
measure	of	financial	constraints.	A	similar	approach	to	the	liquidity	measure	is	
adapted	 for	 leverage.	 Column	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 of	 table	 5.4	 presents	 the	 baseline	
model	with	leverage.	The	size	variables	are	positive	and	highly	significant.	Both	
of	 the	 productivity	 measures	 are	 significant	 with	 the	 expected	 signs.	 The	
coefficients	 of	 leverage	 ratios	 are	 negative	 and	 highly	 significant.	 The	 results	
are	 consistent	with	 the	 theoretical	prediction	 that	more	 financial	 constrained	
firms	are	less	likely	to	export.	By	adding	the	regional	controls	in	column	(3)	and	
(4),	 we	 find	 similar	 results	 to	 the	 liquidity	 regression	 in	 table	 5.3,	 the	
magnitudes	 of	 the	 coefficients	 for	 productivity	 and	 leverage	 decrease.	 The	
regional	 dummies	 confirm	 the	 early	 finding	 that	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 coastal	
region	 are	more	 likely	 to	 export.	 Last,	 older	 firms	 and	more	 labour	 intensive	
firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 export.	 The	 results	 remain	 largely	 unchanged	 with	
additional	 controls	 in	 column	 (5)	 and	 column	 (6).	 In	 sum,	 the	 pooled	 probit	
analysis	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 suggests	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 connection	 between	
financial	factors	and	export	decisions.	The	results	are	consistent	and	robust	to	
those	of	various	specifications	with	different	controls.	
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(employee)  0.336***  0.319***  0.353***  0.351***  0.347***  0.350*** 
(0.00241)  (0.00254)  (0.00245)  (0.00260)  (0.00287)  (0.00305) 
Foreign Owned  1.055***  1.055***  0.981***  0.973***  0.992***  0.982*** 
(0.00680)  (0.00685)  (0.00687)  (0.00693)  (0.00755)  (0.00762) 
State Owned  ‐0.531***  ‐0.549***  ‐0.440***  ‐0.445***  ‐0.472***  ‐0.479*** 
(0.0118)  (0.0119)  (0.0120)  (0.0122)  (0.0156)  (0.0158) 
Collective Owned  ‐0.398***  ‐0.407***  ‐0.395***  ‐0.400***  ‐0.404***  ‐0.408*** 
(0.0105)  (0.0106)  (0.0106)  (0.0107)  (0.0130)  (0.0132) 
Labour Productivity  0.0552***  0.0246***  0.0196*** 
(0.00238)  (0.00243)  (0.00289) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.00919***  ‐0.00495*  ‐0.0127*** 
(0.00209)  (0.00212)  (0.00240) 
Liquidity  0.112***  0.121***  0.124***  0.133***  0.114***  0.128*** 
(0.00736)  (0.00747)  (0.00741)  (0.00752)  (0.00856)  (0.00864) 
Coastal Region  0.684***  0.695***  0.698***  0.709*** 
(0.0106)  (0.0107)  (0.0124)  (0.0124) 
Central Region  0.294***  0.297***  0.322***  0.326*** 
(0.0116)  (0.0117)  (0.0136)  (0.0137) 
Ln(W/L)  0.0000501  0.0000549 
(0.0000444)  (0.0000500) 
Ln(Age)  0.000890**  0.00101** 
(0.000331)  (0.000334) 
Ln(K/L)  ‐0.0000647***  ‐0.0000387** 
(0.0000150)  (0.0000131) 
                    
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1172867  1140821  1172867  1140821  870923  846241 
Pseudo R‐squared  0.199  0.194  0.215  0.211  0.222  0.218 
Table	5.3	Pooled	probit	model	with	liquidity	as	measure	of	financial	constraints	
for	the	 full	sample.	Dependent	variable	is	binary	variable	Expdum,	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	firm	levels	
and	reported	 in	parenthesis.	 *,**,***,	denote	significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	 level.	State	owned,	 foreign	owned	and	
collective	 owned	 are	 dummy	 variables	 for	 ownership.	 Coastal	 region	 and	 Central	 region	 are	 geographical	 dummy	
variables.	Private	owned	firms	and	western	region	are	the	omitted	reference	groups.				
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(employee)  0.340***  0.320***  0.354***  0.348***  0.348***  0.347*** 
(0.00242)  (0.00253)  (0.00246)  (0.00259)  (0.00166)  (0.00188) 
Foreign Owned  1.054***  1.055***  0.986***  0.980***  0.998***  0.990*** 
(0.00679)  (0.00684)  (0.00686)  (0.00692)  (0.00416)  (0.00424) 
State Owned  ‐0.513***  ‐0.529***  ‐0.432***  ‐0.435***  ‐0.466***  ‐0.472*** 
(0.0119)  (0.0120)  (0.0121)  (0.0122)  (0.00829)  (0.00844) 
Collective Owned  ‐0.392***  ‐0.400***  ‐0.390***  ‐0.395***  ‐0.400***  ‐0.404*** 
(0.0105)  (0.0106)  (0.0106)  (0.0107)  (0.00715)  (0.00726) 
Labour 
Productivity  0.0572***    0.0279***    0.0227***   
(0.00239)  (0.00244)  (0.00178) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.0133***  0.000814  ‐0.00695*** 
(0.00208)  (0.00211)  (0.00166) 
Leverage  ‐0.526***  ‐0.525***  ‐0.362***  ‐0.358***  ‐0.352***  ‐0.356*** 
(0.0203)  (0.0205)  (0.0204)  (0.0205)  (0.0161)  (0.0163) 
Coastal Region  0.676***  0.686***  0.690***  0.701*** 
(0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.00662)  (0.00669) 
Central Region  0.299***  0.301***  0.327***  0.331*** 
(0.0117)  (0.0117)  (0.00762)  (0.00772) 
Ln(W/L)  0.0000497  0.0000544 
(0.0000449)  (0.0000503) 
Ln(Age)  0.00112***  0.00125*** 
(0.000174)  (0.000176) 
Ln(K/L)  ‐0.0000654***  ‐0.0000406*** 
(0.00000949)  (0.00000838) 
                    
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1168892  1137038  1168892  1137038  868291  843743 
Pseudo R‐squared  0.200  0.195  0.214  0.211  0.222  0.218 
Table	5.4	Pooled	probit	model	with	leverage	as	measure	of	financial	constraints	
for	 the	 full	 sample.	Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	 variable	Expdum,	 where	Expdum=1if	 firm	 is	 exporter,	 =0	
otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	firm	levels	and	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	significance	at	1%,	
5%,	and	10%	level.		
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The	results	from	table	4.1	and	4.2	are	estimated	with	pooled	probit	with	
standard	 error	 correcting	 for	 clustering	 at	 firm	 level.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	
control	 for	 unobserved	 heterogeneity.	 If	 unobserved	 heterogeneities	 are	
correlated	 with	 the	 regressors,	 the	 pooled	 probit	 might	 not	 yield	 consistent	
result.	 Greenaway	 et	 al	 (2007)	 points	 out	 that	 unobserved	 heterogeneities	
typically	 occur	 due	 to	 unobserved	 firm‐specific	 effects	 such	 as	 managerial	
ability,	 product	 characteristics,	 technology,	 foreign	 experience,	 which	 are	
important	 in	 firms’	 export	 decisions.	 	 Hence,	we	 further	 test	 the	 relationship	
between	financial	constraints	and	export	decision	with	a	Random‐effects	probit	
estimator,	which	controls	for	unobserved	heterogeneity	into	account.		
Table	 5.5	 reports	 the	 random‐effects	 probit	 result	 for	 the	 full	 sample.	
The	results	 in	general	echo	those	of	 the	pooled	probit	regression.	Column	(1)	
and	 Column	 (2)	 reports	 the	 results	 for	 specification	 with	 liquidity	 ratio	 as	
measure	of	financial	constraints.	The	liquidity	ratio	coefficients	are	positive	and	
precisely	 determined.	 The	 total	 factor	 productivity	 coefficients	 are	 no	 longer	
negative.	 It	 is	 now	 positive	 and	 precisely	 determined	 as	 expected.	 This	 is	
possibly	due	to	controlling	for	unobserved	heterogeneity	by	using	the	random‐
effects	probit	estimator.	The	rest	of	the	results	from	column	(1)	and	column	(2)	
from	table	5.5	are	largely	unchanged	compared	to	column	(5)	and	column	(6)	
from	table	5.3.		
Column	(3)	and	column	(4)	of	table	5.5	report	the	results	with	leverage	
ratio	as	measure	of	 financial	constraints.	Again,	 leverage	ratio	coefficients	are	
negative	 and	 precisely	 determined.	 The	 total	 factor	 productivity	 measure	 is	
significant	with	expected	sign.	In	sum,	the	random‐effects	probit	model	results	
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are	consistent	with	those	estimated	with	pooled	probit	model.	It	shows	that	the	
cross‐sectional	 estimates	did	not	overestimate	 the	 impact	of	 financial	 factors.	
The	 evidences	 consistently	 indicate	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	
firms’	 financial	health	and	 its	 export	decisions.	 Firms	with	higher	 liquidity	or	
lower	leverage	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	the	export	market.	
Given	 the	 fact	 that	 under	 the	 random‐effects	 probit	 model	 estimation	
the	 coefficients	 for	 total	 factor	 productivity	 have	 the	 correct	 signs,	while	 the	
coefficients	 for	 total	 factor	 productivity	 have	 the	 wrong	 signs	 under	 pooled	
probit	model.	 The	 random‐effect	model	 is	 the	preferred	model	 for	 our	 study.		
Therefore,	from	the	next	section	onwards,	we	will	estimate	all	our	subsamples	
with	random‐effect	probit	model.	
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(employee)  0.718***  0.685***  0.718***  0.683*** 
(0.00587)  (0.00610)  (0.00586)  (0.00606) 
Foreign Owned  2.799***  2.805***  2.804***  2.814*** 
(0.0192)  (0.0196)  (0.0192)  (0.0196) 
State Owned  ‐1.148***  ‐1.208***  ‐1.156***  ‐1.216*** 
(0.0372)  (0.0381)  (0.0372)  (0.0377) 
Collective Owned  ‐0.982***  ‐0.977***  ‐0.981***  ‐0.975*** 
(0.0302)  (0.0306)  (0.0297)  (0.0304) 
Labour 
Productivity  0.0976***    0.0992***   
(0.00523)  (0.00522) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.0205***  0.0242*** 
(0.00430)  (0.00426) 
Liquidity  0.105***  0.119*** 
(0.0150)  (0.0154) 
Leverage  ‐0.357***  ‐0.369*** 
(0.0410)  (0.0419) 
Coastal Region  1.835***  1.857***  1.828***  1.849*** 
(0.0276)  (0.0284)  (0.0275)  (0.0285) 
Central Region  1.030***  1.030***  1.035***  1.035*** 
(0.0302)  (0.0311)  (0.0303)  (0.0313) 
Ln(W/L)  0.0000226  0.0000241  0.0000217  0.0000233 
(0.0000161)  (0.0000159)  (0.0000161)  (0.0000160) 
Ln(Age)  0.00861***  0.00922***  0.00898***  0.00959*** 
(0.000762)  (0.000775)  (0.000757)  (0.000758) 
Ln(K/L)  0.0000279  0.0000705***  0.0000266  0.0000690*** 
(0.0000171)  (0.0000159)  (0.0000169)  (0.0000163) 
              
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  870923  846241  868291  843743 
Rho  0.861  0.862  0.861  0.862 
Table	 5.5	 Random‐effects	 probit	 model	 with	 liquidity/leverage	 as	
measures	 of	 financial	 constraints	 for	 full	 sample.	 Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	
variable	 Expdum,	 where	 Expdum=1if	 firm	 is	 exporter,	 =0	 otherwise.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 reported	 in	
parenthesis.	 *,**,***,	 denote	 significance	 at	 1%,	 5%,	 and	 10%	 level.	 State	 owned,	 foreign	 owned	 and	
collective	 owned	 are	 dummy	 variables	 for	 ownership.	 Coastal	 region	 and	 Central	 region	 are	 geographical	
dummy	variables.	Private	owned	firms	and	western	region	are	the	omitted	reference	group.				
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5.5.3	Heterogeneous	effect	across	ownership	
 
One	of	the	most	noticeable	institutional	arrangements	of	Chinese	economy	is	its	
firm	 ownership	 structure.	 In	 the	 early	 years,	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 was	
dominated	 entirely	 by	 state	 owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs).	 	 Every	 industry	 was	
supervised	 by	 agencies	 of	 the	 central	 government.	 The	 transformation	 of	
ownership	 structure	 was	 initiated	 by	 a	 gradual	 decentralization	 which	 took	
place	by	shifting	responsibilities	from	the	central	government	and	agencies	to	
local	 governments.	 The	 central	 government	 subsequently	 opened	 consumer	
markets	and	 industrial	markets	 for	competition.	The	opening	of	markets	gave	
incentives	 to	 set	 up	 private	 owned	 enterprises	 (POEs)	 to	 compete	with	 state	
owned	enterprises.	Compare	 to	other	 transition	economies,	China	 is	a	 special	
case,	where	the	rise	of	the	private	sector	is	not	only	a	result	of	privatization	of	
state	 owned	 firms,	 but	 also	 of	 newly	 setup	 private	 businesses.	Moreover	 the	
export	 oriented	 FDI	 policy	 has	 brought	 foreign	 ownership	 into	 the	 Chinese	
economy.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 is	 now	 dominated	 by	 four	major	
ownership	groups:	state	owned	enterprises,	foreign	owned	enterprises,	private	
owned	enterprises,	and	collectively	owned	enterprise.		
These	 different	 ownership	 groups	 receive	 very	 different	 treatments	 in	
terms	 of	 access	 to	 finance,	 special	 policies	 and	 law	 status.	 The	 state	 owned	
enterprises	 typically	 face	 soft	 budget	 constraints.	 They	 are	 the	 main	
beneficiaries	of	China’s	state	dominated	banking	system.		Until	1998,	the	state‐
owned	 commercial	 banks	 were	 instructed	 not	 to	 lend	 to	 private	 enterprise.	
There	is	a	significant	lending	bias	against	private	firms	(Allen	et	al.	2005).	This	
prevents	 private	 owned	 enterprises,	 now	 the	 engine	 of	 growth	 of	 China’s	
276 
 
economy,	to	have	access	to	finance	from	the	formal	banking	system.	Moreover,	
private	firms’	property	rights	were	not	formally	recognized	until	the	passing	of	
the	 new	 property	 Law	 in	 2007.	 Hence,	 the	 private	 owned	 enterprises	 are	
considered	 the	 most	 financial	 constrained	 firms	 in	 Chinese	 economy	 (e.g.	
(Guariglia	et	al.	2010)).	Huang	(2003)	argues	that	this	lending	bias	gave	rise	to	
a	large	inflow	of	export‐oriented	FDI	in	China.	The	rapid	rise	in	FDI	was	further	
fueled	 by	 China’s	 policy	 of	 attracting	 FDI	 through	 special	 treatments	 and	
favorable	policies	 towards	 the	 foreign	 investors.	The	collectively	owned	 firms	
are	 typically	owned	by	 communities	 in	urban	or	 rural	 areas	and	managed	by	
local	 governments.	 As	 partly	 state‐controlled	 and	 managed	 by	 local	
governments,	 the	COEs	 receive	 favorable	 treatments	 from	 local	 governments.			
Given	 these	 social,	 political	 and	 financial	 factors,	 we	 expect	 to	 observe	
heterogeneous	 responses	 of	 export	 decisions	 among	 the	 four	 different	
ownership	 groups.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 investigate	 each	 ownership	 group	
separately.		
We	 expect	 that	 state	 owned	 enterprises’	 and	 collective	 owned	
enterprises’	export	decisions	are	affected	 least	by	 financial	 constraints	due	 to	
the	lending	bias,	while	the	private	owned	enterprises	are	affected	most	due	to	
the	 continuous	 lending	 bias	 in	 China’s	 banking	 system.	 Foreign	 owned	
enterprises	 fall	 between	 the	 two	 extremes.	 Foreign	 owned	 enterprises	 are	
expected	to	be	less	financially	constrained,	because	they	can	obtain	funds	from	
their	parent	companies.	
Table	5.6	 reports	 the	 results	of	 random‐effect	probit	model	estimation	
of	the	export	decision	for	each	ownership	group	separately	with	liquidity	as	a	
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measure	 of	 financial	 constraints.	 All	 the	 control	 variables	 are	 the	 same	 as	 in	
table	5.5	except	we	now	exclude	 the	ownership	dummies.	The	coefficients	on	
the	size	control	variable,	(the	natural	 log	of	number	of	employees)	are	always	
positive	 and	 significant	 across	 all	 ownership	 groups.	 This	 confirms	 that	 firm	
size	is	one	of	the	most	important	determinants	of	export	decisions.	This	is	likely	
due	to	larger	firms	being	more	likely	to	achieve	the	economies	of	scale	to	make	
export	 worthwhile	 for	 their	 operation.	 The	 coefficients	 on	 wage	 are	 positive	
and	significant	for	all	ownership	groups,	except	for	privately	owned	firms.	Age	
is	significant	for	foreign	owned	enterprises	and	private	owned	enterprises,	and	
is	significant	for	SOEs	in	column	(1)	of	table	5.5.	The	capital	intensity	measure	
is	 only	 important	 for	 SOEs,	 which	 could	 possibly	 indicate	 that	 state‐owned	
firms	 tend	 to	 compete	 in	 capital	 intensive	 sectors	 overseas.	 The	 regional	
dummies	 continue	 to	 be	 positive	 and	 significant:	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 coastal	
regions	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 export.	 The	 central	 region	 dummy	 appears	 to	 be	
negative	but	insignificant	for	foreign	owned	enterprises.	This	is	consistent	with	
FDI’s	 uneven	 regional	 distribution	 in	 China,	 where	 the	majority	 of	 FDI	 were	
concentrated	 in	 the	coastal	region	(Wei	2003)	due	 to	early	policy	restrictions	
(Du	 and	 Girma	 2007).	 Productivity	 coefficients	 for	 both	 measures	 of	
productivity	 are	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	 SOEs,	 POEs	 and	 COEs.	 Yet,	 the	
coefficients	of	productivity	are	negative	and	significant	for	foreign	owned	firms	
in	column	(2)	and	(6)	of	 table	5.6.	The	most	striking	result	 is	 that	 liquidity	 is	
only	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	 privately	 owned	 enterprises	 as	 reported	 in	
column	(3)	and	(7)	of	 table	5.6.	Liquidity	 is	only	 important	 in	 the	 total	 factor	
productivity	 specification	 for	 state	 owned	 enterprises	 and	 insignificant	 for	
foreign	 firms	 and	 collective	 owned	 enterprises.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	
278 
 
expectation,	 where	 private	 owned	 enterprise	 is	 the	 most	 financially	
constrained	groups,	and	there	is	a	heterogeneous	response	to	financial	factors	
across	ownership	groups.	
Table	5.7	presents	the	random	effect	probit	regression	with	leverage	as	
measure	of	financial	constraints	across	the	four	ownership	groups.	Column	(1)‐
(4)	 of	 table	 5.7	 use	 labour	 productivity	 measure	 as	 control	 for	 productivity,	
while	 column	 (5)‐(8)	 of	 table	 5.7	 use	 total	 factor	 productivity	 as	 control	 for	
productivity.	 The	 coefficients	 for	 size,	 wage,	 age,	 capital	 intensity,	
productivities	and	regional	dummies	are	almost	 identical	 to	those	reported	in	
table	 5.6.	 The	 coefficients	 for	 leverage	 are	 negative	 but	 insignificant	 for	 both	
the	 state	 owned	 enterprise	 group	 and	 collective	 owned	 enterprise	 group	
(column	(1),	(4),	(5)	and	(8)	in	table	5.7).		The	leverage	coefficients	are	negative	
and	significant	at	1%	level	for	POEs	as	expected.	Moreover,	the	coefficients	for	
leverage	 appear	 to	 be	 significant	 at	 10%	 level	 in	 the	 labour	 productivity	
specification	 and	 significant	 at	 5%	 level	 in	 the	 total	 factor	 productivity	
specification	for	foreign	owned	firms.		
In	sum	the	results	from	table	5.6	and	5.7	indicates	that	financial	factors	
are	 important	 determinants	 of	 exports	 mainly	 for	 the	 privately	 owned	
enterprise.	This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	private	owned	enterprises	are	
financially	constrained.	The	lending	bias	in	the	banking	system	prevents	them	
from	obtaining	the	necessary	finance.	Moreover,	no	evidence	suggests	that	the	
export	 decisions	 of	 SOEs	 and	 COEs	 are	 affected	 by	 financial	 factors.	 There	 is	
only	weak	evidence	indicates	that	financial	factors	are	important	determinants	
of	 FOEs	 export	 decisions,	 as	 only	 leverage	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 for	
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FOEs’	export	decisions.	Given	the	 fact	 that	export	decisions	of	SOEs	and	COEs	
are	not	affected	by	 financial	 factors	and	FOEs	are	only	marginally	affected	by	
financial	 factors,	 we	 will	 focus	 our	 subsequent	 analysis	 on	 the	 private	 firms	
only.	 The	 POE	 group	 is	 the	 largest	 of	 our	 sample.	 It	 accounts	 for	 1,162,274	
observations,	which	represents	68.27%	of	 the	 total	 firm‐years	covered	 in	our	
sample.	
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   SOEs  FOEs  POEs  COEs  SOEs  FOEs  POEs  COEs 
Ln(employee)  0.923***  0.549***  0.705***  0.757***  0.814***  0.623***  0.679***  0.704*** 
(0.0271)  (0.0121)  (0.00758)  (0.0286)  (0.0302)  (0.0125)  (0.00779)  (0.0290) 
Ln(W/L)  0.00698***  0.00400***  0.0000140  0.0115***  0.0124***  0.00423***  0.0000143  0.0115*** 
(0.00190)  (0.000487)  (0.0000177)  (0.00222)  (0.00222)  (0.000501)  (0.0000175)  (0.00226) 
Ln(Age)  0.00494**  0.0517***  0.0103***  0.00173  0.000325  0.0528***  0.0113***  0.00218 
(0.00166)  (0.00314)  (0.00109)  (0.00270)  (0.00171)  (0.00330)  (0.00110)  (0.00264) 
Ln(K/L)  0.000213*  ‐0.0000344  ‐0.0000123  ‐0.000215  0.000716***  ‐0.0000503  0.0000390  ‐0.000143 
(0.0000946)  (0.0000255)  (0.0000341)  (0.000303)  (0.0000943)  (0.0000278)  (0.0000282)  (0.000296) 
Coastal Region  1.067***  1.859***  1.971***  2.018***  1.200***  1.837***  1.987***  2.008*** 
(0.0789)  (0.0994)  (0.0329)  (0.111)  (0.0740)  (0.0926)  (0.0335)  (0.110) 
Central Region  0.379***  ‐0.0991  1.285***  0.969***  0.491***  ‐0.0959  1.277***  0.967*** 
(0.0951)  (0.121)  (0.0358)  (0.121)  (0.0940)  (0.119)  (0.0364)  (0.126) 
Labour Productivity  0.455***  ‐0.0692***  0.0714***  0.0833*** 
(0.0228)  (0.0116)  (0.00692)  (0.0251) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.200***  ‐0.0854***  0.0192***  0.0663** 
(0.0180)  (0.00834)  (0.00580)  (0.0203) 
Liquidity  0.142  0.00658  0.109***  ‐0.0760  0.234**  0.0407  0.113***  ‐0.0933 
(0.0777)  (0.0322)  (0.0190)  (0.0706)  (0.0765)  (0.0332)  (0.0193)  (0.0718) 
                          
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  59779  155729  563960  60587  56237  148139  553360  58777 
Rho  0.854  0.838  0.868  0.871  0.855  0.839  0.869  0.870 
Table	5.6:	Random	 effect	probit	model	with	 liquidity	 as	measures	of	 financial	
constraints	 for	 different	 ownerships.	 Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	 variable	 Expdum,	 where	
Expdum=1if	firm	is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	significance	at	
1%,	5%,	and	10%	level.	State	owned	(SOEs),	foreign	owned	(FOEs),	private	owned	(POEs)	and	collective	owned	(COEs),.	
Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	region	is	the	omitted	reference	group.				
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   SOEs  FOEs  POEs  COEs  SOEs  FOEs  POEs  COEs 
Ln(employee)  0.934***  0.551***  0.706***  0.759***  0.810***  0.623***  0.677***  0.706*** 
(0.0287)  (0.0121)  (0.00759)  (0.0286)  (0.0311)  (0.0124)  (0.00774)  (0.0286) 
Ln(W/L)  0.00664***  0.00393***  0.0000130  0.0116***  0.0123***  0.00419***  0.0000133  0.0114*** 
(0.00193)  (0.000488)  (0.0000177)  (0.00221)  (0.00227)  (0.000501)  (0.0000175)  (0.00226) 
Ln(Age)  0.00466*  0.0515***  0.0109***  0.00225  ‐0.000144  0.0529***  0.0121***  0.00238 
(0.00184)  (0.00314)  (0.00110)  (0.00275)  (0.00189)  (0.00329)  (0.00106)  (0.00268) 
Ln(K/L)  0.000220*  ‐0.0000261  ‐0.0000183  ‐0.000101  0.000705***  ‐0.0000429  0.0000333  ‐0.0000420 
(0.0000981)  (0.0000253)  (0.0000333)  (0.000273)  (0.0000955)  (0.0000274)  (0.0000305)  (0.000269) 
Coastal Region  1.065***  1.837***  1.963***  2.020***  1.201***  1.826***  1.978***  2.007*** 
(0.0797)  (0.0980)  (0.0331)  (0.112)  (0.0749)  (0.0919)  (0.0337)  (0.112) 
Central Region  0.400***  ‐0.112  1.292***  0.992***  0.486***  ‐0.0985  1.283***  0.986*** 
(0.0929)  (0.121)  (0.0361)  (0.124)  (0.0959)  (0.118)  (0.0367)  (0.129) 
Labour Productivity  0.466***  ‐0.0694***  0.0734***  0.0795** 
(0.0233)  (0.0116)  (0.00691)  (0.0250) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.210***  ‐0.0842***  0.0226***  0.0624** 
(0.0181)  (0.00827)  (0.00576)  (0.0200) 
Leverage  ‐0.295  ‐0.236*  ‐0.381***  ‐0.308  ‐0.288  ‐0.287**  ‐0.395***  ‐0.216 
(0.163)  (0.103)  (0.0505)  (0.174)  (0.150)  (0.107)  (0.0510)  (0.179) 
                          
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  59276  155534  562458  60279  55774  147961  551913  58486 
Rho  0.854  0.838  0.868  0.871  0.855  0.839  0.868  0.870 
Table	5.7:	Random	 effect	probit	model	with	 leverage	 as	measures	of	 financial	
constraints	 for	 different	 ownerships.	 Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	 variable	 Expdum,	 where	
Expdum=1if	firm	is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	significance	at	
1%,	5%,	and	10%	level.	State	owned	(SOEs),	foreign	owned	(FOEs),	private	owned	(POEs)	and	collective	owned	(COEs),.	
Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	region	is	the	omitted	reference	group.				
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5.5.4	Heterogeneous	effects	across	private	firms	characterized	by	
different	degree	of	political	affiliations	
	
The	 results	 above	 show	 that	 firms	 with	 different	 ownership	 groups	 face	 a	
heterogeneous	response	of	export	decisions	to	financial	factors.	This	is	largely	
due	 to	 the	 differential	 treatment	 faced	 by	 firms	with	 different	 ownership.	 In	
order	to	overcome	some	of	these	biased	treatments,	firms	in	China	tend	to	seek	
political	 affiliation	with	 the	 Central,	 provincial	 and	 local	 government	 and	 the	
Communist	Party.	Huang	(2003)	and	Du	and	Grima	(2010)	argue	that	firms	can	
use	 political	 affiliation	 to	 circumvent	 the	 problems	 of	 discriminatory	
treatments	 from	 political	 settings	 and	 institutional	 settings,	 such	 as	 lending	
bias	and	lack	of	secure	property	rights.	The	political	affiliations	obtained	by	the	
firms	are	likely	to	help	firms	to	gain	additional	benefits	such	as	better	access	to	
the	government	officials,	less	bureaucratic	treatments	from	government,	easier	
access	 to	 finance,	 winning	 public	 contracts,	 obtaining	 subsidies	 from	 various	
levels	of	government.	These	distinctive	advantages	of	firms	with	a	high	level	of	
political	affiliations	may	help	them	to	enjoy	a	higher	probability	to	export	and	
less	reliance	on	finance	relative	to	firms	with	low	or	no	political	affiliations.	In	
this	section,	we	would	like	to	analyze	how	the	political	affiliation	status	affects	
private	 firms’	 export	 decision.	 Specifically	 we	 will	 assess	 whether	 privately	
owned	 firms	 with	 higher	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
participate	in	the	export	market,	and	whether	the	export	market	participation	
decisions	 of	 these	 firms	 are	 less	 dependent	 on	 financial	 factors	 than	 those	of	
private	firms	with	low	or	no	political	affiliation.			
283 
 
Our	 data	 provides	 ten	 different	 categories	 of	 political	 affiliation,	 from	
high	political	affiliation	to	low	political	affiliation	as	follow:	affiliated	at	central	
level,	at	provincial	level,	city	or	district	level,	street	level,	town	level,	township	
level,	community	 level,	village	 level	and	no	political	affiliation.	We	reclassified	
firms	 into	 one	 of	 the	 three	 categories:	 high	 political	 affiliation	 (affiliated	 at	
provincial	 level	and	above),	medium	political	affiliation	(affiliated	from	village	
level	up	to	and	include	city	or	district	level)	and	no	political	affiliation.		We	will	
estimate	equation	(1)	separately	for	each	level	of	political	affiliation.	There	are	
2.41%	of	private	firms	have	high	level	of	political	affiliation,	27.84%	of	private	
firms	have	medium	level	of	political	affiliation	and	69.75%	of	private	firms	have	
no	political	affiliation	in	out	sample.	
                 
      High  Medium   No    
      (1)  (2)  (3)  Total 
Expdum=1  N  8,129  63,918  172,554  244,601 
%  29.42%  20.02%  21.57%  21.33% 
Expdum=0  N  19,502  255,320  627,413  902,235 
   %  70.58%  79.98%  78.43%  78.67% 
Total  N  27,631  319,238  799,967  1,146,836 
   %  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
Table	5.8:	Number	of	observations	and	percentage	of	exporters	 for	private	owned	enterprises	 for	
each	level	of	political	affiliations.	Expdum=1if	firm	is	an	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Column	(1)	is	firms	with	
high	level	of	political	affiliation.	Column	(2)	is	for	medium	level	of	political	affiliation,	and	column	(3)	is	firms	
with	no	political	affiliation.	
	
Table	 5.8	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 exporters	 and	 non‐exporter	 for	
private	 owned	 enterprises	 with	 high,	 medium	 and	 low	 level	 of	 political	
affiliations.	29.42%	of	the	private	firms	with	high	level	of	political	affiliation	are	
exporter,	while	only	20.02%	and	21.57%	of	 firms	with	medium	level	and	 low	
level	of	political	affiliation	are	exporters	respectively.	This	indicates	that	firms	
with	high	political	affiliation	are	more	likely	to	export.	The	difference	in	terms	
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of	percentage	of	 exporters	between	 firms	with	medium	 level	 and	no	political	
affiliations	is	also	statistically	significant	(the	p‐value	of	the	t‐test	of	equality	of	
mean	is	0.00).	
Table	5.9	reports	the	regression	results	of	equation	(1)	with	liquidity	as	
measure	 of	 financial	 constraints	 for	 the	 three	 different	 levels	 of	 political	
affiliations.	 Most	 of	 the	 coefficients	 associated	 with	 the	 control	 variables	 are	
consistent	with	early	 regression	results,	where	 size,	 age,	 and	 regional	 control	
variables	 are	 positive	 and	 significant	 for	 all	 levels	 of	 political	 affiliation.	
However,	 the	 coefficients	 for	 liquidity	 are	 only	 positive	 and	 significant	 as	
expected	for	column	(2),	(3),	(5)	and	(6)	of	table	5.9,	for	firms	with	medium	and	
low	levers	of	political	affiliations.	For	private	 firms	with	high	 level	of	political	
affiliation	 (column	 (1)	 and	 column	 (3)),	 the	 liquidity	 coefficients	 are	 positive	
but	 insignificant.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 expectations	 that	 high	 level	 of	
political	 affiliations	 help	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 faced	 by	
firms.	 Hence	 the	 export	 decisions	 of	 private	 firms	with	 high	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation	 are	 not	 correlated	with	 the	 financial	 factors.	 Table	 5.10	 conducts	 a	
similar	 analysis	 with	 leverage	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 financial	 factors.	 The	 same	
patterns	as	those	of	table	5.9	emerge	in	table	5.10.	The	leverage	coefficients	are	
only	 negative	 and	 significant	 for	 firms	with	medium	 and	 no	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation.	 The	 leverage	 coefficients	 for	 firms	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 political	
affiliation	 are	 insignificant.	 Another	 interesting	 result	 is	 that	 productivity	
appears	to	have	smaller	 impact	on	the	export	decisions	for	private	firms	with	
no	political	affiliation	(column	(3)	and	(6)	of	 table	5.9	and	5.10).	Berman	and	
Héricourt	(2010)	shows	that	financial	constraints	could	create	a	disconnection	
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between	 productivity	 and	 export.	 Our	 results	 in	 table	 5.9	 and	 5.10	 provide	
some	support	to	this	argument.	
To	further	test	the	consistency	of	the	findings	in	this	section,	we	create	
two	 interaction	 terms,	 namely	 Liquidity*high	affiliation	and	Liquidity*	(1‐high	
affiliation)	 to	allow	us	to	directly	compare	the	differential	 impacts	of	 financial	
factors	 on	 the	 export	 decisions	 of	 firms	 with	 high	 level	 political	 affiliation	
against	firms	with	medium	and	no	level	of	political‐	affiliation.	High	affiliation	is	
a	dummy	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	firm	has	a	high	level	of	political	affiliation,	
and	 zero	 otherwise.	 	 Column	 (1)	 and	 column	 (2)	 of	 table	 5.11	 indicate	 the	
interaction	terms	of	liquidity	and	high	affiliation	are	positive	but	insignificant,	
while	the	interaction	terms	of	liquidity	and	(1‐high	affiliation)	are	positive	and	
significant	at	the	1%	level.	The	chi‐	square	test	indicates	the	two	coefficients	are	
significantly	 difference	 at	 1%	 level.	 Column	 (3)	 and	 column	 (4)	 report	 the	
results	 for	 a	 similar	 analysis	 with	 leverage	 as	 the	 measure	 of	 financial	
constraints.	The	results	suggest	that	the	leverage	interaction	terms	are	negative	
and	 significant	 as	 the	 theory	 predicts	 for	 firms	with	medium	 and	 no	 level	 of	
political	affiliations	only.	Again	 the	chi‐square	test	 also	 indicates	 that	 leverage	
interaction	terms	are	significantly	different	for	the	firms	with	different	levels	of	
political	affiliations.		
Moreover,	table	5.11	also	reports	the	marginal	effects	for	the	interaction	
terms.	The	 results	 indicate	 that	 financial	 factors	 are	only	 significant	 for	 firms	
with	low	or	no	political	affiliations.	In	sum,	the	results	suggest	that	the	export	
decisions	of	private	owned	enterprises	with	high	level	of	political	affiliation	are	
not	affected	by	financial	factors.	This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	firms	with	
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high	 political	 affiliation	 are	 less	 financially	 constrained	 than	 firms	 with	 low	
level	or	no	political	affiliation.	
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   High  Medium   No  High  Medium   No 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(employee)  0.946***  0.779***  0.712***  0.874***  0.702***  0.734*** 
(0.0366)  (0.0156)  (0.00950)  (0.0438)  (0.0158)  (0.00963) 
Ln(W/L)  0.000520  0.00000112  0.0113***  0.00148  0.00000308  0.0118*** 
(0.00102)  (0.0000334)  (0.000540)  (0.000872)  (0.0000316)  (0.000542) 
Ln(Age)  0.00640**  0.00528**  0.0193***  0.00677**  0.00458*  0.0198*** 
(0.00227)  (0.00173)  (0.00157)  (0.00225)  (0.00184)  (0.00157) 
Ln(K/L)  0.0000907  0.0000412  ‐0.000232***  0.000202**  0.0000458  ‐0.000212*** 
(0.0000657)  (0.0000265)  (0.0000645)  (0.0000673)  (0.0000260)  (0.0000518) 
Coastal 
Region  1.520***  1.895***  2.127***  1.171***  1.960***  2.120*** 
(0.139)  (0.0562)  (0.0436)  (0.167)  (0.0569)  (0.0444) 
Central 
Region  0.378*  1.044***  1.556***  ‐0.0596  1.063***  1.547*** 
(0.162)  (0.0612)  (0.0467)  (0.173)  (0.0617)  (0.0474) 
Labour 
Productivity  0.328***  0.156***  ‐0.00465       
(0.0363)  (0.0148)  (0.00864) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.153***  0.0817***  ‐0.0416*** 
(0.0288)  (0.0123)  (0.00720) 
Liquidity  0.0874  0.134**  0.0868***  0.188  0.142***  0.100*** 
(0.126)  (0.0413)  (0.0225)  (0.138)  (0.0424)  (0.0227) 
                    
Time 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  15263  134693  414004  14543  131220  407597 
Rho  0.869  0.879  0.875  0.876  0.878  0.876 
Table	5.9:	Random	 effect	probit	model	with	 liquidity	 as	measures	of	 financial	
constraints	 for	 different	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation.	Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	 variable	
Expdum,	where	Expdum=1if	firm	is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	
significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level.	Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	
region	 is	 the	 omitted	 reference	 group.	 	 Column	 (1)	 is	 firms	with	 high	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation.	 Column	 (2)	 is	 for	
medium	level	of	political	affiliation,	and	column	(3)	is	firms	with	no	political	affiliation.	
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High  Medium   No  High  Medium   No 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(employee)  0.945***  0.787***  0.710***  0.861***  0.703***  0.731*** 
(0.0352)  (0.0157)  (0.00946)  (0.0413)  (0.0159)  (0.00960) 
Ln(W/L)  0.000576  0.000000193  0.0113***  0.00156  0.00000220  0.0118*** 
(0.000995)  (0.0000327)  (0.000543)  (0.000928)  (0.0000312)  (0.000546) 
Ln(Age)  0.00636**  0.00555**  0.0195***  0.00578*  0.00483*  0.0200*** 
(0.00216)  (0.00192)  (0.00158)  (0.00239)  (0.00211)  (0.00158) 
Ln(K/L)  0.0000617  0.0000399  ‐0.000242***  0.000186**  0.0000448  ‐0.000224*** 
(0.0000828)  (0.0000280)  (0.0000575)  (0.0000654)  (0.0000266)  (0.0000678) 
Coastal 
Region  1.553***  1.899***  2.121***  1.196***  1.957***  2.110*** 
(0.135)  (0.0559)  (0.0438)  (0.271)  (0.0564)  (0.0446) 
Central 
Region  0.414*  1.065***  1.565***  ‐0.0291  1.076***  1.555*** 
(0.165)  (0.0608)  (0.0469)  (0.282)  (0.0611)  (0.0476) 
Labour 
Productivity  0.334***  0.163***  ‐0.00423       
(0.0361)  (0.0148)  (0.00859) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.164***  0.0874***  ‐0.0389*** 
(0.0285)  (0.0122)  (0.00715) 
Leverage  0.524  ‐0.545***  ‐0.423***  0.460  ‐0.531***  ‐0.439*** 
(0.281)  (0.103)  (0.0624)  (0.298)  (0.105)  (0.0631) 
                    
Time 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  15171  134193  413094  14455  130737  406721 
Rho  0.870  0.879  0.875  0.876  0.878  0.876 
Table	5.10:	Random	effect	probit	model	with	 leverage	as	measures	of	 financial	
constraints	 for	 different	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation.	Dependent	 variable	 is	 binary	 variable	
Expdum,	where	Expdum=1if	firm	is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	
significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level.	Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	
region	 is	 the	 omitted	 reference	 group.	 	 Column	 (1)	 is	 firms	with	 high	 level	 of	 political	 affiliation.	 Column	 (2)	 is	 for	
medium	level	of	political	affiliation,	and	column	(3)	is	firms	with	no	political	affiliation.	
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Ln(employee)  0.679***  0.706***  0.676***  0.705*** 
(0.00779)  (0.00758)  (0.00775)  (0.00759) 
Ln(W/L)  1.43E‐05  1.40E‐05  1.33E‐05  1.30E‐05 
‐1.75E‐05  ‐1.77E‐05  ‐1.75E‐05  ‐1.77E‐05 
Ln(Age)  0.0113***  0.0102***  0.0122***  0.0111*** 
(0.00111)  (0.00109)  (0.00107)  (0.00114) 
Ln(K/L)  3.92E‐05  ‐1.23E‐05  3.12E‐05  ‐2.22E‐05 
‐2.79E‐05  ‐3.41E‐05  ‐2.93E‐05  ‐3.35E‐05 
Coastal Region  1.987***  1.971***  1.974***  1.964*** 
(0.0335)  (0.0329)  (0.0339)  (0.0333) 
Central Region  1.277***  1.285***  1.280***  1.291*** 
(0.0364)  (0.0358)  (0.0369)  (0.0362) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  0.0192***  0.0228*** 
(0.00580)  (0.00576) 
Labour Productivity  0.0714***  0.0734*** 
(0.00691)  (0.00691) 
Liquidity*high affiliation  0.161  0.182 
(0.130)  (0.122) 
Liquidity*(1‐high affiliation)  0.113***  0.107*** 
(0.0194)  (0.0191) 
Leverage*high affiliation  0.374  0.285 
(0.281)  (0.248) 
Leverage*(1‐high 
affiliation)      ‐0.417***  ‐0.405*** 
(0.0517)  (0.0513) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  553360  563960  551913  562458 
Rho  0.869  0.868  0.868  0.868 
Chi2‐test  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Marginal effects  High affiliation 0.0364  0.0406  0.0644  0.0857 
  (0.0294)  (0.00273)  (0.00562)  (0.0643) 
  (1‐High affiliation)  0.0255***  0.0240***  ‐0.0917***  ‐0.0954*** 
  (0.00444)  (0.00431)  (0.0119)  (0.0122) 
Table	 5.11:	 Random	 effect	 probit	 model	 with	 liquidity/leverage	
interaction	with	different	 level	of	political	affiliation.	Dependent	variable	is	binary	
variable	 Expdum,	 where	 Expdum=1if	 firm	 is	 exporter,	 =0	 otherwise.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 reported	 in	
parenthesis.	 *,**,***,	 denote	 significance	 at	 1%,	 5%,	 and	 10%	 level.	 Coastal	 region	 and	 Central	 region	 are	
geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	region	 is	 the	omitted	reference	group.	High	affiliation	is	a	dummy	
variable	equal	to	1	if	the	firm	has	high	level	of	political	affiliation,	and	zero	otherwise.	Chi2‐test:	reports	the	
p‐value	of	the	test	of	the	equality	of	coefficients	for	the	interaction	terms.	Marginal	effects	are	marginal	effects	
of	the	probit	model	calculated	at	the	mean.	
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5.5.5	Heterogeneous	effects	across	firm	characteristics	
	
5.5.5.1	Firm	size	
	
Firm	size	is	often	perceived	as	an	important	a	priori	criterion	to	sort	firms	into	
groups	of	financially	constrained	and	financially	unconstrained	(see	Farzzari	et	
al(1988),	 Carpenter	 et	al(1998b)).	 Small	 firms	 are	 typically	 younger,	 have	 a	
shorter	track	record,	and	are	more	risky	than	their	large	counterpart.	They	are	
typically	excluded	from	the	formal	financing	sector,	and	this	is	particularly	true	
in	China.		
Moreover,	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises	are	the	engine	of	growth	
for	 the	 Chinese	 economy.	 They	 provide	 many	 job	 opportunities	 for	 the	
economy.	Therefore,	it	is	interesting	analyze	whether	their	export	participation	
decisions	are	differently	affected	by	 financial	 factors	compared	 to	 large	 firms.	
Following,	the	literature	on	financial	constraints	and	investment,	we	sort	firms	
into	large	and	small	groups	based	on	real	total	assets.	If	a	firm‐year	falls	in	the	
top	25%	of	the	real	total	assets	distribution	in	its	industry	in	a	given	year,	it	is	
classified	 as	 large	 firms.	 This	method	 of	 classification	 allows	 firms	 to	 transit	
between	 size	 classifications.	 As	 a	 robustness	 test,	we	 also	 use	 the	 number	 of	
employees	 to	 classify	 firms	 into	 large	and	small	 groups.	 If	 a	 firm‐year	 falls	 in	
the	25th	percentile	of	the	number	of	employees	in	its	industry	in	a	given	year,	it	
is	classified	as	large	firms.	
We	create	 two	 interaction	dummies	 to	conduct	 the	empirical	 study	 for	
this	section.	Large	equal	to	1	if	the	firm‐year	is	in	the	top	25th	percentile	of	real	
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total	assets/number	of	employees	in	its	industry	in	a	given	year,	and	equal	to	0	
otherwise.	Small	is	an	interaction	dummy	variable	equal	to	1	if	the	firm‐year	is	
in	 the	 bottom	75th	 percentile	 of	 real	 total	 assets/number	 of	 employees	 in	 its	
industry	in	a	given	year,	and	equal	to	0	otherwise.	In	table	5.12	only	the	results	
using	 total	 factor	 productivity	 are	 presented.	 The	 estimations	 with	 labour	
productivity	produced	similar	results.		
In	column	(1)	of	table	5.12,	we	classified	firms	as	large	and	small	based	
on	 the	 number	 of	 employees.	 The	 results	 suggested	 that	 liquidity	 is	 an	
important	 determinant	 for	 both	 small	 and	 large	 firms,	 while	 its	 impact	 is	
significantly	higher	than	large	firms.	The	marginal	effects	of	liquidity	calculated	
at	the	mean	for	small	firms	are	0.057	compare	to	0.0148	(the	marginal	effects	
calculated	at	the	mean	for	the	financial	variables	are	reported	at	the	bottom	of	
the	 table	5.12).	 	 In	column	(2)	of	 table	5.12,	we	use	 firms’	 real	 total	assets	 to	
classify	 firms	 into	 large	 and	 small	 group.	 	 The	 results	 from	 column	 (2)	 are	
similar	 to	 those	 of	 column	 (1).	 The	 coefficients	 for	 the	 liquidity	 ratio	 are	
positive	and	significant	 for	both	 large	and	small	 firms,	while	 it	 is	significantly	
higher	 for	 small	 firms.	 Most	 of	 the	 control	 variables	 are	 significant	 with	 the	
expected	signs	for	both	specifications	presented	in	column	(1)	and	column	(2)	
of	table	5.12.	
In	 column	 (3)	 and	 column	 (4)	 of	 table	 5.12,	 we	 use	 leverage	 as	 a	
measure	of	financial	health.	We	find	that	leverage	is	negative	and	significantly	
related	to	firms’	export	decisions	for	both	small	and	large	private	firms,	while	
the	 coefficients	 for	 leverage	 ratio	 of	 small	 private	 firms	 (‐0.507)	 are	
significantly	 larger	 than	 for	 large	 firms	 (‐0.267).	 The	 marginal	 effects	 of	
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leverage	 ratio	 for	 large	and	small	 firms	 in	column	 (3)	are	 ‐0.0762	and	 ‐0.144	
respectively.		
In	sum,	the	results	from	table	5.12	are	consistent	with	the	argument	of	
financial	constraints.	The	exports	decisions	of	financially	constrained	firms	will	
be	 affected	 more	 by	 financial	 factors.	 The	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 marginal	
effects	of	liquidity/leverage	for	small	firms	are	about	at	least	twice	higher	than	
large	 firms.	 This	 suggests	 that	 by	 improving	 small	 firms	 financial	 health	may	
increase	their	probability	to	participate	in	the	export	markets.	These	results	are	
robust	to	using	different	cutoff	points	as	size	classification.	
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   Number of  Real   Number of  Real 
      Employee  Assets  Employee  Assets 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(employee)  0.345***  0.346***  0.342***  0.344*** 
(0.00391)  (0.00390)  (0.00393)  (0.00393) 
Ln(W/L)  0.0000370  0.0000366  0.0000357  0.0000357 
(0.0000348)  (0.0000347)  (0.0000348)  (0.0000348) 
Ln(Age)  0.000657  0.000620  0.000853  0.000869* 
(0.000435)  (0.000436)  (0.000438)  (0.000438) 
Ln(K/L)  ‐0.000162***  ‐0.000159***  ‐0.000157***  ‐0.000164*** 
(0.0000351)  (0.0000348)  (0.0000349)  (0.0000366) 
Coastal Region  0.744***  0.745***  0.736***  0.735*** 
(0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149) 
Central Region  0.417***  0.418***  0.422***  0.422*** 
(0.0162)  (0.0162)  (0.0162)  (0.0162) 
Ln(TFP)‐LP  ‐0.00144  ‐0.00175  0.00201  0.00182 
(0.00315)  (0.00315)  (0.00312)  (0.00312) 
Liquidity*  0.0519***  0.0704*** 
Large  (0.0117)  (0.0116) 
Liquidity*  0.200***  0.146*** 
Small  (0.0212)  (0.0221) 
Leverage*  ‐0.267***  ‐0.297*** 
Large  (0.0503)  (0.0527) 
Leverage*  ‐0.507***  ‐0.493*** 
Small     (0.0350)  (0.0347) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  553360 553360 551913  551913
Rho     0.835  0.854  0.836  0.847 
Chi2‐test   p‐value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Marginal effects  Large  0.0148***  0.0201***  ‐0.0762***  ‐0.0847*** 
(0.00333)  (0.00330)  (0.0143)  (0.0150) 
Small  0.0570***  0.0415***  ‐0.144***  ‐0.141*** 
      (0.00605)  (0.00630)  (0.00997)  (0.00988) 
Table	5.12:	Random	effect	probit	model	with	 liquidity/leverage	as	measure	of	
financial	factors	for	small	and	large	firms	for	private	owned	enterprises.	Firm‐year	
in	the	top	25%	tile	of	real	assets/number	of	employees	in	each	industry	in	a	given	year	is	classified	as	large.	Dependent	
variable	is	binary	variable	Expdum,	where	Expdum=1if	firm	is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	
parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level.	Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	
dummy	variables.	Western	region	is	the	omitted	reference	group.	Chi2‐test:	reports	the	p‐value	of	the	test	of	the	equality	
of	coefficients	for	the	interaction	terms.	Marginal	effects	are	marginal	effects	of	the	probit	model	calculated	at	the	mean.	
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5.5.5.2	Firm	age	
 
Similar	to	firm	size,	firm	age	is	also	a	widely	used	criterion	to	differentiate	firms	
as	 a	 priori	 financially	 constrained.	 Firm	 age	 is	 defined	 as	 firms’	 years	 of	
establishment.	 Older	 firms	 typically	 have	 a	 longer	 track	 record,	 and	 a	 longer	
relationship	 lender	 which	 help	 them	 to	 secure	 external	 funds.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	young	firms	are	more	likely	to	be	financially	constrained	because	of	the	
lack	of	knowledge	in	obtaining	external	funds	and	more	often	restricted	to	their	
internal	funds	only.	 	We	classify	firms	as	old	if	the	firm	year	is	in	the	top	25th	
percentile	of	the	age	distribution	of	its	industries,	and	as	young	otherwise56.		
Table	5.13	reports	the	regression	results	for	privately	owned	firms	with	
different	 ages.	 Firm	 size	 continues	 to	 be	 an	 important	 determinant	 for	 both	
young	and	old	firms.	Productivity	is	only	marginally	significant	at	10%	level	for	
young	firms	in	the	liquidity	regression,	while	it	is	insignificant	for	young	firms	
in	the	leverage	ratio	specifications	(column	(4)	of	table	5.13).	Again,	this	further	
supports	 the	 idea	 that	 financial	 constraints	 could	 create	 a	 disconnection	
between	export	behavior	and	productivity.	
The	 coefficient	 for	 liquidity	 ratio	 is	 only	 significant	 for	 young	 firms	 in	
column	 (1)	 of	 table	 5.13,	 but	 insignificant	 for	 older	 firms.	 This	 result	 is	
consistent	with	 the	 financial	 constraints	 prediction	 that	 financial	 factors	 only	
matter	 for	 firms	 that	 are	 financially	 constrained,	 in	 this	 case	 young	 firms.	 In	
column	 (3)	 and	 (4),	 the	 coefficients	 for	 leverage	 ratios	 are	 negative	 and	
significant	for	both	young	and	old	firms.	Yet,	the	impact	of	leverage	for	export	is	
stronger	for	young	firms	in	column	(3)	than	old	firms	in	column	(4).	In	sum,	our	
                                                 
56 Our results are robust to different cutoff point to classify firm ages. 
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result	indicates	that	young	firms’	export	decisions	are	more	likely	to	be	affected	
by	 financial	 factors	 than	older	 firms.	This	suggests	 that	young	 firms	are	more	
financially	 constrained	 than	 older	 firms.	 They	 may	 find	 it	 harder	 to	 gather	
enough	resources	to	participate	in	the	export	market.	
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   young  old  young  old 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(employee)  0.667***  0.979***  0.670***  0.982*** 
(0.00924)  (0.0161)  (0.00924)  (0.0162) 
Ln(W/L)  0.0101***  ‐0.000000630  0.0101***  ‐0.000000812 
(0.000531)  (0.0000286)  (0.000532)  (0.0000286) 
Ln(Age)  0.0729***  ‐0.0189***  0.0732***  ‐0.0191*** 
(0.00293)  (0.00210)  (0.00293)  (0.00208) 
Ln(K/L)  ‐0.000134**  0.000168***  ‐0.000130**  0.000173*** 
(0.0000471)  (0.0000471)  (0.0000452)  (0.0000450) 
Coastal Region  2.067***  1.996***  2.056***  2.025*** 
(0.0390)  (0.117)  (0.0393)  (0.121) 
Central Region  1.380***  1.258***  1.386***  1.285*** 
(0.0421)  (0.122)  (0.0426)  (0.126) 
Labour 
Productivity  ‐0.0175*  0.190***  ‐0.0155  0.192*** 
(0.00843)  (0.0144)  (0.00840)  (0.0143) 
Liquidity  0.100***  0.0118 
(0.0222)  (0.0407) 
Leverage  ‐0.451***  ‐0.277** 
(0.0609)  (0.102) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  424929  139031  423793  138665 
Rho  0.877  0.878  0.877  0.878 
Table	 5.13:	 Random	 effect	 probit	 model	 with	 liquidity/leverage	 as	
measure	of	 financial	 factors	 for	young	and	old	 firms	 for	private	owned	
enterprises.	Firm‐year	 in	the	top	25%	tile	distribution	of	 firm	age	 in	each	industry	 in	a	given	year	 is	
classified	as	old,	and	zero	otherwise.	Dependent	variable	is	binary	variable	Expdum,	where	Expdum=1if	firm	
is	exporter,	=0	otherwise.	Standard	errors	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	*,**,***,	denote	significance	at	1%,	5%,	
and	10%	level.	Coastal	region	and	Central	region	are	geographical	dummy	variables.	Western	region	is	the	
omitted	reference	group.		
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5.6	Conclusions	
 
This	 chapter	 uses	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 manufacturing	 firms	 from	 China	 for	 the	
period	of	 2000‐2007	 to	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	 factors	 on	 firms’	 export	
decision.	Specifically,	we	use	firms’	liquidity	and	leverage	as	measures	of	firms’	
financial	 health.	 In	 general,	 we	 find	 firms	 that	 are	 larger,	 older,	 with	 higher	
productivity	and	located	in	the	coastal	region	are	more	likely	to	export.	These	
results	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 existing	 empirical	 results	 based	 on	 developed	
economies.	After	controlling	 for	all	 the	above	 factors,	 financial	health	 is	still	a	
significant	determinant	of	 firms’	 export	decisions.	 Firms	with	higher	 liquidity	
ratio	and	lower	leverage	ratio	are	more	likely	to	export.	
We	 further	 explore	 the	 importance	 of	 financial	 health	 to	 export	 for	
different	ownership	groups.	Foreign	owned	firms	are	more	likely	to	export	than	
privately	owned	firms,	while	state	owned	firms	and	collective	owned	firms	are	
less	 likely	 to	export.	We	 further	 find	 that	 financial	health	 is	only	a	 significant	
determinant	of	export	decisions	for	private	owned	firms.	As	there	is	a	political	
packing	order	at	work	in	China,	private	firms	are	in	a	disadvantaged	position	in	
accessing	 finance	 and	 government	 supports.	 Some	 private	 firms	 try	 to	
overcome	 these	 problems	 by	 establishing	 political	 affiliation	 with	 different	
level	of	government.		
Focusing	 on	 private	 firms	 only,	 we	 classify	 private	 firms	 into	 three	
groups	with	different	levels	of	political	affiliation.	Our	results	indicate	that	high	
political	 affiliation	 private	 firms’	 export	 decisions	 are	 not	 affected	 by	 their	
financial	 health.	 However,	 financial	 factors	 are	 important	 determinants	 of	
export	 decisions	 for	 private	 firms	 with	 low	 and	 no	 political	 affiliation.	 This	
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suggests	that	high	level	of	political	affiliation	may	help	private	firms	to	alleviate	
the	lending	bias	and	financial	obstacles.		
In	order	to	assess	the	differential	effects	of	financial	health	across	firms,	
we	divide	firms	into	different	groups	using	firm	size	and	firm	age.	Our	results	
indicate	smaller	and	younger	firms’	export	decisions	are	affected	more	by	their	
financial	 health.	 There	 are	 also	 evidences	 that	 financial	 constraints	 create	 a	
disconnection	between	productivity	and	exports.	Productivity	is	less	important	
for	 firms’	export	decisions	 for	more	 financial	 constrained	 firms,	 such	as	 firms	
with	 no	 political	 affiliation	 or	 young	 firms.	 This	 suggests	 that	 financial	
constraints	 prevent	 productive	 firms	 to	 compete	 and	 participate	 in	 the	
international	markets.	
Our	findings	have	important	policy	implications.	First,	export	promotion	
policies	 should	 consider	 firms’	 financial	 health.	 By	 alleviating	 the	 financial	
constraints	 faced	by	 firms	would	help	 to	 improve	 firms’	 extensive	margins	of	
export.	 Second,	 firm	heterogeneity	 is	 important	 in	 firms’	 export	 participation	
decision.	The	help	 should	 specifically	aim	at	 small	 and	medium	private	 firms,	
who	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 face	 financial	 constraints.	 Moreover,	 the	 export	
promotion	policies	should	also	divert	to	the	inland	regions	(central	region	and	
western	region)	in	China,	where	there	are	less	foreign	direct	investment	and	a	
lower	level	of	financial	development.	Promoting	exports	in	these	regions	would	
help	to	improve	the	economic	developments	of	these	regions.	Successful	export	
promotion	policies	 should	 therefore	 endeavor	 to	 identify	 firms	 that	 are	most	
needed	the	help.	
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Appendix	5A	 	
5A1	Definitions	of	variables	
Leverage	ratio:	firm’s	total	debt	to	firm’s	total	assets	ratio	
Liquidity	ratio:	 the	differences	of	 firm’s	current	assets	and	current	 liabilities	to	total	
assets	ratio.	
Capital	intensity:	the	ratio	of	real	fixed	assets	to	the	number	of	employees	
Deflators:	 the	 provincial	 level	 deflators	 are	 extracted	 from	 the	 China	 Statistical	
Yearbook	published	by	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China.	The	capital	stock	(i.e.	
firm’s	tangible	 fixed	assets)	 is	 deflated	with	 the	 provincial	 capital	 goods	 deflator.	 All	
other	variables	are	deflated	with	the	provincial	GDP	deflator.			
Labour	productivity:	is	defined	as	real	sales	divided	by	number	of	employees.	
Total	factor	productivity	(TFP):	total	 factor	productivity	calculated	using	Levinsohn	
&	Petrin	(2003)	methods	with	intermediate	inputs	as	proxy.	
ROA:	is	return	on	total	assets.	It	is	defined	as	net	income	divided	by	total	assets.	
Collateral:	is	defined	as	tangible	fixed	assets	divided	by	total	assets.	
Age:	is	the	number	of	year	the	firm	has	established.	
Export	Ratio:	is	defined	as	total	exports	divided	by	total	sales.	
Wage	rate:	is	the	real	wage	divided	by	the	number	of	employees.	
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5A2	Regions	allocation	
China	 consists	 of	 31	 provincial	 units,	 which	 are	 classified	 into	 three	 categories:	 22	
provinces;	 4	 autonomous	 regions;	 and	 4	 municipal	 cities	 which	 are	 under	 direct	
supervision	of	the	central	government	(Shanghai,	Tianjin,	Beijing,	and	Chongqing).	We	
allocated	them	into	three	groups	according	to	their	geographical	locations.	
Coastal	region	
Beijing,	Fujian,	Guangdong,	Hainan,	Hebei,	Jiangsu,	Liaoning,	
Shandong,	Shanghai,	Tianjin,	Zhejiang,	
Central	region	 Anhui,	Heilongjiang,	Henan,	Hubei,	Hunan,	Jiangxi,	Jilin,	Shanxi	
West	region	
Chongqing,	Gansu,	Guangxi,	Guizhou,	Neimenggu,	Ningxia,	
Qinghai,	Shaanxi,	Sichuan,	Xinjiang,	Yunnan,	
5A2	Regional	allocation	
	
5A3	Structure	of	the	unbalanced	panel	
Number	of	observations	per	firm Number	of	firms Percent	 Cumulative	%
1	 145,501 27.37	 27.37
2	 92,449 17.39	 44.75
3	 69,941 13.15	 57.91
4	 98,476 18.52	 76.43
5	 35,169 6.61 83.04
6	 24,913 4.69 87.73
7	 25,980 4.89 92.61
8	 39,271 7.39 100	
Total	 531,700 100
	
5A3.1	Number	of	observations	per	firm	
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year	 Number	of	observations Percent Cumulative	%
2000	 144,502 8.23 8.23	
2001	 152,410 8.68 16.91	
2002	 165,393 9.42 26.34	
2003	 180,985 10.31 36.64	
2004	 256,277 14.60 51.24	
2005	 254,404 14.49 65.74	
2006	 283,165 16.13 81.87	
2007	 318,341 18.13 100	
Total	 1,755,463 100
	
5A3.2	Number	of	observations	per	year	
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Appendix	5B	Levinsohn	and	Petrin’s	(2003)	approach	for	TFP	(total	factor	
productivity)	estimation		
A	detail	description	of	TFP	of	the	Levinsohn	and	Petrin	(2003)	is	beyond	the	scope	of	
this	 chapter.	 In	 this	 appendix,	 we	 briefly	 illustrate	 the	 key	 steps	 of	 Levinsohn	 and	
Petrin’s	 (2003)	 approach	 for	 TFP	 estimation.	 The	 following	 illustration	 follows	
Levinsohn	and	Petrin	(2003)	and	Petrin		et	al(2004)	closely.	
Assuming	the	production	function	as	follow:	
yt  = β0 + βl lt + βk kt + βm mt  + ωt + ηt .                                             (1) 
 
All	the	variables	are	expressed	in	logarithmic	form.	The	three	inputs	for	the	production	
function	(1)	are:	freely	variable	labor	(lt	),	state	variable	capital	(kt),	and	an	additional	
freely	variable	 intermediate	 input	(mt)(e.g.	materials	and	energy	expense).	There	are	
two	components	in	the	error	term:	a	state	variable	transmitted	component,	(ωt) which	
impacts	 the	 firm’s	 decision	 rules and	 i.i.d component	 (ηt), which	 do	 not	 impact	 on	
firms’	decisions.	
	 Demand	 for	 the	 intermediate	 input	 is	 assumed	 to	depend	on	 the	 firm’s	 state	
variables	kt	and	wt	:	 	mt=mt(kt	,	wt).	Assuming	the	intermediate	input	demand	function	
is	monotonically	increasing	in	wt,	we	can	obtain	wt	as	a	function	of	kt	,and	mt	:		
	 wt=wt(kt	,	mt)	 	 	 					(2)	
	 Equation	(2)	has	expressed	the	unobservable	productivity	term	as	a	function	of	
two	observable	inputs.	We	can	now	write	the	production	as	follows:	
	 										yt   = β0 + βl lt + βk kt + βm mt  + ωt + ηt .                                              
	
              yt    = βl lt + φt(kt,mt) + ηt .                                                            (3) 
	 		
Where																																									φt(kt,mt) 		=			β0 + βk kt + βm mt  + ωt 
	 By	taking	expectation	of	equation	(3)	conditional	on	it	and	kt,	we	can	obtain:	
             E[yt | it , kt ] = βl E[lt | it , kt ] + φt (it , kt )                   (4)	
	 Subtracting	(4)	from	(3)	yields:	
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	 yt  - E[yt | it , kt ] = βl (lt - E[lt | it , kt ] )+ ηt                                             (5) 
Assuming	that	ηt	 is	mean	 independent	of	 lt,	we	can	obtain	consistent	estimates	of	βl.	
The	 second	 step	 of	 the	 process	 is	 to	 estimate	 βk.	 Assuming	wt	 follows	 a	 first‐order	
Markov	 process	 and	 capital	 does	 not	 immediately	 respond	 to	dt	 ,	 the	 innovations	 in	
productivity	 over	 the	 last	 period’s	 expectation,	 given	by	dt	=wt	–E[wt	|wt‐1].	 Let	yt*	 be	
the	output	net	of	labour’s	contribution:	
 yt*   = yt - βl lt = β0 + βk kt + E[wt |wt-1]+ ηt + dt                               (6) 
 By regression yt* on kt and E[wt |wt-1], we can obtain a consistent estimate of βk. 
Finally,	 we	 can	 calculate	 the	 TFP	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 actual	 output	 and	
estimated	output	derived	with	the	Levinsohn	and	Petrin	(2003)	estimates. 
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Chapter	6:	Conclusion	
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6.1	Introduction	
	
The	 main	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 empirically	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	
financial	constraints	on	firms’	activities	in	China.	In	the	last	two	decades,	fixed	
investment	 and	 exports	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 Chinese	 economy’s	 main	
drivers	to	success.	Using	two	large	panels	of	Chinese	manufacturing	firms,	we	
study	 the	effects	of	 financial	 constraints	on	 firms’	 fixed	 investment,	 inventory	
investment	 and	 the	 export	 participation	 decisions.	 These	 three	 activities	 are	
closely	 related	 to	 key	 drivers	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy.	 Our	 empirical	 study	
provides	 some	 insights	 about	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 fixed	 investment,	
inventory	investment	and	exports	decisions.		
	
This	chapter	provides	a	summary	of	the	key	findings	from	our	thesis	and	
the	 limitation	 of	 our	 study.	 We	 will	 then	 discuss	 the	 corresponding	 policy	
implications	 from	 these	 findings	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Chinese	 economy.	 Last,	we	
will	 provide	 some	 suggestions	 for	 future	 research.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	
chapter	is	organized	as	follows:	section	two	provides	the	summary	of	the	main	
findings	 from	each	chapter,	section	 three	discuss	 the	policy	 implications	 from	
our	 findings,	 and	 the	 last	 section	 provide	 some	 suggestions	 for	 the	 future	
research	
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6.2	Summary	of	main	findings	
	
6.2.1	Financial	constraints	and	fixed	investment	
	
In	 chapter	 3,	 using	 a	 large	 panel	 data	 of	 Chinese	 manufacturing	 firms	 with	
114,098	 observations	 between	 1998	 and	 2005,	 we	 estimate	 two	 versions	 of	
fixed	 investment	models	derived	 from	 the	Euler	 equation	model	 to	 study	 the	
relationship	 between	 financial	 constraints	 and	 fixed	 investment	 for	 Chinese	
firms.	 	
	 	
Estimation	results	based	on	the	full	sample	suggests	that	cash	flow	is	an	
important	determinant	of	 the	fixed	investment	of	Chinese	firms.	Motivated	by	
the	unique	institutional	settings	of	China,	we	classify	firms	into	five	categories:	
state	 owned	 enterprises,	 privately	 owned	 enterprises,	 foreign	 owned	
enterprises,	collectively	owned	enterprises	and	listed	firms.	We	find	that	cash	
flow	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 only	 for	 privately	 owned	 firms,	 foreign	
owned	firms	and	listed	firms.	The	results	are	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	of	
“lending	 bias”,	 where	 SOEs	 and	 COEs	 receive	 preferential	 treatments	 from	
China’s	banking	sector.	We	then	extended	the	model	by	including	the	coverage	
ratios	 and	 leverage	 ratios	 in	 the	 estimation.	 We	 find	 that	 coefficients	 for	
coverage	ratio	are	only	positive	and	significant	for	SOEs,	while	the	coefficients	
for	the	leverage	ratio	is	positive	and	significant	for	privately	owned	firms	and	
listed	firms.	These	results	suggest	that	privately	owned	firms	and	listed	firms’	
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fixed	 investment	 are	 financially	 constrained.	 Yet,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	
financial	constraints	for	SOEs	and	COEs.	
	 	
We	then	 investigate	the	regional	disparities	 in	China.	By	dividing	firms	
into	Eastern,	Central	and	Western	region,	we	find	that	cash	flow	is	an	important	
determinant	 for	 eastern	 region	only.	 This	 is	possibly	 the	 result	 of	 the	 central	
government	relocating	resources	from	the	eastern	region	inwards	to	 facilitate	
the	central	and	western	regional	development	policy.	By	jointly	consider	both	
ownerships	 and	 regional	 disparities.	 We	 find	 that	 private	 firms	 and	 foreign	
firms	 locate	 in	 the	eastern	 region	display	 significant	 cash	 flow	sensitivities	 to	
investment.	 Yet,	 for	 the	 case	 of	 listed	 firms,	 all	 three	 regions	 displayed	
significant	cash	flow	sensitivity	to	investment.	Furthermore,	the	listed	firms	in	
the	eastern	region	appear	to	be	least	financially	constrained,	while	listed	firms	
in	 the	 western	 appear	 to	 be	 most	 financially	 constrained.	 This	 result	 is	
consistent	with	the	prediction	of	the	financial	development	that	better	financial	
development	will	lower	the	levels	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	firms	located	
in	that	region.	
	 	
In	 the	 last	 part	 of	 chapter	 3,	 we	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	whether	 the	
presence	 of	 foreign	 ownership	 helps	 to	 alleviate	 the	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	The	results	 indicate	 that	 the	presence	of	 foreign	ownership	helps	
to	 alleviate	 the	 levels	 of	 financial	 constraints	 faced	 by	 firms.	 This	 result	 is	
robust	for	both	the	full	sample	and	sub‐sample	of	privately	owned	firms	
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6.2.2	Financial	constraints	and	inventory	investment	
	
In	 chapter	 4,	 we	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 another	 key	
activity	 of	 firms,	 the	 inventory	 investment.	 	 Using	 a	 large	 census	 data	 from	
China	national	bureau	of	 statistics	between	year	2000	and	2007,	we	estimate	
an	error‐correction	model	 to	 test	 the	effects	of	 financial	 constraints	on	 firms’	
inventory	 investment	 in	 China.	 From	 a	 descriptive	 analysis	 we	 find	 that	
inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 decrease	 significantly	 over	 the	 study.	 The	 decline	 in	
inventory	 to	 sales	 ratio	 is	 dramatically	 across	 ownership	 groups,	 where	
inventory	 to	 sales	 ratios	 for	 privately	 owned	 firms,	 collectively	 owned	 firms	
decline	significantly	more	than	state	owned	enterprises.	This	is	possibly	due	to	
the	 different	 levels	 of	 financial	 constraints	 faced	 by	 firms	 belong	 to	 different	
ownership	groups.	
	 	
The	 estimated	 results	 based	 on	 the	 full	 sample	 indicate	 no	 significant	
relationship	between	inventory	investment	and	cash	flow.	However,	this	is	due	
to	 the	 failure	 to	 recognize	 the	 importance	of	 the	difference	across	ownership	
groups.	Once	we	classified	firms	into	four	different	ownership	groups,	we	find	
that	cash	flow	is	negatively	related	to	the	inventory	growth	for	the	state	owned	
enterprises	 and	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 inventory	 growth	 for	 private	 firms.	
These	results	suggest	that	state	owned	firms	is	possibly	still	facing	soft	budget	
constraints,	while	privately	owned	firms	are	financially	constraints.	We	find	no	
evidence	of	financial	constraints	for	collectively	owned	firms	and	foreign	firms.	
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When	we	sort	firms	into	three	groups	according	to	geographical	regions,	
we	find	that	cash	flow	is	a	significant	determinant	of	inventory	growth	for	firms	
in	the	coastal	region,	while	the	coefficients	are	insignificant	for	the	central	and	
western	regions.	This	result	 is	consistent	with	the	finding	from	chapter	3	that	
firms	 located	 in	 the	 coastal	 region	 tend	 to	 face	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 financial	
constraints.	
	 	
We	 also	 find	 evidence	 that	 privately	 owned	 and	 foreign	 owned	 firms	
operate	in	the	durable	sector	are	more	likely	to	be	financially	constrained	than	
their	counterparts	operate	in	the	nondurable	sector.	Furthermore,	we	also	find	
that	 private	 firms	 with	 low	 levels	 of	 political	 affiliation	 and	 no	 political	
affiliation	display	a	positive	and	significant	inventory	investment	and	cash	flow	
sensitivities,	while	privately	owned	firms	with	high	levels	of	political	affiliation	
appear	to	be	not	 financially	constrained.	This	suggests	that	political	affiliation	
may	help	to	alleviate	the	levels	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	private	firms.	
	 	
In	 the	 last	 part	 of	 chapter	 4,	 we	 also	 assess	 whether	 the	 levels	 of	
financial	constraints	faced	by	firms	have	change	over	time.	Use	year	2003	as	a	
cutoff	 point,	 we	 find	 some	 evidences	 that	 suggest	 the	 levels	 of	 financial	
constraints	have	increased	for	privately	owned	firms,	foreign	firms	and	the	full	
sample.	 Furthermore,	 the	 evidences	 also	 suggest	 that	 privately	 owned	 firms	
with	low	level	of	political	affiliation	are	no	longer	financially	constrained	in	the	
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second	period.	Yet,	privately	owned	firms	with	no	political	affiliation	are	facing	
increasing	levels	of	financial	constraints.	
	
6.2.3	Financial	constraints	and	exports	
	
In	chapter	5,	we	study	the	impacts	of	financial	factors	on	firm’s	export	market	
participation	 decisions	 in	 China.	 Using	 a	 large	 panel	 of	 census	 data	 from	 the	
China	national	bureau	of	statistics,	we	estimate	a	random‐effects	probit	model	
of	firms’	exports	participation	decisions.	
	
The	 results	 indicate	 that	 financial	 health	 of	 firms	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	for	firms’	exports	decisions	in	China.	We	also	find	it	is	important	to	
take	 consideration	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 effects	 of	 financial	 health	 on	 firms’	
exports	decisions	across	ownership	groups.	
	
Similar	 to	 the	study	 in	chapter	3	and	4,	we	 find	 that	 financial	health	 is	
mainly	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	 exports	 participation	 decisions	 for	
privately	 owned	 firms.	 We	 then	 further	 analysis	 whether	 private	 firms	 can	
alleviate	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 constraints	 through	 obtaining	 political	
affiliation	 to	 the	 central	 and	 local	 governments.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	
exports	decisions	of	private	firms	with	high	level	of	political	affiliation	are	not	
affected	 by	 their	 financial	 health,	 while	 financial	 health	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	 of	 export	 decisions	 for	 private	 owned	 firms	 with	 only	 medium	
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level	 or	no	political	 affiliation.	This	 result	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 result	 obtain	
from	 chapter	 4,	 where	 private	 firms	 may	 be	 able	 to	 alleviate	 their	 levels	 of	
financial	constraints	through	establish	political	affiliation.	
	
Last,	we	 also	 consider	 the	 heterogeneous	 effects	 of	 financial	 health	 on	
private	 firms	 export	 participation	decisions.	 	Using	 two	popular	 criteria,	 firm	
size	 and	 firm	 age,	 to	 sort	 firms	 into	 groups	 of	 financially	 constrained	 and	
financially	unconstrained	 firms.	We	 find	 that	 financial	health	 is	 important	 for	
both	small	 firms’	and	 large	 firms’	exports	participation	decisions,	while	study	
based	 on	 firm	 age	 shows	 that	 financial	 health	 is	 only	 important	 for	 young	
private	firms’	exports	participation	decisions.			
	
6.3	Policy	implications	
	
First	of	all,	the	empirical	study	of	this	thesis	suggests	that	financial	factors	are	
highly	important	factors	for	firms’	fixed	investment,	inventory	investment	and	
export	 participation	 decisions.	 Firm’s	 activities	 are	 strongly	 relying	 on	 their	
internal	 source	 of	 funds.	 	 Therefore	 it	 is	 crucial	 for	 China	 to	 speed	 up	 its	
financial	market	development	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	Chinese	 firms	demand	 for	
financial	 resources.	 Failure	 to	 do	 so	 would	 slow	 down	 the	 phenomenon	
economic	growth	that	China	has	been	experiencing	in	the	last	two	decades.	The	
finding	 of	 the	 listed	 firms	 being	 more	 financially	 constraints	 suggests	 that	
China’s	stock	markets	have	not	been	an	effective	tool	for	firms	to	obtain	finance	
312 
 
to	their	expansion,	such	as	funding	their	fixed	investment.	This	call	for	a	review	
of	 the	 current	 setting	 of	 the	 stock	 market	 in	 China,	 to	 better	 facilitate	 firms	
needs	and	channel	the	substantial	savings	into	the	financial	markets.	
	 	
Secondly,	 our	 results	 indicate	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 lending	 bias	 against	
privately	owned	firms.	Given	the	fact	that	privately	owned	firms	are	the	future	
engine	 of	 growth	 for	 China,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 policy	makers	 to	 promote	
substantial	reform	of	the	banking	sector	to	stop	the	lending	bias.	Special	policy	
should	 be	 designed	 and	 implemented	 aiming	 to	 facilitate	 the	 fast	 growing	
private	sectors	in	China.	
	 	
Third,	our	 study	 indicates	 foreign	ownership	of	 firms	or	 foreign	direct	
investment	helps	to	alleviate	the	levels	of	financial	constraints	faced	by	private	
firms.	 The	 current	 policy	 aims	 to	 attract	 foreign	 investors	 and	 foreign	 direct	
investment	should	continue	to	be	implemented.		
	 	
Last,	our	study	suggests	there	are	significantly	heterogeneous	effects	of	
financial	 constraints	across	 firms	with	different	 firm	characteristics.	 If	policy‐
makers	 aim	 to	 increase	 firms	 activities	 (such	 as	 fixed	 investment,	 inventory	
investment	 and	 exports)	 by	 making	 more	 finance	 available	 to	 them,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 firm	heterogeneities	we	have	 identified	 in	
this	 thesis.	 In	 this	way,	 the	policy	maker	can	help	 firms	that	are	most	needed	
the	help,	and	make	the	policy	more	effective.	
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6.4	Suggestions	for	future	research	
	
The	study	on	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	continues	to	be	an	interesting	
topic	for	both	the	theoretical	and	empirical	researchers.	In	this	section,	we	aim	
to	 briefly	 suggest	 some	 possible	 future	 research	 direction	 to	 extend	 our	
research.	
	 	
First,	 there	 is	a	 large	number	of	 firm‐year	 in	our	sample	have	negative	
fixed	investment	during	the	study	period.	It	is	 interesting	to	examine	whether	
financial	constraints	are	the	main	reasons	to	conduct	divestment.	Furthermore,	
we	can	jointly	consider	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	fixed	investment	
and	 inventory	 investment	 to	 consider	 whether	 financial	 constrained	 firms	
adjust	 their	 inventory	 investment	to	 facilitate	 firm’s	 fixed	 investment.	We	can	
further	 analyze	 to	 what	 extent	 firms	 can	 use	 good	 inventory	 investment	
management	 to	 alleviate	 the	 problems	 of	 financial	 constraints	 on	 fixed	
investment.		
	 	
Second,	in	this	study	we	rely	on	time	invariant	ownership	indicators	to	
sort	firms	into	different	ownership	groups.	We	can	use	the	detailed	ownership	
information	 to	 study	 whether	 change	 of	 ownership	 types	 will	 significantly	
affect	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 constraints	 faced	 by	 the	 firm.	 This	 will	 further	
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facilitate	 our	 understanding	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 ownership	 types	 in	
China’s	special	institutional	setting.	
	 Last,	in	chapter	5	we	analyze	the	effects	of	financial	constraints	on	firms’	
extensive	margins	of	exports.	This	work	can	be	extended	to	study	the	intensive	
margins	 of	 exports.	 We	 can	 test	 whether	 financial	 constraints	 are	 also	
important	determinants	of	the	intensive	margins	of	exports	for	firms	in	China.		
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